

Country Survey Series

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EGYPT

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PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

The Country Survey Series is one of several means by which the Human Relations Area Files seeks to promote and facilitate research and comparative study in the sciences concerned with the behavior of men. Other means include series of behavior science monographs, outlines, translations, reprints, and bibliographies, as well as the Area Files at the 16 member universities and in Washington, D.C.

The Country Survey Series is designed to provide an interpretive, integrated description of selected societies in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Far East. Each Survey examines in depth the sociological, political, and economic aspects of a whole society. The purpose in each case is to define basic cultural and institutional patterns, and to identify dominant values and attitudes.

Research and writing are done with the aid of a new research guide and in accordance with new procedures for interdisciplinary team research. Both guide and procedures were specifically developed to ensure that analysis undertaken within the context of any one discipline be informed by the theories and findings of the others; and that the resulting interpretations of the several disciplines be refined and integrated through a process of challenge and synthesis.

The Country Survey for Egypt is the sixth Survey in the series (see appended list for preceding volumes); research and writing were completed in January. 1957. The Survey was written by one of the interdisciplinary teams at the Washington, D.C. branch of the Human Relations Area Files. Disciplines represented were: anthropology, international affairs, political science, economics, history. Kathleen Sproul was editor, assisted by Lon Hefner. The maps and charts were prepared by Ernest A. Will and Lewis Buck.

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INTRODUCTION

The Suez Canal crisis of 1956 focused world attention on Egypt's strategic position at the Mediterranean bridgehead to the Middle East and the Asian lands beyond. The geographical fact itself was not new, of course. but its significance had taken on new meaning with Egypt's emergence, for the first time in more than 2,000 years, as an independent state capable of utilizing its position for purposes defined in Cairo rather than in the capital of this or that foreign power. That Egypt's leaders meant to-exercise the country's unaccustomed sovereignty to the limit of strength and opportunity was apparent in the militancy of their policies no less than in the implacability of their statements. Critical as the events of this period seemed, what lay behind them was perhaps of even more basic importance. The fundamental background fact about Egypt today is change-change which promises in time to reweave the very fabric of Egyptian society. The process of change was initiated little more than a hundred years ago by the arrival of the first representatives of the modern West, but, once started, it became self-generating and still goes on.

The forces of change have not affected all parts of Egyptian society in the same way or degree. For the well-to-do city dweller the experience of the last century has meant western education, western material comforts, and often an imitation of western ways so thorough-going that it has almostbut not quite-obscured his Egyptian background. For the urban poor the western impact has meant new types of work and a familiarity with, if not the benefit of, the output of the modern factory; it has involved a weakening of the traditional patterns of life without the development of satisfactory substitutes. The course of events has by no means left the countryside untouched, but here in the hundreds of mud villages of the Nile Valley and the delta the essential features of the old order have been least affected. Cotton for the peasant's patched clothing, and his few household utensils are factory-made, and a cash economy centering on the large-scale production of cotton for export has replaced the earlier subsistence agriculture; but his tools, his sunup to sundown labor, his poverty and ill-health, and the villageand family-bound horizons of his social existence remain what they have been for generations. Out of all this there emerges the over-all picture of a

disjointed society—of a people split, not down the middle but across the top, by a great gap. This gap lies between a small elite, concentrated in the towns, and the impoverished and largely rural mass. The division did not originate in the contact with the West, but westernization widened the distance between the elite and those below. Future developments in Egypt depend much upon whether and how the gap is bridged.

In the ferment of social, political, and economic change at work in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East in our time, few things are certain, but it is clear that if the traditional order—the Islamic synthesis of the Arab empire of the Middle Ages—is irreparably broken, whatever is emerging will not be a mere copy of any western model. The problem in attempting to study such a situation is that the traditional and the borrowed stand side by side without evident connection to give any hint of what may be the outcome of their interaction. There is no dearth of documentary materials on Egypt; indeed, they exist in quantity far greater than any single book on the subject could comprehend. Much of this material, however, deals with the past and with a traditional Egypt which has ceased to be, while a large percentage of the contemporary studies are devoted to the consideration of a single problem or particular aspect of Egyptian life.

The book which follows is an attempt to analyze the dominant sociological, political, and economic aspects of a changing society as a whole, to present that society's strengths and weaknesses, and to identify the patterns of behavior characteristic of its members. It does not include all the data examined—that would be to throw back upon the reader the task of analysis. Many questions posed could not be answered, much of the information sought is not available. Consequently, some parts of the total picture are missing; every effort has been made to identify the missing parts and their probable implications. Despite occasional gaps, then, and despite the absolute impossibility of excluding every error of detail from a work of this nature, the analysis provided here should be of value for the interpretation of new information and new developments.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIETY

Egypt was one of the first countries to be incorporated in the expanding Arab empire 1, 300 years ago. An Islamic nation ever since, Egypt is commonly identified by its own people and others as an "Arab" country. There is justification for this claim in Egypt's centuries under Arab rule, in its Arabic speech and Moslem faith, and in its current effort to place itself at the head of a revived and united Arab world. There is, however, a specific quality about Egyptian life, a distinctiveness which has its roots in a pattern of existence in the Nile Valley long antedating the rise of Arab Islam. While Egypt shares much with its Middle Eastern neighbors, it remains uniquely Egyptian.

Territorially, the early history of the Middle East was a record of the development of two centers: the Fertile Crescent, a strip of arable land curving northeast from Palestine and south to the Persian Gulf; and the Nile. The two have by no means been isolated from each other, but they developed differently. The Fertile Crescent was open to large-scale population movements, and a succession of peoples and civilizations passed through it. The Nile Valley and delta, on the other hand, provided a constricted arena in which a single people, under their own or alien rulers, preserved themselves and their way of life for thousands of years without any real break in continuity. Egypt has taken part in and often been deeply affected by events elsewhere in the Middle East, but it has never lost its essential Egyptian identity.

Like other Middle Eastern countries, Egypt today is caught in a headlong process of change. Set into motion in the last century by the impact of the West, that process has developed an impetus and a dynamic of its own, and in the past decade it has been gaining momentum. It is not easy to foresee the direction of change or even at any given moment to identify the outlines of the changing society. Certain factors, however, stand out as of lasting importance in the development of Egypt and its people. Marking some of the reference points of what Egypt has been in the past, they suggest what it may be becoming in the present.

THE NILE AND THE CANAL

Geography, as a factor in the life of a people, is perhaps more obtrusive in Egypt than in most countries. Pressed by the desert onto the banks of a single river, Egypt's population has found that river both bountiful and demanding: bountiful, in that the waters of the Nile have been a reliable source of food and wealth since the earliest cultivators moved into the Valley in prehistoric times; demanding, because for the mass of the people the price of extracting a livelihood from the river has been lifetimes of unremitting and scantily rewarded toil. The Nile has left its imprint on the people, from the official and businessman who must concern themselves with the problems of a one-crop economy to the fellah* (peasant) who spends every daylight hour in the fields.

In the course of Egypt's development the major problems presented to its inhabitants centered on the use and management of the Nile; the solutions they found gave characteristic form to Egyptian society and culture. The need for unified water control was reflected in Egypt's historic political unity under highly centralized and autocratic government. A crude agricultural technology applied to the fertile silt of the river could be made to yield heavy food surpluses only by the prodigal use of human labor. Land was wealth, and men's relationship to the land became basic in defining their place in the social scheme. Even today when urban and industrial forms are supplementing the basic agricultural pattern, the ambition to hold land is hardly less strong in the city dweller than in the peasant. Early Egyptian science and religion alike show their connections with the all-encompassing preoccupation with the Nile. Ancient Egyptian mathematical knowla edge stemmed out of the effort to maintain accurately the boundaries of fields which would be flooded every year, and to predict with certainty the annual rise and fall of the river itself. The cult of the Nile was a major element in the Pharaonic religion, and remnants of it still exist in the countryside beneath the overlay of Islam and Coptic Christianity.

The Nile remains, as it has been since earliest times, the ultimate term of Egypt's existence. Of the country's 386, 200 square miles, only some 13,000 are accessible to irrigation from the Nile. This area of delta and Valley is historic Egypt, and there the life and work of the country still

^{*}In this book Arabic words, with the exception of certain proper names, are underlined at their first use in each chapter. Diacritical marks are not included in the text. Underlined words—and other acceptable forms of the words—will be found with diacritical marks in the Glossary.

are concentrated. For the peasant majority, the desert which rims both sides of the Valley is less a territory than a threatening, thrusting barrier; one does not enter that wasteland, but seeks only to hold it back from the irrigated fields. The traditional focus, then, has been not outward, but inward on the river. Modern involvement in international politics and trade is widening Egyptian horizons, but the dominant motif of national existence from day to day continues to be the Nile and the problems of its utilization.

The geographic factor is also conspicuously present in Egypt's position at the Sinai land bridge between Asia and Africa. This neck of land has been an open corridor connecting Egypt with the Fertile Crescent, determining through the passage of men and ideas its orientation to Asia rather than to a remoter Negro Africa. Under the more vigorous pharaohs Sinai served to carry Egyptian power into Palestine and beyond; much more often it brought Asian conquerors to Egypt. Later, as Europe began to seek trade with farther Asia, the area became a portage point for goods moving between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. It remained only for the Suez Canal to be constructed in the nineteenth century to bring Egypt's strategic position to its fullest importance.

The crisis which led to British, French, and Israeli military action against Egypt in 1956 and to the blocking of the Suez Canal illustrates the dangers and the opportunities which are presented Egypt by its geographic position on an intercontinental crossroads. The dangers have been manifest in Egypt's long experience of domination by invaders whose entry was not hindered by any natural barriers. The opportunities are those of a country whose physical control of one of the world's vital arteries of trade and strategic communication gives it a degree of influence out of proportion to its actual strength.

THE GREAT GAP

In Egypt and throughout the Middle East the social order is riven by a great gap which separates a small elite from the mass of the people. The elite comprises the educated, the government officials and military officers, the western style businessmen, and the big rural landowners. The mass includes the great peasant majority of the villages and a small but growing body of urban workers.

Wealth, occupation, and education have traditionally defined the boundaries of the gap, and in modern times the space between has been widened by the western impact. Economically, the demands and opportunities of the world market have converted Egypt's old diversified subsistence agriculture into a single-crop system of cotton production for export.

The shift has brought more wealth into the country, but the distance between rich and poor has widened as the minority grew richer and a spectacularly increasing majority grew poorer. Modern trade and industrial development stimulated an urban growth which sharpened the traditional contrast between town and country. Socially, the new occupations and the new knowledge from the West drove still deeper the rift between the urban-centered elite and the rural mass. Where once a common set of traditional values had provided points of contact between the two, the westernization of the elite rendered it less able than it had ever been to communicate with—or to lead—those below.

While the gap between the thin upper layer of Egyptian society and the rest of the community is not new, this disruption of communication between them is—a fact that is perhaps the main internal source of instability in the area today. In the family—and village—bound social setting of Egypt, almost the only source of natural leadership above the village level is the elite. To the extent that the elite is, not merely separated, but isolated from the people, it is capable neither of grasping the increasingly large—scale problems with which it is confronted nor of commanding popular support. The need for such capability is mounting because, although the peasant is still preoccupied with his traditionally local concerns, social and economic pressures are beginning to force him to look outward. He and his former fellows who have moved to the cities have not been immune to western influences or, least of all, to the promises of a fervidly nationalistic government. As their expectations have increased, so have their potential dissatisfactions.

There are signs at the present time that new lines of communication are being thrown across the social gap. The government is employing all the media of public information and education to persuade the people to give it their active support in the service of an ideal of national unity and strength. President Nasser has emphasized his own origins in a family of moderate means, and the fellah and the workman are idealized as the embodiments of the new Egypt. Professional people as a group still cling to the comforts and emoluments of the cities, but some, moved by recognition of need, are taking their skills to the squalor of the villages. The outcome of these efforts remains to be seen. Certain traditional wielders of power. particularly the larger landowners, tend to fear any emancipation of the peasant. In the cities the westernized business community is dubious about the government's policy of mass agitation and is concerned about the taxes and restrictions heaped on business in the name of the national welfare. The government itself has yet to resolve the dilemma posed by the conflicting financial demands of a militant foreign policy and of the domestic measures needed to narrow the vast distance between the country's rich and poor.

THE PATTERN OF POWER

The Egyptians were among the first peoples to develop an elaborate structure of public administration. Two notable characteristics of the governmental pattern were already clear 5,000 years ago. One was centralized authoritarianism. The ruler—pharaoh—was not merely divinely ordained; he was God. Under his absolute authority a large and complex hierarchy of civil and religious officials carried forward the daily business of government. There were times during Egypt's long dynastic period when this absolutist principle was challenged from below, and for relatively brief periods local or regional forces succeeded in asserting themselves against the central power. The authoritarian principle, however, always reasserted itself, and it was preserved by the succession of foreign rulers which governed in Egypt from 525 B.C. to the present century.

The second characterizing feature of the Egyptian governmental tradition has been restriction of the scope of official activity. From the time when the pyramids were built until very recently, Egypt's rulers have limited their concerns largely to fiscal and judicial matters, the control of the waters of the Nile, and in prosperous periods to large-scale public works. It did not occur to them to go much beyond these functions, for in other spheres of life essential social services and controls were maintained by such units as the family and the village. So long as agricultural production was maintained and taxes were collected, there was no occasion for government to interfere with the autonomy of these units. The authority of government was absolute, but its direct impact was cushioned by a web of kin and local groups.

The dictatorial powers wielded by the military government of President Nasser are in the authoritarian Egyptian political tradition. The scope of the exercise of those powers, however, represents a new trend. In the pursuit of its nationalist goals, the government seeks to inject itself into areas of Egyptian life which have in the past been managed by other institutions in other ways. The process is still largely a political blueprint, broadly projected in the latest constitution and somewhat haphazardly reflected in the activities of a multitude of official agencies. Meanwhile, the traditional life of the villages goes on—not undisturbed but powerfully resistant to planned change—and the narrow allegiances to the kin and local groups in which people grow up are still carried into the sphere of government itself.

THE ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS

The conquering Arabs in the seventh century brought to Egypt not so much a new political regime and a new religion as a single order in which the religious and the secular were united. The caliph was the guardian of the faith, and the faith in its prescriptions and prohibitions was the sufficient guide in all spheres of human conduct. All social responsibilities appeared in the light of resigion, and religion was to be fulfilled in the ordinary affairs of life no less than in prayer. Upon the arrival of Islam, Fgypt had already known more than a thousand years of foreign rule, and the basic arrangements of the society in terms of family organization, vil lage life, economic and political pattern, etc., had been firmly established for much longer. As a social code, Islam reflected the nomadic existence of the desert dwellers who had originated it; transplanted to sedentary Egypt, it affected but did not fundamentally change or destroy the traditional Egyptian pattern. What Islam did do was to give the Egyptians a new explanation of their social and physical existence, and, in so doing, pro vided new values and meaning to life,

Within the Islamic synthesis the Fgyptians found a set of compelling sanctions for public and private life. The Moslem faith they shared with their Arab rulers tended to make the latter acceptable by obscuring alien origins. The traditional patience of the people in the face of hardship and exploitation was now reinforced by the doctrine of submission to God's will (Islam). Whereas in Christian Europe an important element in the growth of opposition to despotic rule was the belief in the sinfulness of the state as a secular institution, no such notion could arise in the Islamic theocracy. Resistance to social change of any kind was heightened by the operation of religious canon law, the sharia, which made the wide range of personal and social activities it regulated matters not merely of transitory human wishes but of God's abiding will.

The Islamic faith survives in Egypt today; the Islamic synthesis does not. This century has witnessed the collapse and disappearance of the decaying caliphate before the impact of western power. With the caliphate went the Moslem theocratic ideal, and Egypt formally emerged as an independent state patterned on a secular model derived from the West. Religious injunctions against such essential features of modern business enterprise as the taking of interest were rationalized or pushed aside as Egyptians sought to take advantage of western economic techniques. Western strength contrasted at every point with Egyptian weakness, and the contrast carried with it the insistent notion that the secret of western success was science and technology unhampered by the a priori assertions of religion. Education,

once religious by definition, was secularized as a necessary step in grasping the new power. The people did not cease to be Moslem or to perform the traditional observances of worship; increasing numbers, however—particularly in the cities—simply focused their real interest elsewhere. That trend appears to be continuing.

The breakup of the Islamic synthesis has meant the disappearance in Egypt of vital sanctions and verities which once made for social stability and individual security. However wide might be the gap between ruler and ruled, they were bound within a framework of common faith and mutual obligation. Life might be difficult and injustice might be in the world, but man's fate was ordained of God and His will stood over the just and unjust alike. This outlook has by no means disappeared among the Egyptian masses, but it exists as a retained personal faith and not as part of the old synthesis, which is gone. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government, although it encourages Islam as the official religion of the country, inevitably contributes to the secular drift in its commitment to the material goals of a militant nationalism.

THE BOUNDS OF LOYALTY

Egypt's leaders are today calling on the Egyptian people for loyalty to the Egyptian state and to a set of unifying national ideals. The government may in the course of time succeed in constructing this essentially western pattern of allegiance, but the task will not be an easy one; the basic Egyptian loyalties have been and are set in a much narrower framework than the national state, and they attach to smaller units. Family, village, ethnic community—these, and not the nation, continue to bound the horizon of the great majority of Egyptians. For the rural population in particular these units, and not an abstract "Egypt," are the present reality.

The rural Egyptian family is more than a close circle within which people live their personal lives; it is the primary institution of economic cooperation, social control, and mutual protection. Thus, the individual's first obligation is to his family, and loyalty to family transcends any other. Beyond the family, the peasant tends to identify himself with his village, and even city dwellers are apt to keep vital the image of their home villages. The self-sufficient village is the arena in which the fellah is born and dies. The land he works and covets begins where the cluster of mud huts leave off, and such comforts and social life as he knows are centered in the village. Above the level of the village, a larger but much vaguer sense of group identity and loyalty is provided by membership in the Moslem majority or in the sizable Coptic minority. Other smaller minorities exist, but these are

largely confined to the cities and are outside the predominantly rural pattern of indigenous Egyptian life.

Egyptian rulers in the past have been content to govern in terms of this mosaic of local self-sufficiency and autonomy. The rulers themselves, during the hundreds of years Egypt was under foreign domination, were not Egyptian. They were further isolated by their residence in Cairo, one of the country's few cities, where they were surrounded by a small urban elite almost as far removed from the life of the people as they were. Their chief concerns were the collection of taxes and the control of the Nile as the source of the country's wealth. Since no initiative was required of the people other than to maintain the round of agricultural production, it did not matter that their preoccupations and loyalties remained local and fragmented.

The current effort to transform Egypt into a modern national state is the outcome of a century and a half of western influence and domination. Not only have Egypt's leaders adopted nationalist ideals and ambitions learned in contact with the West, but they are impelled by the pressure of western induced social and economic change. When in 1952 the new military regime expelled King Farouk from the country, it signalized the fact that it was committed to broadening the base of its political support beyond the traditional urban and rural elite. The government sees the Egyptian people no longer as a merely passive economic asset, but as a potentially active force to be channeled into the building of Egyptian industrial and military power and into the assertion of Egyptian leadership in the Arab world. What is involved is nothing less than breaking down the ancient, resistant barriers of family and village exclusiveness, and constructing a new and more unified pattern of Egyptian loyalty.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL SETTING

Egypt today is in the center of an upsurge of Arab (Islamic) nationalism in North Africa and the Middle East which cuts across political boundaries and reflects the national aspirations of the individual countries in the area. Contemporary development of Arab self-consciousness emerges as a two-edged sword that works toward both regional unity and divisive local nationalisms. The ultimate outcome of these tendencies may be a strong Arab Middle Eastern political power, which could work toward international peace and stability. It is also likely that for the indefinite future local nationalisms will continue to flourish and to endanger international arrangements in the region.

An emotion-charged awareness of the Islamic and pre-Islamic past is stimulating and shaping national aspirations in a Moslem world which derives a measure of unity from language, history, religion, and a common pattern of thought, as well as from factors associated with the introduction of modern technology. All of these elements are present in the nationalist ferment in Egypt today, and they are given added force by education, the press, and the radio. Egypt's 4,500 years of recorded history antedating the Islamic period provide a tremendous store of materials out of which to construct a sense of national worth and mission. Egyptian leaders are calling upon the people to take pride in the "Pharaonic heritage" and are striving to make of the ancient glories a backdrop against which Egyptians will see their present world position.

The Nile River Valley is separated from Asia by a narrow isthmus. For centuries a great center of civilization and wealth, the Valley has been and remains one of the focal points of human affairs and political power. The vicissitudes of history have sometimes obscured this fact. The vigor of the ancient Egyptian empire can be contrasted with late Ptolemaic decadence, the progressive if turbulent rule of Mohammed Ali with Mameluke impotence under a decaying Ottoman suzerainty. External events, too, have at times brought Egypt into eclipse, as when the Eurasian trade route through the Suez isthmus was diverted around Africa. But Egyptians always

have lived in one of the potential or actual arenas of imperial strategic calculation. Throughout its long history, Egypt has been faced with the alternatives of either asserting effective hegemony over the territories adjacent to its open borders or falling victim to other powers based in or able to push through those territories. From late dynastic times until the 1920's, Egypt's role has been almost continuously that of victim. The national self-assertion now manifesting itself can be transformed, as has been demonstrated in the past, into an ambition for expanding Egyptian power and influence reaching beyond Egyptian boundaries. The strategic importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal in the cold war is a fact of not regional but global significance.

PERSISTENT FACTORS IN EGYPTIAN HISTORY

Certain persistent factors stand out from the complexity of Egyptian history. So continuous has been the operation of these that much of what took place when the pyramids were new has a modern ring. Down through the centuries Egyptians have had to confront recurring problems peculiar to their situation, and they have done so in characteristic ways.

Geography

Situated as it is at the African bridgehead to Asia, the land of Egypt has always been in question or jeopardy. The strategic importance of the Suez area and the productive potential of the Nile have been, in the past as they are today, key factors in the regional power equation. Power has ebbed and flowed in the area between Egyptian and foreign hands and always has tended to run beyond the boundaries of the Nile center itself.

A fact of geography strongly influencing Egyptian history has been the role of the Isthmus of Suez as a corridor to and from southwest Asia. In hibited by the cataracts of the Nile and the wastelands to the south, the desert to the west toward Cyrenaica, and the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Egypt's active frontier has been to the northeast, where beyond the passageway of the Sinai Peninsula lie historic Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Contacts in this direction have taken the form of trade, of minor political relations, and sometimes of outright empire; the driving force of all these types of relations has been by turns Egyptian and foreign. Today the drive is from Egypt and is manifested in Egypt's relations with Israel and the urge to influence, if not dominate, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian policy. Egypt's expansion in the past has cut across European lines of communication and alliance, as it is doing today on the Suez Canal and in

relation to the Baghdad Pact (involving Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan), now weakened if not destroyed by the Middle Eastern crisis of 1956.

Historical Continuity

Vulnerable to invasion through its sea and desert approaches, Egypt has known much of foreign conquest, but the Egyptian people and their basic pattern of life were never destroyed. Foreign conquerors came to rule and exploit and they brought with them new religious and political forms, yet none chose to wreck permanently or replace the human apparatus which was so well adapted to converting the water and silt of the Nile into the riches of Egypt. All this has meant historical continuity, and the Egyptian peasant of today is recognizably the descendant of the farmers who paid grain tax to the pharaohs. In the persistent patterns of such a people there are important data for the prediction of future trends.

To historical continuity is related the remarkable unity of Egyptian culture. Ethnic contrasts are present, but they are observable mainly among town dwellers and, though less strikingly, between the inhabitants of the delta to the north and those of the river valley to the south. But no division between Upper and Lower (mainly Deltaic) Egypt nor any of the successive foreign regimes has fundamentally altered the essential Egyptian cultural homogeneity (see Chapter 3, Geography and Population). The limits of the Nile Valley have since the beginning concentrated the population in a relatively small area, reducing the possibilities for the development of extensive regional difference. The dependence of agriculture upon a single source of water, the Nile, has required highly centralized control of the river, a pattern of authority which was carried over into the political sphere and which has characterized Egyptian government since the days of the first pharaohs. Pressed close along the banks of their river and accustomed to unified political authority, the Egyptians have conformed to common patterns of speech, outlook, and behavior which clearly distinguish them from other Near Eastern peoples.

Foreign Domination

Egypt was continuously under foreign rule from the Persian conquest of the country in 525 B.C. down to the twentieth century. Formal independence was achieved in 1922 with the ending of the British protectorate, but many Egyptians would claim that their real independence dates only from the coup d'état of 1952 and the elimination of all foreign influence with the expulsion from government of the descendants of the old Albanian

and Turkish ruling groups. The fact that Egyptians have had no experience of self-rule for more than 25 centuries takes on special significance in the present phase of national ferment wherein a self-consciously "Egyptian" regime claims to be leading the poor of the city and the fellahin (peasants) of the countryside against foreign oppression.

The tradition of highly centralized and authoritarian government of the pharaohs was continued by Egypt's successive alien rulers. The Egyptian people themselves rarely challenged their overlords, for they had never been in a position to participate significantly in the political process and, after the close of the dynastic period, no native aristocracy existed which could have led them in a struggle for local autonomy. No tradition of popular or individual initiative in public affairs developed. Centuries of experience with political rapacity, and almost no experience with official concern for the general welfare, made government for most of the people an adverse interest profoundly to be distrusted.

One of the most notable features of Egyptian history from the period of pyramid building to the present has been the heavy burden of economic exploitation the people have had to endure. Under it, the Egyptian has acquired a cheerful acceptance of hard fate, a deep suspicion of all things official or alien, and a tendency to wild outbursts of individual violence when pushed too far. Only recently has he begun to demand improvement. There have been in his past no periods of well-being and prosperity to which he might refer and desire to return, but he is becoming aware of the outside world with its precedents and examples of human prosperity.

Religion

Religion has been a dominant theme in Egyptian history from the beginning. In the Pharaonic period Egyptian armies moved into Asia proper carrying a sense of their identity and role as people of the gods. This early Egyptian religion with its pantheon of deities and cult of the dead was in no sense a proselytizing faith, for its gods were rooted in the soil and cities of Egypt and the pharaoh himself was divine. With the disappearance of the pharaohs, the traditional religion declined, but it was still active enough at the time of the Roman conquest for the new rulers to present their own official cult to the country in Egyptian guise. Prior to Islam, Egypt had become one of the centers of early Christianity, and much of its history was colored by the doctrinal issues that marked the growth of that new faith.

With the coming of Islam in the seventh century and the separation of Egypt from the Byzantine Empire, to which it had been bound by religious as well as political ties, the country was taken over by the new religion in

the short space of a few years. If the basic Egyptian way of life was not greatly altered, new concepts and social forms were nevertheless introduced. The new religion made it possible for Egypt's rulers to see themselves as potential leaders of the Islamic world, and for a time an Egyptian caliphate dominated that world. Today, under the banners of Moslem nationalism, Egypt's leaders again visualize a united Arab world with Egypt at its center. The tie of Moslem faith is not the least important component of this ambitious project.

ORIGINS OF THE PEOPLE

The Nile Valley has received throughout its long development, from prehistoric times to the present, numerous accretions of people, each bearing variant cultural contributions and patterns of life. The skeletal remains of the prehistoric peoples, who were in the area when North Africa was beginning to dry up with the retreat of the last ice sheet in Europe, show striking similarities to those of modern Egyptians. The progressive desiccation of the grasslands of the region drew these seminomadic food gatherers and hunters to the still swampy valley of the Nile, where they began to practice a simple agriculture and animal husbandry. Whether these skills had an independent origin in Africa or were diffused from southwestern Asia is not clear, but the Sinai Peninsula then, as since, provided a corridor for the passage of peoples and cultural influence between Asia and Africa. By 6000 B.C. the Nile Valley was the scene of a neolithic ("New Stone Age") culture, marked by the characteristic elements of settled village life; pottery, agriculture, and domestic animals. The archaeological sites of this period reveal the beginnings of the burial customs which later were so highly elaborated by the dynastic Egyptians. Physically, these prehistoric inhabitants of the Nile appear to have been members of the same brunet, longheaded Mediterranean stock which dominates the area today (see Chapter 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Historically, the constricted valley of Upper Egypt in the south and the swampy fan of Lower Egypt in the north form a geographical division of the country which has been reflected in certain cultural differences and a tendency toward political disunion. The first Egyptian dynasty was the outcome of a struggle for supremacy in which Upper Egypt prevailed. Thereafter, with the growth of urban power in the delta, Lower Egypt more often dominated the south, as it does today.

The penetration into Egypt of peoples and influences from outside by no means ended with the close of the prehistoric period. The cavalry of the Asian Hyksos pushed through the Sinai Peninsula and briefly conquered

the country in the middle of the second millennium. Ethiopians were followed by Assyrians, and the influence of a civilization as complex as Egypt's was brought in with the Persian conquest. Later came Alexandrine Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Syrians, Turks, Albanians, and Circassians.

All have left their impress on Egypt and its people without fundamentally altering the deeply rooted and peculiarly Egyptian design. Aside from the resistant qualities of Egyptian culture, all of these historic arrivals came as conquerors or members of privileged groups. As such, they tended not to be assimilated but to preserve their ethnic identity apart from the Egyptians whom they ruled or manipulated. A major theme of the modern Egyptian nationalist upheaval has been denunciation of the remnants of these groups as alien, and the demand that they be displaced in power and social prominence by native Egyptians.

PRE-ALEXANDRINE PERIOD

A natural division of Egyptian history might be made at 525 B.C., when the period of dynastic Egypt ends and the country emerges as a province of the Persian Empire. The year marks the change from Egypt independent to Egypt under foreign rule, as it was destined to remain for many centuries. But the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great in 332 B.C. has been chosen instead, for the arrival of Alexander heralded the introduction into Egypt of an entirely new Indo-European influence. Both Alexander and the Persians employed in Egypt the concepts of absolute monarchy that had been part of the experience of the Nile Valley since the days of the earliest pharaohs; but, whereas under the Persians Egypt's political relations had continued to be oriented to the Fertile Crescent, northeast and south beyond the Sinai Peninsula, under the Greeks the country for the first time found itself looking across the Mediterranean. The coming of Alexander moved the center of gravity of political and cultural relationships, involving Egypt in the dynamics of the Mediterranean-where it has been involved for the most part ever since,

Glancing briefly at pre-Alexandrine Egypt, one fact is paramount: how early almost all the essential elements of high civilization appeared on the Nile. By 3000 B.C., or shortly thereafter, the Egyptians had the plow and a developed agriculture, a complex town life, architecture in stone and brick, the arch, sculpture in the round, bronze, writing, astronomical records, and accurate calendars. At about that time the country, after an earlier period of union between Upper and Lower Egypt, was reunited by a ruler (or rulers) bearing the Greek name Menes; his rule initiated the first of the 30 dynasties into which Egyptian history prior to Alexander is divided.

The Old Kingdom

The first two dynasties are obscured by lack of information, but the Third Dynasty (ca. 2980) was the beginning of a brilliant period, known as the Old Kingdom, which lasted through the Sixth Dynasty to 2475 B.C. Autocratic power became highly centralized in the hands of the pharaoh. The great pyramids were built in the Fourth Dynasty. The force of the Pharaonic religion and the correlative power of the state are symbolized by the Great Pyramid, the tomb of King Khufu (Cheops), rising 481 feet and containing 2, 300, 000 blocks of limestone.

Beginning with the Fifth Dynasty (2750 B.C. to 2625 B.C.), the royal prestige and power declined with the growth of the power of the priests and the nomarchs (governors of the nomes, or provinces). The Seventh and Eighth Dynasties (2475 B.C. to 2445 B.C.) were a period of social revolution in which the common people successfully challenged the extreme authoritarianism of the royal power. The Ninth and Tenth Dynasties (2445 B.C. to 2160 B.C.) seem to have been a time of transition to a feudal or quasi-feudal regime in which the royal authority extended little beyond the capital at Heracleopolis (vicinity of modern El Faiyum).

The Middle Kingdom

The Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties (2160 B.C. to 1788 B.C.) comprise a great period, known as the Middle Kingdom, which saw the revival of royal authority in a modified and less absolute form. A kind of state socialism had developed, and the power of the pharaohs was now exercised through an elaborate bureaucracy, which assigned lands and trades and administered the proceeds. Commoners had access to official appointment and could rise in the state service.

An interim from the Thirteenth through the Seventeenth Dynasties (1788 B.C. to 1580 B.C.) witnessed both a renewal of internal troubles and an invasion by the Hyksos—the first of the large-scale foreign invasions which finally were to bring to a close the dynastic period. It was probably just prior to this time that Semites in the Sinai Peninsula developed an alphabetic writing system based on symbols taken from the Egyptian hieroglyphics. The invention was one of the great ones in human history, providing the foundation for all subsequent alphabets.

The New Empire

The period of the Eighteenth through the Twentieth Dynasties (1580 B.C. to 1090 B.C.) is known as the New Empire. These years marked the peak of the power of ancient Egypt. Egyptian thought took a secular turn, and the art of the time is characterized by a preoccupation with the details of daily life and a technical brilliance which some critics find rather sterile compared with earlier phases. Egyptian wealth and power were at their height, and, by means of the military campaigns of Thothmes III, Palestine, Syria, and the area of the northern Euphrates were brought within the boundaries of the Empire. Military expansion involved Egypt in a complicated system of international relations, in which the modern diplomatic devices of embassies, alliances, and treaties were employed.

The end of the New Empire at the close of the Twentieth Dynasty (1090 B.C.) saw the decline of Egyptian power, which thereafter was only temporarily restored by particularly able kings, as in the Twenty-Sixth (Saite) Dynasty. In 525 B.C., with the entry of the Persians, the period of Egypt's ancient greatness came to a close.

THE ALEXANDRINE AND PTOLEMAIC PERIOD 332 B.C. - 30 B.C.

With the defeat of Darius, the Persian, at Issus in Cilicia in November 333 B.C., Alexander turned to the consolidation of his forces in Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean. The Persian satrap in Egypt submitted to Alexander, who entered Memphis, where, in contrast to the Persians, he paid homage to the native gods and consulted their oracles. The Egyptians had not been tractable subjects of the Persians, but they seem to have accepted the more flexible Alexander without difficulty. The priests of Amon could receive him as the son of the god, employing the conventional Egyptian salutation to new kings. With characteristic energy, Alexander at once began the construction of the Greek city of Alexandria, which was to become one of the great centers of the Mediterranean world. Greek settlers. moving into their new domain, brought their Egyptian subjects into cultural and political collaboration with themselves, thereby setting in motion a process of cultural synthesis which was to affect Europe no less than Asia. Alexander's brief rule on the Nile was the prologue for the Egypt of the Ptolemaic period, during which the great Macedonian's successors continued on a less grandiose scale the work he had begun.

Alexander, and perhaps to a lesser extent the Ptolemies, applied the social policies of the melting pot in Egypt. Although the Greeks tended to

settle in separate, privileged communities and were not subject to certain legal disabilities and obligations imposed upon Egyptians, such as corvée labor on the canals and embankments, there was no severe racial discrimination. The Ptolemies were intensely practical administrators intent upon developing as tangible a base of power and prestige in Egypt as possible. Where Egyptians could not conveniently be used, as in the military forces, outside groups were brought in and these tended to live in their separate communities, but there was little of the Herrenvolk concept, as such. For imported ethnic groups to maintain their separate cultural identities and places of abode was consistent with the traditional Egyptian pattern, and this continues to be true in Egypt and the Middle East today, where villages of diverse peoples are to be found side by side with little communication between them. Under the Ptolemies, as before and after, only a few Egyptians rose to high official position, for government was the monopoly of the rulers. Most Egyptians were confined to the classes of cultivators and artisans; then, as throughout the long period which followed, Egypt was not a cohesive national state, but an entity in which a native population was ruled by a foreign group employing the techniques of bureaucratic absolutism.

As the Ptolemaic period drew to a close, the increasing weakness of the royal government enabled various contestants for the throne to appeal to the Egyptian population for support. The result was to give Egyptians a position of greater equality with the Greeks. In this there is perhaps analogy with President Nasser's current appeal to the masses in his search for political support outside the circle of the old ruling group.

THE ROMAN AND BYZANTINE PERIOD 30 B.C. -642 A.D.

With the establishment of Roman rule by Augustus in 30 B.C., Egypt again became a province of an empire, as it had been under the Assyrians and Persians and briefly under Alexander. Egypt had a widespread reputation for disorder, and, as the principal source of the grain supply of Rome, it was brought under the direct control of the Emperor, in his capacity as supreme military chief, and garrisoned with a powerful force. The Emperor ruled as successor to the Ptolemies—"Pharaoh, Lord of the Two Lands"—and to him were attributed the conventional divine qualities assigned Egyptian kings. All the land was royal domain. Once again Egypt and its conquerors were adapting to each other, although Roman practice and institutions of government and religion were formally established. Rome was particularly careful to bring the priesthood, the invariable source of Egyptian national ism, under its control, while guaranteeing its traditional rights and privileges.

The advent of the Romans further intensified the social problems which had been created by the injection into Egypt of a privileged Greek minority under the Ptolemies. Those of Hellenic culture no doubt continued to enjoy special advantages, such as the privilege of paying a reduced poll tax, but Roman rule brought a new elite and complicated the alignments of the old ones. Practical administrators, interested in knowing what they had in their Egyptian province, the Romans reached far down into the society in their management of affairs, employing such measures as a regular, house-to-house census of property and persons. Dynamic, secular, and utilitarian, they exposed post-Ptolemaic Egyptians to a new variant of European culture.

Christianity was received early in Egypt, and the new religion quickly spread from Alexandria into the hinterland of the country, reaching Middle and Upper Egypt by the second century. The possibly legendary account is that the mission that carried Christianity into Egypt was that of St. Mark in 37 A.D., and the founding of the Church in Alexandria is fixed around 40 A.D. The Egyptian Church had a tendency toward heretical movements, in particular Christian Gnosticism—placing great stress on the redeeming function of knowledge—a fact that may account for the popularity there of the Gospel of St. John with its doctrine of the Logos. Egypt was the early center of the development of Christian monasticism (see Chapter 23, Religion). Prior to the onslaught of Islam, Christianity was almost completely extinguished in the disorders which accompanied the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West, but a Coptic (Egyptian) Christian Church has survived down to the present time.

Gradually, as the third century advanced, the decay that beset the Roman Empire was more and more manifest in Egypt. It became increasingly difficult to fill the urban civil magistracies. Civil war, pestilence, and conflict among claimants to the imperial power beset the Empire. A renaissance of imperial authority and effectiveness took place with the Emperor Diocletian, during whose reign, beginning in 284, the division between the eastern and western Roman Empires took place. Egypt continued as a province of the eastern Empire, which had its capital at Byzantium (later, Constantinople, today, Istanbul). Diocletian inaugurated drastic political and fiscal reforms greatly simplifying imperial administration. It was Diocletian too who, seeing in Christianity a threat to the Roman state religion, launched a violent persecution of the Christians, which fell on the Coptic Church in Egypt with greater severity than any persecutions it was to know under the Moslems. The sectarian doctrinal divisions of the Egyptian Church came to the fore as a central factor in Egyptian history during the Byzantine period, for Egyptian opposition to the imperial rule was often expressed in religious terms. When Constantinople, the eastern capital, was heretical, Egypt rallied to Roman Catholicism: when the capital was Catholic, Egypt fell into heresy.

During the latter part of the Byzantine period in Egypt signs of decay multiplied again. In addition to the religious sources of division, the political and economic relationship with the Empire and a semifeudal social order in which the local peasantry were slavishly bound to the local magnates had begun to emerge. There was now little prospect that Hellenism, with its stress upon a civilization of free citizens with free minds, could survive in Egypt. By the seventh century evidence of the retreat of Hellenism could be seen in the declining use of the Greek language. Coptic was again coming to the fore, with even Church dignitaries losing ability to communicate in Greek. At the same time, the eastern Empire came under heavy assault from the north and east. In 616 A.D. the Persians again conquered Egypt, but their triumph there was short-lived. In 639 the Arabian General Amr ibn-al-As won from the Second Caliph of Islam consent to invade Egypt. The invasion was overwhelmingly successful. In September 642 the imperial army of the Byzantine Empire sailed out of the harbor of Alexandria. The wave from the other side of the Mediterranean had subsided. The political absorption of the country by the Arabs proceeded with breath-taking speed, both morally and culturally. After nearly a thousand years, Egypt again looked northeast to Asia.

THE ARAB PERIOD, 642-1517

The Arab conquest of Egypt under the banner of Islam was a Semitic engulfment of the country. It was but a part of a larger movement that created an Islamic Empire which once reached from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of China. The invaders out of the Arabian peninsula carried a sword and a will to rule, but they also brought a simple, compelling religion and a workable code of law which became profoundly implanted among the peoples they found in their path. Their impact in Egypt was not the limited one of the Greeks. The Islamic faith spread in the land more quickly and more widely than had Christianity. More slowly, but inexorably, the Arabic language supplanted the old Coptic Egyptian. The institutions of marriage and of property ownership were transformed. Basic Egyptian patterns, as expressed in the life of the fellah cultivating the banks of the Nile, remained, and not all that had been learned under the Greeks and the Romans was forgotten. But the transformation that took place was so profound that it must be reckoned one of the great revolutionary developments of history.

Politically, the Egyptian Arabian era may be divided into a number of dynastic periods: the Umayyad Caliphate; the Abbasid Dynasty; the Tulunid Dynasty; the Ikhshidid Dynasty; the Fatimid Dynasty; the Ayyuabid Dynasty; and the Mameluke (Slave) Dynasties. During some of these Egypt was ruled as a province from afar. In others, during periods of disunity in the Arab empire, Egypt's local (but always foreign) rulers could assert their authority and transform Egypt into an independent, severeign state. At still other times Egypt itself became the headquarters of an Arab caliphate and empire.

The vigor of the Mameluke Dynasties (1252-1517) gradually declined with the growth of the power of the Mameluke governors of the various provinces to assert independent authority. Decay at the center of the imperial apparatus was accompanied by the rise of obtrusive and obstructive power at the extremities. Under these conditions, Egypt was ripe for the assault of the Ottoman Turkish Selim I, who incorporated the country into the Ottoman Caliphate in 1517,

THE OTTOMAN CALIPHATE, 1517-1914

The Turks introduced very little political change or reform into Egypt. As a pashalik of the Empire under a Turkish pasha (viceroy), the country was divided into 12 sanjags (provinces—the word is Turkish for flag), which were the equivalent of the 12 liwa (the Arab provinces-Arabic for banner). Each of the 12 was placed under one of the Mamelukes from the previous regime. These latter surrounded themselves with the usual following of slave warriors. In the roughly 280 years of direct Turkish rule, at least 100 pashas succeeded each other. As time went on, the control of the pashas became ever more shadowy, the army more undisciplined and violent, and the Mameluke beys more and more emerged as the real authorities in the land. Mameluke power reached its peak in 1769, when Ali Bey became powerful enough to expel the pasha and declare Egypt's independence. Ali Bey went on to conquer Syria and Arabia, but he was soon betrayed to the Sublime Porte (the Turkish Caliphate) by a slave, Abu-al-Dhahab, who became his successor under a reaffirmed Turkish suzerainty. Turkish vulnerability had nevertheless been revealed by Ali Bey's brief career. The struggles among the Mameluke beys for control of Egypt continued until 1798, when a new conqueror, Napoleon Bonaparte, appeared on the delta and set the country upon a new course of history.

The brief but dramatic sojourn in Egypt of Napoleon's army, accompanied by a retinue of French scientists, initiated the tradition in modern Egypt of strong attachment to French culture. More significant, the

Napoleonic adventure dramatically accented the importance of Egypt as the last base of enfeebled Turkish control over Syria and Arabia, and as a vital communications link with India and the Far East. Suddenly the whole Middle Eastern area, with Egypt as an important focus, was precipitated into the vortex of European power politics and diplomacy, where it has been ever since. Europe had once again moved into the Egyptian horizon, not, however, this time to the exclusion of that large part of the Asian world to which Egypt was bound by the ties of Islam.

Mohammed Ali

Egypt at the turn of the nineteenth century was pushed into the modern era by the developing power of industrial Europe. But in Egypt itself the principal agent of the changes that followed was an Albanian Moslem officer in the Turkish forces, Mohammed Ali, who had assisted in driving out the French forces. The Sublime Porte designated him Pasha of Egypt in 1805, and from that time until just before his death in 1849 his story is practically that of Egypt. As an enthusiastic importer of European culture and techniques he was a modernizer whose political methods were nevertheless those of the authoritarian past. A dynamic economic innovator, he cast European techniques into a framework of nationalization and state socialism which was unfamiliar to the Europe of his time and completely novel in the Arab world. By a policy of confiscation he became the sole proprietor of land; through a system of monopolies he became Egypt's exclusive manufacturer and contractor. Armed with such power he worked an economic revolution, particularly in the building of canals for irrigation and transportation, in the promotion of scientific agriculture, and in the introduction of cotton cultivation in the delta. No less energetic in the sphere of education, he fostered training in engineering and medicine, imported academicians and physicians from Europe, sent students abroad to be trained in needed skills, and imported training missions, educational and military, for the education of Egyptians at home.

Mohammed Ali was well aware that in Egypt political and military power must coincide, and he devoted much attention to the construction of an Egyptian army and navy. One of his early steps in this connection was to crush the Mamelukes, who under the Ottoman Caliphate had been confirmed in the power they had usurped during the Arabian period. The means chosen by Mohammed Ali are characteristic of a tradition in which the alternatives to ignominious surrender have been guile and violence. On the eve of the departure of an Egyptian force for Arabia, the Mameluke beys were invited to a reception, the main feature of which was an ambush

prepared by their host. The departing guests were cut down in the streets, and of those who were taken alive most were tortured and executed.

Mohammed Ali found employment for his new forces which had a bearing upon international affairs. Between 1811 and 1818 he pursued a war against Arabia. In 1820 his armies began an invasion of the eastern Sudan. This was the beginning of a movement that was to occupy his successors and constitute a problem for Anglo Egyptian relations down to the present time. Another military venture in the late 1820's found the Egyptian Pasha assisting the Turkish Sultan in the repression of Greek independence-as a result of which Turkey and Egypt were forced off the eastern Mediterranean by the destruction at Navarino of their combined naval strength. Mohammed Ali's fourth and most important foreign venture was a war against the Sublime Porte itself, the occasion for which was the Sultan's refusal to honor his commitment to give Mohammed Ali Syria and Morea in return for assistance in repressing the Greek rebellion. The Egyptian forces came within sight of Constantinople but the Great Powers, committed to the preservation of Turkey and fearing a threat to their lines of communication to the East, forced Mohammed Ali to withdraw his troops to Egypt. The one tangible benefit by Mohammed Ali from the adventure was a decree of the Porte making the Pashalik of Egypt hereditary in his family and another granting him the government of the Sudan.

The great Pasha's immediate successors, Abbas I (1849-54), Said (1854-63), and Ismail (1863-79), were uniformly less capable than he. Abbas I has been described as a reactionary, and Said as a jovial, gargantuan sybarite. The latter, although he initiated the building of the Suez Canal, also began those colossal expenditures and personal extravagances which, enlarged under Ismail, finally brought a bankrupt Egypt under British control in the latter part of the century.

Ismail's financial irresponsibility invited the subordination of the country to great power interests, and this fact was not offset by his being granted in 1867 the title "Khedive of Egypt." England in 1875 under the ministry of Disraeli was able to purchase Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal. A year later, Ismail was forced to accept a French-British Debt Commission to manage a receivership for Egypt's fiscal affairs. Ismail sought by turns to place responsibility for the financial impasse on others and to placate local and foreign opinion by accepting constitutional limitations upon khedivial authority. Finally his policy became too sinuous for the Dual Control (Great Britain and France), and in 1879 he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Tewfik and to go into exile at Constantinople, where he died in 1895.

Tewfik was confronted with financial and political chaos, and his

situation was complicated by the outbreak of a nationalist and military revolt under Arabi Pasha, the first Egyptian leader in modern times to come from a fellahin background. The British reacted to the disorders by the naval bombardment of Alexandria in July 1882, and by the landing of a British army, which defeated Arabi Pasha at the battle of Tel el Kebir and occupied Cairo. The British occupation of Egypt and the virtual inclusion of the country within the British Empire began at this time.

British Occupation: The Rise of Egyptian Nationalism, 1882-1914

The record of the British occupation is in effect the story of three outstanding proconsuls of empire. These, bearing official titles of British Agents and Consuls-General, were the Earl of Cromer (formerly Sir Evelyn Baring), Sir Eldon Gorst, and Lord Kitchener. During this period, it was the British Agency and not the Khedivial Palace which was the real locus of authority. An Egyptian ministry continued to function under the khedive, whose decrees were ostensibly the main form of governmental decisions, but the basic policy was British. The khedive became a major symbol of growing Egyptian nationalism, which was manifested in the appearance of political parties. Important among these was the Egyptian Nationalist Party (al-Hizb-al-Watani) led by Mustafa Kamil, a young lawyer. The British representatives saw their task as twofold: to bring fiscal and governmental reform to Egypt, and to accommodate as much as possible Egyptian desires for political self-expression and—despite the opposition of Egyptian conservative groups—constitutional representative government.

The British success in bringing about fiscal reform was outstanding. Early in the occupation, budgets were balanced and began to show a surplus; within 20 years the government could plan an expenditure almost two and a half times what had been possible in the 1880's. British control also brought administrative reform and expanding economic and agricultural services. The scant attention paid to education during this period represents an omission for which the British continue to be criticized in Egypt.

Under the leadership of Lord Dufferin, who had been Ambassador in Constantinople, the British effected the establishment of an Egyptian Constitution designed to set forth the limits of governmental authority. Under this Constitution (embodied in the Organic Law of May 1, 1883), provision was made for an elective structure of government under the khedive which it was hoped might stimulate the development of democratic political processes, although the British sponsors were not optimistic about the possibilities (see Chapter 5, Legal and Theoretical Base of Government). These proposals were adopted under pressure from a liberal government at

home in England, but they also reflected Lord Dufferin's realization of the central importance of coming to terms with rising Egyptian nationalism. A major problem in Anglo-Egyptian relations during this period involved the question of the special court system and laws for the protection of the rights of foreigners: the special privileges accorded foreigners under the terms of the Capitulations imposed on the Sublime Porte were a constant source of Egyptian resentment and a stimulus to nationalist sentiment.

THE BRITISH PROTECTORATE, 1914-22

The outbreak of the war in 1914 focused attention on the strategic importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal to the British lifeline to the East. Upon Turkey's alignment with the Central Powers and the adherence of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi (1893-1914) to the Turkish cause in November, Britain declared a protectorate over Egypt and the nominal rule of the Ottoman Caliphate came to an end. The title "Khedive" was abolished, and Abbas' uncle, Hussein Kamil, succeeded to the throne with the title "Sultan." Upon his death in 1917, he was succeeded by his brother Prince Ahmed Fuad.

The failure of British and Allied attempts to force the Dardanelles and secure the passage of the Straits heightened Egypt's importance in the prosecution of the war, not least of all as a base of operations against Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and other Turkish possessions in the Middle East.

Egyptian nationalism was relatively quiescent in the early phases of the war, but by 1917, when the Allied victory began to be visible and following President Wilson's pronouncement of the principle of national self-determination, demands for Egyptian independence and for representation at the peace conferences multiplied. By late 1918 a new broadly based nationalist political organization, the Wafd al-Misri (the Egyptian Delegation), under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul Pasha, emerged as the most important Egyptian political party-a position which it held for the next generation and a half. The initial purpose of the Wafd was to prepare the Egyptian case in London. Agitation and unrest continued and heightened after failure to get a hearing at Paris. Finally, when police measures proved abortive, the British Government responded by sending a special mission to Egypt under the leadership of Lord Milner. Following an investigation, the mission proposed the renunciation of the protectorate, a declaration of Egyptian independence, and a treaty of alliance-all subject to certain guarantees respecting British and foreign interests. Negotiations failed, and in February 1922 the British unilaterally declared their acceptance of the principal Milner recommendations (except for the treaty of alliance) and

set forth certain minimum conditions in terms of which an Egyptian ministry could be formed. Pending an agreement between the two countries, there were reserved to absolute British control the following: imperial communication in Egypt, Egyptian defense, the interests of foreigners, and the Sudan. In tacit recognition of the declaration, Fuad assumed the title "King" on March 15, 1922. Egypt was thus independent, at least by formal pronouncement of the British Government, although it continued to bear certain disabilities.

INDEPENDENCE

A new Constitution was promulgated in April 1923. It made no claim to Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, and this issue was held over for subsequent adjustment between the British and Egyptian governments. In September 1923 the nationalist leader Zaghlul Pasha returned from exile. His party, the Wafd, won a sweeping success in the elections of January 1924. Zaghlul went to London to negotiate with the British, but negotiations with the Labor Government of the time foundered over the issue of the Sudan, and Zaghlul returned to Egypt having failed in his mission.

Rioting broke out, in the course of which the British Governor General and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated in Cairo. The crime climaxed a series of murders of British subjects beginning in 1920. The British demanded the removal of all Egyptian personnel from the Sudan. Zaghlul, who was under the pressure of bad relations with the Palace, took the occasion to resign. He had succeeded in initiating a modicum of parliamentary government in Egypt and in transforming the Wafd into the dominating political force in the country. The Nationalist Party (al-Hizb-al-Watani) went into relative eclipse. Upon his death in 1927, Zaghlul was succeeded by Mustafa Nahas Pasha, who remained a dominant figure in Egyptian politics until recent times.

Other parties also rose during this period, especially the Liberal Constitutional Party and the Saadist Party, which were used by the King as counters to the Wafd. There were also a number of minor groups which amounted to little more than the personal followings of particular political leaders (see Chapter 7, Dynamics of Political Behavior). The other most important political force to emerge in the country after the war was the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood), which by 1946 had reached a membership of 2 million. Demanding stricter and purer observance of the tenets of Islam, it represented the anti-western, anti-British forces of fanatical Pan-Islamic nationalism in the country. The Wafd and the Ikhwan remained in conflict and competition down to the post-World War II

period, with the Wafd increasingly showing the signs of corruption that made it and other Egyptian political parties easy targets of the puritanical Moslem Brotherhood. Down to the present time there have been few signs that leftwing or Communist groups have made much inroad into Egyptian politics. The Communist Party is illegal, as it has always been, and the police are diligent in arresting suspected Communists. The Socialist Party has cooperated with the Wafd in its opposition to Britain. The Liberation Rally, formed in 1953 following the 1952 coup by the military junta, represented diverse groupings, and it was thought it would become the foundation of a single party which in its bid for popular support would attract a melange of those quasi-Communist, quasi-fascist, fanatically anti-western, and simply opportunistic political forces that have contended for fortune in Egyptian politics for a long time. The Rally has not had this function, however, under the new Constitution of 1956. That document provides for the development of a single party, the National Union, under the guidance of the president.

The Treaty of 1936

In the political situation that prevailed from 1924 to 1936, the year of the death of King Fuad, three forces competed with each other: the Wafd, the royal prerogative (the Palace), and British power. The first two were agreed upon one thing, the desire for real independence from Britain. On other grounds they were at odds, with the Wafd working to curtail the royal prerogative, and the King striving to prevent the Wafd from forming governments which might carry out the popular Wafd program. In the course of the struggle, the Constitution was suspended in 1928, restored in 1929, replaced in 1930 by a modification favoring royal authority, and restored again in 1935. During part of this period, Nahas Pasha led the Wafd in violent, extraparliamentary opposition to the government of Ismail Sidqi Pasha.

A constructive development of this period was the successful negotiation leading to agreement with Britain. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia had underscored the vulnerability of an Egypt unsupported by Britain. The King worked for and produced a united front, and restored the Constitution as a bid to the Wafd. In May 1936 the Wafd won in the elections, and Nahas Pasha led a delegation, representing several parties, in negotiations with Britain. Agreement was reached in August 1936.

By the terms of this milestone treaty, the occupation of Egypt was terminated. Britain retained the right to maintain troops for 20 years along the Suez Canal and the right to have the Royal Air Force fly over Egyptian

soil for training purposes. In the event of war, the treaty provided for large-scale mutual assistance. Moreover, it was agreed that the alliance would be extended after 1956. It was stipulated that the Sudan would continue to be ruled under the Agreement for Condominium of 1899, with the proviso that Egyptian troops would be readmitted into the Sudanese military forces. Britain undertook to sponsor Egyptian membership in the League of Nations, and Egypt gained admission in 1937. In the same year by agreement of the Capitulatory powers at Montreux, the Capitulations were abolished, and the progressive abolition of consular courts and mixed courts began and was brought to completion in 1949, when Egyptian courts took over all judicial functions in the country. The advances of the years 1936 and 1937 were modified and restricted by King Fuad's death in 1936 and the subsequent outbreak of World War II, but a great step forward had been taken.

Egypt in World War II

With the outbreak of World War II, the war clauses of the 1936 treaty, rather than those relating to Egypt's independence, were applied. It was not until 1947 that British troops finally left Upper and Lower Egypt. During half of that time they were present on a war footing, with Egypt functioning as a base of Allied operations. On British advice, Egypt declared her neutrality but provided more assistance to the Allied cause than was stipulated by the treaty.

The war deepened the cleavages of Egyptian politics. The young King Farouk early showed his independence by refusing to accede to Wafd demands for dismissal of the Saadist Chief, Ali Maher Pasha, as chief of the Royal Cabinet. Farouk's temperament came into conflict with the dictatorial nature of Nahas Pasha, and the critical issue between them became the attitude toward the war. In this conflict the King came to symbolize what was suspected to be a pro-Nazi attitude, while Nahas and the Wafd represented a strongly pro-Allied position. The King was forced by an ultimatum from Lord Killearn (the British Ambassador) and by a show of British military strength before the palace in February 1942 to appoint Nahas as Prime Minister. Throughout the critical phases of the war, especially in North Africa, Egypt under Wafdist leadership wholeheartedly supported the Allied cause. As the war progressed toward the victory, the Wafdist tendency toward corruption, second thoughts on its involvement in the British humiliation of the King, and a disastrous malarial epidemic in Upper Egypt created a situation in which it was possible for the King to dismiss Nahas. This he did in October 1944, at the very moment Nahas had brought to

completion the agreement creating the League of Arab States (Arab League).

Nationalist feeling became more and more inflamed during this period. Anomalously, the Wafd, once again in opposition, began to exploit this feeling which had been intensified by inflation and the Wafd's own record of misgovernment. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Government under Ahmad Maher Pasha declared war against the Axis in February 1945, with British acquiescence, in order to be able to participate in the peace settlements. Paradoxically, this act, which made Egypt an outright ally of Britain, the great opponent of Egyptian nationalist demands, was necessary in order to serve Egyptian nationalist interest in the international arena.

Egypt Since 1945

In July 1952 a group of army officers with General Naguib as their nominal leader precipitated a coup d'état signalizing the beginning of what may prove to be an Egyptian political and social revolution. The King was forced to abdicate and to leave the country. Soon the monarchy itself was abolished and a republic proclaimed. Gamal Abdel Nasser, then a military officer, emerged as the strong man of the government, to become in 1956 President of the new republic under a new Constitution adapted and proclaimed the same year.

Indeed, Egypt in mid-century is at a crossroads in internal and international politics. Dynamic events and conflicts on many levels—cultural, economic, philosophic—place the country in a position in world affairs perhaps more critical than any it has known before.

Egyptian nationalism, stimulated in the main by the contact and conflict of Egyptian Islamic culture with that of the West, is a force which any modern Egyptian Government must control and direct to survive. Egyptian nationalism takes many internal forms, and it has continued to shift with respect to external issues around which its various elements could arrange themselves in a moving kaleidoscope of alignments. One of these issues has been anti-British sentiment and the pressure for treaty revision. Anti-British feeling, after subsiding upon the conclusion of the agreement on the Suez Canal and the Sudan, has again flared up with the revival of the Suez issue. The last British troops left the Canal Zone in early 1956, and in the same year the former condominium of the Sudan came to an end with the achievement of independence by that territory under its own government. The outcome of the new crisis precipitated by President Nasser's move to nationalize the Canal saw the momentary return of foreign troops, but its full meaning remains to be seen.

The problem of Israel is one of the most acute issues of Egyptian international relations, and it affects all the others. The failure of Egyptian arms in the war against Israel in the late 1940's was a major factor stimulating the revolution in 1952 under the leadership of the military junta (Revolutionary Command Council) and the Liberation Rally. In meeting the challenge of Israel, Egypt proposed to lead the Arab League and to oppose the defection of Arab states to other political and military alignments, such as the Baghdad Pact, to which Iraq adheres. In pursuit of this policy, Egypt rejected the proposal of a Middle East Defense Organization which would have aligned it with the West.

Egypt has been in the familiar posture of seeking to play one set of powers off against another, hoping to achieve in this way benefits which it believes it could not gain by outright alignment with one side or the other. The great Middle East crisis beginning in July 1956 was produced by old issues. Its scope, however, as time passed suggested that it might produce novel alignments quite beyond the expectation of the principal actors.

CHAPTER 3

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

GEOGRAPHY

Egypt, in the northeastern extremity of Africa, lies in the desert belt that stretches across the Northern Hemisphere from the Atlantic Ocean through Arabia and Iran to China and that forms the main habitat of the Islamic peoples. Covering about 386, 200 square miles and rectangular in shape, Egypt (from the Greek Aegyptos and called Misr by its inhabitants) is about the size of Texas and New Mexico together, and its desert areas bear many physical and climatic resemblances to the desert regions of those states,

Of the boundaries of Egypt only the coastal ones are natural, and one of these, the eastern (Red Sea), extends into a non-natural boundary across Sinai. The western frontier as it is today was defined by an agreement with Italy in 1925. The southern limits were fixed under the Sudan Condominium Treaty of 1899. Thus the two land boundaries are the result of modern agreements and, because of the nature of the terrain through which they pass, are little more than political abstractions; they have no relation to ethnic divisions, and they are only vaguely understood and rarely observed by the nomad herdsmen of the desert (Bedouin), who cross and recross them in search of forage and water for their flocks. Much the same situation applies even to the eastern coastal boundary: the desert east of the Nile is inhabited by Bedouin and the coast by fishermen, all of whom have close kinsmen in Saudi Arabia, a hundred miles or more away across the Red Sea. Only at the northwestern frontier posts and at the river station and Sudan railhead at Wadi Halfa would a traveler be conscious of entering a different political entity.

The trans-Sinai boundary, demarcated in 1906, runs from the northem extremity of the Gulf of 'Aqaba to the Mediterranean near Rafah. The Gaza Strip, a 258 square-mile tongue of desert running along the Mediterranean northeastward from Rafah, was under Egyptian administration from the end of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 until it was overrun by the Israelis

in November 1956. At the end of 1956 the status of this area was disputed. Formerly part of Britain's Palestine mandate, and Arab in settlement, the Gaza Strip is a political tinderbox, crowded as it is with many thousands of Arabs who fled their homes in Palestine when the war turned in Israel's favor in 1948.

Accessibility

The location of Egypt is such that the country would, under normal political conditions, be easily accessible by land from the northwest and northeast. To the northeast the passage by road and rail across Sinai will remain blocked as long as the Arab-Israeli tension persists in its present overt and often violent form. A good graveled and black-top road enters Egypt from Israel near Gaza and swings south at El 'Arish to join another all-weather highway which runs from Jerusalem through Beersheba to the Suez Canal at Ismailia and thence to Cairo. The railroad also carried heavy passenger and freight traffic from Egypt to Haifa, which is an important distribution center for points to the north and east.

Communication between Egypt and Libya is maintained to the northwest by a first-class coastal road which can be followed as far west as Casablanca. Inland from this north African highway, however, there is no modern means of overland ingress to Egypt, and vast sand dunes, impassable even to desert-wise Bedouin, restrict entry in this direction to the tracks linking the western oases with the delta and Nile Valley. The strategic Western Desert Railroad, which was put to good use by the Allies in World War II, has now been extended from its former railhead at Mersa Matruh to Tobruk, where it meets the coastal highway. As recently as 1954 this line was not in use.

The excellent harbors of Alexandria and Port Said give easy access to the country from the Mediterranean, while Cairo and the delta may be reached from the east through Suez and Port Taufiq at the southern extremity of the Suez Canal, the vitally strategic waterway that, when opened in 1869, converted Egypt's isthmus of Sinai from a barrier to a corridor through which maritime traffic could pass to India and the Far East. The Red Sea coast of Egypt offers very limited entry facilities, although there are ports at Tor, Abu Zenima, Port Safaga, Hurghada, and Quseir used by the light traffic which takes on cargoes of locally mined manganese and phosphates. To the south, a desert road now connects Aswan with Wadi Halfa, bridging the gap which separates the Egyptian and Sudan railways. Preliminary surveys have also been made for a railroad link. Access to Egypt by water from the south is hampered by the cataracts of the Nile, but the journey from

Cairo to Khartoum can be accomplished by means of a river-railroad combination. With these exceptions, conditions similar to those of the western desert are found in the south.

In recent years Cairo has developed into an important air crossroads. As was proved in World War II, the nature of the terrain favors the rapid construction of serviceable airfields. A great deal of passenger and freight traffic from Egypt to central and south Africa now moves by air, while from the Cairo airport, served by the two Egyptian airlines and most of the major international companies, it is easily possible to make direct connections with any part of the world.

Of primary strategic importance since the beginning of recorded history (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting), Egypt, under virile leadership, has many times been able to develop and expand its boundaries by conquest. On the other hand, internal dissensions have more often weakened the political and military organization of the country to the point where it became the prey of ambitious and more powerful peoples who not only coveted Egypt's riches but sought in addition, by controlling the isthmus of Sinai, to place themselves in a dominant position in the Middle East.

Thus, during periods of political and military ascendancy, Egypt—which at various times ruled empires embracing what are now the Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and part of Iraq—was from time to time in a position to introduce its culture into countries many hundreds of miles from the Nile Valley; conversely the recurrent invasions to which the country was subjected permitted the absorption of cultures other than Egyptian. Since the beginning of the Islamic era (642 A.D.), however, the boundaries of Egypt have undergone little change. True, Egypt's troops occupied Syria and parts of Saudi Arabia and the Sudan in the nineteenth century, but they did not remain long enough in these countries to consolidate any new boundaries, even had it been Egypt's intention to do so. The treaties of 1899 and 1925 delineating the Sudan and western boundaries merely confirmed formally what had been tacitly assumed for many years.

Lack of education has limited the concepts of the fellah (Egyptian peasant) concerning the outer world. The delta is his universe; the physical limit of his interests coincides not merely with the dividing line between desert and civilization but, in most cases, with his own landmarks. To the fellah the desert is an unknown and is, therefore, a hostile world which must be given a wide berth. The true Bedouin in turn despises the fellah and all the fellah stands for; the cultivated fringes of the desert are still subject to Bedouin depredations. The Bedouin, nevertheless, like nomads everywhere, are coming by degrees to recognize the inevitability of sedentarization, and their assimilation by the cultivators has been a continuing process for many years.

The Egyptian aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and to a lesser extent the city proletariat are more likely than the fellahin to have an appreciation of the size, boundaries, and strategic importance of their country. A potential source of trouble is the dissatisfaction, in recent years, of these articulate groups with the southern boundary and their deeply felt conviction that the Sudan boundary, beyond which lie the sources of the water upon which Egypt is dependent for life, is arbitrary and that the Nile Valley is a natural unit. The basis for such feelings with regard to the western frontier is lacking, since the water factor, common to most boundary disputes in the arid Middle East, is not involved in that region. To the northeast, however, the Egyptians see, not water, but vital military and strategic interests at stake: should the boundaries of Israel at any future time be advanced across Sinai, the Suez Canal would be endangered and a large proportion of Egypt's scanty mineral resources would be cut off.

The indoctrination measures of the Nasser regime must be expected in time to instill in the fellah a more intense consciousness of nationality, and with this will come a concern for boundaries and the designs, real or imagined, of Egypt's Libyan, Sudanese, and Israeli neighbors. Thus far the Bedouin, true to historical type, has shown no sign of responding to nationalist appeals.

Physical Characteristics

The Nile. Seen from the air, Egypt presents a striking resemblance to the standard colored map. A flight along the Nile Valley from Wadi Halfa to Cairo reveals one wide river flanked by narrow strips of green cultivation that end abruptly at the limit of irrigation and give way to drab brown desert dotted with outcroppings of darker rock and patches of paler sand. The Nile is, in effect, Egypt, fertilizing and irrigating its soil, serving as an important means of internal communication, and opening a gate to Central Africa. From prehistoric times the enduring efforts of Egyptians have been directed toward the fullest possible utilization of the waters of their rivers.

By the time the Nile reaches Egypt, its waters have been swollen from three main sources: the Atbara and the Blue Nile, originating in Ethiopia, and the White Nile, whose springs lie in the equatorial regions of British East Africa. The characteristic feature of the Nile is the seasonal flood between July and December when an average rise of 24.6 feet is registered at Aswan and 14.8 feet at Cairo. The flood water is carried by the Blue Nile and the Atbara from the Ethiopian highlands; the waters of the White Nile, regulated by their passage through the central African lakes

and diminished by the enormous amount of evaporation over the Sudd (swamplands of the southern Sudan), flow much more evenly and in winter supply the bulk of the discharge.

One of the great natural features of the world, the Nile has played a prominent part in the early development of the human race. It affects all of Egypt, the Sudan, Uganda, much of Ethiopia, and parts of Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo. Flowing for 4,160 miles from its most remote source near Lake Tanganyika and watering a basin of more than 1 million square miles, the Nile influences in varying degrees the lives of the millions of people along its course. To it Egypt owes its physical existence, for without the river the fertile valley would return to the desert which presses on either side. The entire area of Egypt is dependent on irrigation, and with the present irrigation systems 5 million out of Egypt's 6 million acres of cultivable land provide two and sometimes three crops a year.

The Nile Valley. The Nile enters Egypt near Wadi Halfa in the cataract region which stretches from Khartoum to Aswan. From Wadi Halfa to Aswan, a distance by river of just under 200 miles, the channel is a narrow groove through cliffs of sandstone and granite. Below Aswan the cultivated strip widens to an average of 12 miles, and over the 200 miles south of Cairo the river tends to cling to the eastern bluffs, so that cultivation and the chief towns are confined mainly to the western bank where there is a very gradual slope of several miles before the foot of the escarpment is reached.

The Delta. At Cairo the Nile Valley spreads out to form a fertile delta, 155 miles wide at the base and about 100 miles from north to south. Once a broad estuary, the delta is among the most intensively cultivated areas of the world, thanks to the rich deposits of silt brought down in the past from Ethiopia. Seven branches of the Nile used to run through the delta; in the course of the centuries these have been controlled, and the river has now been diverted into two main streams, the Damietta and Rosetta branches, and a network of drainage and irrigation canals. In the north, near the coast, the delta embraces a series of salt marshes and lakes; the high rate of evaporation from these produces summer periods of uncomfortably humid weather.

The Deserts. The desert area of Egypt—over 96 percent of the country's total land area—may be divided into three regions: the Libyan, or Western Desert, which extends from the west side of the delta and the Nile Valley to the Libyan border; the Eastern, or Arabian Desert, from the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal to the Red Sea; and the Sinai Desert, which has a common frontier with Israel on the east and is separated from Egypt's

Eastern Desert by the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

South of the delta the deserts on either side of the river are very different in character. The Eastern Desert is rugged and mountainous and is much cut up by deep valleys (wadis) down which occasional heavy rains bring brief but deep torrents. Such rains are rare, however, and a wadi may remain dry for several years on end. The desert cliffs, particularly those to the east, are in many places close to the river, and it is only between Assiut and Luxor that cultivation on the east bank covers any considerable area.

The Western Desert is not cut by wadis, and the occasional drainage lines do not bring down torrents like those that pour down the watercourses of the east. Lower and much more undulating than the Eastern Desert, the Western Desert is nevertheless sharply divided from the valley at the limit of irrigation. It stretches away west of the Nile across Africa to the Atlantic Coast and is one of the most desolate regions in the world. Wells are few and far between, though a hundred miles or so to the west of the Nile Valley there is a chain of large depressions, the oases (Faiyum, Bahariya, Farafra, Dakhla, Kharga, and Siwa), in which water is near the surface and where there are villages and cultivation. Tracks which hold their identity well because of the gravelly nature of the desert run from the Nile Valley to these oases.

The Sinai Desert, a triangular area with its base on the Mediterranean is somewhat different in topography from the deserts bordering the Nile. Two thirds plateau, with occasional peaks rising to 8,000 feet, Sinai has a heavier rainfall, and its desert character is relieved by numerous wells and oases which support centers of habitation and which formerly were focal points on trade routes. Water draining toward the Mediterranean from the northern escarpment of the main plateau supplies sufficient moisture to permit a fair amount of agriculture in the coastal area, especially near El Arish.

Cities. The chief cities of Egypt lie in the delta or in the main stream of the Nile above Cairo. Cairo, the largest city in Africa, is not only Egypt's administrative capital but has the largest concentration of industrial and commercial enterprises. Alexandria, the second city, is the principal port, while the cities of Port Said and Suez, at the northern and southern extremities of the Suez Canal, have risen from small backwaters to cities of over 100,000 population in 80 years. Egypt's concentrated water supply is responsible for the geographical location of its cities; away from water there is little or no settlement of any kind. With the industrial development of the delta, new cities (Mahalla el Kubra, Kafr el Zaiyat) have sprung up; old ones (Tanta, Zagazig) have emerged from torpor. As in many other countries, the drift to the towns is quite marked.

Climate

The Egyptian climate is characterized by a two-season year, long hours of blazing sunshine, and lack of rainfall. Climatically the year falls into two parts: a cool winter from November to April and a hot summer from May to October. Spring and autumn, as experienced in more temperate lands, are unknown. There is almost no "bracing" period in the spring and fall, practically no trees shed their leaves in winter, and crops ripen in April and May as well as in July and August. Except for the variations in temperature, there is little difference between the seasons.

Extreme temperatures during both seasons are tempered by the prevailing northerly winds. In the coastal regions temperatures range between a mean maximum of 99 degrees F. and a mean minimum of 57 degrees F. Wide daily variations of temperature occur in the inland desert areas—ranging from a mean annual maximum of 114 degrees F. during the hours of day light to a mean minimum 42 degrees F. after sunset. During the winter season the temperature in the open desert often drops to 32 degrees F., and even in the delta and in the northern part of the Nile Valley light frosts are not unknown. The mean annual temperature in Egypt increases slightly from the delta to the southern border and then remains steady as far south as Khartoum. Except, perhaps, for the summer humidity of the delta, the only really unpleasant feature of Egypt's weather is the hot, sand-laden wind from the south (khamsin), which comes between March and May.

The third characteristic of Egypt's climate is lack of rainfall. As would be expected, most rain falls along the Mediterranean Coast, though even here the average annual precipitation is only eight inches. Inland, the amount falls off rapidly until at Cairo it averages just over one inch a year. Beyond a line that could be drawn east-west through Cairo to Merowe in the northern Sudan, the precipitation is less than an inch. At Assiut, for example, the average annual rainfall is one fifth of an inch, and south of Assiut years may pass without rain. At Merowe, however, which is on the northern fringe of the tropical rainbelt, rainfall rises to one inch. The rain in Egypt falls mostly in winter.

In the delta, rain can create unpleasant conditions in the villages. The roads, though paving is being increasingly introduced, are still generally of packed earth. Excellent in dry weather, they become slippery after a little rain, making traveling of all types very difficult. As many roads lie along the banks of canals or drains, it is by no means uncommon for traffic to skid into the water.

NATURAL RESOURCES

Minerals

Egypt's most important natural resource is the Nile, which provides water and soil. Oil exists in limited quantities in the Suez area, and there are various other mineral deposits, many of which are unexploited either because of transport difficulty or because of their poor quality. The deposits of the greatest economic importance are mineral oil, calcium phosphate, manganese, and various types of building stone. Iron is known to exist in large quantities near Aswan, but so far there has been no exploitation, owing to the lack of coal or of other cheap source of power. Plans are being considered for the setting up of an oil-powered steel plant; should these be carried out, the Aswan iron ore would become Egypt's most valuable industrial raw material (see Chapter 16, Industry).

Crops

Egypt's grain and vegetable crops reflect the regularity of its climate. There is little variation in this respect between Alexandria and Aswan, a north-south distance of almost 500 miles; and maize, wheat, millet, cotton, and berseem (clover), the principal crops, are found in all cultivated areas irrespective of latitude. Fruits of the European type grow profusely in the delta. Farther south, approaching the tropical belt, little fruit is found with the exception of the date, which grows in abundance throughout the country.

Flora and Fauna

The vegetation of Egypt is confined largely to the Nile Valley and the oases. The most widely spread of the few indigenous trees is the date palm. Importations include the eucalyptus, cypress, and the elm, all of which flourish in the arable regions. Particularly in the delta, the arable regions sustain a large variety of plant life that includes the grape, many species of vegetables, and such flowers as the lotus, narcissus, jasmin, and rose. Vegetation in the few desert wadis where water remains near the surface consists chiefly of alfa (esparto grass) and thorn trees. Papyrus, once widely prevalent in Egypt, is now extinct.

Devoid of forest and with all its available land given over to intensive cultivation, Egypt nowadays has few wild animals, though the desert gazelle, the fox, the jackal, and the hyena are not uncommon. Bird life,

on the other hand, is abundant in the Nile Valley. The Nile and the delta lakes contain many species of fish. The principal domestic animals are the camel, the donkey, and the water buffalo (gamus), all of which are extensively used as beasts of burden and in agricultural pursuits.

POPULATION

Size, Density, and Distribution

The most recent official Egyptian census (1947) gives the country's population as 19,022,000. An interim count made by the Egyptian Government in 1949 claimed population of 19,087,304. Most expert opinions hold that these figures are inflated, but it can be taken as certain that the population of Egypt in 1947 was at least 18 million. Allowing the 19.4 percent rate of increase between 1937 and 1947 to be slightly less than the present rate, it may be assumed that the population of Egypt today is between 22.5 million and 23 million.

Of the total, about 21 million Egyptians are Moslems and 1,500,000 are Copts; the remaining half million or so comprise the non-Egyptian minorities—Greeks, Syrians, Lebanese, Italians, Armenians, French, British, and 63,000 Jews. Since the autumn of 1956 the number of French and British has declined considerably; and the recent exodus is estimated to have left only 35,000 Egyptian Jews in the country.

The population, with the exception of some 50,000 nomads and a sedentary population of 170,000 in the oases, Sinai, and the Red Sea littoral, is concentrated within the 13,600 square miles of the Nile Valley and delta and the Canal Zone. The population density of this settled area therefore averages about 1,500 persons to the square mile.

Egypt is divided into five governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Canal, Suez, and Damietta), four frontier governorates (Red Sea, Sinai, Southern Desert, Western Desert) and sixteen provinces (as listed below).

Upper Egypt

Province	Capital	Population
Giza	Giza	818, 168
Beni Suef	Beni Suef	612,027
Faiyum	El Faiyum	669,696
Minya	El Minya	1,044,201
Assiut	Assiut	1, 374, 454

Upper Egypt (Cont'd)

Province	Capital	Population
Girga	Sohag	1, 283, 468
Qena	Qena	1,106,302
Aswan	Aswan	290,842
	Lower Egypt	
Beheira	Damanhur	1,244,495
Gharbiya	Tanta	2,327,031 ^(a)
Sharqiya	Zagazig	1, 345, 829
Daqahliya	El Mansura	1,413,905
Minufiya	Shibin el Kom	1,165,015
Qalyubiya	Benha	693, 908
Liberation	Nasr	_

(a) Population figures for Gharbiya include those of Kafr el Sheikh Province.

According to the 1947 census the largest cities are:


Cairo	2,090,654	Mahalla el Kubra	115, 758
Alexandria	919,024	Suez	107, 244
Port Said	177,703	El Mansura	101, 965
Tama	139, 926	Assiut	90,103

There are seven other cities of over 50,000 population: Damanhur, Zagazig, El Faiyum, El Minya, Giaz, Beni Suef, and Damietta. (Sources for figures on provinces and cities—Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1956; Issawi, Charles, Egypt at Mid-Century; Stateman's Year Book 1955.)

Birth and Death Rate

Egyptian birth and death rates are among the highest in the world. In postwar years, according to official statistics, the former has averaged 42 per thousand and the latter 23 per thousand. Infant mortality is reported to have declined from 160 to 140 per thousand live births in the period 1945-53, but field research (notably that sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1951) indicates that these figures are overly optimistic.

The high birth rate can be attributed to a variety of causes,





outstanding among which are the poverty and ignorance of the Egyptian fellah, coupled with the value he places on a large number of offspring. The large-scale cotton cultivation, which for a century has dominated Egyptian agriculture, must also be reckoned as a primary contributing factor, since children are employed and are thus at an early age turned into sorely needed contributors to the family income. Among the fellahin, the birth of a child each year during the wife's childbearing period is a normal event. One child in seven dies at birth, and disease, in spite of improved conditions, still takes a heavy toll of children under 10 years of age.

Underlying these more obvious factors are the traditional disapproval of celibacy, the prestige of married women, and the security against divorce which children provide for their mothers. The widespread notion that polygamy is responsible for the elevated birth rate is suspect. Polygamous households among Egypt's Moslems in 1947 represented only 3, 8 percent of the total.

It may be noted that the birth rate is higher among Moslems than among Egyptian Christians—44 against 35 per thousand in 1937. The most recent breakdown of vital statistics available, drawn from The Statesman's Yearbook 1955, are as follows:

Year	Births	Marriages	Divorces	Deaths
1949	836, 516	280,463	73,827	410,524
1950	904, 941	272,795	74,881	388, 944
1951	934, 584	252, 526	75, 277	402,158

The fertility ratio in Egypt, compiled on the basis of children under 5 to women of childbearing age, indicates a slight decline since 1917. (Figures drawn from the Egyptian Census Record, 1917-47, in Issawi, Charles, Egypt at Mid-Century, p. 57.)

Year	Females 15-49	Children Under 5	Ratio Per 1,000
1917	3,026,000	1,754,000	579
1927	3,513,000	2,031,000	578
1937	3,852,000	2,108,000	547
1947	4,735,000	2,585,000	546

The death rate figures above show a considerable decline since 1939. The latest available statistics (1950) show an average of 21 per thousand for

the period 1947-49; this is a 20 percent drop from the official figures for 1939-41. Though it cannot yet be said that this is indicative of a long-term trend, the drop in infant mortality from 162 per 1,000 for the period 1932-33 to 133 for the period 1947-49 is suggestive. Further evidence of a continuing process of decline in death rate may be inferred from an increasing life expectancy (see Chapter 18, Public Health and Welfare).

The population of Egypt is evenly divided between the sexes. In 1927 there were 7,058,000 males to 7,120,000 females; in 1937 there were 7,967,000 males and 7,950,000 females. The 1947 returns show a slight preponderance of females—9,603,000 to 9,419,000 males.

Migration

There is practically no emigration from Egypt and very little immigration. Within the country, however, two main streams of migration are evident: from Upper Egypt to Lower Egypt and from the agricultural areas to the towns.

Upper Egypt, with a population of over 7 million in 1947 and a crop area of 0, 47 feddan (half an acre) per person, is much more densely populated than Lower Egypt. Excluding Cairo, Alexandria, the Canal, and northern frontier districts, Lower Egypt in 1947 had 8,600,000 inhabitants and a crop area of 0,64 feddan (two thirds of an acre) per person, providing an important economic inducement for migration from the south to the north. The men of Upper Egypt, who suffer much less than those of the north from the debilitating endemic diseases, can often find work in enterprises for which the northerner is unfitted. Furthermore, the people of Lower Egypt seem to be more attached to the soil than those of the Nile Valley. Even so, migration to the delta from the south has not yet equated density of population and resources; though some provinces—for example, Giza in the immediate vicinity of Cairo—may be oversaturated, there is an actual shortage of labor in other delta areas.

Of greater social significance is the migration to the cities of the delta, where industry is concentrated. Since 1937 the population of Cairo has risen from 1, 312,000 to an estimated 2,500,000 in 1956 and that of Alexandria has increased from 686,000 to about 1,000,000. The population of some of the other large cities also has increased at a rate greatly exceeding the average for the country as a whole, and Egypt's urban population is estimated to have grown by nearly 55 percent between 1937 and 1947.

During World War II the movement into the towns was given great impetus by the opportunities provided by the Allied armies. The population

of the five governorates rose between 1937 and 1947 from 2,249,000 to 3,416,000 In 1947, 19 percent of the country's population lived in towns of over 100,000 inhabitants and 3.5 percent in towns with populations ranging from 50,000 to 100,000.

Population Trends

In the past 140 years Egypt's population has increased more than seven times-from 3 million to over 22 million- and the cultivated sections of the country are among the most densely populated areas in the world, During this period of population growth, the areas under cultivation have increased five times, and the yield per acre of wheat and cotton, to give only two examples, has doubled and tripled respectively, with cotton exports rising proportionately. Thus, the Egyptian population up to 1947 had not outrun the country's income. Today a crisis is developing. The additional cultivable area, which would be provided if and when the Aswan Dam project is completed, cannot at the most optimistic estimate offset the growth of population if the present trend is maintained. Industrial production, though increasing, must for some years continue to play a minor role in the country's economy (see Chapter 11, Basic Features of the Economy). Furthermore, the combination of high death rate and birth rate has the effect of forcing investment of a considerable proportion of the country's income in children who, because so many die young, do not make a rewarding contribution to the economy. This factor is only partially mitigated by the tendency to start working at an early age.

It seems that unless large-scale emigration is encouraged—an encouragement the government is failing to give—or unless birth control methods are more widely taught and accepted, there is little prospect for any easing of the mounting population pressure and the part it plays in contributing to the low standard of living in Egypt.

CHAPTER 4

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES

Egypt lies at one of the great crossroads of human migration, and its history is part of the larger history of the peopling of the Near East and the Mediterranean basin. Out of Asia came populations whose passage through the Sinai Peninsula or across the Red Sea led them into the Nile delta or into the valley trough farther south. From the desert on either side of the Nile, nomads were drawn to the water and the wealth of the great river. Ships from the northern shore of the Mediterranean brought still other peoples, whose objectives were sometimes Egypt itself, sometimes the trade routes to the east and south. Southward, Negro Africa pressed on Upper Egypt, and slaves and occasional invaders from this region introduced a Negroid element into the valley. (See Chapter 2, Historical Setting.)

These movements have affected the physical and cultural inheritance of the Egyptian people, but they never submerged the basic Mediterranean white population and the way of life which has been distinctively Egyptian since prehistoric times. The outcome of racial mixture and culture contact in Egypt has been not heterogeneity but a remarkable uniformity, and the vast majority of Egyptians remain as Egyptians were when the pyramids were built, essentially a single people sharing a common ancestry and culture.

Differences do exist. Physically, skin color is lighter in the delta than in the upper Nile Valley. Negroid characteristics are common in the region south of Aswan. In the towns are concentrated the European and other foreign minorities. Culturally, the settled existence of the fellah (peasant) in his villages and fields along the Nile contrasts sharply with the nomadic pattern of the Bedouin of the Egyptian deserts. Both Moslems and Copts share a common Egyptian culture, but they are set apart by different religious faiths. Throughout Egypt the life of the towns, with their complex social structure, foreign minorities, and western influences, differs greatly from the traditional order of the countryside, where about 70 percent of the population lives much as it did in Pharaonic times. None of these differences, however, overrides the larger identity which marks the inhabitants of the Nile Valley.

The reasons are to be looked for in Egyptian geography, culture, and history. Geographically, Egypt's crossroads position between Asia and the Mediterranean basin has not meant that the country itself has been a thoroughfare. The Nile delta, connecting with the Sinai Peninsula, forms an easy passageway between Asia and North Africa and is readily accessible by sea, but the cliff-rimmed Nile Valley to the south is a narrow pocket in a territory which in historic times has been desert. Large-scale foreign population movements could take place along the coast without greatly affecting the Valley or even the southern delta Culturally, the Egyptians early developed a self-contained society which was highly resistant to the effects of alien intrusions. Historically, Egypt was almost continuously under alien rule from the Persian conquest in 525 B.C. to the present century. Egypt's conquerors, however, came, not to settle the country, but to control and exploit it, and they concentrated in the cities where they governed without mingling with the mass of the population or much altering its basic way of life.

The significant distinctions among the Egyptian people, then, are not ethnic in the sense of any marked divisions along racial lines. The bulk of the population, with some Negroid admixture in the southern part of the Nile Valley, are of the same brunet-white physical type which is found from northern India to Gibraltar and on both sides of the Mediterranean. Culturally, the members of the great peasant majority—Moslem or Copt—share a single way of life rooted in the common Egyptian heritage. There is no clear-cut color bias in Egypt, and Egyptians generally are quick to resent any evidence of it in western countries. Nevertheless, various observers have remarked that, wealth and position being equal, the person without Negroid characteristics enjoys social advantages in Egypt over one who has such traits.

PHYSICAL TYPES

Portraits painted in the time of the early pharaohs might be those of modern Egyptians, and the type is best preserved in the peasantry. Rather heavily built, the fellah is of moderate stature—usually not more than five feet five. The head is characteristically long and narrow, the face broad with strong jaws, prominent chin, full lips, and straight or concave nose of medium height and breadth. Skin color is basically brunet-white but shades to medium and dark brown in southern Egypt. Head hair, which may be straight or wavy but not often curly, is almost always black.

There are, of course, variations in this rural population. The Moslem fellahin are perhaps somewhat darker skinned than the Copts, who,

having tended to marry only within their own group, remain closer to the physical type of Pharaonic and early Christian Egypt. In general, the inhabitants of the delta are somewhat shorter in stature than those of the Nile Valley to the south, and the latter are somewhat less debilitated by disease and inadequate diet than the delta dwellers and seem to be more robust.

Much wider variations may be seen in the cities. Successive waves of foreigners have entered Egypt—from the Persians in the sixth century B.C. to the Europeans of modern times. The Arabs converted Egypt to Islam, various groups of Turks ruled the country, Circassians and Negro Africans were introduced at various times. All these immigrants have gradually mingled in the towns, producing a wide range of physical types.

Egypt's few remaining Bedouin, who move their flocks in search of pasture in the deserts on either side of the Nile Valley, contrast with the fellahin in their taller stature and more slender physique. Now reduced in number to around 50,000 they are gradually being absorbed by the sedentary population of the cultivated area. Evidences of Arab and Negro admixtures are to be found in the oases, particularly at Kharga, where for hundreds of years Arab slave traders paused with their caravans of Negro slaves on the way to Egypt and the countries of the Arab world. The aboriginal population of the Egyptian oases resembled closely the fellahin type, but today a fair proportion of the population shows Negro traits.

The Nubians of Upper Egypt, most of whom are concentrated in the area to the south of Aswan and who supply much of the domestic labor for the cities of the delta, are generally darker and taller than either the fellahin or the townsmen. Taking their name from the Nobatae, a Negro group which entered the region in Roman times, the present-day Nubians are a mixture of this stock with the indigenous fellahin.

The remaining ethnic groups—newcomers except for the Jews—have remained self-contained, and intermarriage with indigenous Egyptians is extremely rare.

THE MOSLEM MAJORITY

The Fellahin

Over 17 million Egyptians are fellahin, fieldworkers whose unremitting toil—and that of their ancestors over thousands of years—has brought scant material reward. The townsman regards the fellah as a dull, cloddish yokel, and the term "fellah" has long been employed as an uncomplimentary epithet. Today, the efforts of Egypt's military regime to construct the foundations of mass support are giving at least a nominal prestige to the

fellah's estate. In the fields the fellah usually wears a high-domed skull cap of a feltlike material and a long galabiya (tunic), unbleached or dark blue, which is never replaced until it literally falls to pieces. The only variety introduced into the drab, hard-working life of the fellah is an occasional visit to the nearest market or the celebration of a family wedding or a circumcision, which are occasions for the wearing of holiday finery. When dressed in his best clothes, the fellah wears a loose undershirt and voluminous cotton drawers held around the waist with a cord. Over the shirt he puts on a gay striped waistcoat that has numerous small buttons, and he adds a galabiya with open front that will show off the waistcoat. This galabiya is of much finer material than the one for everyday wear and must usually last a lifetime. Bright yellow, heelless slippers are often worn.

Peasant women wear long wide drawers, a long chemise, and a shapeless black cotton dress (which among the more prosperous may be of finer material) which has long sleeves and a flounce that trails behind on the ground. Outdoors it is customary to wear a black headdress, similar to a nun's veil, which can be pulled over the face. Fellahin women are not habitually veiled, however, though a coarse lace veil to which is attached a metal bobbin to hide the shape of the nose is sometimes worn. Common ornaments are coin and bead necklaces and earrings, silver, gold, or glass bracelets, and anklets of copper or silver. The only cosmetic used is kohl (antimony powder), which is applied to the eyelids.

A high death rate keeps some two thirds of Egypt's population under 30 years of age. Weakened by disease and caught in an unremitting round of heavy labor, the peasant is only beginning to become aware of horizons beyond his village and fields.

The Moslem Townsman

Ethnically the Moslem townsman can be an indigenous Egyptian or a Moslem immigrant from one of the other Islamic countries or a blend of these two. It is in the towns that the Egyptian population shows its greatest physical and cultural diversity. A large proportion of townsmen are conscientious Moslems, but a growing number are drifting away from religious belief and practice.

Today the great majority of middle- and upper-class males wear European style clothing. The galabiya is almost never worn by members of these groups, and the tall tarboosh or fez, which used to be the distinguishing mark of the Egyptian, is fast disappearing. The wives and daughters of upper- and middle-class Egyptians also have adopted western clothes and frequently go out in public unveiled.

The galabiya, when seen in the town, indicates either that its wearer is from the lower middle class or lower class or that he is a traditionalist; in the latter case he is quite probably a Moslem dignitary, for whom a galabiya of rich material, a silk sash, and a turbaned tarboosh are standard garb. Even among religious leaders, however, western dress is becoming more common.

INDIGENOUS MINORITIES

Egypt's principal indigenous minorities are Copts, Bedouin, and Nubians. Syrians, Lebanese, and other Moslem inhabitants of Egypt, although technically alien, are, because of their religion, thought of as indigenous, as are Arabic-speaking Christians.

The Copts

Egypt's population comprises two major religious groups, Copts (Egyptian Christians) and Moslems. One of the first countries to adopt Christianity, Egypt prior to the Arab invasion of the seventh century was almost entirely Christian. The Arabs brought Islam in a swift conquest; Christianity, however, was not obliterated, and the Egyptian Christian Church today has about 1,500,000 adherents.

One result of this religious division was that the thoroughly indigenous Copts were put in the position of an ethnic minority. The Copts assert that they are the only "true" Egyptians, and they base their claim on their traditional reluctance to marry out of their own group, contrasting this with the relative readiness with which Moslems of the various peoples represented in Egypt have intermarried.

Physically, there is little to distinguish between the Copts and their Moslem countrymen. Differences in dress or in general way of life are not noticeable. In the cities the Copts have traditionally been white-collar workers in business and government; few of them are found engaged in manual labor. Although Moslem and Coptic villagers seem to have no antipathy to one another, in the cities there is a certain degree of tension which has at times flared into overt hostility.

The Bedouin

The Bedouin of Egypt, now numbering only about 50,000, are closely related to the tribes of the Arabian peninsula through more or less remote Arab ancestors who wandered into Egypt at various times over the centuries.

Economic necessity is gradually forcing the Bedouin out of the desert and into the Valley and delta, and there is no doubt that their assimilation is only a matter of time.

Today the Bedouin in Egypt can be divided into four categories: pure nomads, partial nomads, partially assimilated, and completely assimilated. The pure nomads wander in Sinai and in the lands immediately west of the Suez Canal, as we las in the Western Desert. Many of them have relatives in the cultivated areas, whom they visit from time to time, and a certain number prolong their visit until they become sedentarized. The partial nomads occupy parts of Sinai and the coastal strip west of the Nile where they engage in sporadic agriculture. The partially assimilated Bedouin occupy the agriculture zone immediately adjoining the desert, where they live a settled existence but still engage in some herding. They trade with, and occasionally steal from, the purely agricultural fellahin, and in the course of time they begin to intermarry with them. The completely assimilated Bedouin have usually penetrated farther into the settled area, where they have become farmers almost as dedicated as the fellahin. Under these conditions of life, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish the former nomads from their fellahin neighbors. Assimilation was for a time slowed by a law which, in exempting all Bedouin, settled or nomadic, from military service, encouraged members of this group to preserve their minority identity. With the modification of the law to apply only to pure nomads it has become unusual to find any group in the central delta claiming Bedouin descent.

The Nubians

South of the dam and railhead at Aswan and beyond into the northern Sudan live the dark-skinned Nubians. Before the Aswan Dam was started many of these people farmed in the narrow upper reaches of the Nile Valley, but when construction was begun much of this farming area was inundated and large numbers of Nubians were obliged to seek their livelihood by other means. Many of them have gone into domestic service in the Egyptian cities, and in that capacity they are likely to impress the newcomer to Egypt as being more numerous than they actually are. Their reputation for intelligence, cleanliness, and honesty makes them much sought after as cooks, waiters, doorkeepers, and household servants.

Few Nubians come to Lower Egypt as permanent residents. They usually leave their families at home, where they return for vacations and where they settle down when they have saved enough to retire. They do not mingle with the Egyptians, and they live either on the premises of their

employers or in small colonies in the working-class districts. Regarding themselves as superior to Egyptians, they tend to be highly critical of things "Egyptian" and particularly of Egyptian politics. The Egyptians, on their part, affect a superiority to the Nubians.

FOREIGN MINORITIES

Egypt's small foreign minorities have until recently had an importance out of proportion to their size. Some of them, such as the British and French, had behind them the prestige and authority of great western powers and as a group dominated the economic and cultural life of the country.

Meaningful statistics on minority groups are difficult to obtain, since some members of such groups are stateless, while others hold Egyptian nationality and are not listed in the census as members of minorities. The last official statistics on minority groups were issued in 1937; totals for all groups have probably dropped considerably since that time. Approximately 30,000 Jews (of a former 63,000), for example, had left the country by the end of 1956, as had large numbers of French and British, and Maltese and Cypriots holding British nationality.

Mohammed Ali in the nineteenth century was the first Egyptian ruler to encourage minorities to come to Egypt. His policy was followed by his successors, and the British, when they assumed control in 1882, continued to make it easy for foreigners to enter the country. Important factors in bringing foreigners to Egypt in those years were the privileges they enjoyed under the Capitulations (see Chapter 8, Definition and Enforcement of Public Order). These bound the Egyptian Government to exempt foreign nationals from the jurisdiction of its criminal courts and from all but very limited taxation, and guaranteed them broad rights to conduct commerce freely in Egypt. The minority groups, who as merchants or industrialists usually brought money with them, moved automatically into a middle- and upper-class position in the cities; except for certain Coptic elements, until recently they effectively monopolized the most desirable positions in business and government. No members of the foreign minorities are peasants.

The Greeks, the largest of the foreign minorities, are heavily concentrated in Alexandria, where they play a prominent part in the importexport business and the cotton trade. Many of the Alexandria and Cairo Greeks are extremely wealthy, but a great number of less prosperous Greeks are to be found scattered throughout Egypt doing business as small grocers, moneylenders, restaurant operators, and merchants of all types. The Italians, the second largest minority, are largely engaged in business; they dominate the building industry as contractors, architects, builders, and supervisors.

The Jews of Egypt range from the very rich to the moderately poor. The richer ones are primarily engaged in banking and higher finance, and a good proportion of present day Egyptian industrial development has been financed by Jewish investment. Some Jewish families have been in Egypt for hundreds of years, and until the political crises of the past several years were considered almost an indigenous minority. Those who arrived in Egypt following World War I were less favorably regarded, not only by the authorities but by some of their co-religionists longer established in the country. Until evidences of Zionist sympathies began to be seen among them, however, they were not discriminated against.

The Armenians, who do not accept Soviet Armenia as a homeland, are accepted as permanent residents by the Egyptians, probably more than any other minority group.

PRESENT TRENDS

The future of most of Egypt's foreign minorities is anything but secure. Moslem Egyptians and members of the minorities alike admit privately that, despite government assurances to the contrary, the foreigner will eventually have no place in Egypt. The foreign minorities are not likely to become Egyptians, with so many of whom they have only geographical residence in common. Few, if any, of them feel any strong loyalty to Egypt, and culturally and politically they look elsewhere. Many members of these groups have been educated in European schools in Egypt or abroad; French is their common language, and only a very few of them bothered to learn to read and write Arabic—until recent legislation made it necessary to do so.

The Egyptians are well aware of the special position long enjoyed by the foreign minorities, and the growing Egyptian middle class is finding a response to its demands that the government make the jobs once monopolized by the minority peoples available to native born Egyptians. Not yet able to compete in terms of qualifications with the minorities, the Egyptian majority is gradually replacing them in favored occupations through direct and indirect discrimination. The Jewish community, in spite of its size and former prestige, has suffered more in recent years than any other. The Egyptian Jews are caught in an invidious position by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and their treatment since 1947 has varied with the state of tension between Israel and its neighbors. The British and French, unpopular with the Egyptians for many years, have been completely ousted since the Suez Canal hostilities in late 1956.

The growth of Egyptian and Arab nationalism is only slowly altering

the complex pattern of kin and local loyalties which traditionally have fragmented the area. Within this pattern there could hardly be said to be a national "majority" group; rather there is a mosaic of villages and kin groups that have had to learn to live side by side despite differences of religion or ethnic origin. As nationalism and national patriotism take root, however, a national majority begins to come into being and there is steadily mounting pressure on the minorities to conform.

LANGUAGES

The National Language

Arabic, introduced by the Arab conquest in 640 A.D., is the official language of Egypt and the native tongue of 98 percent of the population. Spoken in various dialects from Morocco in the west to Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the east, as well as by most of the population of the Sudan and by scattered minorities elsewhere, Arabic is a Semitic language related to Hebrew, Phoenician, Syriac, Aramaic, various Ethiopian languages, and the Akkadian of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. More distantly, this Semitic group of languages is related to Berber and ancient Egyptian. Coptic, the descendant of ancient Egyptian, probably ceased to be a spoken language as early as the sixteenth century; it survives only in books and in the liturgy of the Coptic Church (see Chapter 23, Religion).

Indigenous Minority Languages

Besides Arabic, three indigenous languages are spoken in Egypt—Berber, Beja, and Nubian. Siwa Oasis, near the Libyan border in the Western Desert, has a population of about 5,000 which speaks Berber. The men of Siwa are bilingual in their native Berber and the official Arabic, but most of the women, traditionally excluded from public activity, speak only Berber. Culturally and economically of minor importance in Egypt, the Berber of Siwa is of interest in that it represents the extreme eastern outpost of the Berber branch of the family of Hamito-Semitic languages, Berber is historically related to ancient Egyptian.

Along the Sudanese border from the Red Sea to the Nile live a nomadic Beja minority of around 10,000 people. (The total population of the Beja tribes is around 100,000, but most of them live in Sudan.) The Beja do not write their own language, and the knowledge of Arabic as a second language among them is not great. None of the women know Arabic, and the men seldom speak it with fluency.

The Nubian dialect area extends from Aswan in Egypt to just north of Khartoum in the Sudan, but Nubians, who are widely employed as domestic servants, are to be found in every Egyptian town of any size. All of these Nubian emigres also speak Arabic and are Arabized culturally. The use of Nubian as a written language is forbidden by Egyptian law, and all schooling is done in Arabic. As in Siwa, the men learn Arabic but most of the women speak only Nubian. The total number of Nubian speakers, both Egyptian and Sudanese, is about a million, and the number in Egypt is between 150,000 and 200,000.

Historically, Nubian holds something of an endurance record for minority languages. As early as 1500 B.C. lower Nubia was brought under control by the pharaohs and Egyptianized. Today, 3,500 years later, Nubian shows no more signs of being displaced by Arabic than it was by ancient Egyptian.

Arabic

Arabic everywhere exists in two different forms—classical and colloquial. Classical Arabic is relatively uniform throughout the Arab world, while the colloquial form differs from area to area and many of its dialects, Egyptian and Moroccan for example, are mutually unintelligible. All dialects of colloquial Arabic are as different from classical Arabic as Italian is from Latin. Colloquial Arabic is commonly looked upon as "very difficult" for foreigners; classical Arabic as "very difficult" for foreigners and native-speakers alike.

Phonetically, Arabic is rich in consonants, including a number formed in the larynx and at the back of the mouth. Structurally, Arabic is characterized by a grammar which to speakers of Indo-European languages is apt to seem highly complicated and by a vocabulary in which the majority of words represent variations on roots composed of three consonants. Thus, ktb is a root having to do with "writing"; katab is "he wrote"; kattab, "he dictated"; kaatab, "he corresponded with"; kaatib, "a writer"; kitaaba, "writing"; and kitaab, "a book." The colloquial differs from the classical language in various ways, notably in vocabulary and in the elimination of such classical features as the use of special case endings on verbs and adjectives to indicate duality.

Spoken and Written Usage. Certain social circumstances call for the use of classical Arabic and others for colloquial. In general, however, colloquial is spoken and rarely written, while classical is usually written and rarely spoken. The chief use of classical Arabic is for writing of all sorts. All books, pedagogical materials, periodicals, street signs, personal

letters, train tickets, movie subtitles, official records, etc., are written in classical. Arabic has its own alphabet of 28 characters. The writing runs from right to left. Usually only the consonants are written; there are special diacritical signs to represent the vowels, but they are used only in editions of the Koran and in books for children.

The failure of the script to indicate vowels and the difference between classical and colloquial add to the difficulties of education. In learning to read and write classical Arabic an Egyptian school child must learn not only a complex set of visual and motor skills but what is in many respects a foreign language—which, to make matters worse, is represented in writing mainly by consonant signs. These difficulties, although not decisive in themselves, no doubt contribute to the low literacy level of Egypt. A liberal estimate, including semiliterates, could not place the literacy level above 25 percent. Few students ever learn written classical Arabic thoroughly or achieve accuracy or fluency in it.

The circumstances in which classical Arabic is spoken are limited. Its widest use is in radio broadcasts, where all programs, with certain exceptions such as comedies, soap operas, and impromptu interviews, are in classical Arabic. Public speeches, some university lectures, and other formal occasions call for the classical form. The Egyptian parliament was also conducted in classical Arabic. Mosque sermons are usually delivered in classical, but colloquial is heard in the smaller mosques where the imam (prayer leader) often has little classical learning. At the universities lectures are increasingly given in colloquial, especially in the sciences, while classical Arabic is more and more confined to belles-lettres. President Nasser, in announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, delivered a precedent-shattering three-hour speech in almost pure colloquial. Even where classical is exclusively used, as in news broadcasts, it is of variable quality and usually shows much colloquial influence. Probably the only people in the world capable of speaking grammatically correct classical Arabic are a handful of Moslem Koranic scholars and literary men and a few European Arabists.

The Classical Ideal. Popular opinions about classical Arabic are contradicted by actual behavior and trends in the Arabic-speaking world. Most Egyptians (and other Arabs as well) declare that it would be good if the colloquial should cease to exist and all Arabs everywhere should use only classical for both speaking and writing. But no serious effort is being made anywhere to realize this ideal, and parents continue to speak colloquial to their children. An often expressed hope is that mass media of communication such as radio and television will help in spreading the knowledge and use of classical. That this will happen is doubtful, although

such media may well lead to the introduction of more and more classical words and phrases into the colloquial vocabulary. Colloquial Arabic is looked upon, not as a separate entity, but as a corruption of classical Arabic. Classical Arabic is "correct," colloquial Arabic is "incorrect," and anyone who openly favors colloquial over classical is considered at best an eccentric and at worst a traitor who would destroy the unity of the Arab world.

The prestige accorded classical Arabic is in part due to its religious significance. Moslems believe that the Koran is God's word in form as well as substance. The words of the Koran are believed to be—with differences as to detail among the various sects—the very words that God spoke, recorded exactly as He spoke them. Since there are other languages God could have chosen if He had wished, there is obviously something special about the language God did choose. The Koran, consequently, represents an a priori standard of perfection, and deviation from it can only be for the worse. Revered for its association with the divine, classical Arabic is also admired as the pinnacle of linguistic beauty.

There is an indigenous tradition of philology among the Arabs, and there is an Arabic Academy in Cairo. Attention, however, is devoted exclusively to the classical language; the methods of study are traditional and do not reflect scientific linguistic technique. Grammar and composition are emphasized, and calligraphy has the place of an important art form. Classical and colloquial proverbs, religious quotations of various sorts, and slogans are popular literary devices, and the ability to quote them appropriately on various occasions is a social asset.

Colloquial Arabic. Colloquial Egyptian Arabic is spoken in various mutually intelligible dialects. The chief dialectal division is between Upper and Lower Egypt, with the border line running just south of Cairo at the base of the delta. Within these major dialect areas there are local variations. Thus, in Lower Egypt there is a difference between the speech of the urban centers and that of the villages. The most noticeable dialectical difference (and the one always cited by both Egyptian and foreign laymen) between Upper and Lower Egypt affects two sounds: the classical "j" (as in joy) of Upper Egypt is pronounced "g" (as in go) in Lower Egypt; the classical "q" becomes a glottal stop (as in the "Brooklynese" pronunciation of "t" in bottle) in Lower Egypt but is pronounced "g" (as in go) in Upper Egypt. A point of interest is that the village dialects of Lower Egypt agree with the Upper Egypt dialects on these points.

Despite the blanket criticism of colloquial as "incorrect" vis-a-vis classical, there are standards of correctness within colloquial, and the urban dialect of the delta has more prestige than the dialects of Upper Egypt and the rural delta. Speakers of the latter give evidence of accepting the social

superiority of the urban delta dialect even while verbally denying it. To date, almost all studies of colloquial Egyptian Arabic have been confined to the urban dialect of Lower Egypt. Very little is known in a technical sense of the dialects of Upper Egypt and the rural delta.

Colloquial Arabic is the exclusive language of conversation. No matter how serious or formal the occasion, in any situation where people speak back and forth, actively communicating with one another, colloquial Arabic is used. Even court proceedings, unlike addresses in parliament, are in colloquial Arabic, although court records are of course written in classical Arabic. The circumstances where colloquial instead of classical is written are few, but increasing. One use of written colloquial is for humor; cartoon captions are in colloquial and so are printed jokes. A fair amount of colloquial poetry appears in newspapers and periodicals, and from time to time an editorial appears in the colloquial. These examples of colloquial journalism, however, are probably too occasional to be interpreted as a general trend.

Colloquial Arabic is popularly disparaged. English-speaking Egyptians refer to it as "slang," and the term "Arabic," unless explicitly qualified otherwise, means classical Arabic. Such a question as "How do you say such-and-such in Arabic?" will usually elicit the classical form unless colloquial has been previously specified This same use of the term "Arabic" is found among the foreign minorities. A cultured Italian Egyptian or Greek Egyptian is likely to say, "I don't know Arabic" or "I don't know Arabic very well." Such people usually speak fluent colloquial Arabic and are merely confessing their small competence in classical Arabic. An unconscious conceit, universal throughout Egypt and the rest of the Arab world as well, is the conviction that one's own dialect is "closer to classical" than any other This belief is earnestly stated and held by speakers of all dialectsincluding natives of Upper Egypt, who appear unconscious of the contradiction between their feelings of linguistic inferiority vis-a-vis the urban delta speech and their assertion that their own dialect is the closest of all to the ideal perfection of classical.

A common derogation of colloquial Arabic is that "it has no rules" and "one may speak as one wishes " These statements represent misconceptions, for colloquial Arabic has as definite a grammatical pattern as any language. The misconception arises from several sources. There is the usual feeling of freedom and lack of restraint, born of familiarity, which one feels in speaking one's native language. The Egyptian never studies his native colloquial speech, and in studying classical he observes that the colloquial contradicts many of the classical "rules." These deviations of colloquial from classical are stigmatized as errors by the teacher, not as a

difference of structure in varieties of speech. Colloquial Arabic is considered unworthy of scholarly observation and study by all but foreign lin-

guists and a few westernized Egyptians.

Social Uses of Arabic: Names and Naming. Arabic names are different in pattern from western names in that almost all names have palpable linguistic meaning. In the West only the scholar knows that Dorothy means "gift of God" and Richard means "rich man," but Arabic speakers all know that the name Atiya means "gift of God" and Hamid means "praising God." An aspect of this meaning content of names is that some names are clearly Moslem, some early Christian, and some may be common to both. Many Christian names are similar to western names and derive from a common Greek origin. A common pattern for Moslem names is Abdul—"slave of the"—followed by an epithet of Allah: thus, Abdul Karim "slave of the Generous One," Abdul Latif "slave of the Gracious One," and so on,

Arabic names are commonly longer than western ones, and Moslems especially may have as many as five or six names. Formerly, family names in the western sense were not used in Egypt, although given names did take account of genealogy. Today, family names are employed, but telephone directory listings in the cities are alphabetical by first instead of last names. Nicknames usually bear some phonetic relation to the actual name (e.g., Wahid, nickname Wahwah). Much more than in the West their use is restricted to intimate friends and family; nicknames are never used publicly, and Egyptians are reluctant even to discuss them with strangers. A westerner is wise to avoid both using and inquiring about Egyptian nicknames unless he is completely sure of his ground.

Politeness Formulas. The politeness formulas, which strike the westerner as unnecessarily tedious and time-consuming, are prominent features of both classical and colloquial Arabic usage. Many of these formulas are bound up with the Moslem religion and are not used among Christians or in contacts between Moslems and Christians. A student learning a greeting or some other politeness formula would do well also to learn its social significance and to accept these formulas without becoming impatient with or irritated by them.

Foreign Minority Languages

Of the languages spoken by foreign minorities in Egypt, Greek is numerically the most important with about 70,000 speakers. Italian and Armenian follow with about 50,000 and 30,000 native speakers respectively. Some 7,000 people, a minority of the Jewish population, speak Sephardic Spanish (also known as Judeo-Spanish and Ladino). There were formerly

sizable British and French colonies in Egypt, the 1947 census listing 32,000 British subjects (not all native-speakers of English) and 19,000 French citizens. British actions in the Suez Canal Zone in the winter of 1951-52, however, led to the dismissal of British teachers of English throughout Egypt. The military activities in the Canal Zone in late 1956 led to a further expulsion of British and French nationals, and within a few months the number of native-speakers of these two languages remaining in Egypt could hardly have been more than a few thousand.

The foreign minorities are (and were) concentrated in the cities, mostly in Cairo and Alexandria. Small groups of speakers of other languages are found in the urban centers. German (there is a German school in Cairo) and, more recently, Russian are heard. Numerous Middle Eastern and African languages are represented in the student body of the great Moslem university at Cairo, whose members come from an area reaching from Morocco to Indonesia,

Despite the restrictions it has placed on the indigenous minority languages, Egypt until recently has respected the cultural and linguistic autonomy of its foreign minorities. The Armenian, Greek, Italian, and Jewish communities have long had their own schools, newspapers, and books. One of the best Armenian-English dictionaries is published, printed, and bound in Cairo. Radio Cairo's home service has broadcast in the languages of these communities. However, outside of their own ethnic communities, these minority languages have had little cultural influence in Egypt.

French and English

The status of French and English has been different from that of the other minority languages. Widely learned as second languages both by Arabic-speaking native Egyptians and the foreign minorities, English and French stand high in the hierarchy of second language learning. Native-speakers of English and French rarely bother to learn any other language, even Arabic, and native-speakers of Arabic scarcely ever learn any second language except English or French. The foreign minorities rarely learn each other's languages, but almost all of them know Arabic and most learn either English or French, or both. Families, both native Egyptian and foreign, who send their children to French or English schools usually have the girls learn French and the boys English. Most speakers of minority languages in Egypt are literate, but a fair number of humble people—such as guides and servants—speak English and French without being able to read or write them. All British and French schools were nationalized in November 1956; it is difficult to predict the future status of these languages, but it is doubtful

that they can soon be supplanted.

French, with some 350,000 speakers, remains the most widely known second language in Egypt. For many years French was almost the exclusive language of business and society, and it was a medium of instruction at the universities. Even today a person knowing only English is hampered in shopping in department stores, pharmacies, etc., whereas a French-speaker would have no trouble. Most of the non-Arabic home broadcasts on Radio Cairo are in French, and there are more newspapers in French than in any language other than Arabic. English-language films are provided with subtitles in both French and Arabic, but French films have only Arabic subtitles; Arabic films, if they have subtitles at all, have them in French, not English. Other foreign films have subtitles in Arabic and French and often in Greek, but not in English. The language of the Cairo and Alexandria stock exchanges was also French until the crisis of 1956, when it was abruptly replaced by Arabic.

The ascendancy of French as the chief foreign language had its beginnings with the French occupation of the country between 1798 and 1801. Mohammed Ali, the vigorous ruler of Egypt after the departure of Napoleon, was impressed with European power and resolved to remake the country in the image of Europe. Europe he knew through the medium of France, and it was to France that he turned for knowledge and inspiration. Large numbers of Egyptian students were sent to France, and French instructors were brought to Egypt. The Gallicizing of the Egyptian upper classes proceeded without competition from any other European source until the British occupation in 1882 (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting).

The pre-eminence of French as a bridge to European civilization was shaken by the British occupation, and today there are approximately 300,000 speakers of English in Egypt. In government and in scientific and technical fields English as a second language has no serious rival in Egypt today. French has prestige as a cultural heritage more than as an active force. The fact that there are slightly more speakers of French than English in Egypt is due to the popularity of French among the Greek and Italian minorities. Among native-born, Arabic-speaking Egyptians, English is more widely known than French. English is compulsory in Egyptian public schools, and the number of Egyptian students studying French is a small fraction of those studying English. In 1956 there were 650 Egyptian students in England and the United States and 550 in France, and in the case of students holding government scholarships to study abroad the proportion in favor of English has been overwhelming. The trend today, however, reflects Egyptian hostility to Britain, and students who would normally have been sent to Britain or France are now going to the United States, the Soviet bloc, and West Germany. Until recently, many teachers in Egyptian universities, especially in technical subjects, were British and lectured in English. They have now been largely replaced by Egyptians—usually British—or American-trained—who lecture in Arabic. Scientific textbooks of all sorts (medicine, engineering, agriculture, etc.) and research materials are still mostly in English.

CHAPTER 5

LEGAL AND THEORETICAL BASE OF GOVERNMENT

THE DOMINANT POLITICAL TRADITION

Egypt's experience with written constitutions dates only from the nineteenth century, when, as a western innovation, the first of what was to be a series of constitutional documents appeared. Lacking written constitutions or any great power-channeling documents—such as the Magna Carta in Britain—the Egyptians nevertheless had not been without what may broadly be called a constitutional system, in the sense that every sociopolitical order possesses an applied definition of political power. Egypt has throughout its long history possessed an unwritten constitution, one which, characteristically, did not stress limitation of power but presented customs and conventions permitting a high degree of rule-making authority centralized in the executive.

The first constitutional instruments of the last century did little to challenge this authoritarian tradition of the past, for they mainly articulated the purely advisory power of embryonic legislatures or semi-parliaments of the day. In the course of time, they came more and more to assert an authority countering that of the executive, but these assertions were rarely successful. To the present, there has been no real victory of legislative power over the supreme authority of the executive in Egypt. At the most, the forms of parliamentary government and responsibility have taken shape alongside an executive that has continued to dominate in policy making and administration. Egypt's modern constitutions are not the products of deliberations by popular constituent assemblies, but grants or formal concessions by the executive. What a supreme executive grants, it can take away. With some qualifications, this appears to be as true in Egypt today as it was in the time of Mohammed Ali.

The deeply rooted tradition of political authoritarianism must, however, be seen in the light of an important fact: government in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East occupies a less extensive, if more arbitrary, position in the social whole than it does in most western countries. Other

institutions perform many of the functions which in the West adhere to government and thereby tend to restrict the scope and effectiveness of governmental activity. In Egypt, one such institution is the family, which plays a dominant role in the making of social decisions (see Chapter 20, The Family).

Under the old political order, it was quite natural for nepotism to prevail in Egyptian government. Families took care of their own as a matter of course, and anyone who ignored the claims of kinship was severely criticized for failing to meet his social obligations. The family institution permeated government and served to protect and advance the interests of kinsmen with respect to place and advantages. Families punished and rewarded their members, granting or withholding benefits. The family in effect protected the individual from isolation and cushioned the impact of authoritarian government upon him. The present Egyptian regime, which sees itself in a revolutionary role, is seeking to modify the operation of old ties in the political realm by requiring that those who benefit by getting jobs through family connections actually have the capacity to fulfill their responsibilities and seriously undertake to do so. The government is also greatly expanding the area of its activities, but the central position of the family in Egyptian society is likely to persist for a long time. At most, its functions are today being given a new orientation and direction.

ROLE OF THE STATE IN ISLAM

Unity of Government and Religion

Government and political power in Islamic countries are at once limited because they operate from a foundation supplied by the more basic institution, the family, and highly pervasive because wedded to religion. Formerly, civil and canon law in Egypt were one and the same thing. This ceased to be true during the period of western influence, and the sharia (religious) courts have been abolished by the new revolutionary regime (see Chapter 6, Structure of Government, Chapter 8, Definition and Enforcement of Public Order). Nevertheless, the civil law is impregnated with Moslem concepts. The jurist, the lawyer, and the legal publicist must be thoroughly grounded in the Moslem legal tradition, the Koran, the Sunna (the Moslem customs and traditions of the community), and the Hadith (sayings of Mohammed). Western legal theories and systems, particularly those of France, have had a strong impact upon Egyptian civil and criminal codes, but they are applied in a Moslem context and are subject to interpretation from Moslem legal premises. Not only must the civil law be

understood largely in terms of its impregnation with Islamic religious rules, but the policy pronouncements of Egyptian political leaders must be interpreted against this background.

Sunnite Orthodoxy in Egypt

In Moslem countries political theory and the way in which political power was validated reflect to a considerable degree the working out of problems that arose in the spread and development of Islam. What Allah has allowed to happen acquires a practical legitimacy. The decaying, corrupt regime of Farouk lasted as long as it did, not only because of the age-old resignation and passivity of the Egyptian people, but also because under the Sunnite tradition that government's very existence gave it legitimacy. The Nasser regime similarly benefits from this tradition. Sunnite orthodoxy also provides a sanction under which Egyptian rulers may more easily claim political primacy in Islam as a whole. Farouk is said to have aspired to the Caliphate. Nasser, judging from his public statements, aspires to lead all the Arab states. Should he succeed, he would in Sunnite eyes have fulfilled the will of Allah and a succession stemming from the time of Mohammed.

The religious tradition makes the ruler—whether or not he has aspired to the explicit title of khalifa—the protagonist of both the Church and the State. Much of the official propaganda coming from Egypt in effect asserts the right of such a ruler to launch or lead a jihad (Holy War) against the infidel to bring about the unity of the Arab nations and even of all Islam. Such considerations emphasize the fact that Egyptian developments must be interpreted in terms of Islamic premises and history rather than in terms of western concepts.

WESTERN IMPACT ON EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Egypt and the Middle East came under great political, social, and economic pressure from Europe (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting). These influences introduced a novel social dynamism into Egyptian society. The ruling elite came under western, especially French, cultural influence. More and more, the educated leadership began to think of political reform in terms of written constitutions establishing representative bodies with the authority to control key items of public policy, such as the budget; some degree of executive responsibility to the legislature also was contemplated. The mass of the people were little influenced by these developments, and even the ruling groups moved

little beyond the limits of their Islamic heritage. The western impact, however, made it necessary to find legal and constitutional instruments suitable to the new forms of political and economic life which were taking shape. (See Chapter 7, Dynamics of Political Behavior, for discussion of popular attitudes toward political institutions.)

The Egyptians long ago learned to fear and distrust governors, and they developed a corresponding cynical disrespect for the instruments by which these might propose to rule. The groups that fostered constitutions tended by virtue of their western education to be isolated from their Moslem backgrounds, and to be doubly suspect on this account. To the people, both old-style Moslem rulers and newly westernized rulers were the hated hukkam (rulers), about whom the following two-part song is revealing:

- A: They starve us, they starve us,
- B: They beat us, they beat us,
- A: But there's someone above,
 There's someone above,
- B: Who will punish them well, Who will punish them well.

This song did not so much indicate popular opposition to authoritarian government as to government in general. There was a feeling of oppression, but the punishment of oppressors was reserved to God. Acceptance of oppression on this earth was the will of Allah.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM MOHAMMED ALI TO 1923

Mohammed Ali to Lord Dufferin

Egypt was the first Arabic-speaking country to be freed from Turkish rule, which was no more than nominal by the time of Napoleon's invasion and continued to decline during the rule of Mohammed Ali and after. Even though Turkish cultural influences remained significant, the weakness of Turkey's control enhanced the opportunity for European influence to penetrate Egypt and further weaken Turkish power.

One manifestation of European influence was the creation of advisory councils to the ruler. Napoleon began the process by establishing several advisory councils (diwan). One of these, the Special Council (al-diwan al-khususi), although appointive, represented several groups in the country: the ulama (learned men), the army, merchants, the Copts, the French. Although these councils did not last, they provided precedents for the future.

Mohammed Ali in turn produced a so-called constitution in 1826, which transformed the old Divan (diwan)—Executive Council of the ruler.

He created the Advisory or Consultative Council (majlis al-mashwarah), made up of 156 members: 33 high officials, 24 district or local officials, and 99 notables. Its function was to advise in matters of administration, education, and public works, to receive complaints, and to put forward suggestions. These limitations reflect the restricted concerns of the government, which were largely fiscal and judicial. Moreover, the advisory nature of the majlis reflected Mohammed Ali's preservation of the Asian practice of giving petitioners direct access to the ruler. He also reorganized the provinces under 12 provincial governments and attempted rather unsuccessfully to apply to officials in them new titles derived from France. In actual effect these changes were superficial, and the whole system continued to be administered by the whip (kurbash), tempered by bribery (bakhsheesh). It is clear that Mohammed Ali and his successors regarded the new government assemblies as personal creations designed to advise the ruler to the degree he desired, and not as checks upon autocratic authority. But under Ismail the assemblies began to assert claims revealing both the growing importance of western ideas and the disposition of assembly members to view the authority of the executive as limited.

In November 1866, Ismail issued a decree establishing the Assembly of Delegates made up of 75 members indirectly elected for a three-year term. Strictly limited by the decree to the consideration of domestic affairs, the Assembly could only advise; its advice would be accepted or rejected entirely at the discretion of the khedive. The khedive's exclusive right to convoke, adjourn, prorogue, or dissolve the body gave him ample powers to combat any show of independence.

The initial conflict between the Assembly and the government was over a financial question. In 1876 a delegate discreetly but firmly requested the government to reveal its past, present, and future financial objectives. Rather remarkably, the Khedive in that year agreed that the continuation of a certain tax, the muqabala, would depend on the will of the Assembly. The body indicated that it appreciated this recognition of its authority and would proceed to use it. Its reply to the speech from the throne showed none of the fulsome flattery notable in former years. In 1879, in another reply to the throne, the Assembly asserted the principle of ministerial responsibility, the right of the people (ummah) to freedom, and the right of the Assembly to participate in making decisions affecting the future of the country. A new constitution of the Assembly proposed the same year by the Prime Minister called for the delegates to take an oath not only to the Khedive but also the watan (nation). On down to the time of Lord Dufferin's work in 1882 the Assembly continued to demand greater authority in relation to the executive-a development accompanied

by a declining representation in the Assembly of the <u>umdah</u> (village headman), on whose conservatism and compliance the executive was able to rely.

From Lord Dufferin to 1923

With the British occupation in 1882, Lord Dufferin, the British Ambassador to Turkey, was sent to Egypt to assist in reorganizing the administrative system. His report, drawn up on consultation with the London Foreign Office, was based on observations in the country. The Viceroy's Council in India was also of some importance as a model in influencing his final proposals—which became the new Egyptian Organic Law.

Dufferin proposed successfully the establishment of the two new quasi parliaments. One, the Legislative Council (majlis shura al-qawanin), was made up of 30 members, of whom 14, including the president and one vicepresident, would be chosen by the khedive and his government and 16, including a second vice-president, by the provincial councils and electoral groups representing the cities. The Council was consultative; it could discuss the budget and general legislation but could exer ise no initiative. The only advance over earlier assemblies would seem to be that the Ministry was required to explain why it had not followed the advice rendered by the Council. The other, the General Assembly (al-jamiyyah al-umumiyyah), was made up of 82 members, consisting of the ministers, members of the Legislative Council, and 46 delegates chosen by electors from the country at large. Candidates were required to be more than 30 years of age, literate, and paying at least LE 50 per year in direct taxes. Although the Assembly's functions were mainly advisory, its vote was needed for any new taxes, and its opinion had to be consulted on loans, construction of canals and railways, and land classification. It could discuss and offer advice on any matter, and the government was required to explain its reasons for rejecting such advice. In addition to these national councils, Dufferin also successfully proposed the establishment of provincial councils.

The more elaborate system was a British product and not the outcome of any organic growth of parliamentary institutions in Egypt. Moreover, British liberals at home to the contrary, it did not reflect any confidence on the part of its author that the country was ready for self-government. The electorates consisted of 13, 28 percent of the population, and the delegates during the initial years were apathetic and ineffectual. Later, under the influence of the Khedive Abbas II Hilmi, the two assemblies followed his lead in registering nationalist opposition to British rule.

These assemblies and councils, although western in form, often

showed-to British consternation-the fundamentally Islamic premises of their members, as when the Legislative Council advised the government in 1890 that certain types of criminals should be crucified or maimed. Often a speaker had only to justify a position on religious grounds to gain the unanimous support of all Moslems in the Legislative Council. The assemblies performed one service of considerable importance, however, in constantly drawing attention to the meager appropriations for education under British rule. Leadership in the legislative bodies remained inadequate, for the country's political talent was not focused on them as significant instrumentalities. Often, as few as 1 percent of the qualified electorate voted, showing an apathy that could not but be communicated to the bodies themselves. On one occasion in 1910, however, the Ministry yielded to pressure expressed in the General Assembly as well as in the country at large and dropped a proposed extension of the Suez Canal concession. Although the Assembly and Council were not representative of the people in general but rather of the privileged few, they gradually increased their pressure on the government for broader powers in the internal government of the country. More attention was given to their advice, and the British under Lord Kitchener, who became Consul-General in 1911, decided to establish a more popular assembly.

In July 1913 the Legislative Assembly (al-jamiyyah al-tashriyyah) was established. It included the ministers, 17 members nominated by the government, and 66 elected members. Among the nominated members the Copts would be represented by four, the Bedouins three, merchants two. doctors two, engineers one, educational groups two, and the municipal interest one. The government also appointed the Assembly's president and first vice-president. This body gained few additional powers and privileges. No projected law could be promulgated, however, without being submitted to the Assembly for criticism, and no new tax measure could be applied without a vote of the Assembly. The Assembly could express opinions on government measures and formulate projects of its own. It could accept, amend, or reject any measure of the government; in case of disagreement, the government could after 15 days either prorogue the Assembly or publish the law, provided it explained its reasons. Certain subjects such as the Civil List, the tribute to Turkey, the public debt, and foreign obligations were not to be discussed.

The electorate was enlarged to include about 2 million people, who elected, at a ratio of one to 50 voters, elector-delegates; these in turn elected the Assembly. Candidates for election to this Assembly initiated the process of announcing campaign platforms, the first to do so being Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the rising nationalist leader. The Assembly marked a closer

collaboration of government and legislature, although it was never allowed to interfere unduly in matters which the government chose to reserve to executive decisions. World War I brought an indefinite postponement of the meetings of the Assembly.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1923

Following the establishment of nominal independence in 1922 and the end of the British protectorate (which dated from 1914), a commission was created to prepare a constitution. On April 19, 1923, the first written Egyptian Constitution was promulgated by royal decree. It was based largely on the Belgian model of 1830-31. Except for an interim period between October 1930 and December 1935, when a substitute constitution more favorable to the royal authority was in effect, this Constitution remained in force until superseded by the decision of the revolutionary military junta in December 1952.

The Constitution outlined a monarchical executive government dominating a representative legislature. It provided for popular participation in administration and the making and execution of laws. However, the authority assigned to the chief of state (king) and the chief of government (prime minister) preserved much of the executive's old power to block the legislature. Principles were embodied that in application were mutually contradictory. It was stated that all power resided in the people; yet the king, in addition to his executive authority, was given legislative power conjointly with the new Senate and Chamber of Deputies, Each could take the initiative in legislation. Thus, the ideal of a monarchy limited by representative institutions confronted the actuality of provisions providing for strong royal authority. The king possessed a strong suspensory veto; he could prorogue Parliament or adjourn it for a month; in the interim, he could rule by decrees, subject to subsequent parliamentary ratification. He opened sessions by a speech from the throne to which the Chambers replied. His ministers were collectively responsible to the legislature, but the king possessed enough discretion to be able to obstruct them in the fulfillment of this responsibility and to follow an independent course of his own. Such power in the hands of a stubborn, willful, unwise monarch was an important factor in the accumulated pressures which led to the military coup of July 23, 1952,

Two fifths of the Senate were appointed by the king on the advice of the prime minister, who was often his creature. The rest were elected by the body itself. The Chamber of Deputies was elected by indirect ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. Each 60,000 inhabitants were represented

by an elector, and the electors chose the members of the Chamber of Deputies, whose terms were for five years. The Chamber elected its own officers. The Wafd (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting; Chapter 7, Dynamics of Political Behavior) won most Egyptian elections after 1923, but the king was often able to prevent the leaders of the party from forming a correlative number of governments or maintaining them for any length of time.

During this period of slow development of parliamentary institutions in Egypt, changes were often of form rather than of substance, yet gradually at least some of the people were being educated in the possibility of participating in the administration of their own affairs. Some were becoming aware also of new political opportunities and alternatives. This awareness was translated into action with the revolutionary coup, which came at a time when the prestige of the House of Mohammed Ali, in the person of Farouk, had fallen to the lowest depths.

During the period of parliamentary and constitutional development, there did not arise any concept of the rule of law operating mainly through an independent judiciary sufficiently strong to limit the arbitrary actions of government (see Chapter 6, Structure of Government). The tradition of executive fiat thus made it easier for the revolutionary military junta to mainly operate through decrees of martial law.

THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME

The military regime that came into power in Egypt on July 23, 1952, did not immediately break with the monarchical principle. Prior to the coup, the young officers who led the conspiracy retained hope that reforms might be carried out with royal assistance. Only when it was decided that King Farouk was hopelessly incorrigible did they cut their ties with the royal regime. The junta had been aroused by the corruption in government, political parties, and the Parliament, particularly as it had affected the army and interfered with the prosecution of operations against the Israelis. There was also deep resentment of the domination of foreign elements, mainly Turkish and Albanian, who had largely controlled the old administration. In all of this, the conspirators were moved by what they opposed. It was only after the successful capture of power that they conceived positive projects for large political, social, and economic changes.

The coup brought in an extra-constitutional regime that could justify itself only in revolutionary terms. It represented a break in constitutional continuity, but the Constitution was not immediately repudiated. As time passed, the repudiation pressure increased. In December 1952 parliamentary activity and the 1923 Constitution were suspended. All political

parties were suspended a month later. On February 10, 1953, an interim constitution was announced, and on June 18 of the same year a new republic was proclaimed with Naguib as President. During the course of 1954 a struggle ensued between the relatively conservative General Mohammed Naguib and the rising star of the Revolutionary Command Council, Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser—who finally emerged pre-eminent with the deposition of Naguib in November. The revolutionary regime continued to rule under the terms of martial law until mid-1956. In June 1956 a new and presumably permanent Constitution was accepted by popular referendum, and simultaneously Nasser was elected President.

The new Constitution does not represent a complete break with the past. It departs from the tradition of the previous written constitutions in that, where they established a parliamentary government at least in form, it opens the way for almost candid dictatorship. Aside from the large grants of power made to the executive, it provides (Article 192) for the creation of what amounts to a single political party under the direction of the president of the Republic.

Not enough time has elapsed to make clear how the Constitution will develop in actual application. The great power of the executive and the one-party principle, if not modified, can hardly fail to vitiate the functioning of the legislature. Although private rights are affirmed, they are likely to prove insubstantial and merely formal in the face of executive prerogatives. In short, the document is a blueprint which allows the government to act solely in terms of officially defined interests. Under such a system, there is no room for individual interests or rights as such.

The new Constitution is to a considerable extent a document announcing great public welfare goals. The Preamble is notable for strong language directed against external aggressors and internal exploitation. It inveighs against imperialism, feudalism, monopoly, capitalistic domination of government. It champions a strong national army, social justice, and democracy. It guarantees the right to a living and the right to worship free of all concern except conscience and reason. It affirms belief in equality and justice.

Articles 1 through 3 describe the new state as "a sovereign independent Arab state," organized as a Democratic Republic, whose people are a part of the Arab nation. Sovereignty belongs, it is asserted, to the nation, to be exercised as prescribed by the Constitution. Islam is declared the religion of the state and Arabic the official language. Articles 4 through 29 assert social solidarity as the essence of the society, the family as the basic unit, and religion, morality, and patriotism as the basic constituents. A long series of articles in this part establish and guarantee private economic

activity within the bounds of public interest, security, freedom, and dignity; the submission of capital to the national economy; the harmony of public and private interest; maximum limitation on agricultural land ownership; a minimum standard of living; rights for women and young people; social security standards; public ownership of natural resources.

Articles 30 through 63 define public rights and obligations. The notable feature of the rights asserted is that they are subject to definition by law. In many cases rights are stated as general admonitions. The statements of rights generally precede those of obligation, but this probably indicates no priority in the minds of the authors.

Part IV defines the powers of organs of government. Chapter I, Article 64 declares the president to be the head of the state, his powers to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. Chapter II, beginning with Article 65, defines legislative power as residing in the National Assembly, and asserts that this power controls the executive according to the terms of the Constitution. Election to the National Assembly is established on the principle of universal secret ballot. Membership is limited to those 30 years of age or over. The duration of the Assembly's mandate is five years. Ordinarily it must begin its annual sessions on the second Thursday of November, this ordinary session to continue for at least seven months or until the annual budget has been approved, whichever is longer. The Assembly may be convoked in an extraordinary session by the president of the Republic, or upon request signed by a majority of members. There appears in the document, then, a seeming plenitude of powers reserved to the Assembly, but these statements must be balanced off against the one-party provision and the executive power.

Article 119 restates the executive power as inhering in the president. He is both chief of state and chief executive officer of the government. By subsequent articles, it is provided that he must be an Egyptian, born of Egyptian parents and grandparents. He must be at least 35 years of age. The candidature of a president is determined by the National Assembly and this candidature is submitted to national plebiscite. His term is six years, beginning the day upon which the results of the plebiscite are announced. He may, in the case of a temporary hindrance to his performance of the office, appoint, with the approval of the Assembly, a minister to carry out his duties. In case of resignation or permanent disability, the Assembly declares a vacancy and the president of the Assembly takes over the presidential functions, with a new election to be completed within 60 days of the declaration of vacancy.

The president with his ministers initially outlines all public policy. He may propose, veto, and promulgate laws. He has a suspensory veto

which he may exercise by sending a measure back to the Assembly within 30 days of its enactment. Article 135 grants him a decree power which is very ample, yet ambiguous in statement, since it is not clear whether the National Assembly can be in session or not. In certain situations prescribed by the National Assembly he may issue decrees having the force of law. He issues all public regulations and those necessary for the execution of the laws, upon the proposal of a competent minister. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces. He declares war after the approval of the National Assembly, concludes treaties, ratifies, and publishes them, whereupon they come into force. He must, however, transmit them to the legislature, some of them for approval.

Articles 146 through 156 set forth the power of the president to appoint ministers and dismiss them, and other matters concerning the ministry. The ministers are responsible to him, although they individually must have the confidence of the National Assembly. Ministers exercise immediate control over their ministries, which are concerned with the executions of general governmental policy in their respective spheres. They may be tried on indictment of the president of the Republic or the National Assembly for crimes committed while performing official functions.

Articles 157 through 166, dealing with local administration, provide for a highly centralized system of local government. The armed forces are heavily stressed in Articles 169 through 174.

Articles 175 through 183 deal with the judiciary, which is made independent under the law, free from interference from other authorities. The judicial machinery is organized by law. Judges are not subject to dismissal except as prescribed by law. The law governs appointment, transfer, and disciplining of judges. Similar provisions govern public prosecutors.

Article 189 prescribes a complicated procedure for the amendment of the Constitution. Under the authoritarian regime made possible by this document, it will be surprising if most public or official purposes cannot be accomplished by fiat interpretation of constitutional provisions, bypassing the necessity for amendment. In any event, single-party control of the legislature makes it certain that the complicated procedure will not obstruct the passage of an amendment desired by the government.

CHAPTER 6

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The apparatus of national government in modern Egypt resembles the western models on which it was designed. The resemblance is superficial, however, for the way in which the familiar structures are used and the social purposes they must serve are distinctively Egyptian.

Wherever governments exist, they operate as instruments of social control, and in the West the scope of government has been extended to include a very wide range of human affairs as notions of common welfare and community responsibility have widened. Tempering the potentially authoritarian features of this development has been the West's dual ideal of the integrity of the individual and the value of the democratic process. The Egyptian experience, shared in its major outlines with the other peoples of the Middle East, has been different.

Government in Egypt is at once restricted in the actual scope of its functions and authoritarian in its operation. From the pharaohs to the military junta of today, Egypt's rulers have been accustomed to exercising arbitrary power, and, characteristically, the executive machinery through which they have ruled has been highly centralized. This tendency to centralized political control has distinguished the dense and sedentary population of the Nile since early dynastic times. As with other Middle Eastern peoples, however, and in contrast with developments in the West, the scope of governmental activity in Egypt has traditionally been limited to fiscal and judicial matters. To these primary concerns has been added the historical preoccupation of Egyptian rulers with large-scale public works and the control of the waters of the Nile. It did not occur to the members of the governmental institution to go much beyond these functions, for in other spheres of life the effective social services and controls were maintained by such units as the family and the village. These, together with the network of friendship groups and religious and occupational associations, have, in supplementing the work of government, marked the social boundaries beyond which political action did not reach. Moreover, because the loyalties, points of view, and ways of doing things learned in these institutions are

carried by Egyptians into government, they have constantly influenced government from within.

Of the two political features of authoritarianism and restricted function, Egypt's present day regime seems to be emphasizing the first and greatly modifying the second. The dictatorial powers wielded by the Nasser government have their sanction in centuries of Egyptian practice. But the ambitious goals and the wide area of government responsibility defined or implied in the new Constitution and reflected in the multitude of official agencies represent an effort to inject government into areas of Egyptian life which heretofore have been managed by other institutions in other ways. The outcome remains to be seen. Clearly, the success of the effort requires much more than "honesty" or "efficiency" in the formal apparatus of government itself. Other and more widely based institutions are involved. What is at issue is whether these can be remolded and made to relinquish functions which they have performed for generations of Egyptians.

GOVERNMENT UNDER THE MONARCHY

Although dating from the 1860's, the parliamentary system of government has no deep roots in Egypt. As elsewhere in the Middle East, the system is largely a western importation that has not displaced the traditional acceptance of and respect for a highly controlled regime having its locus of power firmly centered in the executive. Parliamentary government has never had the support of either the extreme right or left political factions in Egypt, where nonparliamentary forces such as the pseudo-fascist Socialist Party, the Moslem Brotherhood, and the underground Communist Party have to one degree or another been active. Representative institutions tend to have been championed largely by the most westernized and politically moderate groups. The forms for such institutions have existed since the nineteenth century. The Organic Law of 1883 provided for provincial councils, a legislative assembly, and a legislative council. These bodies were purely consultative, however, and had little influence on policy. Under the British occupation the driving force of government was provided by British officials.

With the establishment of an independent constitutional monarchy in 1923, the tradition of a strong executive was further reinforced (see Chapter 5, Legal and Theoretical Base of Government). The parliamentary process often served as a screen for royal dictatorship or a combination of royal and party dictatorship. This dictatorship amounted to an interplay of the power of the palace and that of the party leadership, modified by a conservative religious influence exercised by the Moslem Brotherhood and

the University of al-Azhar. A fourth balancing force in Egyptian government was provided periodically by British influence, exercised vigorously until the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and again during World War II.

With this concentration of real power in the hands of the king and the executive, it is not surprising that parliament rarely acted as the dominating force in government. Elections were usually "controlled," and the reasons for the frequent rise and fall of cabinets had little connection with their relative strength in parliament.

The general instability of short-lived cabinets, coupled with increasing dissatisfaction with widespread corruption, inefficiency, and nepotism in the bureaucracy, as well as the failure of Egyptian arms against Israel which was attributed to these causes, were all important contributory factors in the growth of a revolutionary reform movement among the younger army officers which eventually led to the coup of July 1952. Also of great importance was the gradual disintegration of the major cementing force of the governmental system—the popularity of the monarchy. Farouk's public and personal behavior in the latter years of his reign tended to discredit not only the monarchy but the existing order as a whole.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTS

After the forced abdication of Farouk in favor of his infant son in July 1952, Egypt was ruled by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a military junta nominally headed by General Mohammed Naguib. The Constitution of 1923 was discarded, all political parties were disbanded, and parliamentary life was suspended. On June 18, 1953, the RCC proclaimed Egypt a republic with Naguib as President and Premier. He was deposed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the real leader of the revolution, in November 1954. Egypt was in effect governed by a dictatorship of the RCC from 1952 until its dissolution after the elections of June 23, 1956. On this date Nasser became President and a new constitution calling for October elections of a national assembly was ratified. Although changed in name and form, the dictatorship persisted in the period subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution in June 1956. Former RCC members continue to form the policymaking core of the Cabinet and in addition are expected to serve as the executive committee of the new National Union, which is to be Egypt's sole legitimate political party.

GOVERNMENT UNDER THE NEW REGIME

The Executive

Since the coup of 1952 both executive and legislative functions have resided in the RCC. Since June 23, 1956, the President and the Cabinet, which has a nucleus of former RCC members, continue to govern by decree.

Throughout modern Egyptian political history the cabinet has been the most important means of controlling government. Under the monarchy, this body, with the support of the king, not only controlled the two chambers of the legislature but the electoral process as well. Egyptians had become accustomed to consider the power to establish and dismiss cabinets as the supreme power in the country's politics, whether it might reside in the British occupation authorities, in the king, or, following the coup of 1952, the RCC, which became a kind of collective executive, until President Nasser assumed its power under the Constitution of 1956.

Following the coup and the subsequent abolition of the monarchy, the RCC made few changes in the Egyptian judicial and administrative system. Under the new regime, policy changes took precedence over structural changes. The major examples of structural changes or additions were the establishment of a Revolutionary Tribunal, with politico-judicial functions; the establishment of certain other special courts, such as "people's courts," for the trial of offenses against the government, and a Graft Court, to deal with cases of official corruption; a Ministry of National Guidance with propaganda functions; and two economic agencies, the High Agrarian Reform Committee and the National Production Council. The first of these economic agencies deals with the redistribution of land in accordance with the Land Reform Law of 1952. The second is charged with administering the national economic development program. The membership of both the Committee and the Council is made up of various ministers and undersecretaries, plus additional appointed members.

The Egyptian cabinet has varied in size, but its ministries usually number about twenty. In March 1956, the portfolios were as follows:

Prime Minister Finance and Economy

Deputy Prime Minister Minister of State for Presidential

Communications Affairs
Interior Agriculture
War and Marine and Public Health

Commander-in-Chief Justice Social Affairs Wagfs

Municipal and Rural

Affairs

Public Works
Commerce and Industry

National Guidance and

Education

Sudan Affairs

Supply

Foreign Affairs

Under the new regime, the most important ministries, involving key positions of political control, have been retained by the military. This practice involves particularly the Ministry of the Interior, with its powers over the police, local government, and internal security against counterrevolution. Until recently, certain ministries concerned with economic affairs, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs (dealing with labor and social security, etc.) had been of prime importance, due to the government's emphasis upon public welfare, but because of its recent preoccupation with foreign affairs, financial stringencies have interfered with activity and progress along these lines.

The Judiciary

The modern Egyptian judiciary has experienced a complex evolution. In addition to religious (sharia) courts, there existed until 1949 not only a national system of courts, but also Mixed Courts and consular courts. The Mixed Courts dealt with cases involving foreigners of different nationalities or foreigners and Egyptians; the consular courts dealt with cases involving foreigners of the same nationality according to their own laws. While the former were thoroughly integrated with the Egyptian system, the latter were, in fact, foreign courts adjudicating on Egyptian territory. Both systems of courts were abolished in 1949, and with the recent abolition of the religious courts, dealing with personal status and marriage, there remained a single unified national system of courts. Certain other special courts of various religious communities have also been abolished under the impact of nationalist objections to them.

National System of Courts. The court system now remaining has been given jurisdiction over the whole range of civil and criminal justice, including spheres of jurisdiction formerly handled by the special courts. The Civil Code consists of a combination or partial synthesis of western and Moslem juridical principles.

Above the courts of the umdahs, or justices of the peace (the courts of the village headmen), which deal with the most petty civil and criminal offenses, are the summary tribunals, each presided over by a single judge. Above these in the hierarchy are the courts of first instance (central tribunals), with five judges who hear appeals from the summary courts and handle

civil claims of more than LE 250. Courts of appeal hear appeals from the courts of first instance, at Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Mansura, and Assiut. Finally, a Court of Cassation was established in 1930, with two chambers, one for civil and one for criminal cases. The latter court may review cases on questions of law, set aside lower court judgments in conflict with precedents and return them for retrial. The Ministry of Justice exercises an administrative control over the court system. Judges are nominated by the Ministry subject to presidential appointment.

Under the Ministry of Justice there also functions the office and staff of the Chief Public Prosecutor, a Parquet after the French model. It has both investigatory and prosecution functions and intervenes in cases before ordinary courts involving personal status and nationality, as well as in other cases enumerated by law.

A Council of State was attached to the office of the President of the Council of Ministers under the old regime. It was made up of independent jurists, operating under a special Administrative Code as an administrative court to decide charges of illegal or arbitrary action on the part of public officials. It was also empowered to advise ministries concerning the extent of their powers. It was reasonable to anticipate that under any authoritarian regime such as that of Egypt today the powers of such a court to declare acts of government ultra vires would be seriously curtailed, if the court were not itself abolished. In mid-1957, the laws implementing Article 176 of the new 1956 Constitution were still being awaited to determine whether this court would survive under the new regime.

DIVISIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Egypt is a unitary state, and control of provincial administration is therefore centralized chiefly in the Ministry of the Interior. The chief administrative divisions are the provinces (mudiriyat), governorates (muhafizat), and the frontier districts.

Sixteen Provinces:

Lower Egypt	Upper Egypt
Beheira	Giza
Gharbiya	Beni Suef
Daqahliya	Faiyum
Sharqiya	Minya
Minufiya	Assiut
Qalyubiya	Girga
Kafr el Sheikh	Qena
Al Tahrir	Aswan

Al Tahrir is the "Liberation Province" created in 1954 on the western edge of the desert as a model to emphasize land reform and new agricultural methods. Specially financed, its population is to be made up of carefully selected and transplanted fellahin.

Five Governorates:

Four Frontier Districts:

Cairo Alexandria Suez Damietta Canal Zone Red Sea Coast
Sinai
Southern Desert
Western Desert (including
Siwah, Bahariya, and
Farafra oases)

Local Administration

The <u>mudir</u> (governor or head of the administration of a province) is appointed by the Minister of the Interior. He also acts as president ex officio of the provincial council, which is comprised of two representatives from each district (<u>markaz</u>) in the province as well as certain other ex officio members. The provincial council has formal authority with respect to the maintenance of law and order and normal administration, and also health, agriculture, and elementary schools. It also must approve the establishment or abolition of villages as governmental entities. The administrative apparatus of the provinces, the district officers (<u>mamur markaz</u>), and the police commandants (<u>hakimdar</u>) all function under the direction of the mudir. This control is of more substantial importance than the power of the councils. Although the police in the provinces are subject to the direct orders of the Ministry of the Interior, they are under the immediate control of the mudirs and mamurs.

The district officer or mamur, like the mudir, is also a representative of the Ministry of the Interior. Besides considerable responsibility for public security, he has responsibility for the keeping of public records, the maintenance of liaison between the mudir and the umdahs (headmen) of the villages in his district, and represents the government in all local legal proceedings.

The five governorates are also under the direct supervision of, and their officials are appointed by, the Ministry of the Interior. They are closely identified with certain municipalities. The chief official in each is the muhafiz. Each governorate is in part at least represented on a municipal council. The governorates of Cairo and Alexandria are the most important and include the municipalities plus the environs. The governorate

of Damietta is, however, identical with the municipality. They are further divided and subdivided into areas headed by mamurs and sheikhs respectively.

The four frontier districts are under the administration of the Minister of War.

Municipalities and Villages

Some of the larger villages and municipalities are under the general supervision of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. This ministry may establish councils for villages or groups of villages of 3,000 or more inhabitants. They enjoy some degree of local autonomy under this regime, although the ex officio presidency of the councils by the district mamurs provides for supervision by the Ministry of the Interior. Other ex officio members plus elected members make up the council. The powers of the village councils are somewhat more limited than those of the municipalities.

The municipalities also have councils made up of ex officio as well as elected members. The mudir or his delegate is the president of the council. Elected members serve for four years and are subject to re-election. The councils' acts are subject to the approval of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs with respect to their spheres of widest competence, but the presence of the mudir also assures the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior.

Smaller Villages

The great majority of the villages of Egypt are administered by a village headman (umdah) without the assistance of a council. This official is locally nominated but is appointed and dismissed by the government and acts under the direction of the district mamur. He must be a native of the village, be over 25 years of age, and own 10 feddans of land (of which 5 are exempted from taxation in compensation for his services). Moreover, he must be of sufficient economic status to permit him to pay taxes to the amount of LE 10 annually. The appointment usually goes to the head of the leading family of the village. The maintenance of law and order is his chief function; he is assisted by a force of 20 to 25 irregular police (ghafirs). He may imprison an offender for as long as 24 hours and impose fines up to 15 piasters. He must assist the tax collector, but his real interests are identified as much with the village as with the government. In all other matters he is an intermediary between the government and the village.

THE BUREAUCRACY

The civil administration has suffered from its great and cumbersome size, numbering generally about a quarter of a million, and, for example, in 1940 absorbing one-third of the government's revenue. Its reform has become an announced goal of the present revolutionary regime. Other characteristics of the bureaucracy have been general corruption (vulnerability to bribery) and nepotism. These qualities have not been viewed with particularly strong disapproval and have had little effect upon the high social prestige of the civil service. The latter has been maintained despite low government salaries, which also increase corruption as well as the necessity for officials to try to supplement their salaries by additional employment. Despite the fact that government service remains a major goal of those who have received secondary or higher education and despite the prestige of such service, the present government has a serious problem recruiting reliable personnel, particularly in the higher echelons, because of the identification of many bureaucrats with the old regime.

EFFECT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION

Although Egypt's new Constitution substantially alters the formal structure of government, it does not appear designed to change the actual functioning of government in any significant degree (see Chapter 5, Legal and Theoretical Base of Government). The Constitution provides for a combination of presidential and parliamentary systems, with emphasis on a strong executive having specific safeguards for his authority. For instance, the legislature is prohibited from interfering with matters "within the jurisdiction of the executive" while there is no such limitation upon executive power. Moreover, in addition to having a suspensory veto and wide emergency powers, the President may dissolve the National Assembly at will and call for new elections.

The Executive

Executive power is vested in the President of the Republic and a Council of Ministers. The President, who must not be related to the former monarch, is to be nominated by an absolute majority of popular votes in voting based on universal suffrage. His term is six calendar years, beginning from the date of the announcement of the voting. No constitutional provision

governs the question of re-election; it may therefore be assumed that re-election is permissible. Should he be temporarily prevented from exercising his prerogatives, the President will appoint one of his ministers to act in his place, subject to the approval of the National Assembly. Should he die in office or be permanently incapacitated, his post will be temporarily assumed by the President of the National Assembly and new elections must take place within 60 days. To charge a President with high treason or disloyalty to the Republic, the Constitution requires that a proposal be put forward by at least one third of the members of the National Assembly. If the resolution containing the charge is passed by a two thirds majority, the President of the Assembly assumes the office of President.

In addition to over-all responsibility for government policy and execution of the laws, the President has the power to issue administrative regulations, to ratify treaties (some major categories of which must receive the approval of the National Assembly), and to proclaim a state of emergency. He is commander in chief of the armed forces, and he appoints and dismisses civil and military officials and diplomatic envoys "as provided by law". The consent of the National Assembly is necessary, however, for a declaration of war.

The President is entitled to propose and to veto legislation. To veto a bill, he must return it to the National Assembly within 30 days of its receipt. A bill may be repassed over the veto by a two thirds majority of the National Assembly. The President may then have recourse to another obstructive measure, however, since he is empowered to dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections. He cannot, however, dissolve the new Assembly over the same issue. Between sessions of the National Assembly or during the period of its dissolution the President may issue orders which shall have the force of law, subject to their submission to the Assembly when it reconvenes.

Sharing executive power with the President are ministers. They may or may not be members of the National Assembly. Individually responsible to the Assembly, they are collectively responsible only to the President. Ministers may speak in the National Assembly whenever they ask permission to do so, and the Assembly in turn may require their presence at meetings.

The Legislature

Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly, which is to be popularly elected for a five-year term. In the final clause of the new Constitution it is stated that the National Union (the sole legitimate political

party) will nominate candidates for membership in the Assembly. This clause places a serious limitation upon the independence of the legislature in view of the fact that the party has been established under the aegis of the chief executive.

The National Assembly will meet in November for at least seven months and will be summoned and prorogued by the President. It is to be presided over by a president and two vice-presidents who are elected for the annual session. A quorum of members must be present in order for any decision to be passed.

The National Assembly is given exclusive control over the budget. Taxes may be imposed, altered, or repealed only by law. The basic principles governing the collection of public funds and their expenditure are also to be regulated by law. According to the Constitution, the government may not contract a loan or bind itself to expenditure over the course of one or more years without the consent of the Assembly.

The procedure outlined for the passage of bills is as follows: every bill proposed by one or more members must be referred to a committee, which, if it accepts it, will decide whether the bill merits consideration by the Assembly. If the committee decides in the affirmative and the Assembly also agrees to consider the bill, it is then returned to the committee for examination and the preparation of a report prior to its submission to the Assembly for voting. A rejected bill may not be re-submitted during the same Assembly session.

Other Features

Throughout the new Constitution, administrative structure is left extremely vague and subject to definition "by the law." This is particularly true in the case of the judiciary. The general principle of the independence of the judiciary is stated, but the judicial system is not described and must be established by law.

With respect to administrative divisions, the Constitution calls for the country to be divided into "administrative units" with councils having both elected and appointed members. These councils are to administer economic, social, cultural, and health activities in their areas and impose local taxes. They may be dissolved by order of the President. Thus it would seem that the tradition of a highly centralized provincial administration will be perpetuated.

CHAPTER 7

DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The Middle East, held together in the superficial unity of the Ottoman Empire until World War I, is today divided into a number of national states. Some of these new entities are independent; others, like Algeria, remain under one form or another of western control. A few, like Egypt, have a well-established historical identity; most, like Syria and Jordan, are the arbitrary creations of postwar settlements. All of them, however, have in varying degrees taken on the formal appearance of nation-states, and the rallying cries of Middle Eastern leaders are the familiar ones of national patriotism, national independence, national freedom. Aspirations of the Middle East's leaders to national unity and strength are a powerful force. How readily those aspirations can be realized in the changing but still tradition-bound environment from which they draw their support is an unanswered question.

In the West the nation state in the course of several centuries has become a viable unit transcending local differences and attracting the primary loyalty of its members. In the populous sedentarized areas of the Middle East the basic unit of loyalty above the family is the village, in which most Middle Easterners are born and live out their lives. National controls exist and are expanding, but the basic services and sanctions which directly affect daily life are worked out on the village and local level, and it is here that real sense of citizenship begins and ends for the peasant majority.

The self-containment and the autonomy of the Middle Eastern village has meant that differing ethnic and religious communities could live side by side and preserve their differences. The resultant diversity has given a special character to politics in the Middle East. National government in the area is confronted with a mosaic of communities whose differing values and interests present problems more international than national in character. Given this multicentered pattern of politics, the governments, when they could not rely on force, have had to base themselves on a complex and unstable structure of compromise among numerous competing interests. Alignments among these interests might change but basic loyalties remained local

and fragmented. Middle Eastern politics, despite the unifying force of present-day nationalist and anti-western feeling, remain essentially parochial. An older political leadership was content to govern in terms of the parochial situation. A new leadership has appeared which is clearly bent on constructing a pattern of national politics in which the central elements will be mass allegiance and mass control.

POPULAR INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

The 1952 Coup

Egypt, along with other countries of the Middle East, has for more than a generation been undergoing a political transformation which has been both revolutionary and conservative: revolutionary in its wholesale introduction of western ideas and techniques and, most recently, in its attempt to involve the masses in political action; conservative in its appeal to Moslem traditionalism and Arab exclusiveness. The initiative in this movement comes, not from the mass of the population, but from a ruling elite which differs from its predecessors in its understanding that the Egyptian peasant can be a political as well as an economic asset if his loyalties can be lifted from the village to the national level.

Prior to 1952, Egypt's urban elite, with many of its members of foreign origin, was almost alone in its involvement in political activity. The great mass of the people-both fellahin and city workers-were immersed in the traditional Moslem social concerns of family, neighborhood, and village. It was possible for the partially westernized ruling group to manipulate such borrowed political devices as assemblies, elections, and political parties without much affecting the traditional life of the people. The direct impact of the new ideas and the benefits of the wealth which resulted from western contact were almost exclusively confined to the ruling few. The military coup of 1952, however, brought to power leaders who were more impressed with the material implements of western strength than with western ideas, were militantly Egyptian and Arab, and were devoted to the ideal of a revivified Arab world with Egypt at its head. The new leaders, brought up in a military tradition which in Egypt was unmitigated by democratic values, have found dictatorial government more suitable to their purposes than the parliamentary facade of the recent past. Under these circumstances, mass agitation and revolutionary slogans-often borrowed from Communist and other totalitarian sources-became a normal means of indoctrinating the population. The single-party system prevails because the regime's claim to absolute rectitude is supposed to make the existence of

competing political parties unnecessary if not subversive. Elections take the form of plebiscites designed to confirm the leader in power—as in the 1956 confirmation of Colonel Nasser as President of the Republic—or to register approval of the government program. The people are whipped into frenzied street demonstrations against real or fancied enemies whose machinations help to justify the stringencies of the regime's domestic policies. Meanwhile, the gap between the social plans of the government and its achievements is progressively widened by an adventuresome foreign policy which depletes the government's emotional and physical resources.

The Role of Politics

Despite official preoccupation with mass activity, there is no indication of any significant increase in the actual participation of the Egyptian people in the making of public policy. Below the level of national policy, the traditional political processes of the Egyptian countryside appear to be remarkably undisturbed. The agricultural villages, which contain about 70 percent of the population, are organized in a fairly simple way so that local personal relations, kin ties, and wealth converge on the small official apparatus set up to control the public affairs of the villagers. Much the same pattern exists in the towns, and it is only in the country's two large cities, Cairo and Alexandria, that a more complex structure is found.

The relative self-sufficiency and the narrow loyalties of this pattern constitute both a strength and weakness for any national ruler. Kin group and village, in controlling and caring for their own, relieve the government of a number of problems which elsewhere are of major official concern. And village exclusiveness renders unlikely the growth of any unified mass opposition to an incumbent regime. These same factors, on the other hand, work to limit the ability of the national authorities to extend and perhaps even to maintain direct controls over the population.

During the Suez crisis of 1956 the Egyptian crowds seen on the banks of the Canal had little comprehension of the actual situation. What was involved was the vague, emotional reaction of an illiterate populace to issues presented by the government in the form of inflammatory slogans. A generation ago it might have been enough for the British to send a tank through the streets of Cairo to bring about the overthrow of a Ministry, with only the most minor reaction in the population at large. Today, however blindly, increasing numbers of Egyptians are responding to issues, national and international in scope. This development must be balanced against the traditional factors which still limit popular involvement in politics above the local level. The trend, however, is in the direction of such involvement—

and with it, an enlarged public expectation of benefits from the national political process.

Forms of Popular Political Participation

Popular Demonstrations and Riots. Public demonstrations and riots have been an important form of popular political activity under authoritarian Egyptian governments. In the past these manifestations usually signified loss of government control, but in the twentieth century they began to be employed by the government for its own political ends, and sometimes, as in the case of the Cairo riots of January 1952, they have gotten out of hand. Under the present regime mob action and public demonstrations have become more formally a part of the political process. They are devices employed to exhibit at home and abroad the solidarity of the people with the government. Mass demonstrations become forums before which the leader may appear to announce policy and to whip up mass support.

Elections and Party Activity. Elections under Nasser are in fact plebiscites. The June 1956 election had the function of indicating public approval of the single presidential nominee—Gamal Abdel Nasser. At the same time the new Constitution, western in form and authoritarian in substance, was referred to the people for acceptance.

Contrary to the electoral law of 1935, women for the first time in Egyptian history participated in an election (referendum). By the new electoral law of 1956 the franchise was granted to all Egyptian males and females over 18. In the June 1956 referenda, percentage figures of the electorate favoring Nasser and the adoption of the new Constitution indicated vast majorities. There are many precedents for this kind of electoral activity—designed to register approval of a previously taken decision—and they are primarily found within authoritarian political systems.

Rigged elections were the general rule under the old regime. The system operated through party and family influence upon local officials, by means of bakhsheesh distributed among electoral officials or the electorate, as well as by manipulation of the ballot boxes. In such a situation the candidate coming from a large important family would be almost certain to win because of public custom and the expectation that such a candidate would be more effective, and because such a candidate would in effect have the captive support of a large part of the electorate.

Opportunities for direct government interference in elections were many. Although some electors might vote by secret ballot without interference, others, unable to fill out their ballots and announcing their choices aloud, might have their choices tampered with or undue influence brought

to bear upon them. Another basic practice involved in controlling elections was the substitution of a prepared ballot box for the one in which the voters had deposited their ballots. It was generally an easy matter for the officials carrying the boxes from the polls to the counting places to make this substitution.

In addition to government interference, a large, wealthy, well organized political party like the Wafd could even when out of office manipulate elections in competition with the government apparatus.

Public participation in elections was diluted by the absence of significant national discussion of relevant issues. This was due not only to illiteracy, requiring makeshift indoctrination, but also to failures in technical communication: in the cities the electorate might have access to presentations of party positions through the press, radio, and party meetings, but in the countryside such access was very limited. The largely illiterate fellahin were preoccupied with pressing economic problems and highly susceptible to the organized interests controlling elections.

Elections being a procedure borrowed from the West, other more traditional processes have persisted. The revolutionary military regime has promised electoral reform, which it may in some measure institute within the context of its own conception. Yet as long as it remains authoritarian it will retain devices for manipulating the electorate—if not corrupt and rigged elections, at least the prohibition of more than one party, complete control of communications, and perhaps the use of force.

The more overt type of political activity involved in party work is limited to the educated few. Those engaged in it have been students, intellectual leaders, and representatives of the influential classes. Only a few parties, such as the Wafd, have ever established and maintained an adequate organization reaching down to the village or district level throughout the country. Even at the lower levels the people involved in these party organizations have been privileged members of the community.

HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Typically, the Egyptian political party is made up of the personal following of a strong leader, and it has tended to be more or less rigidly identified with some one point of view or set of interests in the community Parties rose and declined with the immediacy of the causes they championed. The role of the leader was an element of instability: the party's success of failure was closely bound to his personal fortunes. Egyptian political parties generally have seemed to be less interested in winning elections than in providing services and patronage to their members and in maintaining the

prestige and influence of their leaders. Few of them showed any capacity to alter their programs to meet changing circumstances, and only the Wafd al-Misri which in some respects approached the pattern of western parties, survived for as long as two generations.

All political parties in Egypt were suspended by the Revolutionary Command Council in January 1953. The effect of the order was to convert the military junta into what amounted to a single-party regime. The Constitution of 1956 in fact provided for the establishment of a single party, to be known as the National Union. If and when such a party is organized, its main function could hardly be other than that of vehicle for the expression of mass approval of the regime in power. Meanwhile, the history of political parties in Egypt provides precedents which might again become relevant in the event of some future change in the Egyptian government.

Former Political Parties

The Nationalist Party. The first political party in Egypt was the Nationalist Party—al-Hizb-al-Watani—which appeared as part of the nationalist ferment stimulated in the 1870's under the political crusader Gamal al-Din al-Afghani, who counseled the adoption of western methods in order to defeat the West. Organized to oppose foreign pre-eminence in the country, its motive has persisted in Egyptian politics ever since. The role in the party of army officers, notably including some from the rural lower-middle class, marked the emergence of a new political element in Egypt—the officer group whose rural antecedents have enabled its members to idealize themselves as rooted in the peasantry and to represent their programs largely in terms of worker and peasant interests. Other important components of the party leadership were the professional politicians and the religious leaders. More nearly a movement than a political party, the organization was tenuously held together by nationalist sentiment and a network of personal ties.

Aside from foreign domination, various difficulties of the time tended to swell the ranks of the new party, among them a water shortage in 1877, poor crops, and increased taxation. The increasing urban intelligentsia blamed the Khedive Ismail for these and other difficulties, as well as for resistance to the new western constitutional conceptions which they regarded as essential to Egyptian progress. Many officers turned to politics: an unsuccessful Ethiopian campaign had brought a decline in army morale; Egyptian officers resented the preferential treatment given officers of Turkish and Circassian origin. Numerous civil servants, threatened by dismissals in the government's efforts to economize, also joined the Nationalist Party and at one time made up nearly 20 percent of the membership. Among the religious

leaders represented in the party, the Moslems predominated, and their influence gave a strong religious sanction to resistance to the foreigner. An effective protagonist of the party was the Egyptian press, violently nationalist and then, as since, more concerned with political polemic than factual news reporting.

In the particulars of its program the party dealt with financial and constitutional matters. It declared Egypt's income and revenues adequate to meet required expenditures and debt obligations, and it demanded a change in the constitution of the legislature to make it conform more to European modes. The demands were essentially moderate—so much so that the Khedive felt able to endorse the program. This moderation is perhaps explained or suggested by the status of its 327 signatories, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Signatories of Nationalist Party Program

Signatories	Number	Percent
Officers	93	28.44
Officials	72	22,02
Members of the Assembly		
of Delegates	60	18, 35
Religious Representatives	60	18.35
Notables and Merchants	42	12.82

Source: Landau, Jacob M., Parliaments and Parties in Egypt. p. 89.

The Nationalist Party continued to grow and for a time had a large following among the urban elite. With the defeat in 1882 of the rebellion of Arabi Pasha (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting), in which many of the party's leaders were implicated, the party declined. Under British occupation and control, established at this time, Egyptian resistance to foreign influence tended to disintegrate, and the Khedive found support for his view that British rule was the best-if not the ideal--alternative of the day.

Anti-British sentiment did not die, however, and its revival came under the leadership of a young reformer Mustafa Kamil, who founded a new party, also called the Nationalist Party, (al-Hizb-al-Watani) which endured, though with declining influence, until 1952.

The Second Nationalist Party. Mustafa Kamil (born in 1874), whose original endeavors were in journalism, was through the generosity of a

relative enabled to complete his legal studies in France, where he also studied general politics, party organization, and propaganda. On his return to Egypt he dedicated himself to the task of indoctrinating the people with a sense of their identity as a nation (see Chapter 10, Effect of National Attitudes on Domestic and Foreign Policies). The new Nationalist Party, organized in 1907 under Kamil's leadership, assumed not only the task of rousing Egyptian patriotism, but also of convincing foreign powers that Britain's rule was immoral and that Egypt should be independent.

Kamil was well aware of the potentialities of Egypt's growing press in political activity; he gained the support of some of the principal newspapers, and his party founded two newspapers of its own. He also emphasized the importance of schools and the need for education in modern subjects and foreign languages (English and French) as well as in Arabic and traditional Moslem learning.

The second Nationalist Party, although it continued down until the dissolution of parties under Naguib, was unable to compete successfully with the Wafd after that party was founded during World War I. Following the death of Mustafa Kamil in 1908, no party leaders rose who were capable of taking his place, and certainly none with the stature of Zaghlul of the Wafd. Moreover, whereas the Nationalist Party always relied chiefly upon appeals to the upper classes and especially to the intelligentsia, the Wafd turned to the great mass of the people, some sections of which were becoming more politically conscious in the second decade of the twentieth century.

The Wafd. The Arabic word, wafd (delegation), was initially applied to a group proposing to present Egyptian demands for independence at the Paris conferences after World War I and later became the name of the political party which grew out of this issue.

The principle of national self-determination as enunciated by President Wilson had aroused peoples in the colonial and dependent areas, not least of all the Egyptians. The hardships of World War I, the long-standing anti-British feeling, and the spate of wartime propaganda contributed to a state of mind in Egypt that resulted in mass strikes, outbreaks of sabotage, and boycotts against the Imperial power. Antipathy for Britain seems to have provided one of the few common denominators in the inchoate political consciousness of the Egyptian population. Gradually the movement, which included Moslems and Copts alike, began to acquire form during the campaign to raise money to send an Egyptian Delegation (Wafd al-Misri) to Paris,

In the Wafd's early years after the Paris conference its leaders and membership did not consider themselves so much a party as a righteous instrument of the national will. Inevitably, the strong leader, characteristic of every successful Egyptian political organization, emerged: Saad Zaghlul Pasha, of fellah origin, participator in the revolt of Arabi Pasha and later law student in Paris. Formerly pro-British, he came to the notice of Lord Cromer, who secured for him the position first of Minister of Education and then of Minister of Justice. An acute judge of men and a masterful orator, Zaghlul was well suited to lead the movement which finally coalesced as the Wafd Party and which more than any other group dominated Egyptian politics from World War I until 1952.

Zaghlul early became a member of the Legislative Assembly. From this forum he was able to lead in demands for Egyptian independence, the end of the Capitulations, constitutional and educational reforms, and aid to agriculture. Upon Zaghlul's death in 1927, his place was taken by Mustafa Nahas Pasha. The stability of leadership which characterized the Wafd contrasted with the instability of its membership, which, as in most other Egyptian parties, drifted in and out as the personal popularity of the leader and interest in particular aspects of his program rose and fell.

The wide appeal of the Wafd clearly was a consequence not only of the personal appeal of its leaders but of the success of the party in identifying itself as the principal proponent of Egyptian independence. This goal, which the party formally articulated as early as 1921, continued directly and indirectly to be advocated by Wafd spokesmen. So uncompromising was the party's stand that the Wafd almost alone among Egyptian political groups dared to oppose as unsatisfactory the British unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922.

It is against this background of unrelenting opposition to Britain that the refusal of the Egyptian Government to be mollified by the withdrawal of British forces from Suez in 1954 must be understood. In recent years in Egypt the issue of Israel has taken its place alongside that of Britain, but even the Israeli menace is seen as an aspect of British and western "imperialism" in general. Memory for a grievance is long in the Middle East, and the pattern is an important one politically.

In concentrating on the British issue the Wafd tended to neglect the more complicated questions of internal reform. The party established, however, an important precedent in Egyptian politics in cutting across class and religious lines to light the fires of patriotism among a people who had been politically lethargic for centuries.

Minor Parties. There have been other parties in Egypt, some formed in the early years of this century, others notable in the period following World War I. Most of them proved ephemeral. Like the major parties, they were preoccupied with foreign policies and showed little concern with domestic matters, except as these might be related to foreign issues. Three

of them—the Liberal Constitutional Party (Hizb al-Ahrar al-Dusturiyyin), the Union Party (Hizb al-Ittihad), and the Saadist Party (so-called after Saad

Zaghlul).

The Liberal Constitutional group rose after World War I, largely out of opposition to Zaghlul's leadership in the Wafd. Advocating a union of parties in the interest of national unity, it continued to publish vigorous pronouncements on the issues of Egyptian politics. At once liberal and promonarchist in outlook, its following was predominantly from the upper middle class.

The Union Party, founded in 1925, represented much more directly the interests of the Court. Its principal leader, Yahya Ibrahim Pasha, was a close adviser of the King and the head of the commission that prepared the Constitution of 1923. The Union Party functioned mainly as one of the instruments by which the King could rule by decree during the intervals when the Wafd was out of office.

The Saadists began as a dissident Washist group in 1938. Under Ahmad Mahir Pasha and Mohammed Nokrashi Pasha the party held office several times, and it was a Saadist government which in 1947 took the courageous step of disbanding the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) and sequestering its funds. Saadist coalition governments functioned during World War II, and Mohammed Nokrashi Pasha was again Prime Minister during the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning the Sudan in 1947-48. Altogether the Saadists were more consistent in their nationalist outlook than the Wash, which, corrupt and ineffective at times, was made to serve the personal interests of its leaders at the expense of its official program. The decline of the Saadist group, however, was already well marked when the army took over in 1952.

Recent Party Politics

Political parties in Egypt are not easily fitted into the right, left, and center spectrum familiar in the West. The outlawed Communist Party is even less a conventional party than those mentioned above, and the same thing may be said of the "right" extremist Moslem Brotherhood. In different ways, these two groups represent profound subversive elements in Egyptian politics, seeking as they do, not merely to achieve political power, but to alter or destroy the basic rules and premises of the existing social and political order.

Opposition Groups

The military junta which assumed power in Egypt in 1952 has imposed increasingly authoritarian controls on the country. Initially, the military government under General Naguib, President Nasser's predecessor, seemed to be willing to work with the existing political parties. By January 1953, however, all political parties had been suspended, and in 1954 the explosive Moslem Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) was declared to be a political party and was banned. Communist groups, outlawed under the monarchy, continued to be outlawed.

The Nasser policy of suppressing all domestic political competition has had the effect of driving into a subversive position even the moderates, who might have constituted a "loyal opposition." National crises, such as the Port Said invasion, and the apparent success of Nasser's policies have brought surface loyalty to the regime, but there are undoubtedly active areas of discontent underneath. At the extremes of the political spectrum, the Communists on the one side and the Moslem Brotherhood on the other are alert for any opportunity to exploit public discontent. Their disruptive capacity is limited by the effectiveness of government security measures and the popular appeal of government policies. The ban on political parties, however, tends to favor the irreconcilables, who have reacted simply by going underground, while the old constitutional groups have largely been destroyed.

The most serious subversive threat in Egypt today is posed by the Communists. The outlawed Egyptian Communist movement is hardly strong enough to bring about a coup unaided, but it is finding advantages in the current rapprochement between Egypt and the Soviet bloc, and these advantages are enhanced by the virulently anti-western attitude of the Egyptian Government. Short of the unpredictable possibility of direct Soviet or Soviet-sponsored military intervention in Egypt, however, the Nasser government seems strong enough to maintain control against any domestic Communist challenge in the foreseeable future,

The Moslem Brotherhood, numerically larger than the Communist groups, poses a subversive threat which appears to be more immediate, if less revolutionary. The Brotherhood program does not promise the social upheaval that communism would bring and, unlike the Communist movement, it is not in the service of a foreign power. Fanatically traditionalist and xenophobic, it proposes to turn back the clock and reimpose many of the more stringent Islamic principles that have been weakened in recent generations. Like the Communists, the Brotherhood benefits from the antiwestern posture of the government. There is little to suggest that the

Brotherhood desires direct—as distinguished from indirect—political control in Egypt. Accordingly, it seems probable that it will continue to concentrate its efforts on influencing the government by agitation and terror tactics rather than make an attempt to take over directly.

Formerly the most powerful political party in Egypt, the Wafd is reported to have maintained itself in skeletal form. This party may be considered an opposition group—with very limited subversive potential. Insofar as it is active at all it works mainly to bring about a return to the pattern of parliamentary government, as it has been known in Egypt. Radical in its nationalism, the Wafd has not in the past been revolutionary in its domestic program. Certain left-wing Wafd forces do exist, however, and these are reportedly making contact with Communist elements. Their strength within what is left of the Wafd is not known.

It is frequently charged in Egypt that Zionism poses an internal subversive threat through its appeal to Egyptian Jews. Little evidence for this claim is available, and the Egyptian Jews who chose to remain in Egypt after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 have, as a group, been scrupulous in their avoidance of any identification with Zionism. The Israeli invasion of Sinai in 1956 caused the Egyptian Jews to be treated as enemy aliens by the Egyptian government, and reports early in the following year indicated that thousands had left the country.

CHAPTER 8

DEFINITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC ORDER

ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE

Attitudes toward individual and group violence in the Middle East differ substantially from those prevailing in the West. These attitudes have considerable influence in the spheres of public order and safety.

Rioting, for instance, is a common occurrence in Egypt, and the ease with which riots are precipitated in the smallest villages and largest towns suggests that mob violence is an established Egyptian pattern for the expression of public frustration or anger. If individual Egyptians upon reflection disapprove of rioting, there are many for whom the tradition is a "natural" and even desirable means of achieving political goals. In the present century, riots directed against the West, Britain in particular, have reached a peak of intensity. Mosques, schools, and universities are the principal rallying points for the organization of riots, and the inflammatory Friday sermon or agitation by a student leader are the usual prelude to public outbreak. The origin of rioting in these centers of community strength and the invocation of the values they represent gives added sanction to the rioting pattern. An element of recreation is also present, and demonstrations become a kind of public spectacle inviting participation. Serious violence is a frequent, but not inevitable, outcome of public disturbances in Egypt Spectators disappear only with the application of strong police measures, which typically are resented as unwarranted official interference.

Mob demonstrations and riots fall into a number of categories; they may be aimed at looting and destruction, the application of political pressure, or mere celebration. The Egyptian mob, more than its counterpart in the West, seems to possess a kind of internal discipline which enables it to act with something approaching tactical skill—a factor about which little is known in detail.

Another familiar form of violence is that perpetrated by politicians who use hired thugs or bodyguards to coerce opponents and bring pressure to

bear on voters at the polls (see Chapter 7, Dynamics of Political Behavior). Such methods, although without direct public approval, have a social sanction in the Egyptian admiration for the strong and forceful leader.

Violence directed by one individual against another, although condemned by the Koran, is socially approved when it takes the form of vengeance for a crime of violence or vindication of personal honor. An injured family or group regards punishment imposed by the government as insufficient to make amends for the injury, and may try to protect the offender from the law in order to take its own revenge. The individual is thoroughly supported by society—if not the law—in defending his honor, a fact which probably has bearing on the widespread incidence of violent retaliation for adultery, rape, and other offenses of this kind. Individuals who engage in violence against the government or its representatives may win popular admiration if their actions are seen as reprisals for injustice.

It is taken for granted that the government in turn will use violence in dealing with the populace. The precedents for police brutality are numerous in this part of the world, and the third degree and imprisonment without charges, contrary to the provisions of law, have not disappeared. Such practices, coupled with popular resentment of the special privileges enjoyed by the police, substantially affect the degree of public cooperation accorded the police and the ability of the latter to maintain public order.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LAW

The police system and the criminal codes now applied in Egypt are based largely on western models. The actual functioning of criminal procedure has been substantially modified by Egypt's heritage of Islamic legal and social patterns, and the western-derived police system has undergone similar adaptations imposed by local custom. The divergent sources and philosophical origins of law in Egypt, and the inapplicability to the Egyptian context of many borrowed western legal concepts, have given rise to conflicts and difficulties in enforcing the law. By and large, there is scant popular respect for or understanding of the borrowed alien codes. Secular criminal law may even be regarded as sacriligious by convervative Moslems who respect only law derived from the Koran and the sayings of Mohammed. Basic distrust of government is reflected in attitudes toward the national police. They have traditionally been feared and resented, especially in the rural areas, as intrusive agents of an arbitrary and external authority. There are indications, however, that the fellah's ingrained suspicion of government may be undergoing modification through the propaganda efforts of the present regime, which continues to emphasize its concern for the economic and

social problems of the people (see Chapter 7, Dynamics of Political Behavior).

Whatever changes may be in the making, the legal notions of the mass of Egyptians stem from the customary usages and the religious prescriptions of the past. Much of what under the new codes is public law and therefore in the province of court decision and police action remains for the villager purely a matter for private, family, or, at the most, village concern. Murder or insult call for revenge. Theft, outside one's local group, is not a crime but an obvious means of enriching oneself at the expense of an outsider. Taxes are an onerous burden to be evaded if possible. Accusations, convictions, and imprisonment are, to the peasant, not the workings of a reasonable and necessary system of justice, but serious affronts to his dignity and as such ample justification for retaliation against whoever is considered responsible for getting him into trouble with the police. By the same token, he is loath to give evidence in investigations or trials. Similar attitudes prevail in the uneducated urban masses.

THE POLICE SYSTEM

Egypt maintains a highly centralized national police force, organized along military lines. Initially adapted from the French system, the police organization was modified during the period of British occupation through British training and staffing of the higher levels. Under British rule the police force became the main agency for the enforcement of laws and maintenance of order. With the attainment of Egyptian independence in 1922, the police force was transformed, essentially, into a personal agency of the king, who relied heavily on police power, censorship, and other repressive means to deal with political crises and social problems. This led to a steady growth in the strength of the police force and increased centralization of its administration. The paramilitary nature and leadership of the organization at the time of the coup in 1952 facilitated the substitution of the Revolutionary Command Council's executive control for that of the king. Since the coup, the police, in collaboration with the army, have assumed an even more important place as a national instrument of social control.

LEGAL CODES AND PROCEDURE

Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, Egypt has had an extremely complex judicial history. In addition to secular criminal courts organized in 1883, consular courts established on the basis of the Ottoman Capitulations, and religious courts—both sharia (Islamic religious) courts and courts of religious minorities—Egypt had a special system of Mixed Courts

from 1875 to 1949. (For the origin of the Mixed Courts see Chapter 6, Structure of Government.) Presided over by both Egyptian and foreign judges, these courts dealt with cases involving foreigners of different nationalities or a foreigner and an Egyptian. Noted for their efficiency and fairness, the Mixed Courts became an integral part of the Egyptian judicial system, but with the rise in nationalism in the twentieth century they became less and less acceptable to Egyptians. The Montreux Convention of 1937 provided for their abolition, following a transitional period, and the transfer of their functions to national courts. Nasser's abolition of sharia and other religious courts in 1955 contributed further to the unification of Egypt's court system. The jurisdiction of the religious courts had been progressively curtailed so that at the time of their abolition they retained control only over matters of personal status and marriage. Islamic legal codes, however, are still applied in national courts to settle some civil disputes, and they have had a modifying influence on the development of an essentially continental type of criminal law and procedure.

A penal code based on the French model was adopted in Egypt in 1883. Modified in 1904 and subsequently to conform more closely to local needs, it was superseded by a new penal code and code of criminal procedure in 1937 and 1950 respectively. This whole period witnessed a process of adaptation of and selection from western concepts and practices. While various western institutions such as the jury were discarded, certain elements of Islamic law were introduced into the legal system.

The persistence of the granting of diyah (blood money) is a remnant of Islamic legal practice which retains importance today, and although not specifically mentioned in the penal code of 1937, it is still sanctioned by custom, especially in rural areas of Upper Egypt. According to Islamic law, a person who has been injured by another, or the heirs of a victim of homicide, may claim diyah. The persistence of this tradition of granting blood money may reflect a desire on the part of the authorities to reduce the significance of revenge as a motive for crime in Egypt.

Other principles of Islamic law persist in the beliefs and customs of the people and the criminal procedures of today, although they are not embodied in law codes. Formerly, death was the penalty for adultery according to some Moslem jurists; present-day Moslem attitudes of strong condemnation toward this offense reflect the important place in Islamic law occupied by questions involving morality and protection of the family.

Criminal Investigation and Procedure

Investigation of crimes is the dual responsibility of a legal officer

representing the Parquet (a French-patterned institution headed by the Chief Public Prosecutor) and the police officer of the district involved. This system provides some checks on irregularity but also gives both officials an excuse for inefficiency. Moreover, the investigative process is often impeded by a lack of good working relations between the Parquet official and the police officer. A number of other more basic factors combine to make investigation and criminal procedure relatively inefficient processes as judged by western standards. The effectiveness of all government personnel assigned from Cairo is impaired through distrust by the local people and by their own tendency to regard provincial posts as onerous exile. Politics enter into all phases of criminal procedure at the lower levels. Rural judges as well as police and legal officers tend to put the political interests of the party in power ahead of strictly judicial considerations. Politics take precedence over police duties especially at election time, when provincial officials also have been known to engage actively in falsifying election results.

Investigation of murder and other crimes against the person pose special problems. A victim's family often attempts to conceal the crime from investigating officers so as to reserve for themselves opportunities for venge-ance. Moreover, inadequate investigation into causes of death keeps many crimes from coming to official attention. The tradition of a highly formalized investigative procedure presents a further obstacle to enforcing justice. The French model has been carried to such an extreme that the expeditious filing of lengthy, detailed formal reports often takes precedence over the actual apprehension of the criminal. The number of cases dealt with is considered evidence of the zeal and efficiency of an official—regardless of whether they are properly settled. By the same token, a case remaining under active consideration because of the nondiscovery of the criminal is apt to be a black mark on the record of the investigating officer.

Lower courts in Egypt are not noted for efficiency or fairness by western standards. Court calendars are crowded, judges tend to be partial and susceptible to bribery, and the prosecution often resorts to political and social arguments in order to influence decisions. Judges in rural cases often live in the cities and tend to cite formal precedents with little regard for local customs and problems. At the higher levels, Egyptian judicial and legal personnel enjoy adequate salaries, considerable prestige, and a reputation for honesty and ability.

Since there are no juries in Egyptian courts, the judge or judges have a wider range of powers than in either the continental or Anglo-American judicial traditions. A case is decided by a majority opinion of the judges, who play a very active role in the conduct of trials. They are also authorized by the penal code to suspend execution of a sentence or modify its

severity and to revoke the suspension. In reaching such a decision the previous record of the accused generally carries great weight with the judge.

Martial law has customarily been invoked in Egypt in times of emergency. It was continuously in force from the coup of 1952 until Nasser proclaimed its end in June 1956. The outbreak of hostilities in November 1956 quickly brought about its reinstatement.

CHAPTER 9

DIFFUSION AND CONTROL OF INFORMATION

An enormous difference in accessibility to mass communications media exists among various groups in Egypt, reflecting the widely divergent economic levels, literacy rates, and interests of the various segments of the population. Attention to mass media varies with occupational group, degree of literacy, economic position, and urban or rural residence. Thus radio broadcasts of interest to white-collar workers often do not attract industrial workers, while programs appealing to professionals may be considered sacrilegious by the more devout fellahin.

In general, greater respect is paid to the written than to the spoken word. Few can read, and for the illiterate majority the ability to do so means special knowledge and power. Writing in the Moslem world is not merely an essential means of communication; it is the vehicle of the scriptures, and even in its secular uses conveys a kind of credibility to its subject matter. Content, of course, influences receptivity to reading matter. The educated Egyptian, in particular, is likely to explain his preference for a certain newspaper on the grounds of its political impartiality. For the population at large, classical written Arabic is the appropriate and compelling medium for important communications, although the classical language is directly comprehensible only to a minority, who must interpret it to the others.

Despite long standing popular suspicion of authority in Egypt, an "official" source of information, such as Egyptian State Broadcasting, gains a large measure of attention simply by virtue of its governmental sponsorship. By the same token, Egyptian radio stations, which broadcast much official news, are apt to have a larger following than all but the most highly regarded nonofficial newspapers, though the latter enjoy the advantages of the printed medium.

There is considerable resistance to information from western sources, which are widely regarded as "unreliable" and actuated by ulterior motives. This distrust, which to a somewhat lesser degree also extends to Soviet sources, stems in part from a general belief that news reports cannot be

truthful when the issuing country's interests are involved. Most western publications and broadcasts are apt to be dismissed as mere "propaganda." A recent sample survey of four occupational groups indicated that among professionals the United States is particularly suspected in this regard. Many of the Egyptians polled viewed the United States as extremely active in the foreign broadcasting field and argued that American programs must be propagandistic because Americans have had so much experience in advertizing and political campaigning.

An exception to the general distrust of news emanating from western and Soviet sources is the high degree of credence given to all British Broadcasting Corporation programs except those directly concerning matters in the Arab world. With the reputation gained during World War II for objective reporting, even of British defeats, the BBC Arabic service is highly regarded even by strongly anti-British Egyptians, and many consider it more reliable than the local radio.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MEDIA

A large majority of Egyptians are either regular or occasional radio listeners. According to a recent sample survey, only among farmers is there a sizable proportion of nonlisteners. Most farmers do, however, have access to radio through the village coffee house, where a radio plays for the benefit of all customers. A high proportion of urban workers also listen to the radio in coffee shops or at the homes of neighbors. But the actual effectiveness of radio in communicating with these largely illiterate groups is limited by the fact that newscasts and most other programs are in the prestige language, classical Arabic, and contain much vocabulary unfamiliar to illiterate Egyptians, who get the drift but rarely a precise understanding of such broadcasts.

Similar difficulties of comprehension plague the newspaper-reading public, a large percentage of which is not equipped to deal with the complexities of the classical medium employed by the press. Nevertheless, the press is extremely influential and indirectly reaches a large proportion of even the illiterate population. Farmers, for instance, commonly hear the newspapers read aloud in the coffee houses, and concern with the price of agricultural products extends their interest to matters outside the village. Many keep a newspaper handy when merchants come to buy their produce so that they can point to the market quotations as a bargaining instrument.

The number of newspapers distributed is no index to their actual circulation or influence in Egypt. A single copy is often read by a dozen or more people and read aloud to still others. Much of the information contained

in newspapers is heatedly discussed and passed along by word of mouth. In a country with an illiteracy rate of about 75 percent (the rate is higher for women than for men and is decreasing among children with the expansion of educational facilities), informal channels of communication naturally assume special importance. In both rural and urban areas, the coffee houses, shops, and mosques are transmission centers for news of all kinds. News emanating from the mass communication media and other sources is rapidly communicated and interpreted to the illiterate population. Information is not available on the relative effectiveness of the radio and the press in reaching the uneducated and semieducated segments of the population. The well-educated Egyptian tends to read a number of newspapers and to sample a variety of local and foreign broadcasts.

THE PRESS

Egypt has the oldest and most influential press in the Arab world. The first Arabic newspaper was established in 1800 as a propaganda aid to Napoleon's designs on Egypt and ceased publication with the defeat of the French forces. Its highly political nature and short life were prophetic of two features that were to characterize most later Egyptian newspapers. The press has since been divided between neutral independents and party papers, with the independents generally enjoying larger circulations. But whatever their political identity, all newspapers that have survived any length of time or developed a following have been firmly committed to Egyptian nationalism.

Mohammed Ali is credited with founding the second Arabic paper. He established an official gazette in 1828 called al-Waqaa al-Misriya, which is still published by the Egyptian Government. The first stirrings of indigenous and nonofficial Arab journalism occurred in Lebanon, where education was more advanced and missionaries had imported printing presses. From Beirut, journalists emigrated to found newspapers in the freer atmosphere of Egypt, where Turkish censorship was less rigid. Many Egyptian papers, including al-Ahram, which remains the leading one, were founded by Christian Lebanese and have remained in their hands.

Relatively few newspapers appeared before the 1870's, when they increased rapidly. Since then, Egypt has always had a comparatively large number of papers, many of which have suffered from poor quality, low circulation, and unsound financial status. In the early years of Egyptian journalism, when the cities were smaller, the literacy rate even lower than today, and advertising not extensively developed, no paper could hope to support itself on circulation and advertising income alone. The private

wealth of the owner-editor often formed the most important source of financial support. If not independently wealthy, the owner frequently solicited funds from others, often offering in return secret commitments of editorial or other support for the donor's personal or local interests. This practice of accepting covert support at the expense of editorial independence became widespread in the Middle East, and its persistence among the smaller Egyptian newspapers explains their frequent shifts in editorial policy. Sometimes subscriptions are "sold" to prominent individuals who may wish to avoid any criticism or unfavorable publicity in the newspaper. Conversely, gifts are occasionally made to owners or editors in the expectation that adverse comment will be averted. Egyptian law prohibits foreign subsidies to newspapers, but, despite denials, charges and countercharges in the press suggest that such support has not been unknown.

The growth of advertising has lessened the reliance of smaller papers on secret funds. Advertising, however, is apt to be understood by Middle Eastern businessmen not so much as a means of reaching prospective buyers as of influencing editors. Much money is spent on advertisements in small papers throughout the country without expectation of return in increased sales.

Until the abolition of political parties in 1953, party papers generally were privately owned but received support from party subscriptions and contributions—undoubtedly on occasion from hidden sources as well.

Traditions of Egyptian Journalism

The propensity to barter independence of opinion for financial support has been a feature of the Egyptian press to which only al-Ahram and a few other journals have provided exceptions. Traditionally, most Egyptian editors have viewed the primary role of the press as that of fighting for political causes rather than of informing the public about current affairs. Since the editorial policy has so commonly been for sale, few Egyptian editors have questioned the propriety of espousing causes they personally oppose in return for financial support. Except for al-Ahram there is no strong tradition of objective reporting of the news. Egyptians have come to expect that news stories will be colored for political purposes and news coverage as a whole slanted by selection.

The overriding emphasis on opinion, as opposed to factual reporting, is reflected in the strong wording and virulent invective of most Egyptian editorials. Editors seem to believe that their opinion rather than the adequacy of their news coverage sells their papers, although the contrary is suggested by the fact that papers with high circulation also tend to enjoy

reputations for superior news coverage and more accurate and objective reporting.

Editorials, typically placed on the front page, are usually signed by the editor and composed in a different style and print from news stories. They are often highly literary and are discussed as much for stylistic merit as for political content. Quotations from classical poetry and proverbs are frequently used to clinch an argument or end an editorial.

Al-Ahram

Often referred to as the Times of the Arab world, al-Ahram, published in Cairo, is outside the main stream of Egyptian journalism in its emphasis on objective news coverage. It provides an outstanding exception to the weakness in factual reporting which characterizes most Middle Eastern newspapers. Founded in 1879 by Salim and Bisharah Taqla, wealthy Christian Lebanese, it has consistently avoided identification with any one political faction and has never found it necessary to compromise its independence for financial backing. Until the advent of the present regime, al-Ahram never hesitated to criticize the government, prominent personalities, or foreign powers. Criticism of the king was forbidden by law under the monarchy, and since the abdication of King Farouk in 1952, al-Ahram has, of course, had to submit to the more stringent censorship of the current military administration. Although al-Ahram supported Egyptian nationalism and championed Egyptian independence from Great Britain, it has been considered nonpartisan in other respects.

One of the largest and most profitable journalistic enterprises in the Middle East, al-Ahram has a modern plant and excellent staff and correspondent resources. The Egyptian press has always attracted leading writers and educators from all over the Middle East. Authors and poets are active in journalism as editors, proprietors, or regular contributors, and al-Ahram has drawn some of the best talent—both Christian and Moslem. Its soberly phrased, well-documented editorials carry weight throughout the Arab world.

In make-up and size (12 pages) <u>al-Ahram</u> is typical of the larger Egyptian newspapers. In addition to providing excellent coverage of foreign, national, and local news, <u>al-Ahram</u> devotes regular sections to sport, social, and financial news. It carries copyrighted Disney cartoons, "Tarzan" and other illustrated adventure series, as well as complete short stories. A short editorial appears on the first page, but the main editorial of each issue appears on page seven.

While its circulation is not the highest in Egypt, al-Ahram has consistently been near the top. Its nearest competitor in overall quality and circulation was, until recently, al-Misri, a privately owned newspaper loosely affiliated with the Wafd party. Al-Misri went out of business after the coup of 1952, along with several other well established papers which had to cease publication for political or financial reasons.

Other Current Newspapers

There are currently 46 dailies with a total circulation of approximately 500,000, and some 200 weeklies with a total circulation of about 250,000. All the more important papers are published in Cairo or Alexandria. The sizable foreign language press (French, English, Greek, and Armenian) is declining in importance. It has traditionally represented foreign and minority interests—financial, commercial, and cultural. Overt party papers have not existed since the abolition of political parties by the military regime in 1953. Three new newspapers, al-Qahirah, al-Jumhuriyah, and the recently established al-Shab, function as semiofficial organs of the government.

The average daily paper contains from four to eight pages of the same dimensions as a standard-size American paper. Some tabloids are also found among the dailies. Column widths are not fully standardized; some dailies use an eight-column page while others use seven.

The majority of dailies appear six times a week, but <u>al-Ahram</u> is published every day. Many of the Moslem papers do not appear on Friday, while others have, on that day, a larger weekly edition published under a different name.

Sample comparisons have indicated that the larger papers devote about half as much space to advertising as does the typical small American newspaper, and relatively more space to national and world news. The proportionately heavy emphasis on news in these high-circulation papers is reflected in reader tastes. The following table shows content preferences broken down by occupational groups questioned in a recent sample survey.

Table 2. Favorite Parts of Newspaper According to Occupation (in percent)

Most Interested In:	Professional	White Collar	Worker	Farmer
Foreign News Domestic News	43	56	37	48
Domestic Mens	61	6 8	61	64

Table 2 (Cont'd)

Most Interested In:	Professional	White Collar	Worker	Farmer
Local News	5	18	5	
Editorials	11	18	2	-
Culture	19	12	5	4
Other (Death Notices,				
etc.)	49	56	49	52
Number of Newspape		0.4	44	0.5
Readers Queried	110	34	41	25

Source: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Climates of Opinion in Egypt, p. 218.

There is less dependence on the press for local news which is transmitted largely by word of mouth, than for foreign and domestic news. The inadequacy of news coverage in most Egyptian papers stems from the general tendency to slant it rather than from inadequacy of space devoted to it. Slanting until recently usually reflected the opinions of the editor, his party, or his supporters, covert or overt; increasingly, it now mirrors government propaganda policy.

Nearly all Egyptian dailies subscribe to one or more of the major commercial news services. Reuters, AP, UP, Agence France Presse, and the Arab News Agency compete energetically for a share of the market. The latter two are known to operate at a loss, and inevitably many Egyptian readers have assumed that their primary objective is to capitalize on the propaganda potential of news.

Periodicals

Periodicals are of two main types: illustrated weekly magazines containing entertainment features, fiction, local news, cartoons, etc., and satirical illustrated political magazines. Notable among the illustrated weeklies are al-Ithnayn and al-Musawwar, the latter currently having the largest circulation of any publication in Egypt. Rose al-Yusuf, an example of the second type, features local and world news with satirical commentary and caricature. The effectiveness of such magazines is enhanced by their popular style and the fact that cartoons are often accompanied by dialogue in colloquial Arabic, which reaches a larger public than does standard classical newspaper language.

Government and the Press

The Egyptian press has traditionally been subject to both direct censorship and indirect pressure from the government, but the degree of official control has varied with the period and the regime. As elsewhere in the Middle East, freedom of the press has been guaranteed by constitutions (including that of 1956), only to be limited subsequently by law. The administration of press laws appears to be, not an attempt to restrict freedom of the press as an end in itself, but a practical expedient in the interest of maintaining the existing regime in power—in the belief that under prevailing conditions in the Middle East unlimited freedom of the press would render government impossible.

During the period of the monarchy, substantial freedom to criticize the government was enjoyed by opposition papers—provided nothing derogatory to the monarchy, the king, or his entourage was printed. During World War II, publisher Taqla of al-Ahram led a vigorous fight in Parliament against censorship "without cause." His efforts, together with British policy, were largely responsible for the considerable freedom of expression enjoyed by the Egyptian press throughout the war. During the Palestine war the Egyptian Government enforced a more stringent censorship. Although President Nasser proclaimed the end of press censorship on June 19, 1956, it is highly improbable that the existing rigid controls will be modified in practice. In fact, there appears to be a growing tendency for all papers to echo the government line, and even al-Ahram now prints only the most veiled and guarded criticism of the military regime.

Traditional means of enforcing censorship have centered in the licensing system, whereby the government can suspend newspaper licenses for offenses under the press law of the penal code. A central licensing bureau maintains information on newspapers, their personnel, and their distributors. In effect it functions as a post-publication censor of the press. When an item is found to be displeasing or potentially offensive to some official, it is usually possible to invoke one or another of the provisions of the press law to take the case to court. A paper is automatically suspended upon being brought into court on any charge of press law violation, and it remains suspended until the outcome of the trial. The grounds upon which charges can be brought are extremely broad; and it is not difficult to harass a paper out of existence or into conformity by a series of prosecutions, for, even if the charges do not stand up in court, each case brings a temporary suspension of the paper.

Another well established censorship device is the suppression of individual offending issues. Normally, prepublication censorship is not used to control the press, but it may be imposed by decree in connection with martial law. Such censorship was put into effect during the January 1952, "Black Saturday" riots when papers were required to submit prepublication copy to censors.

RADIO

Local radio is a monopoly of the Egyptian government, which operates it through the Egyptian State Broadcasting System. It operates five medium-wave transmitters and one short-wave transmitter.

On the air for approximately 12 hours a day, the home service enjoys excellent reception throughout the country. The only remotely competitive stations are the BBC and its affiliated station on Cyprus. The Voice of America is not so readily heard because most local radio sets are too weak to pick it up, and advance notice of its programs is not so easily available. The local programs of Egyptian State Broadcasting are the only ones known to most rural listeners, and in the towns only the professional and white-collar groups listen extensively to foreign broadcasts. The popularity of the BBC, the favorite foreign station, is due to the strength of its signal and its relatively long broadcasting schedule, as well as its reputation for reliability and the fact that many of its announcers and commentators have attracted a personal following. Throughout the Middle East the importance of the personality of the broadcaster can hardly be overemphasized. To maintain the interest of listeners, it is essential for broadcasters to have voices, diction, and other qualities which make a strong and favorable impression.

The home service of Egyptian State Broadcasting is broadcast mainly in Arabic, but it includes programs in English, French, Greek, Italian, and German. Adult-education programs are broadcast daily, school programs are frequent, and readings from the Koran and other religious programs are heavily emphasized. The recent inauguration of programs in colloquial Arabic—"soap operas" and material of interest to peasants—should enlarge the radio audience to include many who have not been schooled in the classical language.

In 1956 there were over 400,000 licensed radio receivers in Egypt and probably many thousands of unregistered sets. Nearly all cafes in the towns have radios, and the number of sets in villages is increasing rapidly. As elsewhere in the Middle East, it is regarded as inhospitable to keep one's radio to oneself, and each set serves not only its owner but his neighbors as well.

Content Preferences

The following table, based on a recent sample survey, indicates radio program preferences by occupational group.

Table 3. Favorite Radio Program Types According to Occupation (in percent)

Favorite Programs	Professional	White Collar	Worker	Farmer
News Reports	34	47	30	57
Arab Music	41	32	44	29
Western Music	18	15		
Music (Indeterminate)	30	18	22	17
Koran Readings	28	38	64	89
Talk, Lectures, etc.	39	24	24	17
Others	34	32	32	11
Number of Radio				
Listeners Queried	109	34	59	35

Source: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Climates of Opinion in Egypt, p. 206.

News reports rate high with all groups, and especially with the less literate farmers for whom radio is the chief source of external news. The popularity of religious programs increases in inverse relation to the occupational scale of listeners.

FILMS

Egypt is the film producing center of the Middle East, and its flour-ishing industry exports films to the whole of the Moslem world. Except in urban areas, however, the film is not an important mass communication medium. The time-consuming demands of the country's unmechanized agriculture, the cost of tickets, and the distance from cinemas are factors which seriously limit movie attendance by Egypt's predominantly rural population. Also, some devout Moslem farmers disapprove of films on religious grounds.

Some 70 feature films are produced locally in a typical year. Although their technical quality has improved immensely in the past few years.

Egyptian films are still considerably below western standards in this regard. They are also criticized by some Egyptians for the monotony of their typical sentimental and humorous subject matter. The upper-income groups show a decided preference for foreign films, largely on technical grounds. In a recent year only about 20 percent of screen time was devoted to Egyptian films, as compared with 55 percent to American and 25 percent to British, French, and Italian films. Provincial cinemas, however, in general show only locally produced films. The audience for foreign films declines with occupational and educational levels. This reflects not only differences in taste and degree of westernization but also the fact that subtitles of foreign films are in classical Arabic while dialogues of Egyptian films are almost always in the universally understood colloquial language.

Of some 365 cinemas, 175 are in Cairo and Alexandria, and it has been estimated that about one half of the urban dwellers see a movie once a week. (The total attendance figure was 86 million in 1952, as compared with 12 million in 1939.) Mobile cinemas exhibiting films for entertainment as well as educational purposes are also used by various government ministries, and often whole villages turn out to attend them.

PROPAGANDA

President Gamal Abdel Nasser is waging an intensive propaganda campaign designed to consolidate the power of his regime and to inculcate a xenophobic nationalism in Egyptians. In this attempt his government is confronted with a people whose loyalties and interests are localized almost exclusively within the family and the village community.

There is little available information about the administrative details of the government propaganda apparatus or the precise content and effectiveness of its campaign. But in evaluating the techniques, content, and effectiveness of any propaganda campaign in the Middle East a certain cultural context must be kept continuously in mind, otherwise much of what is seen and heard can be grossly misinterpreted.

Any kind of verbal communication in the Middle East tends normally to be louder, more forceful, and more emotional than in America. This is especially true of conversation and argument; an amicable bargaining session is apt to include a climax of high words and mutual denunciations. There is also a general tendency to extreme statement, evidenced even in such conventional phrases as "I swear by my head and eyes" and "May my hand be forfeit." Further, issues are presented in blacks and whites without intermediate shading, and to make a point a speaker will link up by analogy items which to the western observer are totally without connection. For

example, the United States' withdrawal of the proffered loan for the Aswan project was in Egyptian eyes, not merely ill-considered or unfair, but an intentionally hostile act. And, during World War II, Hitler, since he was in conflict with the "imperialist" powers, was regarded as a great anti-colonialist. Any observer who associates this behavior with "propagandizing" is apt to see propaganda campaigns everywhere in the Middle East and hence have greater difficulty in distinguishing what is intended as propaganda from what is not.

Government Information Programs

The government information programs are formally the responsibility of the Ministry of National Guidance, but other ministries maintain their own public relations departments, employing all conventional mass communication media. The Ministries of Agriculture, Public Health, and Social Affairs, for instance, administer educational and information programs through publications, broadcasts, and films. The department of Public Relations of the Armed Forces, especially active in this respect, issues extensive publicity on the achievements of the military regime both for domestic audiences and for consumption abroad in translation.

The numerous speeches of President Nasser himself form the keystone of the government's information campaign and set the pace for propaganda output to the people as a whole and to particular groups. A special effort is made to arouse the peasant masses—the fellahin who form the vast majority of Egypt's population—to loyalty to the regime and concern for national and international issues. In this effort Nasser leans heavily on the portrayal of himself as a man who has not lost touch with the common people.

What are in effect dictatorial powers give Nasser access to numerous special channels for the dissemination of propaganda. Rigid control of the school system, censorship of the press, prohibition of political parties, and intensive indoctrination of the army, all afford both direct and indirect means of inculcating the government point of view. Government training of labor leaders and pressures brought to bear on labor unions enable the military regime to extend its influence to an important segment of the population. In all of these activities, the government enjoys the advantage of a clear field, since it does not permit public opposition.

Covert propaganda techniques, by no means new in Egypt, are also employed by the present government. Examples of these are subsidies to editors of nonofficial newspapers in return for editorials endorsing government policy, grants of holidays with pay when "popular" demonstrations are

wanted, and subsidies to public speakers and rumor spreaders. Religious leaders, including those at al-Azhar, the central institution of Moslem learning at Cairo, are also subject to various governmental influences, and an <u>imam's</u> Friday address is often a vehicle for the government's propaganda message.

Press and Radio

The operation of newspapers and radio as information media in Egypt has been discussed above. Despite guarantees of freedom of the press in the Constitution of June 1956, a system of rigid censorship perisists. All newspapers including the traditionally highly independent al-Ahram, increasingly reflect the official outlook both in editorial policy and in the selection and slanting of news. Three large newspapers—al-Qahirah, al-Jumhuriyah, and al-Shab—are quasi-official organs of the government and subject to even stricter control.

Radio broadcasting is a government monopoly of the Egyptian State Broadcasting. ESB from the beginning has functioned as a propaganda instrument; at present its board of directors is directly responsible to the Minister of National Guidance. In addition to regular religious programs, music, and news broadcasts, there is heavy emphasis on Arab and Egyptian history, topical political subjects, and plays or other programs glorifying the army and the police force. The press summaries broadcast daily reflect primarily the line of the newspapers most closely under government control, but excerpts from al-Ahram are also frequently heard.

ESB's "Voice of the Arabs" service broadcasts to Europe, North and South America, Indonesia, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. Special emphasis on broadcasts to the rest of the Arab world dates from the present regime, and there are also broadcasts in Swahili, Amharic, Somali, and other African languages. The programs stress slogans of Arab unity and anti-imperialism and present Egypt as the "hope of Arabdom." The further claim of African leadership for Nasser is said to be meeting with a mixed reception.

Propaganda Content

Conspicuous in the military regime's propaganda effort has been an attempt to discredit thoroughly every aspect of rule under the monarchy and to justify the revolution as a deliverance "from material chaos and moral rottenness." The old regime is condemned as alien and represented as the oppressive agent of foreign imperialism, the ally of feudalism, and the

personification of bribery and corruption. Phrases such as "the abyss from which the Revolution has saved the Fatherland" are constantly reiterated. The revolution is portrayed in glowing terms as having been dictated by the people's will and by Egypt's destiny to put an end to over 2,000 years of alien rule. The fact of its Egyptian leadership is repeatedly emphasized, as is the courageous role of the army—"the true interpreter of popular sentiment"—in paving the way for Egypt's political emancipation, economic development, and social progress.

Another recurring propaganda theme centers on the far-reaching goals of the military regime and includes an extravagant description of its achievements to date. The preamble to the new Constitution itself serves as a vehicle for propagandizing Nasser's "New Era," elaborating as it does the goals of social justice, equality of opportunity for all Egyptians, economic development, and the elimination of illiteracy—all themes which reappear regularly elsewhere. Ostensibly these objectives are to be attained within a completely democratic framework allowing for freedom of speech, opinion, assembly, and so on.

Much of the government's propaganda output reviews progress already made in the social and economic spheres, often claiming as completed or certain of completion projects which are as yet only in the blueprint stage. Many of the projects themselves are undoubtedly chosen partly for their propaganda potential and there often has been an emphasis on the showy at the expense of the practical in the government's efforts in such fields as education, social welfare, and public health. Schools and hospitals have been built which cannot be staffed for lack of professional personnel and equipment. The experimental Liberation Province in particular functions as a government showplace, although the actual projects of land reclamation and model settlement will not be completed for many years (see Chapter 15, Agriculture). There have been grandiose plans announced that are to transform Egypt from an agricultural to an industrial country with guaranteed employment for all.

Anti-imperialism, couched in the most virulent terms, is an incessant theme of Egyptian government propaganda and one which reached a pinnacle of fervor over the Suez issue and during the hostilities of late 1956. This and other anti-western themes often parallel the Communist propaganda line. The greed of the West is constantly reiterated, and the big powers are attacked for dealing with small powers "in accordance with the law of the jungle." "Arab unity" under Egyptian leadership is offered as the answer to western and Israeli "threats" to sovereignty. Given insistent repetition and supported by the impact of international events, these slogans appear to have filtered down even to the peasant level.

Related to the anti-imperialism theme and the constant emphasis on the menace of Israel is the glorification of a strong national army. Much of the government's propaganda is devoted to glamorizing the army and its "sacred mission" to defend Egypt. Huge posters of soldiers are plastered in the towns. A model of a soldier five stories high was erected in Cairo to celebrate the departure of the last British troops from the Suez area. Propaganda content is full of pleas for continued sacrifice for the "glory of Egypt," and a specific campaign is being waged to enlist civilian interest in military service. Special efforts are also being directed at keeping morale high in the armed forces and infusing soldiers with a greater sense of patriotism and esprit de corps.

Notwithstanding the efforts to glorify the military, President Nasser and his ex-officer subordinates have recently made a point of emphasizing their completely civilian status. The omnipresent photographs of Nasser on billboards and walls now show him in civilian clothes. So important does it appear to Egypt's leaders to promote the belief that the government is under civilian control that a decree issued in September 1956 made any reference to officials by their former military titles an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment.

Effectiveness of Government Propaganda

The "official" nature of the sponsorship gives government propaganda output a special credibility among the population at large but the degree to which the propaganda campaign has really influenced the thinking of Egyptians or its relative effectiveness among various segments of the population is not known. Numerous photographs of tumultuous receptions accorded Nasser and his associates may attest to a measure of personal popularity, but they do not provide even superficial evidence of the effectiveness of propaganda, since many such ostensibly spontaneous demonstrations are arranged by the government. Despite the regime's intensive efforts to instill nationalism in the masses, it is questionable whether the fellahin are greatly aroused by an issue such as Suez—remote as it is from their own unavoidably preoccupying daily concerns.

CHAPTER 10

EFFECT OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

THE NATIONAL IMAGE

During the hundreds of years Egypt was under foreign domination its people held aloof from their rulers and centered their loyalties and values in the more immediate and tangible environment of kin group and village. Any consciousness of belonging to a nation was lacking; national pride was a concept utterly foreign to them.

In 1952 came the new regime, with ambitious plans for Egyptian leadership in the Middle East and a determination to weld the diverse elements of the population into an Egyptian nation. The masses were to be made to realize that in the new scheme of things loyalty to country was to be added to and was to dominate the more personal loyalties of family and village. Egypt had been a country in which no conscious community of interests existed among the people as a whole and where popular institutions of government had never been allowed to achieve widespread recognition. Now it was a state involved with other states in which these strengthening attributes long had functioned. Without similar concepts and institutions Egypt would be at a serious disadvantage.

Faced with a population that is largely illiterate, knows little of the course of world history, and understands less, President Nasser and his associates are working hard to substitute for the old village and urban stereotypes an ideal Egyptian who will stir popular enthusiasm. The leadership holds that its assumption of what is good for the people must prevail, since the masses are hardly in a position to formulate their own judgments concerning the national interest. What the new national stereotype is to be is not yet clear, but two characteristics are constantly emphasized as essential to the new Egyptian: fervid patriotism and devotion to hard work.

Accordingly the Egyptian people are being subjected to an intensive campaign to make them consciously and patriotically Egyptian. Every

medium of mass communication is being used to the utmost, and the burden of every appeal is to the people's priceless heritage in Egypt, the guardian of Islamic traditions. Little reference is made to Pharaonic Egypt, and none to Christian Egypt, Islam is the jealously held faith of the masses, and it is largely through Islam that the approach is being made.

The Friday sermons in the mosques today are more often than not appeals to the patriotism of the people linked to diatribes against the nations of the West-Britain and France in particular—as oppressors and impediments to Egypt's rightful national self-expression. Their efforts to reinstate themselves in the Middle East must be defeated by the love of country of the Egyptian who will fight to "the last drop of blood" for Egypt's freedom. The same theme is heard incessantly on the radio and seen daily in the newspapers. The photograph sections in the latter are often entirely devoted to pictures of military parades, personalities, or equipment. The struggle to preserve the integrity of the nation is the incessant theme. Even the most apathetic and withdrawn Egyptian cannot be unaware of the appeals that are being made to him. How deeply the people in general have been affected by them is another question.

For the first time the fellah finds himself addressed by the great, appealed to by the leaders. Whether this apparent radical change in the attitude of a ruling group has begun to produce the hoped-for results cannot be said, but it would be remarkable if an outlook formed over thousands of years could be changed in the short time since 1952. Superficially, the government might appear to be succeeding in this enterprise, since there is no lack of evidence of patriotic demonstrations by groups of fellahin during the recent troubles. There is always the likelihood, however, that such outbursts are carefully staged and that once the fellah has exhausted his energies he relapses into his habitual torpor.

The creation of a national image that will take hold among urban workers and the nation's literate groups does not present as much of a problem. Nationalism and Pan-Arabism, though largely confined to intellectuals, have a longer history among these groups. But there has always been among the politically conscious elements in Egypt more enthusiasm for the ideal of a united and powerful Egypt than for Pan-Islamism or Pan-Arabism.

The segment of society which from all accounts is unimpressed by the government's "Egyptianist" program is what remains of the old elite, the old-line politicians, large landowners, and the more conservative of the country's businessmen. Though all these have at times demonstrated some hostility toward the West, they have never lost sight of the fact that Egypt has much to gain from good relations with the countries now denounced as political oppressors. Their distaste for Egypt's present government

is understandable, since they have suffered politically and financially from its policies; the exact nature of their feelings is difficult to evaluate, however, because they have carefully avoided drawing attention to themselves since the military coup.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

In addition to marshaling Islam in support of the new nationalism, a secular trend also can be discerned in the institution of such national holidays as National Day (July 23), which commemorates the coup d'état of 1952, and Liberation Day (June 18), the day chosen to celebrate the departure of the last British troops in 1956. The Egyptian flag remains a white crescent enclosing three stars on a green background, but an eagle motif is now often seen publicly displayed, particularly on the covers of government publications. Foreign-language announcements have completely disappeared from the newspapers. The postage stamps of the Republic include a "fellah" series with—for the first time in Egypt—a "dignity of labor" theme. A grim and determined steel-helmeted soldier appears in another series. Much is made of one's patriotic duty to serve in the armed forces, the reserve units, or pioneer labor battalions. Physical fitness and athletic prowess—in the service of the nation and of national dignity—are constantly stressed.

ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGNERS

To the Moslem there are different degrees of foreignness, and attitudes toward foreigners vary considerably. To the fellah the term "foreigner" has little meaning except as identified with exploitation and oppression and therefore with something to be avoided. Since the fellah is not yet fully conscious of himself as an Egyptian, however, his attitude toward other nations can only begin to emerge as that consciousness develops.

Egypt's nationalist intellectuals, and other Egyptians who share a consciousness of nationality have in common with their leaders an attitude of emotion-laden hostility toward Israel and the West. To this group Israel is an unlawful claimant in possession of part of the Arab heritage, and the West is responsible for every misfortune which has befallen Egypt politically and to some degree socially and economically as well, since at least as far back as the British occupation of 1882. In addition to this, in the eyes of the traditionalists the West belongs to the dar al-harb (House of War), the world of the infidel against whom jihad may be called (see Chapter 23, Religion).

The contrasting group of nations, those toward which friendly feelings

are in general felt, constitute the <u>dar al-islam</u> (House of Islam). There is an extension of this sentiment to those new non-Moslem and neutralist countries for which, as former nonself-governing territories, Egyptians feel some sympathy. Within the dar al-islam there are, nevertheless, clearly defined rivalries. Egypt shares in these through its attitude toward Iraq as a potential rival for leadership in the Middle East. Turkey, non-Arab and western-oriented, is viewed as a possible enemy. These are official attitudes, and there is much spontaneous support for them among politically conscious Egyptians.

ATTITUDES TOWARD MINORITIES

There have been sizable ethnic and religious minorities in Egypt since the earliest times. The 1.5 million Copts, ethnic Egyptians, are numerically the largest of these, and their relations with the Moslem majority have, superficially at least, generally been good. There has, however, been friction from time to time which has produced a latent hostility, and for this the Copts must take some share of the blame. The Copts, though found in small groups among the fellahin, tend to concentrate in the cities, and, as a relatively literate group, many of them become white-collar workers and symbols of a bureaucracy which the masses fear and shun. The Copts' insistence that they are the true ethnic Egyptians also contributes to the faint animosity felt toward them. Sensing this, the Coptic body as a whole avoids controversy, but many of its members, especially the rich, are said to look back nostalgically to the days of the monarchy.

From the end of Pharaonic times to the departure of King Farouk, Egypt was ruled by non-Egyptian minorities, and though there was no overt reaction to this condition, the sense of inferiority inevitably caused by foreign domination produced hostility and discrimination once Egyptian nationalists became masters in their own house. The once influential British and French minorities have now disappeared; the Greeks, Armenians, and Italians, who have remained in sizable numbers, are being subjected to pressures to conform. Jews, once tolerated, are leaving the country in large numbers in the face of a hostility which has developed through an anti-Zionist phase into a virulent ethnic anti-Semitism. The nature of Egyptian nationalism leaves no future for non-Egyptian minorities; they can no longer remain passive groups apart, and the only courses open to them are either to leave the country or to become Egyptianized.

MINORITIES AND THE NATIONAL IMAGE

The Copts constitute the only minority group which the government

expects to participate in the public response to the new national symbols. Since the Copts have harbored feelings of insecurity down the centuries and are today heavily outnumbered by a largely Moslem majority of which they are vaguely fearful, they tend to conform to the urgings of the government.

The foreign minorities, even when, like the Greeks, they have been present in the country for generations, have never been anything but "foreign" to the masses of the Egyptian people. The question of their attitude toward Egypt and things Egyptian could hardly arise when there was no "correct" attitude to be considered. Today, however, since the foreign minorities are showing no unusual enthusiasm for Egypt's rulers and tend to feel that the national image is something manufactured for Egyptians to emulate, they are being subjected to discriminatory pressures.

FOREIGN POLICIES

Egyptians have always lived in an area which figured in the strategic calculations of great empires and of aspirants to world conquest. For more than 2,000 years Egypt was a prize or a pawn rather than an independent participant in recurrent struggles for power, and only recently has it been able to pursue a foreign policy of its own making.

In an explosive reaction to a long period of foreign domination, Egypt's leaders now picture themselves as champions and leaders of an Arab nationalism dedicated to the liberation from foreign control of all Arab lands, in North Africa as well as in the Middle East. The initial stimulus and some of the essential elements of that nationalism came from abroad. The Napoleonic invasion made Egyptians aware of their country's importance to Europe as a vital communication link with India and the Far East. During World War I the British encouraged Arab nationalism as a weapon against the Ottoman Empire; in the same period President Wilson's Fourteen Points roused Egyptian hopes for the end of British rule in their country and in the entire Middle East. President Roosevelt recognized the right to independence of the Levant States during World War II. All of these occurrences are so many reference points in a process by which Arab nationalism was revived and developed implications that passed from the local to the world arena.

The intensification since World War II of a global United States-Soviet rivalry has given strategically placed Egypt a decisive position with respect to the original balance of power in that area. Egyptian foreign policy is now inextricably involved with that of far stronger nations, and President Nasser's ability to help tilt the power balance in one direction or the other gives his country importance out of proportion to its actual strength.

Egypt has taken on the militancy of a nation long dependent but now determined to be master in more than its own house.

President Nasser has demonstrated a capacity to interpret and to exploit the lessons of Egypt's historical experience of continuous foreign rule since the Persian conquest in the sixth century B.C. He has also been able to take advantage of the decline of French and British power and its replacement by the competition of the United States and the Soviet Union for influence over the new Moslem nations in a vast area extending from Morocco to Pakistan and Indonesia.

In the conduct of his policy, Nasser has displayed considerable gifts of political intuition and improvisation. He was in a position to exploit the emotions roused by defeat at the hands of Israel in 1948. He learned much from the new totalitarian pattern of empire-building which appeared in Europe between the wars. He has shown that he understands the techniques which can move Egyptian national sentiment from an exacerbated romantic nationalism to expansionist internationalism.

President Nasser came to power under the banner of social revolution; he has probably retained and expanded his power because of what were, for him, the fortuitous circumstances of a cold war. The first indications after the deposition of King Farouk in 1952 were that national reform, and not foreign involvements, would occupy the principal energies of the new leaders. Egypt firmly refused to participate in a Middle East defense pact, but it was not until 1955, when Egypt voiced shrill opposition to the Baghdad Pact, that Egyptian pronouncements became decidedly "neutralist" in that sense which has been identified as neutral against the West, neutral for the Communist bloc.

Egypt is weak as an economic or military factor in the global power struggle. Indeed, except for oil, the entire Arab world is poor. But in the Arabs Nasser has a far greater and potentially more effective instrument than other dictators have had for the calculated use of mass emotions as a lever of power. The material stake in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union is so great that Nasser may be able, temporarily at least to dictate the terms upon which Egypt's support of either party can be won.

The Context of Egyptian Foreign Policy

Egypt's foreign policy is the product not only of the political intentions of the country's leaders but also of Egyptian historical experience, geographical situation, and cultural pattern. This context frames and in part poses the problems of Egyptian foreign policy; it also limits the available solutions.

Culturally, Egypt has been subjected to strong western influence for a century and a half. In the course of that time, some of the traditional values and ways of doing things have persisted relatively intact; others have been changed or eliminated. Two examples relevant to the conduct of foreign policy may be noted. A traditional culture pattern in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East is the tendency to rely upon intervention in disputes. The pattern continues to be manifest in Egyptian diplomacy. Thus, in the Suez Canal dispute between Britain and Egypt in 1952, the persistence of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Salah al-Din Pasha, in his efforts to obtain the third-party intervention of the United States illustrated the continued importance of the pattern in Egypt. On the other hand, the expulsion order applied in 1956 to British and French nationals was officially explained as a necessary wartime security measure, but it is clear that an earlier Egyptian regime would have regarded such action merely as the normal exercise of the traditionally arbitrary power of the political executive, and would have felt no such compulsion to justify it in terms familiar to western diplomacy.

Another feature of the foreign policy context is geography. Egypt's position at the crossroads of three continents is a fact of the greatest economic and strategic significance to countries far away from Egypt itself. While Egypt can without consultation adopt various policies with respect to the Suez Canal, it cannot avoid the consequences of the impact of its decisions on others. Again, in the context of geography, Egyptians may regard the Nile together with its major tributaries—the Atbara, Blue Nile, Sobat, and White Nile—as a single complex properly subject to unified political control in which the dominant voice would be Egyptian. Lacking the strength to achieve that end by force, Egypt can frustrate itself and irritate its neighbors by verbal insistence on its maximum claims or it can accept the compromise gains to be had through international negotiation and mediation.

Among all the elements of the context in which Egyptian foreign policy is made and executed, one element stands out—the Egyptian reaction to the western domination which began early in the last century and continued into the present one. Politically articulate Egyptians in general and the country's present leaders in particular look back on that period with anger and bitterness as a time of oppression and foreign exploitation. The material and cultural benefits which were realized then tend to be forgotten in indignation at the thought of Egypt's dependent position. The achievement of independence and later the voluntary departure of British forces from Egypt did not basically relieve Egyptian feelings. The conviction remained that the country had won only the form and not the substance of

national freedom, and in this there was something of the Middle Eastern capacity to cling to old resentments.

"Western imperialism" and "British colonialism" continue to provide an adequate explanation to the Egyptians for most of their problems, domestic and foreign, and a powerful rallying cry for aspiring political leaders. The military reoccupation of the Canal Zone by Britain and France coupled with the Israeli attack in the autumn of 1956 gave new cause for hostility, but fundamentally the Egyptians were only confirmed in long-standing resentment, stimulated not only by the impingement of western power but by consciousness of western pre-eminence. Whatever the course of events, anti-western sentiment, actual or potential, will for a long time to come constitute a component of Egypt's approach to foreign affairs.

Principal Issues

Since World War II the following issues have dominated Egyptian foreign policy: relations with Britain and France; the Israeli question; relations with other nations of the Middle East and the Moslem world; and relations with the United States and Soviet Russia. The struggle in the autumn of 1956 between Britain, France, and Israel on the one side and Egypt on the other marked a climax in the development of the first two issues.

The stage had long been set for that conflict. Britain and France, caught in the ebb tide of empire, are seeking to protect their remaining vital interests from further encroachments by independence movements in the area.

Israel, viewed by its neighbors as a dangerous interloper and a creature of western imperialism, confronts a uniformly hostile Arab world Behind the specific issues of Israeli-Arab conflict is the profound cleavage between the essentially western political, economic, and social patterns in Israel and the Middle Eastern patterns of the Arab peoples. Israel has had an impact on its neighbors out of proportion to the size of its population or the strength of its economy. Egyptian antagonism to Israel, until recently expressed mainly in political terms, has been going beyond anti-Zionism to a generalized anti-Jewish attitude.

Egypt and the West

The story of Egypt's contact with the West in the last 150 years has been dominated by relations with Britain. Until World War I, France was

both an associate and competitor of Britain in Egypt particularly in economic matters, in which the French tended to press for a more stringent policy than Britain was willing to impose; but, while France's cultural influence upon Egypt overshadowed that of other western countries, Britain dominated the politics of the area. Having compelled the expeditionary force of Napoleon to leave Egypt, the British were in a position to convince the Mamelukes of the uselessness of resistance to the drive of western power into the area around Suez, which was again emerging as a great strategic crossroads. The British both exploited Mohammed Ali as a stabilizing force in Egypt and kept him from too strongly threatening the Turkish Sultan. The preservation of the Sultan's nominal authority was an essential feature of Britain's Egyptian policy until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, at which time it became clear that the Turkish Sultanate could no longer effectively contain the pressure exerted by Russia and that new means must be found for defending Suez (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting).

Britain then moved to exert more direct control over Egypt itself, took over Cyprus, and acquired shares in the Suez Canal. The British occupation of Egypt and the subsequent events in Anglo-Egyptian relations during two world wars and afterward, culminating in the Suez crisis of mid-1956, reveal the critical importance of Egypt in Britain's strategic calculations. The British attitude was dramatically high-lighted in the trying times of 1940-41; standing alone against Hitler's Europe, Britain nevertheless dispatched military forces to the Nile Valley.

Almost since the beginning of the British occupation of Egypt, and certainly since the first decade of the twentieth century, there has been conflict between mounting Egyptian nationalist aspirations and British determination to safeguard a strategic area and lifeline. Britain showed itself willing to make concessions, but with a caution and slowness which stimulated impatience to about the same amount as the concessions themselves whetted Egyptian appetites. The first important event marking Britain's reaction to Egyptian pressure was the British declaration of February 28, 1922, which abolished the protectorate and martial law and granted Egyptian independence, qualified by reservations to be negotiated later. These reservations, in which were forecast the outlines of future Anglo-Egyptian problems, left to British discretion (1) the security of British communications in Egypt (predominantly Suez), (2) the defense of Egypt against foreign agegression (involving occupation), (3) protection of foreign interests and minorities, and (4) the disposition of the Sudan.

Negotiation on these reserved points took almost 15 years to accomplish. Agreement was made difficult by the Egyptian insistence upon British evacuation and upon the unification under Egyptian control of the

Nile Valley, including the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The threat posed by Mussolini's expansionist policy in Africa brought the two sides together into the agreement of August 26, 1936, whereby Britain was allowed to station troops in the Suez area for the defense of the Canal Zone and Egypt. The other British privileges claimed in the reservations were given up, and the question of the Sudan was held subject to further negotiation.

The treaty of 1938, at first hailed in Egypt as a great success, became increasingly unpopular as Egyptians began to realize that it allowed the maintenance of British forces in Egypt not only during World War II but afterward. In 1946 Britain's postwar Labor Government received an Egyptian delegation in London to negotiate a settlement. The main points at issue were the perennial ones: (1) the role of Egypt and Britain in the event of war or aggression in the Middle East, (2) the evacuation of British forces from Egypt, and (3) unity of the Nile Valley. Despite the difficulties, agreement seemed to have been reached until it became apparent that the revised treaty would not be signed because of conflicting interpretations of the meaning of the Sudan Protocol, Egypt asserted that Britain had agreed to the permanent unity of the Nile Valley, whereas Britain insisted that the future of the Sudan must rest on "ultimate self-determination." The Egyptian attitude hardened with a change in governments in Egypt, and Britain, after offering to sign the treaty without the Sudan Protocol, asserted that the 1936 treaty was still in force.

Egypt in July 1947 brought the impasse to the United Nations Security Council, which, however, refused to accept jurisdiction on the ground that the situation did not threaten international peace and security. Therefater, Anglo-Egyptian relations entered a phase of drift from bad to worse. The old issues bred new disputes, and one issue—that of Palestine—exploded into the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

If Britain was more directly involved in the events of this period than other western powers, it was not more profoundly affected than they, for there were present the principal elements of Egyptian relations with the West in general. The attack on Port Said by Britain and France in October 1956 was the violent denouement of the unresolved conflict between Egyptian nationalism and western vital interests.

The Suez Problem

The Suez Canal is regarded by Britain as vital to British survival. Other western powers, France in particular, assign it hardly less importance. From such a point of view there are the strongest objections to the assertion by any one power of a sovereign right to grant, withhold, or restrict the use

of the Canal at will. An Egyptian claim to sovereign right over the Canal is particularly objectionable in British eyes if it is asserted by a militant and dictatorial leader disposed to take advantage of every opportunity to enhance his prestige and power. On the Egyptian side, nothing less than an independence which carries unhampered control of every inch of Egyptian territory is tolerable. This outlook is reinforced by the contemporary wave of Asian nationalism and is encouraged in its most extreme expression by Communist as well as nationalist propaganda.

Britain has sought to base its efforts in the Suez controversy on the foundation of agreements embodied in treaties which are a part of general international law. Thus, the agreement of October 1954 between Britain and Egypt established the status of the Canal as an undertaking of international importance and recognized the applicability of the international Convention signed at Constantinople in 1888, which had established that the Canal should be free and open in time of peace and war to every commercial or war vessel regardless of its flag. The signatories to the Convention, including the Ottoman Sultan on behalf of Egypt, agreed not to jeopardize the security of the Canal or to obstruct it. They agreed that no act of war should be committed in the Canal or within a radius of three miles of any of its ports. Other provisions dealt with rules applying to belligerents and the rights of the Sultan and Khedive.

Under the 1954 agreement on the Suez Canal Base between Britain and Egypt, Britain completely withdrew its forces from Egyptian territory; accepted the termination of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance; and retained the right to defend the Suez Canal Base in the event of an attack by an outside power on any signatory to the Cairo Treaty of Joint Defense among the Arab League States of April 1950. Egypt and Britain recognized "that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially, and strategically of international importance, and [expressed]...the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople."

Despite this accord, President Nasser acted on July 26, 1956, to nationalize the Suez Canal and to assert unilateral control of the waterway. Britain and France interpreted the move as a violation of the Treaty of Constantinople and as a direct threat to their vital interests. The United States, holding that some means of maintaining freedom of navigation of the Canal through a form of international supervision should be found, participated with Britain, France, and a number of other nations in negotiations to find a basis of compromise. Egypt refused to modify its position; when Israel sent military forces into the Sinai desert for the professed purpose of destroying the bases from which Egypt had been raiding Israeli territory, the

British and French invaded the Canal Zone, justifying the step as necessary for the protection of the security of the waterway. The Israeli forces thrust as far as the Canal Zone, meeting little resistance. The British and French advance south from Port Said was halted after a series of political reactions to their activity, including a threat of armed intervention by the Soviet Union, appeals from the United States, and resolutions of censure by the United Nations, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union voted for the withdrawal of the military forces. In December the Israeli Army pulled back from the Canal Zone, and the British and French withdrew their forces as an intervening United Nations security force arrived on the scene and the work of clearing the Canal, which the Egyptians had blocked with sunken ships, was begun.

Egyptian hostility toward its attackers, however, was unabated. In January 1957, Nasser denounced the 1954 agreement with Britain, and continued to treat English, French, and Jewish property in Egypt as that of enemy aliens.

Also in January, President Eisenhower focused on another aspect of the Middle Eastern crisis by appealing to a joint session of the United States Congress for special powers—including the right to use troops—to deal with a possible military emergency that might result from Soviet penetration into the area. Meanwhile, the underlying issue of the conflict between the British, French, and Israelis on the one hand and the Egyptians on the other remained unresolved. In the absence of a settlement which could somehow reconcile Egyptian national claims with vital interests which are broadly western no less than specifically British, French, or Israeli, future conflict in the area seems inevitable.

The Problem of Israel

No problem affecting the Middle East and Egypt is as intrinsically difficult or pressing as that of the independent State of Israel. In November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the Resolution on the Partition of Palestine which led to the establishment of an independent Jewish state in this territory. With the creation of Israel as a sovereign state, there was established in the Middle East a political enclave vigorously western in culture. Occupying territory which had been inhabited by Arabs for centuries, and sharing no significant community of values with the Arabs, Israel can only appear to its reluctant neighbors as a dangerous interloper. Moreover, the creation of the Jewish state led to the displacement of some 900,000 Palestinian Arabs whose presence in bordering states and whose bitter determination to return to their homes is an incendiary

factor in the area. Much of the postwar instability in the Middle East has resulted from this seemingly unsolvable problem.

Egypt has sought to make good its claim to leadership of the Arab world by a policy of violent opposition to Israel. It therefore took the brunt of war with Israel in 1948. The revelation of Egyptian internal weakness at that time prepared the way for the 1952 military coup and complicated Egypt's leadership role in the Arab League. How much Egyptians may have learned from these events about the price of leadership is problematical, but their aspirations limit their alternatives. To the extent that Egypt emphasizes the Suez issue and other concerns which are primarily its own and does not give priority to the problem of Israel, it runs the risk of losing its following among the other Arab nations. There were signs that this had begun to happen in 1956, but the military action by Britain, France, and Israel rallied Arab opinion to the Egyptian cause.

The Problem of the Sudan and the Nile Headwaters

A strong current of Egyptian opinion has long held that the stress of Egyptian foreign policy should be upon bringing about the political unity of the Nile River basin. The proponents of this view believe that Egypt's destiny lies in assuming leadership of the African continent, and they urge the necessity of securing control of the whole of the Nile to assure Egypt's future safety and welfare. With respect to the general objective of controlling the Nile basin, there is little argument among Egyptian leaders except as to means and timing. Back of such discussion lies the nineteenth-century precedent of Egyptian military and political penetration into the Sudan, which often had British support.

In the course of time, however, Britain developed a separate interest in the upper reaches of the Nile—the Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. An Anglo-Egyptian condominium which was established in the Sudan in 1899 had survived a half century when Britain took a stand for the principle of self-determination in the Sudan. The Sudanese chose independence, confirmed in an agreement between Britain and Egypt in February 1953. Since January 1956 the Sudan has been fully sovereign and independent and has acquired membership in the United Nations.

Meanwhile, Egyptian propaganda and official statements indicate that Egypt has not lost its interest in control of the Nile basin, especially that part of it which is in the Sudan. Egypt's physical existence, not to mention such schemes as the Aswan High Dam, depends upon an adequate supply of Nile water, and Egyptian interest in upstream utilization of the river is clearly legitimate. Egyptian political control of the entire area is,

however, another matter, for the Nile basin lacks unity in climate, terrain, and vegetation, and its inhabitants are varied in origin, culture, outlook, and type of contact with the outside world. Egyptian political hegemony in the area could reflect, not the needs and desires of the local population, but Egyptian ambition and determination singlehandedly to control the whole river. Any Egyptian moves in this direction would impinge on both indigenous and British interests in middle Africa.

Egypt in the Arab League

Egypt's claims to Arab leadership are not without foundation. Arabicized rather than basically Arab, Egypt's population—the largest in the region—shares the Arabic language and the Moslem religion with its neighbors and counts itself "Arab." More sedentary and urbanized than any country in the Middle East, Egypt has the largest city (Cairo), the greatest seaport (Alexandria), and the most extensive maritime contacts in the area. Across Sinai and the Red Sea it has easy access to the Fertile Crescent and the whole western littoral of Arabia. A distinct human and geographical unit since before the time of the pyramid builders, it contrasts with the recent and artificial political entities into which the rest of the area is divided.

The Arab League, in many ways an Egyptian creation, today revolves around Egypt. In larger terms, the League constitutes only the latest in a series of events working toward Arab unity and national independence. Following World War I the Arab world was cut up into areas subject to the domination of the victorious European powers. During the next two decades opposition to such forms of control grew in the West as well as in the East, and World War II accelerated the movement toward Arab independence and unity.

The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, took the initiative in 1943 with a proposal to the British Minister of State in Cairo that embodied the idea of a Greater Syria and of the eventual unification of all the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent. The Iraqi proposal met little response, and the next step was taken by Mustafa Nahas, Egyptian Prime Minister, who offered an alternative plan. Although Nahas proceeded in agreement with Nuri al-Said, his action appears as an Egyptian bid against Iraq for leadership of the Fertile Crescent and it carried the seeds of future conflict among the Arab states. The Egyptian initiative was successful and an Arab Conference was held in Alexandria in the fall of 1944; represented were Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Palestinian Arabs. The outlines of the Arab League set forth in the protocol of this conference were somewhat less ambitiously realized in the actual Pact of the

League of Arab States, signed at Cairo in March 1945.

The Pact was followed by a number of related agreements: the Cultural Treaty of the Arab League (November 1946), the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty Between the States of the Arab League (signed by members between June 1950 and February 1952), the Convention for Facilitating Trade Exchange and Regulating Transit Trade Between States of the Arab League (September 1953), and the Convention for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions and the Transfer of Capital Between States of the Arab League (September 1953). The obligation of the members of the League to act jointly to repel aggression against any one of them stands out among the provisions of the Pact (Article 6), and this obligation took concrete organizational expression in the establishment during the crisis of 1956 of a unified military command for the forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

The future of the League as a vehicle of Arab unity ultimately hinges on the ability of its members to meet the obligation to concert in a military crisis. To date the League has not met the military test with notable success, even against Israel, which is the object of common Arab fear and dislike. Arab inability to pose a single front either to the West or to the Soviet bloc is still more marked: Iraq adheres to the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact while Egypt and Syria court Soviet aid and support.

The goal of Arab unity remains largely unrealized. Change and instability mark the whole Middle Eastern situation, but at least until recently Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen have generally been aligned on one side and Iraq on the other. Lebanon and Jordan have tended to waver in between with strong pro-western elements known to be influential. Complex subdivisions, stresses, and strains exist in this pattern of relationship, and, in the unstable flux of contemporary Arab politics, it seems clear that Pan-Arab nationalism is a distant goal and that Egyptian aspirations to supremacy are as tenuously founded as the League through which they are projected. Crisis has brought Egypt forward as a symbol of resistance to external encroachments, but it has also roused the fears of other leaders in the Arab world for the security of their own special interests. The potentialities of the ferment in the Middle East are not to be underestimated, but whether the outcome will be greater Arab unity, with Egypt in the fore, remains very much in question.

Soviet Penetration in the Middle East

Soviet efforts to penetrate the Middle East have progressed. The disintegration of Western European power in the region during and after

World War II saw the revival of tsarist policy toward the Middle East, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared in November 1940 that the area south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf was "the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." In Egypt many of the nationalists who had hoped for a German victory in World War II—in expectation that it would hasten the liberation of Egypt from British control or influence—turned to the Soviet Union for the same reason.

After the success of the Egyptian coup in 1952 the themes of the Soviet propaganda campaign against British and French "colonialist imperialism" coincided with the propaganda of the new Egyptian regime. Soviet policy, anti-Zionist during Stalin's lifetime, was resumed in the form of an anti-Israel position after signing of the Baghdad Pact. The Pact, bitterly condemned in Cairo and Moscow alike, is another example of the coincidence of Soviet policy and Arab special interest. Members of the Soviet bloc have also risen in importance as trading partners of Egypt and other Arab countries, Russian displays and delegations dominate the trade fairs in the region.

Russia has exploited the objections of Egypt and the other Arab League countries to the Tripartite Declaration of Britain, France, and the United States in May 1950. The implication of the declaration was that the arms race between the Arab states and Israel would be controlled by furnishing further military supplies in such a manner as to maintain a bal. ance of power between the two sides. Negotiations between the United States and Egypt for the sale of arms dragged on and then reached a deadlock. In September 1955 Nasser announced an agreement by which Czechoslovakia would furnish heavy weapons, including jet planes, submarines, and tanks, in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice. The Soviet Union later declared that the agreement had been made with Moscow as well as with Prague, and it became known that in order to get the arms Nasser had mortgaged much of the Egyptian cotton crop. Egyptian defense was tied, technically, to the Soviet side, and the propaganda fanfare which accompanied the deal made it appear as a demonstration of Soviet friendship for a beleaguered Egypt and an occasion for gratitude.

The Canal crisis in 1956 provided a further opportunity, which the Soviet Union quickly seized by belligerently supporting the Egyptian position in the United Nations and, at one point, threatening military action in Europe as well as the Middle East against Britain and France if they did not halt their advance along the Canal.

Egypt and the United Nations

International politics in the Middle East continue to be power politics.

Transferred to the arena of the United Nations, that power struggle is somewhat mitigated, but not ended, by the principles and ideals contained in the United Nations Charter. Egypt's leaders have shown a readiness to utilize United Nations processes and invoke United Nations sanctions when these would advance Egyptian objectives; they have been less willing to do so at other times, and there is little to indicate that they are prepared to accept as binding any international decision which they regard as unfavorable. In this, perhaps, they differ little from other member states whose adherence to the United Nations is ultimately conditioned by considerations of national sovereignty, but, given the scope of Egypt's ambition and its adventurous foreign policies, its reservations acquired a special and potentially disruptive significance.

Aims of Egyptian Foreign Policy

Under the Nasser regime the politically conscious element in Egypt sees itself as leader of the Arab world, a role in which, in the present period of Middle Eastern political crisis, it has the support of vocal elements in the other Arab states. Such support, however, appears to stem from Arab readiness to accept any leadership which promises to counter western political dominance and Israeli initiative in the area rather than from any special admiration for Egypt itself. Egyptian prestige in the area is limited by the unsteady foundations on which rest its aspirations to lasting leadership.

The terms on which Egypt seeks Arab leadership are no less important than the ambition itself. Those terms involve a policy of third-force neutralism for Egypt and the other Arab states with respect to the West, but they evidently do not preclude strengthened ties with the Soviet bloc. They also involve competition with Iraq for preeminence in the Arab League and if Egypt is successful in the contest probable ultimate Egyptian domination of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. With respect to Israel, Egypt has been very explicit about its intention to destroy that state, which it regards as a threat to the integrity of the whole Arab world. The long-range significance of Egypt's campaign against "imperialism" and "colonialism" would seem to be nothing less than the wholesale removal of the remaining element of western power and influence in the area.

Egypt seeks to employ the full advantage of its key strategic and geographical position to these ends, and its present leaders have shown that they are prepared to run risks in doing so. The Egyptian ruling elite sees itself at the head of a revolutionary upsurge in the Middle East, and its policies and actions are based on that assumption. Official Egyptian propaganda portrays this revolution as running from the Atlantic to Iran and beyond.

Verbal claims in the Arab world go far beyond the scope of real intentions, but in the context of the present they reveal the dangerous combination of opportunity framed by world crisis and the intention of a parochial, authoritarian elite, which conceives of itself in heroic terms, to seize that opportunity.

CHAPTER 11

BASIC FEATURES OF THE ECONOMY

Western influence and subsequent western control in the last century set in motion a process of change in Egypt's traditional agricultural economy. That process is still going on, and, although limited raw material resources make it unlikely that Egypt will ever become a major industrial power, it is hoped by continued industrial expansion eventually to achieve the viable balance lacking today between agricultural and industrial production. In the meantime, two facts are outstanding in the Egyptian economic situation: on the one hand, western financial patterns are now firmly superimposed on the traditional base of bargain and barter; on the other, Egyptian merchants, industrialists, and bankers are beginning to play a greater role in the economic development of the country.

In both the domestic and international spheres Egypt for many years to come must continue to be a country whose economy is geared to agricultural output and to one crop in particular—cotton. This crop, which is widely sought for its excellent quality, accounts for practically all of Egypt's exports. The human terms of its production, not revealed by Egypt's status in the commercial markets of the world, is the backbreaking labor at the barest subsistence level of 17 million peasants in the Nile Valley and delta.

Egypt's currency is stable and its terms of trade generally good, the only large-scale subsistence import being grain. But behind this façade of fiscal solvency is a threatening reality: since 1820 the land under cultivation in Egypt has merely doubled, while the population has increased seven times, and even with highly increased productivity the peasant is slowly falling behind in the race against hunger and distress. Moreover, even with the dissemination of birth control practices, it will be many years before an appreciable leveling off of population growth can be expected. Mohammed Naguib, the former Egyptian President, has asserted that, although some urban Egyptians are living better than ever before, 90 percent of the population has been reduced to a standard of living as low as the civilized world has ever known.

Egypt, like many other countries today, is the scene of a struggle between modern techniques and traditional methods. On the whole, the country has suffered more than it has benefited from the impact of the new ways; land reclamation, the scientific development of irrigation, and the introduction of new farming techniques have brought bigger crops, but there are many more millions of people among whom the crops must be distributed. The rapid progress of public health programs, unaccompanied by a proportional rise in production, has merely multiplied the population without bettering its living conditions. The costly grain imports must be paid for with cotton, but it is the devotion of the land to cotton production which makes it necessary to import grain,

Western methods are, except in some of the highly skilled working trades, replacing the work of the small artisans and craftsmen. These workers, together with fair numbers of the landless peasantry, are now being gradually absorbed by the expanding factories, and Egypt now has for the first time in its history an industrial working class—and the problems characteristic of the growth of that group.

Despite these results, the displacement of traditional methods by twentieth-century industrial and agricultural techniques continues, though slowly. One of the principal bars to any rapid modernization is the attitude of the Egyptian landlord and entrepreneur toward the use of human energy. Labor is cheap, abundant, and to be exploited. The Egyptian employer feels that he may forgo streamlined efficiency when he can indulge in a prodigal use of manpower, and, though the situation is improving as the number of highly trained technicians increases, this prodigality carries over to the use of machinery. The Egyptian worker abets this attitude in his indifference to mechanical maintenance. More efficient organization and supervision of labor is needed, but, once again, industrial efficiency techniques which in western countries have long been taken for granted still seem unsupportably rigid to the Egyptian worker. As it is, turnover, particularly in industry, is a serious problem, and a too-hasty imposition of a high efficiency program would only aggravate the situation. The potential foreign investor, although still invited to finance Egyptian industrial projects, is unlikely to avail himself of this opportunity as long as these conditions so strongly persist.

The period between 1880 and 1914 was one of rapid development for Egypt. The modernization of the irrigation system brought an agricultural revolution. The cotton crop was increased by 250 percent in bulk, and its value increased fourfold. This expansion in national income made it possible to invest large sums in equipping certain sectors of the economy: a good railway network was laid out, harbors were built, the principal cities were

provided with public utilities, and the banking system was developed. But the poorer classes were forgotten; the rich became richer, the poor, poorer.

World War I halted the period of expansion. Soil exhaustion began to lower yields and the wide-scale use of imported and highly expensive chemical fertilizers, though bringing yields back to and even above the previous level, increased the gross cost of cultivation and thereby raised prices. The small increases were, moreover, absorbed internally, while externally a sharp fall in cotton prices led in the 1920's to a deterioration in Egypt's terms-of-trade. The industrialization program also encountered difficulties. Although production rose with the building of factories and the imposition of a well-nigh prohibitive tariff on imported manufactured goods, the increase was not sufficient to offset the decline in agriculture—and in fact the real national income of the 1930's was below that of the previous decade. These factors, combined with the rise in population, resulted in a distinct decline in the standard of living.

World War II held up Egypt's economic development, created new problems, and, though it provided certain assets, particularly in sterling accounts, did little to alter the fundamental problems of the economy. The postwar period has seen the country faced with the dilemma which obtained during the period between the wars. Meanwhile there is a growing awareness in both private and official circles of the need to alleviate the condition of the mass of the population if the country is to achieve any lasting strength, and ambitious social programs are being projected and in part carried forward. Confronted with the inexorable growth of the population, the authorities are trying to diversify agriculture and expand industry. Achievement, unfortunately, is consistently falling short of aims. One Egyptian authority has observed that Egypt is trying to carry out a nineteenth-century economic revolution in a twentieth-century context and that the fruits of the earlier agricultural revolution have been dissipated in maintaining an increasing population at a low and still declining level of subsistence.

The bulk of Egypt's population is not yet accustomed to the idea of saving and investment. Centuries of bad government and uncertainty as to the ultimate fate of any meager savings have tended to make the average Egyptian improvident rather than thrifty. Social structure and traditional values also handicap the country's economic development (see Chapter 24, Social Values and Patterns of Living; Chapter 17, Domestic and Foreign Trade). Egypt still has no large and energetic middle class to spearhead economic evolution, as nineteenth-century Europe and the United States had. The power of conservative landlords has been somewhat weakened by the agrarian reforms of 1952, but the old preoccupation with investment in landed property still works to the detriment of industrial development. Thus

in industry, and to a lesser degree in domestic trade and banking, commercially minded foreigners—notably Western Europeans and Levantines—continue to hold the dominant position they early acquired in these fields. The establishment of Egyptian banks, factories, and other enterprises has not yet, for all the support offered by the government, succeeded in making a deep dent in this foreign supremacy.

Since 1952, Egypt has been governed by a military regime which, although it initiated widespread and much-needed economic reforms, has been almost continuously involved in diplomatic and military incidents. In pursuit of its ambitious domestic and international goals, Nasser's Government has mortgaged much of the country's wealth, including the cotton crop, for the purchase of armaments. Unable to obtain munitions from the United States, Egypt in 1956 turned for assistance to the Soviet bloc, with the result that since that time Egypt's trade pattern has become noticeably oriented to the Communist dominated countries. Reform programs have recently had to slow down as more and more government expenditure went into the modernization and strengthening of the army (see Chapter 12, Financial System).

The refusal of foreign financial support for the Aswan Dam has further clouded the prospects of the vast land reclamation and industrial schemes which were dependent upon the dam's being built. Unless the international situation improves, Egypt, still far from achieving the viable economy those schemes envisaged, faces instead continued and probably increasing strain and the possibility of eventual collapse.

CHAPTER 12

FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Egypt as a Moslem country has a heritage of Moslem principles influencing the organization and administration of public finance. These principles and their application have long conditioned both the actions of government and the attitudes of the people in this sphere. In the course of the last century, under the impact of the West, the original Moslem principles of public finance were almost entirely replaced by borrowed western forms more suitable to the financing of a modern state. Yet some of the old tradition persists in the application of the new principles and practices.

The real condition of public finance in Egypt, as in other Islamic countries, tends to be obscured or disguised in public information and statistics. The success of tax collection, especially of direct taxes such as income or estate taxes, cannot be determined by noting the provisions of the law or reading official pronouncements about such matters. Tax collection in the rural areas, which comprise most of the country, is largely in the hands of local officials such as the sheikhs, and these function more as representatives of their own community and family interests than as agents of the government. The temptation they face to serve local interests rather than the government inevitably hinders the tax program. In the villages it is also difficult, if not impossible, to determine the size and extent of landholdings as a source of income, and hence the actual incomes of individual landowners. City dwellers, too, are accustomed to misrepresenting income and assets in order to escape the payment of taxes. These practices are so universal that the citizenry sees nothing immoral in them, and behind this attitude lie centuries of Moslem experience with taxes and tax collecting. In the Arabic language the word for tax, dariba, derives from the root drb, meaning to hit or strike. The word at once reveals something of the Arab's feeling toward taxation in general and suggests the justification for avoiding taxes when possible, just as one would avoid a blow. For the Egyptian, taxes have traditionally been regarded -as government itself has been -as something inimical to individual or family interests, a necessary evil to be endured.

ISLAMIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC FINANCE AND TAXATION

The orthodox Islamic concept of public finance, which existed as an ideal in the Arab world and in Egypt for 1, 200 years, permits or enjoins the (Islamic) state to levy a tax, which is called zakat, in order to employ the surplus of the well-to-do for the benefit of the poor. The principle of its application was that the more capital and labor are involved in the accumulation of income, the less the income should be taxed, and that articles should be taxed in inverse proportion to their perishability and in direct proportion to their capacity for production, growth, and reproduction. Thus fruit or fresh garden produce would not be taxed, nor a mule as contrasted with a mare. This concept of taxation was linked inextricably with religion. It was clothed with the sanctity of orthodoxy, and was meant to apply in a relatively static social order. Change was not extolled but decried, except for political and territorial expansion which would bring more persons into the Moslem fold, within which all were supposed to enjoy the benefits of the leveling system of finance directed at the goal of equalitythe state in which all Moslems (theoretically) find themselves on the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Quite naturally, the actual practice of governments in the Islamic world fell far short of the ideal. The rich, in league with government, generally managed to grow richer at the expense of the poor. Thus, in practice, inequality rather than the Islamic ideal of equality was served and a wide gap between the rulers and the vast mass of the people was maintained. Powerless to ease their heavy financial burdens, the peasantry hated and feared their governors and relied on Allah to do justice.

In contrast with the Moslem ideal, fiscal practice in the Islamic state was largely directed at two closely related public goals: military preparedness and territorial expansion. The religious sanction for this policy was the enlargement of the ranks of the faithful by the expansion of Moslem rule, but the consequence of a budget almost exclusively devoted to maintaining and improving an army was the creation of a military caste or aristocracy. This ran counter to Islamic principles of equality, but the financial policy of the state was designed to conform to these objectives. Peacetime goals of the state involving public finance were of secondary significance. Military demands upon the public treasury became voracious and eventually began to destroy taxable capacity. The early military caste throughout Islam was drawn primarily from the militant Bedouin, whose claims were satisfied to the neglect of the needs of the settled population. The only way for conquered non-Moslems to escape even greater burdens of taxation than were imposed on the Moslem majority was to accept the

religion of their conquerors. In Egypt the main tax load had to be carried by the rural population. In the course of time, the tax collecting function was transferred to intermediaries or "tax farmers." This practice led to the development of a kind of Moslem feudal system. The intermediaries became feudal overseers owing obligation directly to the government and spreading corresponding obligations among those below them, but retaining a divided loyalty, one to government and one to local community and the local retainers with whom they might very likely have family relationships

Much of this institutional history continues to have importance to-The old system of tax farming has its modern counterpart in the employment of local sheikhs as intermediaries in collecting taxes, with all the associated conditions of divided loyalties and special interest. In a larger sphere, it is possible to note the persistence of the historic ambiva. lence between military and expansionist aims on the one hand and social welfare goals on the other. The military projects of the Nasser Government may well be paid for at the expense of the public welfare program on which the regime has based so large a part of its appeal for popular support; for example, in the fiscal years 1953-54 to 1955-56, Egypt's defense expenditures rose 40 percent. But the domestic enthusiasm generated for increased power and prestige abroad will no doubt reduce public concern over failures in the field of social welfare Ultimately, this ambivalence has its origin in the conflict between the Islamic religious ideal of equality among the faithful and the demands generated by Moslem militance. Today, with the mass of Egyptians showing signs of becoming more alert to the possibility of bettering their condition, any Egyptian government committed to a largescale military program must persuade the populace that armed might is an essential means to a better life for the country in the future and that present sacrifices are equally shared.

Considerations of this kind have made public finance a central and peculiarly difficult issue in Egypt since the middle of the nineteenth century. Even were the Nasser Government preoccupied exclusively with the amelioration of Egyptian poverty, a degree of poverty exceeded in few other countries in the world, it would be faced with a monumental task in finding the vast sums needed for land improvement and reclamation alone, and this is but one aspect of the agricultural problem which is the key to Egyptian prosperity. Given the many other social and economic projects which need to be undertaken, the financial demands confronting the government loom even larger. The additional burden of an ambitious program of military preparedness can be carried only at the expense of progress in other areas.

PUBLIC FINANCE UNDER THE OLD REGIME

Until recently Egyptian budgets seem to have been drafted as much to obscure as to reveal the true state of the country's finances. Mohammed Ali felt no obligation to make public the condition of the treasury or its revenues and expenditure. Moreover, in his capacity as Pasha, his privy purse was not held separate from the public treasury. Later, the same arbitrariness enabled the Khedive Ismail to pursue what proved to be a ruinous fiscal policy. Ismail's government did make financial reports to the Assembly of Delegates, but these reports are now known to have been blatantly falsified. Governmental secrecy and deception in such matters were of course not new in Egypt, which has known so much of authoritarian and alien rule

With European intervention came the establishment and maintenance of a sound system of public finance. Imposed primarily in the interest of servicing Egypt's foreign debts (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting), the system also brought benefits to the country in political and financial stability. even though the stringent economies and fiscal policies resulted in the neglect of some vital services, particularly public education. Upon the termination of the British protectorate in 1922, the Egyptian Government found itself in a generally favorable economic situation as the result of over two generations of sound government finance. There was sufficient carry-over of the principles of that period by the newly independent nation for the favorable situation to be maintained. However, budgets again were manipulated to conceal the diversion of funds to private pockets, and this condition persisted up to the time the revolutionary military junta took over in 1952. Since that time a real attempt seems to have been made to alter the old system of deception, official corruption, and diversion of public funds by individuals in high places The new regime, intent upon maintaining its prestige and retaining public confidence, is evidently striving to keep public finance on a high level of efficiency and to see to it that monies are expended for the purposes intended.

Upon the abolition of the Capitulations in 1937 (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting), Egypt came into full control of its financial affairs. The sources of public revenue were limited, as they continue to be, by such basic factors as the weak development of a middle class, a high degree of dependence upon agriculture, and an embryonic, although growing, industrial plant; but the government could now resort to direct taxation of in come, estates, and inheritances. Under the Capitulations, foreigners in Egypt could not be directly taxed without the consent of their governments, and, as long as immunity for foreigners existed, no Egyptian government

dared impose direct taxes upon Egyptians. The situation has changed but the old attitudes persist, and it will no doubt be a long time before Egyptians at large view the payment of direct taxes as a public duty rather than an imposition to be evaded if possible. Despite widespread evasion of them, these taxes have nevertheless become an important source of revenue.

The western models in public finance on which Egypt has drawn were produced by a process of economic and social evolution in Europe which more and more has demanded sound and efficient accounting, the payment of taxes in keeping with the law, and expenditure for publicly stated purposes. In the West this concept of public finance, particularly with respect to sources of revenue and objects of public spending, has been associated with a private enterprise system and the development of a strong middle class. Neither is strongly developed in Egypt, nor does the program of economic and social change of the Nasser regime seem to point in their direction. Many of the principles of western public finance, however, are applicable in any type of modern society, and it is possible that these principles will be retained regardless of what Egyptian events may bring. But it is important to note that Egypt has a precedent in Islamic tradition and history for a type of public finance that is neither capitalistic nor collectivist in the European sense and upon which the present regime may draw in seeking to attain its goals.

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC FINANCE

Prior to World War II, the Egyptian budget as a whole absorbed approximately 20 percent of the national income. Since the war, the figure has been about 25 percent. The Egyptian national income for 1953 has been estimated at bE 856.4 million. In these respects Egypt approaches the average of other modern states of medium size, but an extremely low per capita income makes the tax burden a heavy one for the majority, for whom the payment of any tax is a hardship.

Taxation

Traditionally, indirect taxes have been the chief source of revenue of the Egyptian Government. Egyptian direct taxation, despite recent reforms, remains highly regressive. Prior to the abolition of the Capitulations, only two forms of direct taxes existed in the country: a land tax, revised in 1878, which was assessed on the basis of a predetermined average rental value of land, and a building tax, assessed on the estimated annual rental value of buildings. In 1939 the system of land taxes was readjusted. The

average rental of land was put at EE 5.715 per feddan and the rate of taxation at 16 percent, with a maximum per feddan of EE 1.64. (The feddan is 1.038 acres; the Egyptian pound of 100 piasters is today \$2.87.) This meant that a landowner possessing land of an average rental value of EE 21, instead of paying a tax of approximately EE 3 per feddan as the rate which had prevailed since 1899 would have required, paid only EE 1.64. The result was to favor the owner of the best land and perhaps to provide an incentive for land improvement, although the improvement of land was largely out of the control of its owner without the large-scale assistance of government. Between 1942 and 1945 small landowners were granted land-tax relief. Those assessed at EE 2 had their tax remitted, and those assessed between EE 2 and EE 10 had their taxes reduced by EE 2. In 1949 the land tax was reduced to 14 percent and the maximum of EE 1.64 abolished.

The first Egyptian income tax law was passed in 1939. For tax purposes, incomes were divided into four categories: (1) dividends and interest; (2) profits of financial, commercial, and industrial enterprises; (3) incomes of the liberal professions (teaching, law, medicine, etc.); (4) salaries and wages. From a beginning flat tax rate of 7 percent on dividends, interest, and profits, the rate was gradually increased, reaching 17 percent in 1952.

Until 1950, income from agricultural enterprise, other than that organized in joint stock companies, was exempt from taxation, a fact reflecting the political power of the landowners. Members of the liberal professions and those individuals with university degrees (or equivalent diplomas) whose incomes did not exceed LE 1,000 net annually were in 1955 subject to the following taxes: LE 15 per annum for those having graduated 5 or more years ago but less than 10; LE 30 per annum for those of 10 to 15 years' standing; LE 50 per annum for graduates of more than 15 years' and less than 20 years' standing; and LE 80 per annum for those of more than 20 years' standing. Persons in these categories have the option of paying according to their actual income if they give notice to the tax inspectorate.

Taxes on wages and salaries first ranged from 2 to 7 percent, with an exemption of EE 60, which in 1950 was raised to a maximum of EE 150 for married persons. The rise in the cost of living, however, has more than offset the increase in exemptions. In 1952, following the coup led by Naguib, the rates on higher incomes from wages and salaries were raised to a maximum of 9 percent. The very lowness of this rate gave the taxpayers a rationalization for tax evasion. Numerous deductions are allowed, the most important of which is the deduction of all other direct taxes paid during the preceding year, including the special taxes on income derived from the four income categories established under the law of 1939. Indemnities

Table 4. General Income Tax Schedule (in Egyptian pounds)

Kale	o 1,000 Exempted	More than 1,000 to 1,500 8 percent	e than 1,500 to 2,500 9 percent	e than 2,500 to 3,500 10 percent	e than 3,500 to 5,000 15 percent	e than 5,000 to 10,000 25 percent	More than 10,000 to 15,000 30 percent	More than 15,000 to 20,000 40 percent	More than 20,000 to 30,000 50 percent	More than 30,000 to 40,000 60 percent	More than 40,000 to 50,000	More than 50,000 80 percent
	Up to 1,000	More than	More than	More than	More than	More than	More than	More than	More than	More than	More than	More than

Source: Adapted from "Taxation in Egypt," The Egyptian Economic and Political Review, May 1955, p. 33. and fines, however, are not deductible.

In 1944 an inheritance tax was passed, established at 2 percent on the first LE 1,000 up to 10 percent on bequests over LE 50,000. These rates were raised to 5 and 20 percent respectively in 1950, and in 1952 the rates on the higher figures were increased to a maximum of 40 percent.

A 1941 tax, as purely a war measure, on the excess profits of industry, trade, and finance was abolished in 1950.

The traditional Moslem theory of taxation, which based taxes on the nature of the source, characteristically worked to the advantage of certain groups at the expense of others. The system neglected the question of ability to pay and equality of obligation, and individuals with the same incomes might be taxed at different rates depending upon the sources of their income. The provisions of a general income tax law that was passed in 1949 and covered aggregate income from all sources were more equitable. The schedule of taxes under this law, following rate increases in subsequent years, is given in Table 4.

As shown in Table 5, Egyptian direct taxes continue to produce much less revenue than indirect taxes. Revenue from taxes on income and wealth have tended to decline relatively, due chiefly to the fact that taxes are generally levied on external indicators of income rather than on income itself, with the result that rises in income are not reflected in tax yields.

Indirect taxes in Egypt take the form of customs, excise duties, entertainment taxes, and stamp duties. The largest producers of revenue, they are also the cheapest type to administer. In 1950 the Customs Administration's expenses were only 2.7 percent of its revenues as compared with 7.6 percent for the collection of direct taxes.

In recent years yields from indirect taxes, among which customs duties are most important, have risen absolutely and relatively in Egypt, owing to rising imports and increases in tariffs. Customs duties are computed either ad valorem (or at a specified percent on the c.i.f.—cost, insurance, freight—value of goods) or at a specified rate per unit of weight, volume, number, or surface. They are graduated in such a way that smaller charges are assessed on raw materials required for local industries, higher charges on the importation of semimanufactured goods, higher still on luxury items, and highest of all on goods competing with local industries. Some duties are also levied on exports. The Customs Administration administers excise duties and certain charges accessory to customs duties, such as quay dues and portage and weighing fees, as well as the customs.

The stamp duty is levied on a wide variety of documents, including those passed between the government and private parties and between private parties.

Table 5. Estimated Budget Receipts
(in thousands of Egyptian pounds)

	1954 (a)	1955(a)	1956 (a)
Income taxes	20, 250	18, 250	19, 500
Inheritance and real estate taxes	22,570	22,110	22, 140
Customs and other indirect taxes	96,420	105, 750	114,680
Other receipts (b)	37, 570	44,630	54, 660
Total	176,810	190,740	210,980

(a) Twelve months ending June 30 of year stated.

(b) Excluding transfers from the reserve fund and including net results of public undertakings.

Source: United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1954-1955; Supplement to World Economic Survey, 1955, p. 99.

Expenditure Patterns

A strikingly small proportion of the budget expenditure is devoted to the servicing of the public debt: in recent years, the amount has represented less than 3 percent of the total. Mounting defense expenditures, posing a question as to whether this item will ultimately put too heavy a strain upon national resources, are another feature of the Egyptian fiscal scene. This question is, of course, not entirely or even most importantly a matter of economics, but rather of what the Egyptian population has been conditioned to bear.

An even heavier drain has been the cost of a traditionally top-heavy civil service. It has been estimated that this category of expenditure at times has exceeded 40 percent of the national budget. Social services have been expanded markedly in recent years, and price subsidies designed to reduce the cost of living have been inaugurated. Expenditure for the related program of public works has increased at a much slower rate, owing mainly to a shortage of foreign exchange. Important steps to improve the general welfare have been taken, particularly since July 1952. The government has a long way to go in developing budgetary and fiscal policies necessary for an effective attack on the problem of Egyptian poverty.

In Egypt, as in most Middle Eastern countries, public revenues and expenditures are not incorporated in a single budget, and there has been an increasing use of separate development budgets. In recent years a separate budget for production has been assigned to the National Production Council. A second development budget for a Public Services Council was established in 1954 to finance projects in the spheres of health, education, social welfare, and town planning.

The allocations to the National Production Council budget have been large, but except for some extraordinary receipts and the proceeds of certain development loans the sources of its revenue have not been clearly revealed. Further expenditures in this category are apparently to be largely covered by borrowing. Receipts for the Council budget for 1953-54 included LE 11.7 million in profits from revaluation of gold in the note cover and from receipts of the sale of wheat seeds, set at LE 3.3 million. The allocations for 1954-55 and 1955-56 were mainly derived from borrowing and carrying forward unspent sums. In December 1954 the government floated three loans totaling LE 25 million, and on April 1, 1956, it invited public subscriptions to two bond flotations totaling LE 25 million for such development purposes.

The budgets of the Public Services Council for 1954-55 and 1955-56 have been financed with revenue from confiscated property of the former

Table 6. Expenditure Estimates (millions of Egyptian pounds)

1955-56

1954-55

1953-54

1952 - 53

8.8	2, 5	1,3	4.9	10, 2	33, 4	10,5	9.0	8.3	3,6	13.0	3, 9	24.0	55.0	3,7	10, 3	28.0	4.6	2.0	3, 3	0000
6.7	2.4	1,2	4.8	9, 7	28, 7	10.0	80° 80°	6,5	3, 3	13,6	4.2	24,5	53,6	3,4	10, 4	26, 5	4,6	1.7	3,3	
6,9	1,2	1,0	5,2	1,6	26.4	9.2	7.6	4.7	3, 2	11,5	4,2	21,3	39, 3	3.0	8,7	27.0	6.0	6.3	3,2	1 1
6,5	0.7		6,3	2,3	25, 8	9,4	7.9	3,6	3,2	14.6	3,6	22.0	38,7	3,4	4,9	29.0	4.0	15,5	3,5	
Public Debt	Council of Ministers	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Finance and Economy	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Ministry of Education	Ministry of Interior	Ministry of Public Health	Ministry of Municipal Affairs	Ministry of Justice	Ministry of Public Works	Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Communications	Ministry of War	Ministry of Social Affairs		High Cost of Living Bonus	Former British Army Workers	Subsidizations of the Cost of Living		

Total

royal family and from transfers from the general budget. The total appropriations for this budget were LE 16.4 million for 1954-55 and LE 22.7 for 1955-56. The total derived from confiscated property for the latter year was LE 17.3 million, of which LE 8.5 had been carried over. The use of a special budget for public services was discontinued beginning with the fiscal year 1956-57.

The balance between receipts and expenditures under the general budget in 1955-56 was nearly even. During the fiscal period the public debt increased, because of the necessity to cover development expenditures by the flotation of bonds. As a result of balancing the general budget, however, the government's financial situation was strengthened over what it had been in 1954-55 and cash balances in the National Bank of Egypt increased more rapidly than the public debt. The latter had been reduced during the fiscal year 1953-54 by LE 28 million, and in the following year the volume of treasury bills outstanding decreased from LE 72 million in June 1954 to LE 54 million in June 1955. Despite increased expenditures in the latter part of 1955, the cash balances of the government in the National Bank of Egypt increased from LE 5. 2 million to LE 35 million between July 1954 and February 1955.

Governmental expenditures in Egypt continue to rise. In the fiscal year 1955-56 ordinary expenditures were estimated at LE 238 million, a net increase of about LE 10 million over the previous year. In the same period, the estimated expenditure under the development budget was LE 54, 25 million, and the sum for public services was LE 22, 7 million. The increases under the general budget reflect heavier expenditures for education, defense, public health, and public utilities. The two largest items in the 1955-56 budget were for external security and internal security (foreign service, defense, home security, and justice), totaling LE 70.4 million, but the LE 108 for the various welfare expenditures amounted to nearly half of the entire budget. (Table 6 indicates expenditure estimates for the four fiscal years culminating with 1955-56. Table 7 shows the revenue estimates for the same four fiscal years.)

The development budgets and other special budgets for the fiscal year 1955-56 must be considered separately. In this category, in addition to the development and the public services budgets, there were separate budgets for the following:

Agrarian Reform (Ministry of Agriculture)
Government Employees Insurance and Savings Funds
Education Buildings Establishment
Permanent Production Council
Egyptian State Broadcasting

Table 7. Revenue Estimates (millions of Egyptian pounds)

	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56
Land Tax	14.5	18,0	17.4	17.3
Tax on Buildings	0,8	0.8	0.9	1.0
Tax on Movable Property and Earned Income	16.0	15,0	14.0	15,5
Excess Profits Tax (arrears)	2.5	1.0	1.0	0.8
General Tax on Income	7.2	4.3	3,3	3, 3
Stamp Duty	5.0	5, 3	5,3	6,5
Estates Tax	3, 5	3.0	3.0	3.0
Property Transfer Tax	3,0	3.0	3,6	3,6
Customs and Excise	94.8	88, 7	98, 5	102,9
Legal Fees	2,8	2,9	3,6	3, 7
Egyptian State Railways	15,1	14.5	14.6	15.6
Telegraphs and Telephones	4.4	4.6	• 5,5	0.9
Postal Administration	1.7	1, 7	1.7	1,9
State Domains	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.0
Natural Resources	2.0	2,5	2,8	2,9
Industrial Establishments	5,5	5,3	17.6	21.6
Special Resources for Subsidizing the Cost of Living	7.1	5,0	6.0	6.4
Funds from Confiscated Property			6.0	
Other Items	17.9	20.0	20.9	24.3
Total	206.0	197, 5	227,9	238, 3

Source: National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, VIII, 2 (1955), p. 103 (Table 6), p. 105 (Table 7).

Calyub Training Center Cairo University Alexandria University Ayn Shams University al-Azhar University Others

In the fiscal year 1955-56 total expenditures and revenue under these budgets amounted to LE 23, 3 and LE 28, 5 respectively.

The Egyptian budgetary estimates for 1956-57 balance ordinary budget revenue and expenditure at LE 280, 5 million, compared with LE 238, 3 million for the previous fiscal year. The development budget expenditures for 1956-57 are estimated at LE 45, 77 million, compared with LE 54, 25 for the previous fiscal year. Estimated government expenditures in 1956-57 thus total LE 326, 27 million compared with LE 315, 25 million in the previous year, the latter figure including EE 22.7 million for public service. In 1956-57 all the public services allotments and some customary development allotments were transferred to the ordinary budget. The net increase in the ordinary budget also resulted from increased allotments to defense, internal security, health services, and education. The larger expenditures were to be met by tax revenue from expanding private and governmental economic activity, improvement in tax collection, and some additional taxes. Most recently, however, a trade deficit has forced the government to draw on its foreign exchange and gold reserve, which from June 1955 to June 1956 dropped from LE 269 million to LE 213.4 million. This situation, accompanied by critical international events, may presage difficulties in the internal economy of Egypt. A possible governmental reaction might be changes in tax policy aimed more than in the past at encouraging domestic production.

The Public Debt

The credit of the Egyptian Government has been high in recent years. Prior to 1939 the public debt (except for a loan of EE 2.5 million in 1933) gradually declined. During World War II two loans were issued to cover government cotton purchases, and in 1948 two loans of EE 15 million each were floated to meet the costs of the war in Palestine. In 1952 another cotton crop loan was issued. On the whole, these loans have been financed with a remarkably small yield to bond purchasers. By the end of 1952 the Egyptian Government was offering less on long-term loans than, for example, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, France, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa, and Uruguay. The treasury bill rate, following

some difficulties in 1952 which brought it up to 1.219 percent, has stood as one of the lowest in the world, indicating an easy-money situation. In recent years, the general budgets have been in balance and most public loans issued have been to finance the development budget of the National Production Council.

The Reserve Fund

The Reserve Fund, initiated during the British occupation and designed to give the Egyptian budget elasticity, has now little more than historical interest. A source of funds to cover budgetary deficits and a repository of budgetary surpluses, it was a symbol of Egypt's increasing solvency. Today, most of the fund is frozen in special accounts representing Egypt's contribution to the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and to domestic banking and municipal enterprises. The free portion has been reduced to meet the government's purchases of cotton.

OUTLOOK

Recently, the question of financing the Aswan Dam has brought Egypt's public finances to the fore as a matter of international importance. In terms of the previous domestic political and economic goals, Egypt's fiscal condition has been remarkably healthy. Given the goals of the new regime, whether they are considered political or economic, it is highly questionable whether they can be financed without the acquisition of new resources not immediately available at home. But in the light of the healthy condition of public finance in Egypt up to the present time, the reasons related to the condition of the Egyptian economy which were advanced by the United States and Britain as justification for withdrawing the offer to help finance the High Dam seemed to Egyptians both specious and insulting.

Certain minor changes in the Egyptian fiscal system are obviously called for—such as additional reforms in the system of taxation, as well as certain economy measures, including a reduction in the size of the overblown bureaucracy. Whether Egyptian society is prepared to accept such changes is questionable. The Egyptian and Islamic heritages do not support optimism in this regard but rather lend impetus to projects of foreign adventure as solutions to most internal problems, including those of public finance.

BANKING AND CURRENCY SYSTEM

European banking practices were introduced into Egypt soon after the middle of the nineteenth century. Both the Koranic proscription against the taking of interest and the subsistence character of Egypt's agriculture worked to delay the adoption of this innovation. The Napoleonic foray and the subsequent efforts of Mohammed Ali to modernize the country exposed Egypt to western financial methods. The rapid growth of the cotton export market changed Egyptian economic life, and an expanding overseas trade gradually forced a compromise between the secularized business practices of Europe and the traditional commercial patterns of the Moslem East.

The growth of modern banking in Egypt, like that of domestic trade, may be traced to European and Levantine initiative. The Anglo-Egyptian Bank was founded in 1864, and the establishment of Egyptian branches of the Crédit Lyonnais (French), Ottoman Bank (British), and Crédit Foncier (French) followed within the next few years. Italian and Greek bankers shortly afterward entered the field. Even the National Bank of Egypt, founded in 1898, and the Agricultural Bank of Egypt, founded in 1902, were organized with British capital. It was not until 1920 that the first purely Egyptian bank, the Banque Misr, opened its doors. The German, Italian, and Japanese firms, which were closed or sequestrated during World War II, have resumed business, some of them with different names. In 1954 the National City Bank of New York established an office in Cairo, the first and so far the only American bank to do so.

In January 1957, the government announced immediate "Egyptianization" of British and French banks and insurance companies, charging them with waging war and discriminating against Egypt on loans. Other foreign banks and insurance companies are to be "Egyptianized" over a five-year period; meanwhile all agents for foreign organizations must be Egyptian citizens.

Native Egyptian banks are growing in number and importance. Religious objections to investing money at interest have to a large degree been overcome through reassuring interpretations of the Koran by prominent religious leaders. A much more serious obstacle to the establishment of a strong native banking system continues to be the attitude of the bulk of people to savings. The use of the savings bank does not come naturally to a largely peasant population that traditionally have hoarded any small cash surpluses or employed them to buy land or indulge a propensity for conspicuous consumption. (The Egyptian fellah usually carries his bank in his head in the form of a resplendent set of gold teeth.) The rich also tend toward costly ostentation, but it is encouraging to note that Egypt's small but growing

middle class is, as it becomes financially more secure, taking an increasing interest in deposit and borrowing facilities. The main problem, however, continues to be the shortage of local financial resources which from the outset has left the financing of Egyptian banking mainly to outside sources.

BANKING PRACTICE

Egypt has no specific law regulating banking practice, but adequate controls are maintained through articles in the Central Bank Law, which came into force in May 1951 with the legal confirmation of the status of the National Bank of Egypt as a Central Bank. Under this law all commercial banks operating in Egypt must maintain with the National Bank an account carrying no interest and representing a varying portion of its deposits (at present 12.5 percent). Furthermore, commercial banks must maintain liquid funds of a kind to be determined by the Minister of Finance, and must furnish monthly to the Central Bank a statement of their financial position.

A commercial bank is defined in Egypt as any individual person or corporate entity whose main activity is the acceptance from the public of deposits payable on demand or at a fixed date, a definition which excludes many institutions that would be considered banks elsewhere. The Land Bank of Egypt, the agricultural mortgage companies, and the Industrial Bank are not included and are not bound by the rules which govern the relations of commercial banks with the National Bank.

Any person or group of persons with capital exceeding LE 20,000 may start a bank in Egypt, provided there are a specified minimum number of Egyptians on the board and on the staff. Once a new commercial bank is founded, it must register with the National Bank of Egypt, publish copies of its statutes, and adhere to the law regarding deposits of its capital with the Central Bank and the submission to that body of a monthly balance sheet.

BANKING SYSTEM

The banks of Egypt are of four distinct types: the Central Bank, the clearing banks (which exchange checks and bills and foreign currency), the nonclearing banks, and those which are classified as noncommercial.

Not including the National Bank of Egypt, which is the Central Bank, there were 11 clearing banks in 1955; all were members of either Cairo or Alexandria clearinghouses. All clearing banks belong to the Association of Egyptian Banks, which regulates charges and rates of interest. With the exception of the Import and Export Bank of Egypt, which was not founded until

1946, the clearing banks are old, established institutions. Of the 11, however, only the Import and Export Bank and Banque Misr are Egyptian owned.

There are 16 nonclearing banks; half of them are Egyptian banks founded with Egyptian capital, and half are foreign houses. Only 8 of them existed before World War II.

The noncommercial category includes institutions for agricultural, mortgage, and industrial credit. Agricultural and urban mortgage credit is offered by four main concerns: the Credit Agricole et Cooperatif, Credit Foncier Egyptien, Credit Hypothécaire Agricole, and the Land Bank of Egypt. Industrial credit is handled by the Industrial Bank and by some commercial banks, notably the Banque Misr.

The National Bank of Egypt

The National Bank of Egypt was founded in 1898 and empowered to issue bank notes with a 50 percent gold cover. This innovation was greeted with more than a little suspicion, especially by the elements of the population who still persisted in thinking of money in terms of intrinsic value of the coinage. The circulation of bank notes was at first confined to those largely urban groups which had some notion of the economic processes involved, and the use of the paper currency spread very slowly.

Since its foundation the National Bank of Egypt had functioned as a central bank in that it was responsible for the note issue, acted as the government's banker, and controlled rates of exchange. The Bank was confirmed in these functions by law in 1951, although it preserved its legal status as a joint stock company. It is now presided over by the Minister of Finance and has a management committee made up of three government representatives and three bankers. According to the terms of its charter, the Bank is responsible for regulating the volume of credit in the country and acting as lender in times of economic or financial necessity (more than once it has financed the cotton crop). Previous informal agreements between the National Bank of Egypt and the commercial banks have been given legal sanction.

The balance sheet presented by the Bank Issue Department on December 31, 1955, showed that bank notes to the amount of LE 192 million were in circulation, the total backed by gold, foreign exchange and securities convertible into gold, Egyptian Government securities and treasury bills, and foreign government securities and treasury bills. The gold cover, which has been increasing for several years, was LE 62, 522, 607 in 1955, the remainder coming from Egyptian and foreign sources in about equal proportions.

Table 8. National Bank of Egypt
(in EE's 1,000)

December 1938	December 1953
2,925	3,000
2,925	3,000
17,205	71,897
608	38,824
0.440	9, 945
2,449	3, 340
	13,068
14,478	139,435
8,259	17,091
	2, 925 2, 925 17, 205 608 2, 449

Source: Egyptian Economic and Political Review, March 1955.

The effectiveness of the compulsory bankers' deposits regulation is evident in Table 8. Other notable increases are in investments, which have multiplied nearly 10 times; in deposits, which have nearly quadrupled; and in advances, which have more than doubled. The increased investment is accounted for by the acquisition of large sterling balances during World War II.

Unlike the Central Banks of other nations the National Bank of Egypt is not required to withdraw completely from commercial banking. It does not, however, open new small accounts or undertake minor transactions, nor is it allowed to pay interest on sight deposits. Consequently, the Central Bank has kept out of the smaller competitive field, and the report of the 1954 Ordinary General Meeting of the Bank makes it clear that the policy is to withdraw gradually from small commercial operations.

Egyptian Banks

The Banque Misr is the most important of the purely Egyptian banking institutions. Founded in 1920 by a group of Egyptian financiers, it made rapid progress and was able between 1920 and 1927 to increase its capital from LE 175,000 to LE 1 million. Its founders were primarily interested in the promotion of Egyptian industrial and commercial enterprises, a

policy which led to the immobilization of so large a proportion of the bank's funds in long-term investments that it could not meet short-term liabilities. The crisis came in 1939, and only government intervention kept the bank from closing down. Official inquiries into Banque Misr's difficulties were held and a reorganization under government supervision was ordered; government nominees were placed on its board of directors. Since then deposits have increased fourfold. They now approach LE 60 million, of which the principal sources are the various Misr companies which the bank has helped to found. In 1954 it was decided to double the bank's capital by the issue of an additional LE 1 million worth of shares which may be taken up by shareholders in the ratio of one for one.

With its establishment in 1946, the Import and Export Bank of Egypt became the second large bank founded under purely Egyptian auspices. This institution joined the clearing bank group in 1954, and, although its deposits amount as yet to only be 2 million and its advances to be 1 million, a banking survey in 1955 indicated that its progress was satisfactory.

Foreign Banks

The most important foreign banks until the "Egyptianization" order were Barclays Bank, D.C.&O., (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas), which absorbed the old Anglo-Egyptian Bank; the Crédit Lyonnais; Ottoman Bank; Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris; Ionian Bank; National Bank of Greece and Athens; Commercial Bank of the Near East; and Banque Belge et Internationale en Egypte.

During the war all these were cut off from their main offices, but, as most of them were either centered in London or had large offices there, some help was forthcoming. Generally, however, they had to rely on themselves, and that they succeeded in carrying on their businesses without serious crises is evidence of their strong position. The formerly important Banco Italo-Egiziano, which was in custody during World War II, is now attempting to recover its position, but the reduction of the Italian community in Egypt—since the Italian war with Ethiopia and World War II—has made its task difficult.

Only three foreign banks maintain branches throughout the country; Barclays Bank has 33, the Ottoman Bank 12, and the Ionian Bank something under 10. Most of the larger institutions, however, maintain three offices—usually one each in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said. Banque Misr has 52 provincial branches, the National Bank 33. The support given to Egyptian banks and the rapid growth of the Crédit Agricole since its foundation in 1931 are tending, according to the 1952 Economic Bulletin of the National

Bank of Egypt, to limit the scope of branch banking in all but the principal cities.

Other Credit Institutions

Agricultural and industrial credit is largely in the hands of five large institutions. Of these, Crédit Agricole, the bulk of whose funds are provided by the Ministry of Finance, and Crédit Hypothécaire Agricole are entirely government run. They specialize in short-term small loans. The Crédit Foncier and the Land Bank deal in larger amounts lent for longer terms. The former, entering a new field in Egyptian banking, now offers building-construction loans.

Since World War II, Crédit Agricole, with agencies and storehouses throughout the country, has been used by the government for such purposes as the distribution of seeds and fertilizers, the requisitioning and storage of crops, and the purchase, storage, and distribution of sugar. Its debtor accounts amounted in March 1955 to about LE 15 million, mainly, it was claimed, in advances against first mortgages. According to the terms of its establishment, individual loans in this category should not exceed LE 15,000 nor be less than LE 50.

Complaints against Credit Agricole and Credit Hypothécaire Agricole are numerous. There is the repeated accusation that accommodation is given not to peasants but rather to influential landowners, who continue to be a power in the countryside. As a result, neither institution has so far succeeded in the primary aim of replacing the Greek and Syrian money-lenders in the villages. These independent operators continue to supply the bulk of the credit furnished to the smallest peasants, who still prefer the simpler, if more costly, procedure of the usurer's loan.

The Crédit Foncier Egyptien is one of the country's oldest credit institutions. Founded in 1880 to grant loans against both urban and rural land and promises mortgages, its capital and debentures amount to some LE 8 million and its reserves to LE 4 million. The heavy predominance of loans against urban securities at the end of 1954 reflected a shift of the organization's earlier focus on urban credit. The management of Crédit Foncier is pronouncedly French, and, as with similar institutions in France, Belgium, and some southern European countries, much of the fund raising is done by issuing 3 percent Lottery Bonds.

The Land Bank of Egypt is less French influenced and more rural in its concerns than Crédit Foncier, and is given damaging competition by the latter. Its business has been dwindling recently, and it has had to draw on its very limited reserves to ensure adequate dividends.

The Industrial Bank was created in 1949 to advance loans to industry. Short-term, medium-term, and long-term loans, secured by raw or manufactured material or physical plant, are made to industrial enterprises. Fifty-one percent of the Industrial Bank's capital of LE 1.5 million is held by the government, which guarantees a dividend of 3 1/2 percent. The bank, whose advances are mainly absorbed by the textile concerns, has progressed slowly, and bank officials complain that schemes submitted to them are often too poorly thought out and prepared to justify loans. Also, there have been cases in which loans have not been used for the purpose for which they were requested. The difficulties of the Industrial Bank are added to by the challenge of the Banque Misr and other commercial banks, which are advancing large amounts to industry against a wider range of collateral.

Efforts to make credit available to small industrial enterprises come up against many of the same basic attitudes and problems that hinder credit reform in the countryside. The artisan with a workshop employing only few persons is, like the peasant, suspicious and impatient of the complicated procedure of the new lending institutions, for which small loans are less profitable and more troublesome than large ones. Once again, the money-lender is often not the last, but the first resort of the artisan in need of money.

SHORT-TERM CREDIT

The annual disposal of the cotton crop creates Egypt's principal short-term credit need. Before World War I the autumn influx of gold was large enough to cover requirements; later, as note circulation grew, the banks were able to transfer funds through the National Bank against an equivalent increase in the note issue. This expansion falls back as growers repay loans and pay cash for industrial goods and taxes.

Short-term loans and advances against collateral in Egypt are at their peak around December and at their lowest in August. Advances made chiefly to merchants, though sometimes to growers, are covered by the prospective cotton crops and other merchandise and securities, usually up to about 90 percent of the amount of the loan. During the height of the season, cotton will account for 50 percent of the collateral on these loans. Other crops, particularly grains, are offered, though decreasingly in recent years, and rates of interest, varying with the type of collateral, range from 4 to 6 percent. Cotton exports are highest between September and the end of the year, thus giving an annual period when a highly favorable balance is shown. Since cotton accounts for over 90 percent of the country's exports,

however, and imports remain roughly at the same level throughout the year, there are adverse trade balances during the spring and summer. By balancing winter export surpluses against seasonal import surpluses, a steady situation can be shown to prevail from year to year.

INFLATIONARY AND DEFLATIONARY PRESSURES

Cotron has tied Egypt to the world economy since the last century. Until World War II, fluctuations in international markets, particularly those of Great Britain, were closely reflected in Egyptian commodity prices. World War II brought serious inflation. The shortage of shipping and the Allied blockade of some of Egypt's customers led to an unfavorable trade balance that was only partially compensated by extensive purchases by Britain. Allied military expenditures, which were uncontrollable, produced a sharp rise in the national income; the consequent rise in prices was aggravated by bad harvests, shortage of stocks, and smuggling of goods out of Egypt in order to reap higher profits in countries where inflation was even more pronounced. Measures such as rationing, requisitioning of grains, and subsidies on staples had only limited success. By 1944 the price index had risen to 330—from 100 in August 1939. Thereafter it declined, as allied troops were repatriated and overseas commerce began to revive.

The fact that the Nile Valley was never reached by an enemy force which almost certainly would have lived off the land kept inflation from getting as completely out of control as in occupied Europe. On the other hand, the landlords, merchants, and industrialists, who had great power in government circles, were able to manipulate the inflationary situation to their advantage by raising rents and prices to a level that worked great hardship on the rest of the population. Perhaps even more serious in its direct impact on the salaried and wage -earning groups was the failure to bring incomes into line with prices.

Since the end of the war fluctuations in price indices have been relatively minor. The Arab Israeli war of 1948 kept prices at a high level, and in 1949 the devaluation of the pound sterling, a rise in import prices, and a boom in cotton combined to rocket the index to 386. In 1952 a deficit in the balance of payments, resulting from the drastic curtailment of cotton exports, and price control measures introduced by the new regime brought the index down to slightly below 300, where it was stabilized until recent political developments stimulated a new upward trend.

SAVINGS

The growth of deposit banking in Egypt began with World War I. Steady increases took place between the wars, and during World War II the rise in national income led to increased deposits. In 1947 about LE 287 million was on deposit in the National Bank and the clearing banks. A decline in the early postwar years was offset by an increase in the bank note issue, and the National Eank of Egypt in its 1955 General Report asserts that a steady increase has accounted for about 80 percent of the total deposits; time deposits constitute 14 percent, savings about 7 percent.

Apart from deposit banks, the only agencies for direct or indirect savings are insurance houses and savings banks. Insurance activity is expanding, seven Egyptian insurance companies having been established since 1938. Foreign companies handled 60 percent of the country's insurance business, and they noticeably increased their share of the business during the period from the end of World War II to 1948. Insurance houses were first put under government regulation in 1939, and foreign concerns, of course, come under the 1957 'Egyptianization' order,

The Post Office Savings Bank and other savings banks were organized at the beginning of the century to encourage small savings; they accept very low minimum deposits and do not permit holdings of more than LE 500. Initially offering a comparatively high rate of interest—3 percent—they grew rapidly, and in 1952 the Post Office Savings Bank alone had 728,000 depositors, drawn mainly from urban groups which, more accustomed than the peasantry to handling cash, had some small margin available for savings. As a part of the Post Office, the Post Office Savings Bank has no capital. Its liabilities to its depositors are balanced by cash in hand, government stocks, and various securities.

A recent decline in the patronage of the savings institutions is believed to be due to a reduction in the rate of interest and to poor conditions of service. Traditional attitudes toward savings are no doubt also a factor in this development, and it would appear that old habit is proving strong as the novelty of the savings banks has begun to wear off.

CURRENCY

Prior to 1860, Egypt had operated on a bimetallic currency system, but the rapid fall of silver prices forced the adoption of a gold standard based on the Egyptian gold pound. Silver coins retained a token value only, the English gold sovereign, the gold Napoleon, and the Turkish pound were used along with the Egyptian pound in commercial transactions. In view of

the shortage of Egyptian pounds, the sovereign, which during the latter part of the nineteenth century had the highest prestige of the foreign coins, soon became for all practical purposes the standard unit of Egyptian currency.

The gold shortage of World War I found Egypt without sufficient gold reserves to cover the note issue. Authorization was obtained to use British treasury bonds and bills as backing, and this drew Egypt more deeply into the British monetary orbit. Thus between 1916 and 1947 Egypt had a very close working arrangement, including easy exchange provisions, with the sterling countries (countries in which the English pound and local currency are freely interchangeable). Never formally integrated with the sterling area, Egypt terminated all special arrangements in 1947. In July 1948 new regulations concerning the coverage for the note issue were published, and at the same time the Egyptian Government was authorized to issue LE 50 million in treasury bills. This amount was raised to LE 100 million the next year. These new issues were backed by gold, Egyptian treasury bills, government securities, and securities guaranteed by the Egyptian Government.

The Egyptian pound of 100 piasters or 1,000 millièmes is equal at the standard rate of exchange to US \$2.87. The public rarely refers to piasters and millièmes, the vernacular term for coins being: one half piaster—tarifa; 1 piaster—qirsh sagh; 2 piasters—nussfrank; 20 piasters—riyal; and 20 piasters (as used on the cotton exchange) tallari (dollar).

Egypt has a wide variety of bronze and silver alloy coins, ranging from 1 millième to 20 piasters, the latter, one fifth of a pound. Silver coin is legal tender only up to LE 2, and bronze up to 10 piasters. In the cities, bank notes are freely offered and accepted in money transactions. But in the countryside, paper currency is still subject to a lingering suspicion which is by no means accounted for by its lack of durability. Coins are still used in feminine headdresses and necklaces as an evidence of wealth, and the large silver 20 piaster piece, whenever it can be saved, often finds its way to a pot buried beneath a tree.

CHAPTER 13

AVAILABILITY AND USE OF MANPOWER

Egypt's human resources are perhaps its greatest potential asset; at present they are its greatest social and economic problem. The sevenfold increase in population during the past century has created new and greater demands on the economy, but the nature of the labor force and the opportunities open to it have changed very little.

In the rural areas, the work to be accomplished and the ways of doing it are basically the same as in the days of the pharaohs. In the towns, the importance of the crafts has declined and a small new industrial labor force has been formed. Those employed in the industrial sphere are, however, removed from the traditional agricultural or handicraft pursuits by at most one generation, and they retain many of their customary work habits and attitudes.

The disparity between rapid population increase and the opening of new opportunities has produced an extremely critical labor situation. Unemployment and underemployment are characteristic features of both the urban and rural areas. A sizable percentage of the human resources which could contribute so much to Egypt's revival are either not employed or employed unproductively. Yet, at present neither the economic outlets nor the services needed for a more adequate distribution and utilization of the labor force exist.

A related major problem is the lack of balance in Egyptian manpower resources. Unskilled agricultural and industrial labor is plentiful, as is also the supply of white-collar workers, small merchants, and to a lesser extent certain categories of western-trained professional people. But there is a severe shortage of semiskilled technical personnel and lower- and medium-grade professional people.

In part this imbalance stems from the historical composition of the Egyptian labor force, which was until recently made up of two major groups. One group—a small governing elite drawn from the ranks of the wealthy landowners and merchants, often of foreign extraction—held the initiative

in the life of the country In addition to controlling the economy, it also furnished the country with its political and intellectual leadership. The second group, constituting about 90 percent of the population, was composed primarily of fellahin and a small number of craftsmen, domestic servants, and so on. Passive in its role, this group carried out the orders which came from above, and little individual initiative or enterprise was expected of it.

The Egyptian labor force in its traditional form was adapted to the needs of a particular social and economic situation. The western impact dating from the last century has been progressively altering that situation, and with it Egypt's manpower needs. Knowledge of western developments in such fields as industry, medicine, and communications has given many Egyptians a desire to participate in the benefits these techniques can provide. But the trained human resources necessary for the application of this new knowledge - and the creation of an economic order based upon it - are lacking, and the traditional division of labor militates in numerous ways against development of such resources. Illiteracy is a common and widely accepted state for the mass of the Egyptian population. The traditional tendency to look down upon anyone who works with his hands still persists. A portion of the Egyptian elite is western-trained, but the persistence of conventional attitudes toward status and prestige deters many of them from putting their training to practical use. Even more serious is the fact that a corps of skilled workmen, which in modern society supplements the work of the professionally trained, has not yet been created or evolved.

The international complications resulting from the determination of the present Egyptian Government to control the Suez Canal and the limited number of Egyptian pilots to operate Canal shipping provide an example of the problems created by the lack of trained labor resources. Still another example is the controversial Aswan Dam project. One Egyptian observed that, although Egypt has a sufficient number of engineers to build the dam, there are not at present enough skilled technicians to keep it in operation.

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOR FORCE

Any attempt to determine precisely the numerical composition of Egypt's labor force encounters a number of difficulties. Egyptian statistics are generally unreliable and are quickly outdated by the rapid growth of the population. Extensive movement from rural to urban areas and the ephemeral nature of much of this migration constitute a second problem. Finally, there is considerable occupational overlapping. Wealthy Cairo entrepreneurs are frequently landowners, and even some of the industrial

workers own land, which is worked by a tenant. Many of the urban occupations require little or no skill, with the result that a worker may pass from industrial to commercial employment, then to unemployment or begging, in a relatively short period of time. The owner of a small craft shop is usually craftsman and merchant combined. Everyone in urban Egypt appears to make some contribution to the economic output, but it is all but impossible to determine the exact extent of the contribution or the form in which it is made.

It is estimated that Egypt's adult labor force comprises only 35 percent (8 million out of 23 million persons) of the total population. This small percentage is explained in great part by the average life span in Egypt—so short that almost half of the population is under 15 years of age.

Agriculture provides employment for the majority of the Egyptian laborers. Estimates based on the 1947 census indicate that over 5 million persons, or between 65 and 70 percent of the 8 million persons in the labor force, are engaged at present in agriculture. Many other Egyptians earn their living from processing and marketing agricultural goods. Farming, largely a family enterprise, draws on the labor of untold numbers of women and children on a full- or part-time basis. Most rural women work in the fields and may do so throughout their lives except at intervals when bearing children; children begin to provide some assistance at about the age of 5.

There is a strict division of labor between men and women. Men do all the plowing, cultivating, and threshing and all work in which draft animals are used. Women weed and carry fertilizer to the edge of the fields in baskets, then the men take it to spread broadcast on the ground. For a woman to take over a man's job would be highly disapproved, and a man would consider it degrading to be seen doing a woman's work in the field. The younger children, both male and female, assist the women in their tasks or are engaged as a group in picking cotton worms.

Industry and handicrafts are of lesser importance as employers of labor. Manufacturing on an industrial or handicraft level employs approximately 750,000 persons, or about 10 percent of the total labor force. Workers employed in such fields related to industry as transportation, communication, construction, and mining are estimated to number an additional 350,000.

Commercial activity in Egypt absorbs a large number of workers. Reliable estimates put the number of persons engaged in commerce at about 650,000, but many of those included in this category are also considered handicraft workers, since the small entrepreneur frequently is producer as well as merchant.

The remainder of the Egyptian labor force is found in government

employment, professional service, and domestic work of various kinds, The professional element—doctors, lawyers, engineers—has almost doubled in the past 20 years, but the number of qualified professional people in some fields is still far below the needs of the country. On the other hand, the bureaucracy, traditionally a haven for the educated and the partly educated, has been notoriously overstaffed. The stated objective of the Nasser Government—to reduce the number of government employees to 650,000, which is almost the number engaged in manufacturing—indicates the present size of the bureaucracy.

A final important labor category is that of domestic service. Because of the dearth of modern household equipment, the relative cheapness of labor, and the prestige value of employing servants, domestic servants reportedly number over 150,000.

Ethnically and religiously, the Egyptian labor force is highly homogeneous, more than 95 percent of the total being Moslem Egyptian. The remainder are largely Greeks, Italians, Armenians, Jews, Nubians, Sudanese, Syrians, Lebanese, and Copts. The occupational distribution of these various groups differs from that of the Moslem Egyptians. Many of them, the Greeks and Armenians in particular, are found in the fields of commerce, handicrafts, and industry, while other groups—the Sudanese, for instance—monopolize the field of domestic service.

The Christian Copts—ethnically Egyptians—number about 1,500,000. The high level of education achieved by many members of this group has permitted them to occupy important positions in a number of fields. Their influence in the past has been particularly important in government. To-day, however, many of them are being replaced by Moslems. There are Coptic farming villages in Egypt, but few of the members of the other minorities engage in agriculture.

THE AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE

The primacy of agriculture in Egypt's economy makes the position of the Egyptian peasant—the fellah—one of major importance. The pressure of a rapidly increasing population and the division of landholdings, as a result of Moslem inheritance laws, into almost unworkably small plots contribute to making the livelihood of the fellah precarious. It is difficult to assess the income of those engaged in agriculture; but it is certain that the majority of the Egyptian peasants, whether small landowners, tenant farmers, or agricultural laborers, live in a state of malnutrition and debt. The reluctance of even the poorest industrial workers to return to agriculture suggests that the lot of the fellah is the least enviable in Egypt.

The unproductive utilization of human resources has been most common in the rural areas. When employed, the peasant usually works at his backbreaking task from sunrise to sundown. Many, however, find themselves out of work part of the year and dependent for seasonal employment upon the limited number of factories and other economic outlets in the countryside. The problem of seasonal unemployment has been partially overcome by the present system of crop rotation, which involves year-round cultivation (see Chapter 15, Agriculture), while the recently created rural social centers are attempting, with uncertain success, to combat underemployment by offering peasants an opportunity to develop handicraft skills and establishing outlets for their produce.

Within the limitations of the primitive tools and techniques he uses, which have changed little over the centuries, the Egyptian fellah is a skilled husbandman. Forced to get a living out of a small amount of land, he cultivates intensively and carefully. The attention he lavishes on his crops not unfrequently goes to a disastrous extreme, as when he overirrigates in the early growing stages, apparently out of fear that the water supply will ultimately prove insufficient or in the belief that the amount of silt deposited on the land depends on the quantity of water used.

The low per capita output of Egyptian agriculture is undoubtedly due mainly to factors beyond the control of the fellah. The minute size of the plots of land cultivated, which prevents the application of more modern techniques and equipment, is probably the chief factor retarding greater productivity. The Land Reform Act of 1952, although creating popularity for the new government, did not come to grips with the basic problem of rural overpopulation. It is estimated that at the present (1957) there is a surplus unskilled labor force of about one million in rural Egypt. The experience of World War II, when large numbers of the fellahin migrated to the cities to provide needed industrial labor, indicates that this surplus could and would move into industry if given the opportunity. It is difficult at the present time to see how these problems can be overcome without extensive land reclamation or the movement of a large number of peasants from the land and into the cities, where, however, industry is not yet sufficiently advanced to absorb them. A more moderate solution is the extension of handicraft and small-scale industry into the countryside, Such a development would provide seasonal or part-time employment for the fellah, as well as produce goods greatly needed in the villages.

Though incapable of resolving his own difficulties, the fellah does not welcome intervention from above. Despite growing enthusiasm for such measures as the Land Reform Act and minimum-wage legislation for agricultural laborers, the villagers have not lost their fear and dislike of

the political authority of government or the economic power of the landlord. Such attitudes, rooted in the centuries of constant mistreatment suffered by the fellah, will complicate even the best-considered government program. Visits to villages of persons whose missions are beyond the experience of the peasant and are therefore incomprehensible are regarded as intrusions and are viewed with suspicion, skepticism, and often unbelief.

However, the fellah has demonstrated a willingness to make adjustments if the measures offered show concrete results which he can comprehend and if they do not basically conflict with traditional ways. Thus, DDT, offered as a means of eliminating typhus, met a hostile reception, but was accepted when the fellah discovered that the chemical put an end to the itching uncomfortably familiar to every villager. The replacement of subsistence-type farming by commercial crops was a step of major importance in Egyptian agriculture; it met little resistance, for it did not intimately affect the traditional methods. The peasant simply substituted one item for another, with little economic or functional difference to himself, and adapted himself to the new circumstances by growing the new crops in the old way.

Reform in agricultural technique in Egypt requires an extremely cautious approach. Among other things, it must be explained in terms comprehensible to the peasant, it will have to show concrete results, in most cases it will have to be of such a nature as to not conflict drastically with traditional work habits and attitudes, and, if possible, it should be presented in such a manner as to make it appear to be the idea of the peasant himself, with as little governmental or landlord imposition as possible. Centuries of experience have made the peasant cautious.

INDUSTRIAL LABOR

Industry, mining, and construction employ approximately 900,000 workers. The majority of these are in small hand-powered enterprises which have more in common with the handicraft field than with modern industry. Over half of the manufacturing establishments enumerated in the 1947 census employed less than 4 workers, and many of the remainder employed less than 10 workers. It is estimated, however, that at least 65,000 workers are in large industrial establishments employing over 500 workers. Prominent among the large establishments are Mahalla el Kubra with 14,000 workers, Kafr el Dawar with approximately 10,000 workers, and the Filature Nationale with about 7,000 workers. There also are many factories which employ between 100 and 500 workers.

The greatest number of workers in manufacturing are in the textile

milling, food-processing, and cotton-processing industries, which employ respectively 90,000, 50,000, and 25,000. Other important industries from the viewpoint of employment are the petroleum refining industry with 14,000, the cement, clay, and glass factories with 14,000, and tobacco-processing with 11,000.

The industrial labor force is located largely in Cairo and Alexandria. Other important industrial labor centers are the Canal Zone, Suez, and Damietta.

Age and Sex Composition

According to a recent industrial census, which covered only those factories employing more than 10 workers, males constitute over 95 percent of the total industrial labor force. It is estimated, however, that the percentage of women employed in industrial enterprises having fewer than 10 workers is somewhat higher than this figure indicates and that the actual number of women employed in industry may be close to 60,000. Over half the women engaged in manufacturing are employed by the textile and apparel industries, and they constitute almost 10 percent of the total labor force of these industries.

Although Moslems discourage public employment of women, the decline in the percentage of women employed in industry during the past 20 years is probably more directly attributable both to stiff job competition and to social legislation restricting the employment of women in certain industries and limiting their working hours in others.

A 1945 census covering 316 144 workers in the field of manufacturing reported that 26,050 children (& percent of the total) under 15 years of age were employed. The number of children employed is certainly higher, as would have been revealed if the country's numerous small shops had been included in the census. Child labor in Egypt has its origins in agriculture in the small family—shop enterptise and in the guild apprentice system of the Middle East tradition; today it is reinforced by the desire of many owners to keep wages at a minimum. The practice presents a serious problem from the viewpoint of industrial efficiency as well as from that of human welfare Children employed at an early age not only further increase the problem of unemployment but also, under contemporary conditions, fail to receive the vocational training needed for the creation of a skilled labor force.

Wages

Judged by western standards, the wages received by industrial workers

in Egypt are very low. Complaints are common among the workers themselves that the wages are insufficient to supply their nutritional and material needs and that they must borrow in order to keep alive. Relative to the income of the fellah, however, these wages are quite high, even allowing for the high cost of living in the large urban centers. Despite the dissatisfactions of the industrial worker, it is this difference of earnings between the agricultural and industrial sectors which in great part explains the migration to the cities and the reluctance of the erstwhile peasant to return to agriculture.

According to the sample industrial census of January 1953, the average weekly earnings of workers in industry and commerce was LE 1.80 (about \$5.15; the Egyptian pound of 100 piasters is valued at approximately \$2.87) for a 51-hour week, or approximately 10 cents an hour. This contrasts favorably with the wages paid to agricultural laborers, even when the new agricultural minimum-wage law requirement of slightly over LE 1 for a week's labor is enforced.

There is considerable variation in wages by industry. In general, western owned firms pay higher wages than those owned by Egyptians. Average weekly earnings are reported to range from somewhat over EE 7 in the foreign operated petroleum industry to between 75 and 100 piasters in such Egyptian owned industries as those making rope, twine, baskets, paper, paper board, and so on.

Considerable wage spread exists in Egypt; it depends on relative skill, age and sex, and the region of employment. The average unskilled worker earns less than 30 piasters daily; skilled workers average about 65 piasters. In many industries the wage difference between skilled and unskilled workers is even greater, indicating the premium placed on trained personnel.

Men's wages are on the average almost double those of women. Women are usually employed in relatively unskilled positions and in such lower-paid industries as textile manufacturing. The wages received by child laborers, employed for the most part in unskilled work, average even less than the wages received by women. Within the category of child labor, female workers tend to receive higher salaries than male workers, possibly because girls are often employed in luxury trades where profits are high and where they can initially command higher pay than the male apprentices in other fields.

A 1951 wage survey based on regional location showed that workers in Suez and the Canal Zone received wages well above the average; wages in Cairo and Alexandria were estimated to be just below the average for the country, while wages received in other areas were considerably below the

average. This survey presented no occupational breakdown, but it is possible that much of the difference is explained in terms of the more prevalent use of high-paid foreign labor in Suez and the Canal Zone.

The reasons for the low wages in Egyptian industry are those common to other economically underdeveloped countries. The most important are (1) the large reserve of unemployed and underemployed workers, which makes job competition keen and reduces the worker's bargaining power; (2) the weakness of trade unions (see Chapter 14, Organization of Labor); (3) the low productivity of many firms (see Chapter 16, Industry); and (4) the high rates of return expected on invested capital.

Government efforts to improve the economic position of industrial workers have centered on price-control measures and minimum-wage legislation. Although price control was partially successful in limiting inflationary rises in the cost of living, the growth of black-market operations limited its effectiveness. Recent legislation established a minimum-wage level of 25 piasters a day, but it is reported that this is not observed by most employers. The fact that the average daily pay of all workers is about 30 piasters indicates that many of the unskilled workers receive far less than the minimum wage. Wages continue to depend on the factors of supply and demand, and at present the average wage fluctuates below the minimum-wage level. Legislation providing a cost-of-living increment to base pay has also been enacted. This increase is graduated according to the worker's base pay and the size of his family.

Another government effort to raise working-class wages has taken the form of court decisions making annual bonuses mandatory. Formerly these bonuses, amounting to from one to three months earnings, were granted as a gift to the workers at the end of exceptionally good years only.

The Individual Contracts of Service Law of December 1952, amended in June 1953, also represents a significant attempt to guarantee regular and equitable salaries for industrial and commercial workers. One of the more important provisions of this law is aimed at eliminating the wage abuses arising from the widespread use of labor contractors to hire workers. Traditionally, the labor contractor and not the employer was responsible for the payment of workers. The new law stipulated that, where workers are hired by a contractor, it remains the responsibility of the employer to ensure that they are paid in full and that their terms of employment are not less favorable than those of other employees of the firm. This provision, however, lost much of its effectiveness by an amendment which excepted "temporary workers" from its coverage—most contract labor is classified as "temporary."

Working Conditions

Working conditions in industry have improved considerably in the past 25 years. A number of labor laws, enacted for the most part in the 1930's, limited working hours, prohibited the use of child and female labor in certain dangerous industries, established special working hours in all other industries for women and children, accorded annual leaves, and so on. Although these laws have not been rigidly adhered to by many employers, they have had some effect in improving working conditions. Whereas prior to the enactment of this legislation a 60-hour week was common in Egypt, the July 1952 census indicated that only 42, 2 percent of the employees worked over 50 hours and only 14 percent continued to work over 60 hours. Moreover, a 1942 law established a wage system of time-anda-quarter for any work over the 9-hour daily maximum. The Egyptian Labor Department has also been active in the promotion of industrial safety. Unfortunately, most of the work in this field has been limited to the larger, more modern industrial establishments; labor conditions in the smaller factories have been neglected.

In accordance with Act 86 of 1942, employers are required to carry insurance to cover their liability for compensation for work-connected disabilities. The liabilities of employers in regard to work-connected disabilities are defined by two 1950 acts—the Industrial Relations Act and the Compensation for Occupational Diseases Act. Under their terms the benefits received by workers include free medical care, periodical cash benefits, incapacity benefits for temporary disability, lump-sum grants in case of permanent incapacity, lump-sum survivors' benefits, and funeral guarantees. The employees of a number of foreign firms operating in Egypt, such as the Shell Oil Company, also receive some protection from provident funds established by the employer. Supported either by employer contribution or by joint employer-employee contributions, these funds provide pension and sickness benefits to the workers.

Other measures of protection in the form of individual employer liability are afforded to many industrial and commercial employees by the provisions of the Individual Contracts of Service Law. Under this law, each employer is bound to provide first-aid treatment, and those with 100 or more employees are required to appoint a part-time doctor and to furnish medicine without charge. Employees who are absent because of sickness receive partial wage payments for up to 30 days a year, and if dismissed after a long period of illness they must be granted an indemnity. Another provision of this Act is aimed at eliminating labor turnover and requires the payment of dismissal (except for cause) and resignation bonuses based on length of service.

The Nasser Government has also taken steps to provide some degree of job security for workers by the enactment of laws protecting them from unwarranted dismissal and unfair treatment. The worker now has the right to report his grievance to the director of the local labor office, who attempts to effect conciliation between the employer and the worker. If the attempt fails, the worker can then bring his case into court (see Chapter 14, Organization of Labor).

Productivity

The low average output of the Egyptian industrial worker—estimated as one eighth that of an American worker and about one third that of a British worker—is explained in part by such factors as inefficient management, the heavy reliance on hand-power in the numerous small factories, and the obsolescence of much of the equipment. In part, also, low productivity is explained by the physical state of the workers, many of whom suffer from malnutrition and chronic illness.

The imbalance in the labor force resulting from the shortage of skilled and semiskilled workers and from the reluctance of Egyptian technicians to perform other than supervisory duties is also a serious deterrent to efficient production. In the early 1920's the government attempted to overcome this problem by establishing a number of industrial schools designed to prepare high school graduates for technical jobs. Although this program had some success, much of the training provided was wasted, in that it did not correspond to the actual needs of Egyptian industry. More important from the viewpoint of creating skills was the training received by many Egyptians in the British wartime workshops.

In the postwar period the Egyptian Government has sponsored both on-the-job training and programs of vocational education. The International Labor Organization has been active in planning programs of vocational education for Egypt, while UNESCO has established an Arab Training Center at Sers-el Layan, north of Cairo, designed to train an elite group of technical instructors and professors. The experience of the vocational schools and the on-the-job training program has demonstrated that the Egyptian is apt at acquiring new skills. The Egyptian worker displays considerable ingenuity at mechanical improvisation, but he is generally negligent in maintenance of equipment.

In contrast to the effort made to overcome the shortage of skilled labor, little attention has been given to such factors as the lack of advancement opportunities for workers and the frequent corresponding lack of initiative on the part of the workers themselves. Many workers believe that

advancement depends, not on good work, but on a combination of seniority and favoritism. As a result, there is widespread feeling among the most able workers that any effort beyond that required by routine duty is fruitless and unwelcome. Passivity and patience rather than activity and initiative are looked upon as the keys to advancement. Concomitantly, many Egyptian workmen, particularly those in the less skilled categories, show little desire for advancement that entails greater responsibility.

GOVERNMENT WORKERS

Egypt's swollen bureaucracy until recently employed about 900,000 persons, or about one employee for every 25 citizens. Although many of the government workers are productively employed in such enterprises as the government operated railroad, the Egyptian bureaucracy has traditionally served as an employment haven for those with family and financial connections or political backing. As long as clerical or administrative positions were to be obtained in local or central government, it was rare for the educated Egyptian to enter the technical field.

The high pay, social prestige, and political influence that accompany bureaucratic office have powerfully encouraged this trend. In general, the pay received even by those in the lower echelons of the civil service is far higher than that of other Egyptian workers. The differential in the wages received by the white-collar workers on the one hand—and most civil servants fall into that category—and manual workers on the other is the difference between the respective standards of living of the western and eastern worlds. Egypt's civil servants are now covered by a special pension and provident fund financed by the government.

The deference accorded the civil servant is correspondingly great. Not only is he envied as a man who does not have to work with his hands, but he is feared as an agent of an autocratic government. Although those bureaucrats who come into direct contact with the people may be resented, their authority commands outward respect and consideration. The political influence the civil servant has exercised, or was thought to exercise, has been an additional factor. Since many of the civil servants received their appointment through family or political influence, their allegiance was to family or political party and not to the government as such. Consequently, their primary concern was not to assist in the creation of an efficient and honest civil service but rather to promote personal and party objectives. Under this system inefficiency and corruption flourished at the expense of the country. One of the objectives sought by the present regime when it dissolved the political parties was the elimination of party influence over

the administrative apparatus of the government.

The stated objective of the present government is the creation of an efficient, honest, and well-balanced civil service. In order to reduce the present high cost of the civil service and to eliminate the waste of manpower, the Nasser regime is attempting to reduce the number of government employees to a maximum of 650,000 persons. Trusted army officers have been introduced into the civil service to inspect and observe its operation, in order to eliminate corruption and inefficiency and to promote the policies of Egypt's present leaders. Although these officers are viewed with suspicion because of their surveillance function, they appear to have achieved some success. Corruption has been reduced and a promotion system based on performance has been introduced. The ultimate success of this effort will hinge upon Nasser's ability to replace the traditional network of personal ties in government with depersonalized patterns of administrative practice. The task clearly is not an easy one, for it involves changing attitudes and ways of doing things which are firmly rooted in Egyptian culture.

COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES

The commercial endeavors, employing about 650,000 persons, constitute a relatively favored field. Commercial enterprise is fairly lucrative, and the numerous small entrepreneurs have considerable independence. Both merchants and their employees enjoy the prestige which in Egypt attaches to nonmanual work.

While the majority of Egypt's merchant group is made up of owners or employees of small shops, street hawkers, and traveling merchants, all of whom depend on their individual sales for their income, there is also a small class of workers employed in the larger commercial establishments who are paid regular salaries. In matters of working conditions, social benefits, and wages this group is subject to many of the same conditions as industrial workers in the more advanced enterprises. Almost all the social legislation of the past 20 years, such as minimum-wage laws, applies equally to commercial and industrial employees.

The majority of the small one-man commercial establishments in Egypt are owned and operated by Egyptians, but the larger commercial establishments are generally owned and staffed by members of the ethnic minorities. Jews rank high among the employees of city retail firms. Greeks and Armenians also play an important role. Greeks are particularly active in the sale of foodstuffs and in the operation of restaurants and cafes; the majority of small stores in the rural areas also are operated by Greeks.

Banks, brokerage houses, and other financial institutions, while directed by Egyptians, are generally staffed by members of the minority groups.

THE PROFESSIONAL ELEMENT

Egypt's professional element has increased rapidly in the past 20 years. Between 1937 and 1947 physicians and dentists increased from 3, 700 to 6, 300; chemists and pharmacists from 1, 200 to 1, 600; schoolteachers from 35, 300 to 52, 100; engineers from 8, 400 to 15, 800. There were ccrresponding increases in the number of writers, lawyers, and social scientists. Presumably this expansion has continued and probably accelerated during the past 10 years,

Despite this growth, Egypt still lacks a sufficient number of professional people, and the professional element, like other Egyptian occupational groups, is badly balanced. While many of the university students trained in law, journalism, and the social sciences are unable to find employment, thus creating a small but vocal group of rootless and dissatisfied intellectuals, there is a lack of qualified personnel to adequately handle the material and physical problems confronting the country. Even within this latter field there is a considerable lack of balance. In regions where doctors or engineers are in sufficient supply, supporting staff is lacking. As a result, physicians are required to perform tasks which should be taken care of by nurses, and engineers are constantly called upon to undertake repairs which should be carried out by skilled workmen.

FORCED LABOR

The institution of corvée or forced labor was abolished in Egypt by Lord Cromer, the British Consul General and Agent, in 1893. Despite this formal abolition and subsequent Egyptian confirmatory legislation, the use of forced labor has never been completely eliminated in the country. Its persistence may be attributed in part to long tradition, and in part to basic factors in the economic life of the Nile Valley.

Servitude in Egyptian History

Slavery and other forms of forced labor have been important until recently in Egyptian history. The pyramids of the pharaohs and the nineteenth century canals built by Mohammed Ali are reminders of it. The system has left its mark on the people as well as on the landscape, and the fear and hostility which exists in the villages toward governmental authority

is in no small part the aftermath of centuries of experience with forced recruitment.

Forced labor has been known in almost every epoch. Of the reign of Thutmose III in the middle of the second millennium B.C. (about 1500 · 1400 B.C.), one historian writes:

Year after year did this Pharaoh's war galleys, mooring at Thebes, disembark an unlimited supply of captive manpower, and the imagination can perhaps be inspired to call up a mental picture of long files of oppressed Israelites assisting the vast army of captives from other countries to raise some of those gigantic temples whose ruins remain to remind us of the Old Testament epoch.

The use of enslaved captives by the pharaohs is portrayed in the relief on the walls of the temple of the god Amon at Karnak, showing Amon leading rows of captives. In periods of expansion the ancient Egyptians relied heavily on captive labor; in times of decline and defeat, the Egyptians themselves were subject to the slave levies of their conquerors.

The Arab conquest of Egypt had little effect on the employment of forced labor. Under Saladin and his successors, captives were converted to Islam and some of them were formed into an elite corps of warriors. So great became the power of these slaves, the Mamelukes, that they were able to overthrow the government and found the Mameluke (or Slave) Dynasty, which ruled Egypt until its conquest by the Turks in 1517 (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting).

The founder of modern Egypt, Mohammed Ali, also placed great reliance on forced labor in his program of modernizing the country. One writer observes that "the fellahin, under the lashes of the Pasha's overseers, were made to work even beyond the limits of human endurance. It is said that 20,000 of his unpaid labourers died during the construction of the Mahmoudia Canal."

In evaluating the accomplishments of Mohammed Ali, the same writer says that "he had shown not the slightest regard for human life or human suffering; his subjects had been flogged and driven to toil, unpaid, on his public works; his concern had been for Egypt and not the Egyptians." The practice of utilizing forced labor was continued by Mohammed Ali's successors until its abolition in 1893.

The <u>corvée</u> system appeared again, however, in 1917 when it was used by the Egyptian Government as a method of recruiting labor for the wartime transportation services. Although this was only a temporary

expedient, other more permanent forms of forced labor continued and were given legal sanction. As late as 1942, for instance, the peasant could be taken from his village and forced to labor anywhere in the country to meet the crises of floods, cotton pests, and locusts. Although by the law every Egyptian was subject to such service, none but the fellahin were ever called upon. Still another practice of the recent past, if not the present, has been for the peasant who desires to keep in the good graces of his umdah (village headman) to "donate" periodically several days' labor without pay.

The Role of Economic Factors

Economic factors have contributed to the long survival of forced labor in Egypt. The nature of Egypt's agricultural economy, with its high degree of dependence on the maintenance of dikes and levees, and seasonal pest control, required the frequent and regular use of large numbers of laborers. Coupled with the traditional landholding system, which permitted a small number of owners to control most of the agricultural land, this situation made almost necessary the existence of various forms of obligatory seasonal work. Such labor can be considered forced labor even when a nominal wage is paid, as the laborer had no choice other than to flee or comply. Forceably recruited, he was often carried off under guard to work on estates many miles away.

British and Egyptian legislation aimed at abolishing forced labor was never completely successful because it failed to eliminate the need for such labor. In attacking the basic conditions out of which forced labor sprang, the Land Reform Act of 1952, which broke up the large estates and divided the land among the fellahin, is likely to be more successful in bringing about its final elimination.

Present-Day Trends

The Egyptian Government in response to a questionnaire prepared by the International Labor Office in 1956 stated that it considered that certain kinds of work or services required from the population by law or custom, and contributing to the basic welfare of the community, should be considered not as forced labor but as normal civic obligation. This view, while in principle favoring the abolition of all forms of forced labor, recognized that there may be some instances where some form of coercion is required to insure the public welfare.

Official policy in Egypt today is clearly aimed at remodeling the nation along lines that will leave no room for the traditional types of

compulsion which could wring crops and monuments, but little else, from a passive peasantry. Whether the autocratic habits of the past will be abandoned or transformed into new and more political forms of coercion by a leadership determined to revive Egyptian national power remains to be seen.

CHAPTER 14

ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

Trade unionism in Egypt, imported from Western Europe in the early 1900's, has developed slowly. Unions are numerous, but they are small, weak, and lacking in unity. Total union membership—perhaps 150,000—is concentrated largely in the modern fields of transportation, manufacturing, and mining.

The numerical weakness of the Egyptian labor movement is in great part due to the dominant role of agriculture and small crafts in the Egyptian economy. The traditional relationships between landlords and tenants in the rural areas and between master craftsmen and artisans in the urban centers have, however, strongly influenced the nature of Egyptian industrial union organization.

Although Egyptian unions bear a surface resemblance to those of Western Europe, there are striking differences in their inner operation and in their motivation: these continue to be based on traditional work relations since the rapid, and often artificial, creation of modern unions in Egypt involved their penetration by many of the ideas, patterns, and individuals involved in earlier labor relations. Speaking of modern industrial workers in the Middle East, one writer asserts "for the most part they are still without characteristic new social attitudes of their own, however much the ordinary patterns of thought and behavior may have been distorted by their new circumstances."

THE TRADITIONAL PATTERN OF LABOR RELATIONS

Underlying the entire Egyptian labor picture is the traditional authority pattern found in the family and the government. The worker, whether tenant farmer, craftsman, or modern industrial worker, still commonly looks to his landlord, master craftsman, labor leader, and in recent years his government, for protection and guidance.

In the landlord-tenant relationship the role of the fellah is a passive one, and, although there is considerable variation in the exact terms of the

relationship, it is invariably the landlord who takes the initiative. He determines all matters relating to crop rotation, harvesting, and the division of the crop. The peasant's dire need for land and his lack of other opportunities deprive him of the ability to reject the arrangement imposed by the landlord.

Formerly, the landlord accorded varied types of protection to his tenants, such as assistanc: in time of sickness or death in the family, guidance in personal problems, and the adjustment of disputes. These advantages to the tenants have, however, been disappearing with the growth in the past century of a class of merchant landlords whose residence in the cities and absentee control through overseers have diminished their sense of obligation to the peasant. In many cases the authoritative feature of the old reciprocal relationship persists, and the fellah, however much he may resent the landlord, is bound by poverty and dependence to the arrangement.

The traditional craftsman-artisan relationship was similarly based on the authority of the master and the protection he could offer the artisan. The master's authority resided in his power to employ, his role as ultimate judge of the quality of a piece of work, and his determination of wages and working conditions. The artisan executed the patterns set out for him and accepted without question the commands of the master. The authority of master over worker was further enhanced by the formation within each city of separate trade or craft corporations headed by the most influential of the masters. Each group of masters determined policy in regard to working conditions, wages, and standards of workmanship, and the workers were without much recourse from their decisions. On the other hand, ties of religion, family, and pride of workmanship reinforced the relationship between masters and craftsmen and bound them together in a sense of mutual interest and shared objectives. In the personal atmosphere of the guild pattern, the workman found security in relation to the outside world and opportunity to advance in his profession.

In some measure the traditional combination of authority and protection has been transferred to the newer forms of labor relations which have arisen with the growth of modern industry. And, at least in part, the inner drama of the Egyptian labor movement is the attempt effectively to apply in a new situation the old pattern.

Changes in the Patterns

Since wealth in Egypt has traditionally been based on land and since the wealthy ruled the country, the landlord class played a dominant role in the formulation of Egyptian political and economic policy. To a

considerable but lesser extent the merchant and artisan guilds in the urban centers managed to exert pressure for similar but less positive purposes: concentrated in the cities, the merchants and artisans were in a position to swell the ranks of a demonstrating crowd in a matter of minutes. An unpopular measure such as an increase in the price of wheat generally brought the guild members into the streets in vociferous protest. On other occasions the government could depend on the guilds to furnish active support to certain policies.

The passage of time has seen great changes in the composition and internal organization of the landlord and merchant groups—changes which have altered their traditional relationship with the government and diminished their political and economic strength. Direct government intervention in the affairs of the peasant has been replacing the old paternalism of the landlord in the countryside, and the trade union movement, weak as it is, is appearing as the alternative to the personalities which once bound master and craftsman together in the guilds.

The Land Reform Law of 1952 was aimed not only at limiting the wealth and power of the landowning class but also at predisposing the mass of the peasants in favor of the government. Programs looking to the introduction of government services and instruction into the rural areas are resulting in the substitution of the government for the landlord in the traditional role of guide and protector.

The power of the artisan corporations has also, but more gradually, been whittled away—by the rise of modern industry and of trade unions. Many types of goods which were formerly produced and distributed in the bazaar now come from foreign or Egyptian factories and are merely sold in the bazaar. This has lessened the need for apprentices and craftsmen, and they have been largely absorbed into the modern factories. Workers, particularly in large enterprises such as the petroleum industry, are beginning to look to the labor unions for guidance and protection of their interests. The government in turn is directing its efforts toward controlling these new institutions, or at least making allies of them, as formerly it strove to draw support from the artisan corporations.

LABOR UNION DEVELOPMENT

Before the enactment of the Trade Union Law of 1942, the right of workers to organize was not recognized by the Egyptian Government. Nevertheless, considerable union organization had taken place, and the pattern of union activity has already been established. In the late 1890's a number of "friendly societies" were organized among the better-paid workers.

These served as a transition between the traditional craft system and the modern union, the first of which was organized in 1899 by the cigarette workers. The early initiative toward the creation of western-style union organizations came from the workers—French and other foreign skilled workers in particular. By 1911, 11 unions with a membership of over 7,000 existed.

Denied the right to strike during World War I, these unions had little influence. Their influence grew in the immediate postwar period, however, as they moved into the realm of political action through a policy of cooperation with the existing political parties. In the early period the Egyptian Socialist Party, which in the early 1920's adhered to the Communist Third International, was favored by many unions. Later, the allegiance of most workers was given to the Wafd (Wafd al-Misri, "Egyptian Delegation"—leading nationalist party). The numerous strikes of these years were more important for their role in establishing the principle of political action by unions than for the achievement of concrete economic benefits.

Official recognition of the right of workers to organize came in 1942 from a Wafdist Government which apparently hoped to exercise some control over the existing unions and to channel their activities along lines acceptable to the government. The Wafd hoped at the same time to hold and enlarge union political support. The right to strike, which was granted at this time, was hedged about by numerous restrictions. Recognition was to be accorded only to those unions which subjected themselves to considerable government supervision.

The fear that labor organization might escape government control and fall under Communist or left-wing influence was a constant preoccupation of post World War II governments, and it was one which was confirmed in the labor unrest which immediately followed the war. The strikes which swept over Egypt at this time were inspired in part at least by the left-wing-controlled Workers' Committee of National Liberation (commonly referred to as the Workers' Congress); they were ruthlessly but not quickly suppressed. There followed a period of close government supervision of union activity, somewhat ameliorated by an attempt to eliminate the causes of grievance among the workers by means of investigation, reform, and the expansion of social benefits.

In December 1952 the new military government issued, by decree, Trade Union Act No 319, which among other things tendered the right to organize to agricultural workers, foreigners, and certain others. The effect of an amendment to the Act, in 1954, was to prohibit strikes among employees of the Ministry of War and all administrations subordinate to it,

including workers in munitions and arms factories. The new legislation permits the formation of a federation to represent each group of unions whose members are from the same craft or industry, and further permits federations and individual unions having 1,000 or more members to join in a single national confederation. It also maintains the 1942 provisions for close government supervision. One provision, which makes management subject to punishment for claiming to represent a union or otherwise interfering in union activities, suggests that the efforts of employers to control the labor movement through company unions and other devices have come into conflict with the aims of government in this regard.

THE TRADE UNIONS TODAY

A major factor in the persistent weakness and instability of the Egyptian trade union movement is the slow development of an urban industrial population. Another factor pertains to the difficulty of transplanting the western-derived trade union institution into Egypt. In western countries the trade union is regarded, and functions, as an independent organization specifically formed to protect and advance the interests of its members largely in terms of their identity as wage earners in a particular field of enterprise. In Egypt, as in the majority of Arab states, unions play quite a different role; they have been manipulated to increase the power of government and management; they have not been expected or allowed to play an independent role. They have not generally been regarded, even by union members themselves, as a collective instrument of employee interest, but rather-when they have been comprehended at all-as a vehicle for political demonstration or a means of individual advancement. The impersonal aspects of union organization are in sharp contrast to the intricate network of personal relations in which the Egyptian is accustomed to move, and he finds the transition a difficult one to make.

Numerical Strength

In March 1953 the Egyptian Labor Department reported the existence of 933 unions with a total membership of over 260,000 workers, or an approximate average of 280 workers per union. The majority of nonofficial sources place total union membership much lower, with rough agreement on a maximum of 150,000. Many of the organizations registered with the Labor Department are "paper unions," having fewer than the minimum of 50 members required by law.

Such power as the unions have lies, not in their individual or even

collective numerical strength, but in the fact that well over half of the organized labor force is concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria, while the Canal Zone, Suez, and Damietta are other important centers of union organization. This geographical concentration permits them at times to exercise pressure out of proportion to the size of their membership.

Union membership is largely concentrated in a few major industries. The workers in the textile mills represent the largest segment of organized labor, with approximately 35,000 total membership in 30 local unions. A loose federation of some 50 local unions in the transport field claims to represent about 25,000 workers, while the Petroleum Federation, with some 20 local unions, is estimated to represent 12,500 workers. It is reported that the Petroleum Federation is the most powerful labor organization in Egypt, an important fact since the petroleum industry is controlled by foreign interests. It is possible that the government has assisted this Federation in order to enhance its own control over the industry.

Although trade union membership is high for a few industries, less than 20 percent of the workers in all industries are union members. The percentage of organized workers in the fields of commerce and domestic services is even smaller, totaling less than 10,000. Among white-collar workers, the union of employees of banking and brokerage houses, with over 10,000 members, is the strongest. Organization of agricultural workers has not advanced appreciably.

Union Structure

The major weakness of the Egyptian labor movement is not lack of numerical strength but the failure of the unions, with a few exceptions such as the Petroleum Federation, to develop beyond the plant level. Some notable attempts, beginning in the early 1920's and culminating in the post-World War II Workers' Committee of National Liberation, were made to form a national federation to represent all Egyptian trade unions, but none has been successful. Government fear of a united labor organization has certainly hindered such a development. Although craft workers and workers from similar industries were in theory accorded the right to create federations by the Trade Union Act of 1942, the enabling regulations for such a development have never been promulgated and the government has apparently withheld actual permission to form confederations. Other factors limiting union federation have been the individualism of many of the union leaders and their refusal to accept a secondary position in a united organization.

Although the labor law of December 1952 finally gave written

approval for the formation of a single national confederation, the government has not actively supported such a development. It is quite possible, however, that once the Nasser Government is confident of its ability to dominate the unions it will encourage the formation of a single national confederation of unions as the best means of exercising control.

The absence of a single national confederation in Egypt has meant that the greater part of trade union activity has been devoted to organization at the plant level. With the majority of Egyptian unions numbering less than 200 members, there is no single organization capable of representing a majority of the workers on the international level. The Egyptian Labor Department has, moreover, been hostile toward the western-oriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and worked against Egypt's participation in it. However, limited affiliation with international trade union organization has been secured. The General Union of Motor Drivers in Cairo was at one time affiliated with the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), and its president Zein el Din was a member of the ITF executive committee. In 1954 the Petroleum Federation of Egypt affiliated with the Oil Workers' International, CIO, and sent two delegates to the international conference in Paris. Unofficial delegates have also represented Egypt at conferences of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions-in Paris in 1945, and in Berlin in 1951. The delegates to the Berlin conference were arrested by the government on their return to Egypt, The recently organized Arab Confederation of Labor, tightly controlled by its secretary general, Fathi Kamal, an Egyptian, is significant as an instrument of the Nasser Government for exercising Egyptian leadership in the Arab world.

Internal Structure

The lack of external unity among the Egyptian trade unions is matched by the internal weaknesses and dissensions in many of the plant unions.

Management-controlled, or "company," unions are common, and member-ship activity in these is largely confined to the presentation of rather ineffectual requests for better working conditions, the registration of workers' complaints, etc. The company union is often an agent for the promotion of production; it is rarely an effective instrument for collective bargaining.

Even in those unions which enjoy independent leadership there is always the danger that management may succeed in buying off—with money or favors—union officials. Subversion of union leadership in this way is common in the Middle East, and many able and ambitious men have used the labor movement as a steppingstone to successful careers in management. A further

hindrance to union action results from the infiltration of police informers into union ranks. Fear of the ubiquitous informer inhibits discussion and decision even in the routine business of the union.

There are differences of opinion among the workers themselves concerning the value of union organization. These differences in outlook are in part based on the relative position of the worker in the plant and on his background. A recent study of workers' opinions in the Mahalla textile mills near Cairo reveals that, while almost all the workers oppose the present company union, the desire to form an independent union is strongest among the skilled and semiskilled and least evident among the unskilled workers on the one hand and the top-earning grades on the other. The lack of enthusiasm among the unskilled workers reflects their reluctance to pay dues for small returns and objectives that are little understood, the attitude of workers in the top grades stems from their identification with management, which for many of them is strong enough to make an independent union appear as a threat to their own position It has been observed that in the typical Egyptian industrial plant the line dividing those who regard themselves as members of the general working force from those who identify themselves with management runs between subforemen and foremen. The cleavage, cutting through the lower stratum of supervisory personnel, has had a detrimental effect not only on labor organization but also on the efficiency of plant function.

Attitudes toward union organization differ according to the rural or urban background of the workman A high proportion of those from rural areas actively favor a strong independent union which would permit them to deal with management on terms of equality. Their experience of family and village solidarity against outside groups undoubtedly contributes to this attitude, and in the new industrial environment they tend to look for new forms of unity and joint action to replace the traditional ones. City born workers are less enthusiastic about the value of organization, perhaps because they have already adjusted to the dissolution of the traditional bonds of the countryside and have learned more individualistic modes of behavior. Members of this urban group appear more adept at promoting their own and their friends interests, and they may feel that these interests can be better advanced outside of the union framework.

Another source of weakness in the Egyptian labor movement is the way in which union officers are selected. Union members have the right to choose their own representatives; in practice they exercise little influence. Management influence in the selection of union officials is strong, and workmen often find themselves represented by their labor contractor, who has been automatically designated union delegate. One worker, when

asked if he could vote for whom he desired, replied, "Some of the workers and chiefs make propaganda for some delegates and we elect them without knowing why." There appears to be a marked inclination to follow the lead of the majority regardless of personal preference. Under these circumstances, a short pre-election propaganda campaign by management can usually bring about a landslide vote for the candidate of its choice. Frequently the owner of the enterprise, or an influential labor leader acting as management's agent, purchases the workers' votes by agreeing to pay their back union dues.

Objectives and Procedures

The most important stated objectives of Egyptian trade unions are: higher minimum wages, increased social security and other social benefits, measures to meet the problems of unemployment and underemployment, greater freedom to bargain collectively, and the achievement of a higher status and dignity for the industrial working group. At the Mahalla mills, however, it was clear that, while the workers supported these general demands, their main emphasis was on securing job security, better pay, better working conditions, and the elimination of favoritism in plant personnel practices.

General problems, such as unemployment, are the major responsibility of the Superior Advisory Labor Council, created in 1932 and most recently reorganized in September 1953. It is composed of 26 members, including 6 representatives of labor and 6 of management as well as a number of government officials. Most of the work of the Council is handled by its permanent committee, which includes 2 representatives each of labor and management.

The objective of the Council is to ensure continuing collaboration and consultation between government, labor, and management on labor matters. It has been fairly active in advising the government on labor questions and studying labor legislation prior to its promulgation, but its role is strictly advisory. No comparable or subordinate administrative bodies have so far been established at the provincial and local levels; whatever has been done at these levels seems to have been handled by the General Administration of Labor of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

STRIKES

Although the right to strike has been curtailed by law, strikes have nevertheless been frequent in the postwar period. One evidence of the

gravity with which the Nasser regime views strikes is its policy of dealing with strikers through the military rather than the civil courts. In the post-war period a number of local strikes have been based on economic grievances, but the major conflicts have sprung from a combination of political and economic considerations.

An important element in the unprecedented wave of strikes that swept Egypt from 1945 to 1948 was the agitation of the politically oriented Workers' Committee of National Liberation, organized in early 1946. The long and violent labor disturbances at Shubra el Khayma and the September-October 1347 strikes at Mahalla el Kubra, over both of which the Workers' Committee exercised leadership, appear in retrospect to have been part of a general pattern of labor agitation by political leaders. The strikes were based, however, on the felt grievances as well as the nationalistic sentiment of the workers, and in both cases the Workers' Committee sought to associate uself with such Egyptian nationalistic and patriotic front organizations as the Democratic Movement for National Liberation. The anti-British strikes of February 21 and March 4, 1946, which brought together both leftwing and conservative unions, were certainly more nationalistic or patriotic than economic in nature; the Egyptian Government has shown little interest in discouraging manifestations of this type.

Although labor agitation has been curbed since the strikes which followed the coup of 1952, the use of the strike as a political weapon has been confirmed by the events of 1954. Coincident with the Naguib-Nasser struggle for power, a series of strikes was staged to protest Naguib's plan for scheduling national elections on July 15, 1954. It was later reported that these were carefully planned by political leaders to support those within the Revolutionary Command Council who desired to postpone the scheduled elections and to replace Naguib by Nasser. The main industries affected were transport including taxis and railways, motion pictures, and petroleum—services which for the most part affect the daily lives of the maximum number of people. The pledge made by Arab trade union leaders to President Nasser in 1956 to sabotage oil pipe lines in the event of an attack by the West on Egypt indicates not only the continuing role of nationalism as a factor in labor action but also a drive to unity in Arab trade union—sem.

Strike Settlement Procedures

The procedure for settling labor disputes was redefined by Decree Law No. 318 of December 1952. According to this decree, either party to a collective dispute may request the intervention of the Labor Department.

Once either party has made such a request, conciliation and arbitration procedures are compulsory. If the representative of the Labor Department is unsuccessful in composing the differences between the parties to the dispute, a tripartite conciliation board must be set up. The union and employer concerned are represented on the board, which also includes one representative from the local chamber of commerce and one from a trade union not directly interested Failure of conciliation entails the automatic reference of the dispute, within a three-day period, to the competent regional arbitration board. This board also includes chamber of commerce and trade union representatives not concerned in the dispute who sit as assessors with no right to vote but who must be consulted by the chairman before he gives his decision. This decision is binding and not subject to appeal. The workers' and employers' organizations concerned are parties to the proceedings throughout. However, denial of the right to strike and the arbitrary and binding character of government decisions leave the union with little effective pressure to bring to bear on management,

Individual workmen may bring grievances to the director of the local labor office. If his attempts to conciliate fail, the matter is dealt with by an ordinary law court, except when the district is within the jurisdiction of a special labor court. A ministerial order of April 1953 created special labor courts in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said, but these have not been extended to other areas.

Although this formal apparatus is used in the settlement of local labor disputes, the government relies heavily on military repression to end more serious labor conflicts, particularly those in which there is any sus—picion of political subversion. Such strikes are generally crushed by arresting the leaders for Communist agitation and dismissing those workers suspected of "subversive and disruptive activity." This policy is a strong deterrent to forceful union action, since any workman dismissed under such circumstances finds it almost impossible to find another job. In actual practice, it would appear that the Ministry of Interior through its Department of Public Security—the police—plays a more important role in settling labor disputes than does the Labor Department. The government justifies its policy on grounds of the necessity to protect lives and property against the violence and sabotage which are a frequent accompaniment of strikes,

RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES

Although Trade Union Act No. 319, like earlier labor legislation, forbids unions to "deal in political or religious matters," the trade union movement in Egypt traditionally has been and continues to be deeply

involved in politics and religion. As a general rule, the majority of unions have depended on the aid of political leaders, who in turn directed union activities in the interest of their parties. As early as 1923, Abbas Halim, a prince of the royal family, formed a rudimentary Labor Party, which was suppressed by the government at that time. Although it reappeared in the 1930's and later during World War II, it has never been an important force in Egypt. The composition of its leadership is drawn to a large extent from the upper class, making it suspect in the eyes of the workers; the encouragement given it by the government during the labor unrest of 1946 was also a reason for the workers' suspicion.

Other political parties and pressure groups have also vied for the support of the labor unions. Through covert activities the Communists have made a continuous effort to infiltrate and influence union activities; left-wing leadership of the Workers' Congress is but one example. The Communists have also sought to gain influence by clandestine support of such extremist religious groups as the Moslem Brotherhood, which represents itself as, among other things, the defender of the working class.

The late president of the Moslem Brotherhood, Hassan al Bamna, went so far as to break from former affiliation with the Wafd in 1946 in an unsuccessful attempt to organize a political movement based on working class support. Before the Wafd's suppression in 1953, it was the most successful party in winning labor support. It had carried out a number of investigations of working class conditions, and its paper, al-Wafd al-Misri, gave extensive coverage to labor problems. It was a Wafd ministry which in 1942 passed the law granting workers the right to organize, as well as much of the social legislation favorable to them.

Since 1952 the Revolutionary Command Council has attempted to control union activity and at the same time gain popularity among the working class. Labor organization has been encouraged and protection of workers extended—for example, in a prohibition against unwarranted dismissal. But government control over the unions has simultaneously been increased. A week's notice must now be given to the competent authorities before general union meetings can be held, and the government exercises supervision over the union books. As a last resort, the government can always dissolve the union on the pretext of illegal or subversive action. The Revolutionary Command Council has never hesitated to suppress strikes it did not favor.

One of the main sources of guidance for the trade union movement during the past two years has been the Labor Section of the Liberation Rally, the mass organization which supports the Nasser Government. Headed by a retired army officer, Major Abdullah Toaema, the Labor Section has opened

labor clubs and trade union centers at the Revolutionary Command Council Headquarters in Cairo and Alexandria. At these centers Labor Department officials are busy instructing union leaders in the operation of trade unions "within" the framework of Egyptian legislation. The centers, which opened in September 1954 and January 1955 respectively, expected to train 120 union officials monthly over a 10-month period.

It appears that the Nasser Government is in the process of consolidating its control over Egypt's industrial labor force. The pattern of political control of trade unions is firmly established, and only the conflict of competing political groupings has permitted the unions to enjoy some degree of freedom. The military regime's elimination of political competition and its dual policy of encouragement and control make it likely that the Egyptian trade union movement will come even more under the thumb of the government in the future than it has in the past.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNIONS

The attitude of Egyptian business enterprise toward the trade unions parallels that of the government. Favorable to the unions when able to control them or win their cooperation, managements become hostile when the unions display individual interests and objectives which clash with their own. Although the employers at first tended to look upon trade union activity with suspicion and were bitterly opposed to early labor legislation (the Trade Union Act of 1942 in particular), tension has since eased somewhat. This change may be in part attributed to the fact that many earlier fears were not realized, and in part to the control achieved by the creation of company unions.

The trade union movement finds considerable support in the urban intelligentsia. Students in Cairo and Alexandria consistently support workers' demands and cooperate with them in their strikes and demonstrations. The National Committee of Students and Workers, established in 1946, is one of a number of organizations that attempt to provide cooperation and coordination of activities between the two groups. This Committee was active in the organization of the anti-British strikes of February 21 and March 4, 1946.

Although most of the press has reflected little interest in the problems of workers, the labor movement has had the support of a few of the smaller journals such as al-Assas, and union activities have received a sympathetic hearing in the French-language newspaper Le Journal d'Egypte. Clandestine pamphlets and such obscure journals as La Vérité and L'Opinion Révolutionnaire (reportedly Communist-inspired) apparently have considerable influence in the labor circles at which they are aimed.

CHAPTER 15

AGRICULTURE

The economy of Egypt always has been and still is dependent on a highly productive agriculture. Recent discoveries of fair-sized deposits of industrial minerals, particularly iron ore, petroleum, and manganese, give some hope for future development of the country's industrial potential, yet there remains little doubt that Egypt will continue to be for many years a predominantly agricultural country. More than half of the national capital is invested in the soil; agricultural products provide two fifths of the national income and more than nine tenths of the country's exports. Raw agricultural products feed mills employing 70 percent of Egypt's industrial labor. More than half of Egypt's commercial firms, wholesalers, and retailers are kept busy handling local agricultural produce.

That Egypt's agriculture, which keeps such a large proportion of the working population employed, can be so successfully pursued is due to four main factors: (1) an agricultural labor force with centuries of experience on the land; (2) a highly efficient irrigation system; (3) a good "growing" climate with abundant sunshine; and (4) the fertility of the soil, its adaptability to intensive cultivation, and the heavy application of commercial fertilizers.

Egypt's land is worked by its millions of fellahin who live off it at a bare subsistence level and produce the surpluses which feed the city dweller and find their way into the export markets. This rural population lives in crowded villages which are essentially clusters of farmhouses from which the villagers go out daily to their small parcels of land or to the larger holdings of local or absentee landlords. The village pattern of settlement is common throughout the Middle East, but it does not reflect the same social or physical conditions everywhere. In Egypt a highly centralized system of irrigation based on the control of a single river, the Nile, rests on the cooperation and disciplined labor of the village unit. Village life is deeply rooted in the tradition of the Egyptian countryside, but, even if the peasant chose to do so, he could hardly live apart from his fellows, for much of the land is fragmented into plots too small to maintain independent homesteads.

The squalor of the <u>fellah's</u> physical surroundings, the resemblance of his simple tools to those of his forebears, the techniques he employs in working the land, all make it easy to think of him as impervious to change. Yet if the social organization of agriculture and the village institution have changed little over the centuries, economic and technical change have occurred and these have affected the peasant, increasingly so in our time. He has accepted the crops and become dependent upon them. He has persisted, however, in trying to grow them in the old ways, and traditional cultivation techniques exist side by side with modern irrigation methods. Because the fields must now produce more, and more varied, crops, he works the year around instead of seasonally as in the past. The fellah has borne the burden of economic change in Egypt, and among his countrymen he has benefited last and least by it.

Throughout most of Egypt's history the fellah has been treated by his rulers as an expendable economic resource. Successive Egyptian governments—most of them alien—have used the food supply and tax revenue they extracted from the peasant, not to improve his condition, but to perpetuate themselves. The victim of countless oppressions and indignities and living in unrelieved monotony and poverty, the fellah had, as General Naguib wrote in 1955, been brought "too low to be able to help himself without a great deal of compulsory assistance from the government."

After the military coup of 1952 attempts were made to improve the fellah's lot by such measures as a minimum-wage law and health and sanitation legislation. The latter innovation, typically, was greeted with more suspicion than enthusiasm; the former, though a step in the right direction, was a minimal one. Furthermore, it appears that some landlords or their agents, exploiting the mechanization-induced threat of rural unemployment, are once more engaging workers on their own terms.

Egypt's heavy financial commitments in other directions certainly will slow, and may halt, the progress of the recently begun reform in the countryside; Egyptian agriculture, however, in spite of the inequalities and injustices with which it is riddled, will continue its profitable yields.

THE PATTERN OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN EGYPT

The chaotic condition of the Egyptian pattern of land ownership may be judged from the fact that in 1947 more than 70 percent of all owners possessed one feddan (1.038 acres) or less each. This was tantamount to being landless, as a holding of three to five feddans is considered to be the minimum for maintaining the average family in Egypt. The total area held by small farmers amounted to only 12.5 percent of the cultivated land. In

addition to the large group of below-subsistence owners, there were a large number of small tenants, sharecroppers, and wage laborers. These groups together constitute the Egyptian peasant class.

The Fellahin

Egyptian peasants struggle constantly to make a living by working their own small plots, by renting from the large owners, or by hiring out for daily wages. In no case can the peasant reasonably hope to improve his lot within this traditional system: as an owner he (and his family) have to farm at least three feddans to make the venture economically profitable; as a renter he pays the owner in cash or in kind, or both, an amount which leaves the minimum margin, if any, of reward for his labor. Varying with the fertility and location of the land, rents run from \$10 to \$150 per feddan yearly, the most common rates falling between \$30 and \$90. The agricultural wage laborer, with daily pay averaging about 8 cents for boys, 15 cents for women, and 24 cents for men, was in the same situation, though since 1952 his financial position has been somewhat improved. The narrowness of the subsistence margin leaves no capital for experimentation, thus contributing to the ossification of farming methods and accentuating the fellah's resistance to change.

Table 9. Distribution of Land Ownership in Egypt, 1947

Size of Holding	Number of Owners	Percent of Total Owners	Area Owned (feddans)	Percent of Total Area
1 feddan and unde	r 1,921,000	72.1	785,000	13.1
1 to 5 feddans	587,000	22.1	1,219,000	20.4
5 to 50 feddans	143,000	5.4	1,774,000	29. 7
Over 50 feddans	11,000	0.4	2,200,000	36.8
Total	2,662,000	100.0	5,978,000	100.0

Source: United Nations: Department of Economic Affairs, Land Reform: Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development, p. 9.

Under such conditions it is very difficult for the Egyptian fellah to become an independent owner. He rarely succeeds in saving enough to buy one or even a half acre, though the ownership of a plot of land, however small, is one of his overriding ambitions. The rapid increase in population

and the futility of further subdividing (in accordance with Moslem traditions of inheritance) already uneconomic small lots have brought into being a landless population, estimated in 1950 at over a million and probably not substantially reduced today. In 1947 there were in Egypt about 2, 662, 000 farm holdings of all kinds, ranging from less than one feddan to the very largest estates. While the number of holdings of more than 50 feddans has remained almost stationary since 1896, the number of those of 1 to 5 feddans increased fourfold during the same period. There were almost 2 million holdings of less than one feddan in 1948. What emerges from these statistics is that the majority of Egypt's farms are too small to support their owners, who must supplement their income either by renting additional land from large proprietors or by working part of the year as hired laborers.

Agrarian reform has had little effect on the land ownership distribution figures. Percentage breakdown for owners remains fairly constant

The Landowners

Before the introduction of agrarian reform, a small group of 11,000 landowners (with properties of 50 feddans and upwards) held 2,200,000 feddans, or about 37 percent of Egypt's total cultivable area. Comparatively few of these large owners worked their entire estates themselves, and many of them regarded the land, on which a luxurious villa was a characteristic feature, as a place to which to repair to escape the city heat. The current expression was not "I'm going to the farm," Lut "I'm going to the villa." Most landlords were, and still are, city merchants, industrialists, or wealthy professional men. For them, as for their counterparts elsewhere in the Middle East, real estate has been a major vehicle for capital investment, owing both to the traditional prestige connected with land ownership and to the generous returns in rents and income from cash crops. Absentees for the most part, they left the management of their domains in the hands of managers or bailiffs, whose underlings dealt directly with the peasant tenants.

Some landlords were in the habit of retaining for their own use a fraction of the land they owned and farming it through a manager; the amount of land thus retained varied with the profitability of the crops in any particular year, and it is not clear what proportion of the total cultivable area was worked by the owners. Figures compiled during recent studies differ widely, but the figure probably varied between 25 and 40 percent.

No moderately prosperous smallholder group stands between the big landowner and the peasantry, for while those holding 5 to 50 feddans are more apt to be in direct contact with the peasant and therefore to have firsthand knowledge of his plight, their attitudes and pattern of relationships

with the peasant are essentially those of the larger landlords. Agrarian reform has not fundamentally altered this picture. The big landlord, shorn by the new laws of a portion of his land, and the smallholder, striving to become a bigger one, are in the main still very much landlords, and the tenancy and hired labor systems preserve their essential character.

Tenancy

The conditions governing tenancy in Egypt are of three kinds. First, and least complicated, is the cash payment system, which—not surprisingly in a country where the peasantry is perennially short of cash or in debt—is the least developed. It is found almost exclusively on state domains and in the immediate vicinity of the larger cities, where truck farming can be profitably carried on.

A second and more widely spread practice is the payment by the tenant of all or part of his rent in kind. The rent is fixed according to the quality of the soil, the owner usually undertaking to buy the crop at going prices. Should the tenant or the owner at any time during the agreement wish to change the payment plan, this is usually arranged without difficulty. If, for example, a tenant agrees to pay his landlord a cash rental plus 5 kantars (about 500 lbs.) of cotton, he may, on agreement, substitute cash for the total, or any fraction, of the crop payment.

The third and most general practice is metayage. Here, generally, the landlord provides the costs of cultivation and gets the bulk of the crop, while the tenant does all the work and receives the lesser share. This type of contract is usually made for one crop only. A tenant takes over for a single cotton crop; the landowner provides seed, fertilizers, and draft animals, meets the taxes and half the cost of picking, and receives in return about five sixths of the crop. This proportion decreases as the services provided by the landowner are reduced, though it is only rarely that the landlord receives less than one half, even if the tenant pays all the expenses including taxes. Metayage has become much more widespread with the inflation of land values following World War II.

Under all forms of tenancy the landlord or his agent regulates matters of water, drainage, and rotation. He also supervises gathering of the crops and has them deposited in his granary as collateral for rent. The landlord usually takes full advantage of his knowledge of the markets in dealing with his tenants.

Owing to the pressure of population on the very limited land resources, and because there is not sufficient industrial employment available to reduce this pressure, land values have risen enormously. In some cases,

the rents charged are higher than the net output from the land and rental payments absorb part of the peasant farmer's supplementary income as a day laborer. With no money left over for tools and fertilizers, the decline from tenant to landless laborer is accelerated.

Unrealistic tenancy agreements and the steadily rising price of land have been as damaging to the physical components of Egyptian agriculture as to the farmers. The shortness of the leases, the longest of which rarely exceed three years, the myopia of many of the landlords, who are concerned only with the immediate returns, and the poverty and ignorance of the tenants have had a disastrous effect on the land worked by the fellah, who, paying a high rent and knowing he has only a very limited tenure, stints the use of fertilizers and exhausts both the land and the livestock.

COOPERATIVES

The agricultural cooperative movement, which in Egypt has been concerned mainly with the provision of cheap credit and with the marketing of produce, was weak and disorganized until the achievement of political independence. In 1923 and 1927, however, laws were passed bringing cooperatives under government supervision and placing EE 350,000 (at that time \$1,400,000) at their disposal with the Banque Misr. Under the terms of this loan, cooperatives could borrow at 4 percent and relend to their members at 7 percent.

The response was not immediate. The fellah, suspicious of anything in which the government had a hand, would not desert the village usurer until his reticence to participate in a scheme which he did not understand was overcome by the zealous propaganda of the <u>umdahs</u> (village mayors) and village notables and the promises of the government publicity teams. When it became clear to the fellah that cheap credit was really available, there was a rapid swing in favor of cooperatives, and by 1931 about 540, with a total membership of 53,000, were in operation.

The foundation in 1931 of the Agricultural Credit Bank (Banque du Crédit Agricole; see Chapter 12, Financial System), which advanced money both to individuals and cooperatives, hit the cooperatives hard, and their growth had slowed down almost to a standstill by 1939. It was during this period of decline that the big landlords began to join the cooperatives and quickly secured control of them. The peasants, on the other hand, preferred an uncomplicated loan from the new bank, if they could get it, and many of them left the incomprehensible and demanding cooperatives for the simpler if less advantageous procedure of the bank or the moneylender.

During World War II the cooperatives once again received support

and encouragement from the government, and they enjoyed unprecedented prosperity until 1945. Cooperatives were heavily relied upon for the distribution of supplies and fertilizers, and membership increased from 78,000 in 1939 to about 770,000 in 1944. The end of the war brought another decline in interest, and from 1945 until General Naguib assumed power there was no increase in cooperative membership and little increase in transactions. A further factor in the decline was that during the World War II period the cooperatives for agricultural supply and loan were by far the most numerous (1,654 out of 2,004 in 1948), and marketing activities, which would have been of the greatest help to the peasant, were negligible, only six marketing societies being in operation in 1949.

In 1944 the cooperative movement in Egypt was reorganized and government control was extended. The Agricultural Credit Bank was also reorganized to permit the cooperatives to share more fully in its activities. By 1948, when the name of the bank was changed to Agricultural and Cooperative Credit (Credit Agricole et Cooperatif), it had a capital of LE 500,000 (\$1,400,000), of which half was subscribed by rural and consumers' cooperatives and half by government, and deposits of cooperators with the bank had risen to LE 575,000 (\$1,610,000) by 1951.

Vigorous encouragement given to cooperatives by the present government has received an enthusiastic response. The Land Reform Law of 1952 provided for the compulsory organization into cooperatives of all peasants owning less than five feddans, and these new bodies are assuming an important role in the peasants' economy by helping to organize production, advance loans, and provide supplies. One of the most far-reaching consequences of cooperatives is that the peasant, through controlled credit linked with marketing, is being freed from the clutches of the moneylender in which he has been held for so many years.

FARMING PRACTICE

Farming practice in Egypt is slowly and unevenly changing under the impact of modern knowledge. Where, as in the new Liberation Province (see below, Agrarian Reform), government planners are given a free rein, mechanization and scientific soil treatment almost completely exclude the older ways. However, in spite of the government's ambitious land redistribution program and the avid encouragement it gives to the use of mechanized and scientific methods, the fellah is not easily turned from the traditional procedures he has learned from his elders and regards as sure. The high yields obtained by progressive landlords and the government experimental stations show that the old methods of cultivation are laborious,

wasteful of seeds and natural fertilizers, and insufficiently productive, but these facts must be doubly proved to the peasant, whose economic margin is too narrow to allow him to experiment.

Other factors in the technical stagnation of Egyptian agriculture have been the prevalence of absentee landlords, the illiteracy and resignation of the fellahin, the small size of individual plots, and the overworking of the soil. Factors also are the innumerable open drains, which occupy so much of the surface, and the nature of the principal cash crop, cotton, for which no completely satisfactory method of mechanical picking has yet been devised. Finally, most of the fellahin are suspicious of mechanized innovations. They view with alarm the growing numbers of tractors and mechanical farm implements, knowing that there is already a surplus of farm labor and seeing for the first time in Egyptian history the rapidly materializing shadow of widespread rural unemployment.

The tools the fellahin employ for working the land are few, simple, and differing only in minor respects from those their ancestors used in Pharaonic times. Their draft animals are the cow, the buffalo, and sometimes the camel, and these they hitch to primitive plows, scoops, furrowers, drags, and threshing sledges. Hand tools are the hoe and the sickle, with which vast quantities of grain and clover are still cut.

Seasonal Rotation

In 1950 a total of 5, 800,000 feddans was under cultivation in Egypt, of which 3,500,000 feddans were in the delta, giving, with rotation, a total crop area of about 9,000,000 feddans. The remainder were about equally distributed between Middle Egypt (Giza, Beni Suef, Minya, and Faiyum) and Upper Egypt (Assiut, Girga, Qena, and Aswan). About one sixth of Egypt's soil is still under basin irrigation; with the help of continuous warmth and maximum sunlight, allowing only short periods for fallow, it can produce crops throughout the year. There are three growing seasons in Egypt: a winter season (shitwi), when slightly under half the total crop area is cultivated; a summer season (seifi), with about 36 percent of the land under cultivation, and an autumn season (nili), with only 17 percent. Cultivation is most intensive in the delta, where for the entire year the crop area averages 1.63 times the cultivated area, and nearly doubles it on land adjoining the Nile branches and the main irrigation canals.

Berseem (clover) and wheat are the chief winter crops, occupying 80 percent of the more than 4 million feddans of cultivated land. Horse beans rank third with 10 percent, and barley, lentils, fenugreek, and onions are also raised in winter.

About 3 million feddans are cultivated in summer, over 60 percent of which are in the delta. Cotton is the leading crop, occupying more than half of the crop area; rice and sorghum are also widely cultivated, though the former still has to be restricted in years of low flood. Sugar, melons, sesame, and peanuts are also grown in large quantities.

Only 1.5 million feddans are planted in the fall, when flooding prevents cropping in the basin areas of Upper Egypt. By far the greater part of the fall crop consists of maize; most of the remainder is put to sorghum and vegetables.

The length of the seasons varies somewhat between the upper valley and the northern part of the delta. There is a considerable overlapping of the seasonal crops, and the high winter yield is largely due to the fact that winter is the only cropping season for land completely under basin irrigation.

Irrigation

It has been said that the harnessing of the Nile has given Egypt the equivalent of the rainfall of the Mediterranean in winter, of the American Gulf of Mexico in spring and early summer, and of the monsoon in late summer and autumn. Mastery of the river is achieved by two main types of irrigation: basin irrigation, in which the water is supplied by a single flooding during the high-water period of the Nile; and perennial irrigation, which regulates the flood and furnishes controlled amounts of water at all times.

The System. Modern Egypt is almost literally the creation of the irrigation engineers, who maintain a highly complicated and efficient irrigation system and plan and execute its further development. The greater part of the credit for building the present installations and for development of maintenance techniques must go to the British, who from the time of the occupation until 1946 provided the directors, senior planners, and executive officers of the Egyptian Government's Department of Public Works. Today, however, the engineering staff and planning staffs are graduates of the Egyptian School of Engineering in Cairo, or Egyptians who have been trained abroad.

All dams, barrages, regulators, and canals are owned and maintained by the government, which carefully controls the distribution of water, thus obviating inequities which might otherwise result from local and sectional rivalries.

The Irrigation Service maintains 10 Inspectorates, 4 in the delta and 6 in the valley, each of which is divided into districts of about 40,000 feddans in the charge of a district engineer. The recommendations and

complaints of farmers are brought to the attention of the Irrigation Service through the Provincial Councils, to which two members are elected from each of the districts into which the provinces of Egypt are divided. Two inspectors-general, one in Upper Egypt and one in Lower Egypt, receive the reports of the ordinary inspectors and coordinate plans for the seasonal water budgets and programs of control at the various barrages, taking into account the acreages under the principal crops, the specific needs of these crops, and the amount of water available at any given time.

Basin Irrigation. The earliest form of agriculture on any large scale in Egypt consisted of a simple scattering of seed in the mud left behind on the river banks after the annual Nile flood had subsided. Basin irrigation followed as the population grew and as better control of the crop area became necessary. Basin irrigation, now confined to areas totaling less than one million feddans in Middle and Upper Egypt, has few mechanical requirements. First, the land is divided into compartments by building an earth bank along the river and crossbanks leading outward to the edge of the bordering desert. These main strips are subdivided into individual holdings and fields by other banks running parallel to the river line, and the basins thus formed are connected directly with the river by regular canal systems. When the Nile rises to flood proportions in mid-August, the sluices of the Nile barrages are opened and water floods the basins to depths varying between three and six feet. The land is allowed to remain inundated for 40 to 60 days, then water not absorbed by the soil or evaporated is drained back into the river.

With this procedure the basins are entirely dependent on flooding and devoted exclusively to one-season cropping. Today, however, a good deal of summer irrigation is achieved by pumping from wells within the basins themselves. This modification of the simple flooding practice has proved of particular value in the case of land put to cotton. Since cotton cannot be picked until late August or early September, flood irrigation has to be delayed until after cropping, and without the wells the ground cannot be saturated for a long-enough period to give the best results.

Perennial Irrigation. Perennial irrigation, as practiced in Egypt, involves a complicated system of storage reservoirs, barrages across the river to maintain the flow into the network of main, branch, and distributary canals during the annual low-water period, subsidiary regulators within the canals, and drainage lines.

Perential irrigation is generally preferred to basin irrigation since it increases the total potential crop yield per unit area and makes possible the cultivation of a wider variety of crops. Such important crops as rice and sugar, which require a constant supply of water during their growing season, can only flourish under perennial irrigation. It is hoped eventually to expand the perennial system to include all land now under basin irrigation, and to add further desert land to the cultivated area. The Egyptian Government has long been aware of the problems attending the maintenance and extension of drainage, fertilization, and general soil care, and its long experience in dealing with such matters is evident in the plans being worked out for future irrigation undertakings.

Though envisaged by Napoleon during his occupation of Egypt between 1798 and 1801, canal-fed perennial irrigation in Egypt really began in 1816 when Mohammed Ali dug a deep canal from the delta branches of the Nile to provide water for the summer irrigation of his cotton and sugar cane plantations, It was Mohammed Ali also who took the first step in the development of the present system of storage reservoirs and barrages when, in 1835, he commissioned French engineers to draw up plans for a twin barrage across the heads of the two delta branches of the Nile, some miles to the north of Cairo. Construction began in 1843; but the Viceroy's impatience to have his plans completed resulted in faulty construction, and the barrages did not function satisfactorily until rebuilt and strengthened in the early years of the British occupation. Five subsidiary barrages have since been built-two in the delta, at Zifta (1903) and Idfina (1951), and three between Cairo and Aswan, at Assiut (1902), Nag Hamadi (1930), and Isna (1908). In 1900 there were only about 700,000 feddans in the delta under perennial irrigation from canals. Today in Lower Egypt some 3,5 million feddans are canal irrigated, while the 1.5 million feddans under canal irrigation in the Nile Valley (including the Faiyum Oasis) are almost entirely a development of the past 50 years.

The completion of the first Aswan Dam in 1902 (heightened in 1906 and 1934) and the Assiut barrage six years later furnished the impetus for rapid development of Egyptian agriculture. Together, these works make it possible vastly to increase the area of perennial irrigation in the Nile Valley and to maintain a scientific programing system for the supply of water to the valley and the delta throughout the year.

Lift and Pump Irrigation. Water for the perennial irrigation of small areas, both within the basin compartments and elsewhere where canal irrigation is not provided or cannot be guaranteed throughout the year, is still provided by lifting from wells or canals or from the river itself, by various antiquated hand or animal-operated devices or by mechanical pumps.

The earliest water lifting device, the <u>shadoof</u>, unchanged since primitive times, consists of a pole attached near one end to a crossbeam. From the long end of the pole a bucket or water skin is suspended, and to the other end a lump of mud or a stone is attached as a counterweight. The

operation consists simply of lowering the bucket into the water, then lifting it with the aid of the counterbalance. Wasteful and tedious, this method allows two men, working from sunrise to sunset, to water only one feddan in four days.

More efficient, though nonetheless time-consuming and wasteful, is the Archimedean screw, a cylinder about 10 feet long containing a broad-threaded screw; when lowered into the water at an incline it can be made, by rotating the screw with a crank, to lift water into a trough connected with a field ditch. Two men working in shifts with the device can water only about three quarters of a feddan a day.

The third device, the <u>saquia</u>, is much more elaborate. In its common form it consists of a vertical wheel, with wooden cogs on its rim, meshing with a cogged horizontal wheel to which water buckets are attached, and the mechanism is moved by a draft animal (often blindfolded) which walks round and round hitched to the end of a shaft on the horizontal wheel. As the filled buckets of water rise they tip and empty into a trough.

Some 100,000 acres in the Nile Valley are watered by pumps driven by steam, diesel power, or electricity, all of which are owned and operated either by the government or by the richer landowners. This method is, however, to be found in relatively small areas which border immediately on the river and are too high to be reached by canals except at the height of the flood; it is also found to some extent in both the Nile Valley and the delta on land usually watered by canals from gravity flow. In the latter areas, pump irrigation is as a rule limited to the early part of the flood when the demand for water is so great that all canals cannot be supplied with enough to reach all parts of any particular section of the system. It is anticipated that lift and pump irrigation will disappear with the development of new drain and barrage projects.

Drainage. The complicated network of canals and ditches required for successful perennial irrigation demands that close attention be paid to adequate drainage. The soil deposited by the Nile through the ages is a clayey silt which is not sufficiently permeable to allow water to seep down quickly to its lowest layers. In basin irrigation the problem does not arise, but with the perennial system, unless there is an efficient system of artificial drainage, waterlogging near the surface can occur, with the consequent accumulation at root level of noxious chemicals.

In the middle and upper Nile Valley drainage has been less difficult than in the delta since, when perennial irrigation was instituted in the Valley, the need for good drainage was well recognized. In the delta, where drainage of the low-lying land is a problem in any case, difficulties have been enhanced by the fact that canal irrigation was in operation before the

important role of drainage was fully realized. Even today the greater part of the delta is drained by the wide-ditch method, which is wasteful of land and water, time-consuming, and expensive to maintain. Experiments are now being made with small-bore tiles of porous cement laid below root level and inclining very gradually to the main drains. The initial capital outlay, however, is so great that there is little prospect of any broad development of tile drainage for some time, except perhaps in the government-sponsored reclamation projects.

New Irrigation Projects

The Egyptian Government is now in the early stages of implementing a long-term program to be carried out in three phases. The first phase, which it is hoped will be completed by 1975, is aimed at reclaiming 1.5 million feddans, for the most part in Lower Egypt, by extending the fringes of the delta. During this period, also, 676,000 feddans of basin-irrigated land are to be converted to the perennial system. The second phase, for which no timetable has been set, aims to reclaim another 1 million feddans; the third phase, a further 1.5 million.

How this is to be achieved presents serious technical and international problems. Since no tributary joins the main Nile within Egyptian territory, the country contributes none of the Nile flood water. Therefore, international cooperation becomes a prime necessity, if Egypt, with its growing needs, is to obtain additional water for the expansion of the area under cultivation or even be assured in years of low rainfall of an adequate water supply for the present crop-bearing regions. Furthermore, if perennial irrigation is eventually to replace basin irrigation completely, annual storage—the only form of storage practiced to date—must be replaced by a long-term system.

Thus far, the measures completed in an over-all long-term storage plan are the erection of dams at Gebel Aulia and Sennar in the Sudan Republic, and at the outlet of Lake Victoria in Uganda. To complete the harnessing of the Nile waters, the cooperation and good will of the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika, and Kenya would be essential, but general political considerations seem to have led Egypt to set this comprehensive ideal aside, for the time being at least, in favor of a new local project at Aswan. The enormous cost of the High Dam scheme, the political crises which have attended fund-raising negotiations, and uncertainty that the new dam could provide sufficient storage capacity to keep pace with the needs of Egypt's mushrooming population may nevertheless force the Egyptian Government to turn once again to consideration of the wider scheme.

The present Aswan Dam has already been heightened twice, and, since no further heightening is considered practicable, a site for a completely new dam has been chosen some four miles upstream. With a planned capacity of 120 billion cubic meters, more than 20 times that of the present reservoir, the new dam, if erected, would be the largest in the world. Specifications call for a height of 492 feet, a length of 3 miles, and a maximum storage level of 590 feet above sea level. When full, the reservoir would extend upstream 282 miles and would flood much of Nubia, including the Wadi Halfa region of the Sudan.

The purpose of the project is to store the water which is now lost to the sea during the annual Nile flood, an amount calculated to be sufficient to increase greatly the area now under perennial irrigation and make possible the rapid conversion of most of the feddans now under basin irrigation. In addition, the dam would provide the total area under cultivation both with a supplement to the low-water period supply and with storage reserves to meet deficits in years of low flood. The flow would be controlled to supply proper amounts for the various crops at the right times, and the tremendous storage capacity would eliminate the danger of periodic overflooding and, by curtailing the free flow of water during the height of the flood season, would lower the ground water table and reduce the danger of waterlogging. Another facet of the over-all High Dam program is the generation of hydroelectrical power, the potential for which is estimated at 10 billion kilowatt hours per year (see Chapter 16, Industry).

Reclamation of Deserts. As far back as Greco-Roman times, the Mediterranean fringe of Egypt was famous for its grain and wines. Since those days, however, the southern limit of the Mediterranean rain belt has moved farther north; in addition, the water table is much lower now than it was in the past. In spite of these handicaps, the Egyptian Government recognizes that great possibilities remain for the reclamation of desert areas, and in recent years experimental stations have been set up in both the Sinai Peninsula and the Western Desert. In Sinai reservoirs have been built to capture as much as possible of the meager rainfall, and, with an auxiliary supply from wells, successful vegetable and fruit farming has been conducted in the neighborhood of El Arish since the 1930's. A project for the reclamation of areas in the Western Desert was begun with U.S. technical assistance aid, and the early results have been encouraging.

The fullic desert replantation holds great promise. The generation of electricity from the Qartara Depression could provide the power to bore and operate wells which would tap the vast water table of the Sahara. The Qattara Depression, only 120 miles west of the delta, occupies an area of roughly 7,000 square miles and has a bed averaging 150 feet below sea level,

and electricity estimated at 200 million KWH could be generated by drawing in Mediterranean water by canal to Qattara's northern tip. The main drawback to this scheme is the cost, which has been put at around \$300 million.

The harnessing of solar energy is also being considered, and, since Egypt has as much sunshine as any country in the world, prospects are good, especially now that French experiments in North Africa have met with some success. Solar stills might also be built. A still, one acre in extent, insulated from the ground to capture the full effect of the sun's rays, could, when used for the evaporation of sea water, produce 10,000 to 12,000 gallons of fresh water a day. Here again, production costs are a deterrent.

THE CROPS

In the 1950-51 season, field crops accounted for 76 percent of Egypt's gross agricultural revenue. Vegetables brought in only 2.9 percent, fruit 2.1 percent, livestock and livestock products 19.1 percent. Of the total value of field crops, cotton accounted for 54 percent, clover for 15 percent, wheat 9 percent, maize 7 percent, and rice 5 percent. The most important change in the relative importance of these crops—apart from cotton, which fluctuates considerably—is the increase in rice production, a trend which has continued into 1956. Rice is now becoming a profitable export crop, though cotton, the main cash crop, continues to average, year after year, between 85 and 90 percent of Egypt's total exports.

Cotton

Egypt occupies a unique place in cotton production. Although growing only 5 percent of the total world crop, the country is the second greatest cotton exporter, coming next to the United States. Egypt's share in the world output of long staple cotton is almost 40 percent, and of extra-long staple 70 percent, both types being rated among the best in the world.

For 30 years the Cotton Research Board of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Royal (until 1952) Agricultural Society of Egypt have been working successfully on the improvement of existing varieties. Other experiments have led to the adoption of improved growing methods, such as earlier sowing and closer spacing, while the ruling prohibiting the mixing of varieties in ginneries has reduced possibilities of hybridization. Buyers must obtain their seed from the Ministry of Agriculture, and the requirement that only specified varieties be sown in each region also helps to minimize the risk of degenerative hybridization. Thanks to these measures and to the increasing

Table 10. Acreage and Production of Selected Crops 1953-54 to 1955-56 (in 1,000 units)

1955-56	Acres Metric Tons			623 1,310	1,885 334	ally larger	16 3
1954-55	Metric Tons	1,753	1,728	1,118	348	300	2
1954-54	Acres	1,867	1,864	633	1,639	87	10
	Metric Tons	1,854	1,546	652	318	268	63
31	Acres	2,090	1,858	439	1,375	84	7
Crop		Maize	Wheat	Rice (rough)	Cotton	Cane Sugar	Flax

Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Circular, FATP 13-56, April 23, 1956,

Table 11, Percentage Area Under Main Crops 1937-38, 1942-43, 1950-51

	1950-51	21	16	15	24	ro	∞	4	Н	100
Area as Percentage of Total	1942-43	00	21	21	18	00	. 7	4	ಬ	100
	1937-38	21	18	1.7	21	5	Ф	5	4	100
Crop		Cotton	Maize	Wheat	Berseem	Millet	Rice	Beans	Barley	Miscellaneous Total

Source: Issawi, Charles, Egypt at Mid-Century, An Economic Survey, p. 108.

control of cotton pests and diseases, the yield of Egyptian cotton rose by more than 50 percent between 1919 and 1940. A progress plateau seems temporarily to have been reached, largely as a result of World War II, during which the soil was exhausted through lack of fertilizers and the over-cropping of cereals; but a leading authority states that, with even closer planting and a change in emphasis from long to medium staples, the present cotton crop of about 400,000 tons could be nearly doubled.

Cotton is by far the most profitable of the three main field crops. Besides being "light" on the soil, coming after a soil-exhausting cereal crop as it usually does, it provides the ground with a period of comparative rest. Therefore, in normal times growers try to plant as much cotton as is possible within the limits of the rotation pattern, though they have nevertheless always been sensitive to changes in the relative profitability of wheat and cotton. The area of cultivation has fluctuated considerably as a result, and, in the years between 1933 and 1939, shifts ranging from 2 million to 1.7 million feddans were recorded. Following the relaxation of wartime restrictions on cotton acreage, this prewar pattern has been resumed.

Grains

Food-grain crops—maize, wheat, rice, sorghum, barley, and millet—every year occupy almost half the total cultivated area. For the past quarter of a century the average production of maize has been about 1.3 million tons, from an average of 1,850,000 feddans planted. Wheat has averaged 1,280,000 tons for 1,600,000 feddans planted. These yields are among the highest in the world.

Egypt nevertheless is no longer a grain-exporting country, largely due to the fact that its population has increased during the present century out of all proportion to the increase in land cultivated. Also, although grains are the principal items in the diet of Egyptians, much of the area which might be planted to them must be reserved for cotton, the crop to which the Egyptian economy is geared. Other factors in the restriction of the area which can be put to the two principal grain crops are that the maize-planting season overlaps the cotton-picking season, and that, though wheat is a winter crop and does not compete with cotton for the occupation of the land, the storage of water for the summer irrigation of cotton, rice, and sugar cane limits the amount of wheat which can be irrigated. Maize and wheat together occupy about 70 percent of the area planted to grain, with the corn area slightly greater than that of wheat. Sorghum, barley, and millet occupy 20 percent, and rice has been occupying a larger area year by year.

Clover

Egypt's clover, the quick-growing, vivid green berseem, is peculiar to the country and has been known since Pharaonic times. Its dual purpose as a stock food and a fertilizer makes it indispensable, and each year some 2 million feddans, more than 20 percent of the total crop area, are planted to it. Berseem, Egypt's staple animal fodder, is cut and fed green in the winter or dried for summer feed, and every farmer, large or small, grows it in proportion to his stock-feeding needs. Though used sparingly for green manure, there is no doubt that its faculty for fixing nitrogen from the atmosphere has played a major part in the continuing high fertility of Egypt's soil. A winter crop, sown usually in October, berseem grows very rapidly, being ready for cutting in seven weeks and yielding between six and eight tons to a feddan.

Sugar Cane

After many ups and downs, Egypt's sugar industry survives today in a healthy condition; from the 30,000 feddans in the depression period of the 1930's, the area devoted to cane has today reached a fairly steady figure of 90,000 feddans, or about 1 percent of the total crop area. During the period 1946-51, inclusive, an average of 195,000 tons of cane were milled annually and about 85,000 tons of molasses extracted. Climatic conditions and good drainage in the Nile Valley, particularly in the most southerly provinces, are ideal for sugar cane growing, and in this region it has become the principal industrial crop. The plantations in Qena province provide 60 percent of the country's total production, while mills in Aswan province and in the Qena neighborhood produce three quarters of the raw sugar output. It is a common practice to leave the cane stubble in the ground to sprout a second crop, and even a third crop may be produced this way, though the yield is poor and unprofitable. Sugar cane quickly exhausts the soil and requires heavy artificial fertilization and a three- or fouryear rotation. Nevertheless, a good crop is so highly profitable in proportion to acreage that the industry has been more than able to hold its own.

Truck Farming Crops

All the common varieties of vegetables are grown in Egypt, and the yield is high and the quality generally good. Except for onions, however, vegetables occupy only a limited place in the rural diet. About 3 percent (250,000 to 300,000 feddans) of the total crop area is put to vegetables, and

about one sixth of this area is in onions, which constitute Egypt's only exportable vegetable crop of any significance. Onions, tomatoes, potatoes, and melons are important crops in the urban trucking areas.

Truck gardening is a year-round occupation in Egypt, and its prospects seem to be good. However, there has been a general lack of interest in this type of cultivation. World War II, which cut off food imports and discouraged the cotton growers, gave some impetus to small-scale vegetable growing, but there has been a marked dropping off since the cessation of hostilities,

Egypt has a wide range of temperate zone, subtropical, and tropical fruits. These are of a generally high quality (except for the citrus fruits), and, since they ripen early, they would be sure of a good demand in European markets if they were grown in exportable quantities. The total orchard area, however, was estimated in 1955 at only 100,000 feddans; though this is a threefold increase since 1930, it is still not sufficient to provide exportable quantities of fruit.

The failure to take advantage of the potentialities of the fruit industry can be variously ascribed. The initial capital outlay required is heavy, and cash returns are long in coming. There is also a shortage of trained orchard husbandry personnel. Other detrimental factors are to be found in the high cost of packing and transport and the limited local market, which is restricted to the financially better-off groups.

One fruit, however, is found everywhere and is consumed by all classes. Egypt has over 6 million date palms fairly evenly distributed throughout the Valley, the delta, and the oases. Most of the date crop is eaten locally; even the Saidi date, which is among the world's finest, gets no farther than the tables of Cairo and Alexandria. The date requires little cultivation. It is tolerant of soil and water salinity, and all the manuring it gets is from plowed in stubble and decomposing undercrop. The only attention date palms receive is artificial pollination (usually the female flower is dusted with pollen from the male flower by boys who climb the trees) and an annual pruning. The trunk of the date palm is a supplementary source of lumber, of which Egypt is in very short supply.

Other Crops

Peanuts, sesame, and fenugreek are other crops which, though of minor importance, all play definite roles in the general economy. Peanuts are especially useful, both as raw or cooked food and for their oil, which is widely used in cooking. Cooking oil is also extracted from sesame seeds, which in addition are widely used for flavoring breads and cakes. Fenugreek,

a winter crop grown mainly in the upper Valley, is a leguminous herb of the pea family which not only makes excellent fodder but provides, both raw and cooked, a highly aromatic flavoring for vegetable dishes.

LIVESTOCK

Concentration on those food and cash crops on which Egypt's economy is based leaves little margin for the production of fodder for more than a small livestock industry. The chief interest of the small farmer in his cattle is as draft animals. Animals sold by the farmer for meat are always males, the cows and cow buffaloes being kept to provide milk and to work in harness. Only on a few of the larger estates has there been any tendency to raise cattle solely for dairy purposes and for meat.

As it is, one fifth of the total crop area is put annually to the principal fodder, berseem. Government agronomists and progressive farmers have demonstrated that if the small producer could be induced to shift from the two-year to the three-year rotation plan, thus allowing longer periods for fallow grazing, the prospects of increased livestock raising would be good.

Table 12 gives the approximate number of the various livestock species over the period 1927-47. Large progressive increases are shown, but these have barely kept pace with the extension of total acreage resulting from irrigation projects and they have not meant any significant increase in the amount of meat available for human consumption.

Table 12. Livestock in Egypt (in thousands)

	1927	1937	1947
Cattle	739	983	1,321
Buffaloes	757	958	1,240
Donkeys	570	1,142	1,125
Camels	179	154	196
Horses	37	31	27
Mules	21	22	12
Sheep	1,232	1, 918	1,875
Goats	622	1,310	1,475
Pigs	20	36	50
Total	4,177	6,554	7, 321

Source: Egyptian National Census, 1947.

The water buffalo is the most popular farm animal. Hardy, resistant to disease, tolerant of the climate, and docile, it works well at the plow or the water wheel. It has greater endurance than the cow and gives more and richer milk. The raising of sheep and goats is a secondary source of wool, meat, and milk supply to the small farmer, and, though some flocks are run on scientific lines on the larger farms, most of Egypt's sheep live au pair with peasant families. The few nomads left in Egypt have the largest flocks (some 10 percent of the total). The comparatively few pigs are raised and consumed exclusively by the Coptic and European elements of the population, since Islam forbids the raising as well as the consumption of pork. Even so, the local supply is insufficient and a fair amount of preserved and processed pork is imported.

The donkey, used both as a mount and a carrier of produce, is Egypt's principal beast of burden. Seen in thousands, it is the fellah's inseparable companion.

The camel, though used to some extent as a draft animal, is really a desert creature, none too well suited to conditions in the delta. As a carrier, the camel is giving way to the truck, but the camel population of the delta and the Valley remains around 200,000. There are few horses and mules outside the urban centers, where they are mainly used for heavy carting. They, too, are being less used than formerly, and their disappearance as carriers is only a matter of time.

Meat, Dairy Products, Poultry

The main source of Egypt's limited domestic meat supply—slaughtered by the peasants or sold on the hoof at village markets—consists of surplus cattle and buffaloes, some camels, and sheep raised for the purpose. Some meat is imported, but its consumption is confined to the wealthier elements. Domestic dairy products are in adequate supply in the rural areas only and deficiencies in the cities have to be met by imports. In only a few districts are there creameries and cheese factories to cater to the urban consumer. The average production of buffalo, cow, and goat milk is about 2 billion pounds, or less than 100 pounds per capita. Of this more than half is made into butter, about 30 percent into cheese, and only 10 percent is drunk fresh. Egyptian cow milk has a butter-fat content of 8 percent, or more than twice that of American cow milk; buffalo milk is still richer.

Poultry is everywhere underfoot and overhead in the villages and countryside generally. Chickens, geese, turkeys, pigeons, and ducks have the run of the peasant houses, eating what they can pick up for themselves. As a result, they are stringy and tough and their eggs are small. Chickens

far outnumber all other types of poultry. The Egyptian Department of Agriculture now has a program under way for the development of a better breed of chickens through the importation of foreign stock.

FISHERIES

Egypt's fisheries employ some 50,000 men and 15,000 boys. The annual yield is about 60,000 tons, of which half comes from the lakes in the delta and from the Faiyum areas; the remainder is divided equally between the yield of the Nile fisheries and of deep-sea fishing. Consumption of fish in Egypt is only about 6.6 pounds per person a year, which is barely one third of the world average, yet the country is still not self-sufficient in fish.

The lakes in the delta are mostly salt lakes; their fishermen are professionals. The fellahin are not interested in fishing to any extent, nor do they eat much fish. There are many wholesome varieties of fish in the country, and in view of the generally low protein intake of the average Egyptian it would seem that an attempt might well be made to increase the country's fish supply by a scientific restocking of the canals and lakes.

POSTWAR AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Crop Priorities

Egypt's agricultural policy since the war has been influenced by the profitability of cotton on the one hand and the country's dependence on imports of wheat on the other. In the latter respect, the situation has been made more difficult by a world-wide wheat shortage.

With the recovery of the world textile industry, cotton exports began to increase and Egyptian cotton profited by the general rise in prices. Dollar shortages in Europe favored Egyptian cotton, and the devaluation of the Egyptian pound together with sterling in 1949 brought an increased demand for cotton from soft-currency countries. The war in Korea also exerted a powerful upward pressure on Egyptian cotton prices. Since, at the same time, the price of wheat was fixed below the average for the world market, Egyptian farmers began to defy the restrictions placed on cotton acreage

A general slackening of world business activity in 1952 placed Egypt in the position of trying to unload the cotton surpluses which were beginning to accumulate anew, and at the same time of having to purchase increased quantities of wheat and flour. As a result, steps were taken to bring the export price of Egyptian cotton down to world level, to reduce the acreage under cotton, and increase the grain yield. By the end of 1952 cotton prices

were once more on a competitive level. Subsequently, restrictions on cotton acreage were further tightened, the maximum being reduced to 30 percent of individual holdings, and the price paid to wheat growers was raised, thus encouraging a further shift in favor of grains. The rapid clearance of cotton stocks which followed prompted the government cautiously to increase the area allocated to cotton, while the price paid to growers, though fluctuating rather wildly, increased on the average by 30 percent. It would appear from this that the present government policy is aimed at restoring the prewar pattern which, while giving priority to cotton, checked any tendency to overproduce at the expense of wheat.

The most notable feature of the past two years, one which is perhaps not without political significance, is the enormously increased quantity of rice grown with government encouragement. The 1955 rice crop of 1,310,000 tons was more than twice that of 1953. In 1956, Egypt was expected to export 200,000 tons of milled rice, leading customers being the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Japan, and further expansion of production is planned.

Agrarian Reform

There was nothing spontaneous about the present Egyptian regime's land reform program. Redistribution had been tried, although with unfavorable results, at various times, and even in the last days of the monarchy there were evidences of a growth of social and political consciousness which led among other things to a demand for a reform of the Egyptian system of land tenure. A bill which would have limited the future acquisition of land to 100 feddans was overwhelmingly defeated by a parliament dominated by rich merchants and industrialists, most of whom had invested heavily in land. The most that the would-be reformers could obtain from the government at that time was a law which required owners of large estates to provide better housing and social services for their tenants and laborers. Even this was largely nullified by the inadequacy and corruption of the supervisory machinery.

The abdication of King Farouk in July 1952 brought new legislation almost immediately. In September, General Naguib's Government promulgated a comprehensive law, the principal and most widely publicized features of which were the limitation of individual agricultural land holdings to 200 feddans and plans for the redistribution of the surplus area sequestrated. This did not apply to land in process of reclamation. The new law required that redistribution be complete within five years of the date of promulgation and that the portion to be requisitioned each year should not be less than a

fifth of the total made available for redistribution. The stipulated compensation to the former owners is 10 times the annual rental value of the requisitioned land, and this indemnity is paid in 3 percent government bonds redeemable in 30 years.

Requisitioned land is now in process of redistribution among farmers owning less than five feddans, each of whom is being alloted, upon request, an area of not less than two and not more than five feddans. Should the small farmer wish to pay in cash, as very few can afford to do, the price is fixed at the rate of indemnity paid to the former owner plus 15 percent for expenses. New land can be financed by the government at 3 percent, the loan being repayable in 30 years.

All peasants owning more than five feddans have been organized into cooperatives, which are fast being established in villages where land has been requisitioned. Rents on agricultural land have been fixed at seven times the previous land tax, an appreciable reduction in most cases. Wage rates have been fixed and agricultural laborers are permitted to unionize, a right which at present remains mostly theoretical.

It was originally estimated that, excluding Waqfs (see below), over 700,000 feddans would change ownership. This figure has undergone several downward revisions, and the planners are now talking in terms of 450,000 feddans. Even so, should this amount be redistributed by 1957, some 7 percent of Egypt's cultivated land will have changed hands and about 100,000 peasant families will have benefited. All this is, of course, contingent on finding enough new landowners and tenants among the peasantry. It is claimed by the Egyptian Government that the plan is running on schedule.

Amid the enthusiastic publicity given to the land reform program, a note of apprehension may nevertheless be heard. In General Naguib's view:

A little is better than nothing, and although only a minority in each village is able to purchase additional land, the results, we think, will be worth while. The minority will provide us with the village leaders of tomorrow.

How the politically inarticulate fellah feels about the slow pace of these measures for his betterment is not clear. The fact that there have been a great many promises and some progress makes it doubtful that he continues to be immune to discontent for lack of knowing better. Among the measures taken to alleviate the misery of the peasants is the new minimum wage law, which makes it illegal to pay a man a daily wage of less than 18 piasters (52 cents), and a woman or child less than 10 piasters (29 cents). Though this is double the prewar average, living standards remain critically low.

While it is still too early to gauge the impact of the current changes on the rank and file of Egypt's farmers, one informed source says that, although in these days the peasant is more quickly informed about what is going on through the media of the radio and the village newsreader, he is so limited in his experience that such facts as come within his ken are soon swallowed up in the stream of his everyday preoccupations. The same source doubts whether even the breakdown of the traditional pattern of landlord-peasant relations has made any profound impression. Meanwhile, the landless peasant still finds himself surrounded by the bailiffs and managers of the absentee landlord, whose holdings have been only somewhat reduced. No worse off, he is still little better off, in spite of changes that seem to be in the making. How long the smallest of the farmers and the landless fellahin will remain in this lethargy may depend on how the more immediate beneficiaries of land reform-the middling farmers-play their new role, and on the success of the government's schemes for rural education.

The landlord, at the other end of the scale, has not fared badly. In a country where irrigated land is worth anything from \$1,000 to \$3,000 a feddan, a limitation of 200 feddans is generous, especially when it is possible to retain an additional 100 feddans for division among the family. Members of the royal family were the principal sufferers, some 190,000 feddans belonging to 175 of them being expropriated without compensation. The situation of other landlords, indemnified on the basis of 10 times the annual rentable value of the land taken, including construction and installed machinery, may be illustrated by the following example. The income of a landlord permitted to retain 200 out of 500 feddans, with a rentable value of \$150 a feddan, would be reduced by three fifths, from \$75,000 to \$30,000. If he had children and could transfer an additional 100 feddans to members of the family (in amounts of not less than 50 feddans each, according to law), the income of the estate would rise to \$45,000. The 200 feddans expropriated would be paid for at the rate of \$1,500 a feddan, which means that the landlord would receive \$300,000 in 3 percent bonds. Furthermore, during the time which elapsed between the enactment of the expropriation measure and the presentation of the bill of expropriation, in other words at any time between September 9, 1952, and September 9, 1957, the dispossessed landlord would retain two sevenths of the annual income from the surplus land (in this case \$8,400).

The landlord is still a power in the countryside, and is still a large employer of fellah labor. He knows that the government considers the 200 feddan individual limit overly generous. In this potentially difficult triangle involving government policy, peasant needs, and landlord interests,

it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the landlord group will at some time provoke a trial of strength. The international situation may have united Egypt as never before, but it should not be overlooked that a large proportion of the landlords have little cause to love the present regime.

Waqfs. Among the institutions to disappear in 1952 were the Waqfs (mortmains; see Chapter 23, Religion; Chapter 18, Public Health and Welfare), which the new leaders recognized as obstacles to progress. At the time of their abolition by General Naguib, there were 600,000 feddans held by family Waqfs, in which the usufruct of the land was vested in the heirs in perpetuity. Waqf land was inalienable, and banks would not advance money to Waqf beneficiaries since they could secure a lien only on the income and not the property itself. Further, since the land was deeded in perpetuity, the owners, however willing to sell out, could not even mortgage any part of their inheritance to raise money to pay debts.

Another complicating factor was the Moslem system of dividing an estate among the heirs. In numerous instances, the multiplicity of beneficiaries reduced the share of each to an insignificantly small amount—cases have been cited where, from a family Waqf income of LE 7,500 (\$22,500), some heirs received only 60 piasters (\$1 75). The whole system was more over riddled with inefficient and corrupt administrators and bailiffs, who profited by every opportunity to falsify the returns, and the Waqf domains fell into decay.

The abolition of the family Waqfs was a bold, if necessary, stroke, risking as it did the disapproval of Islamic traditionalists. Charitable Waqfs, or endowments in favor of religious or educational bodies, were not affected by the legislation eliminating family Waqfs.

Liberation Province. Mudiriat al Tahrir (Liberation Province) provides an example of the present government's ideal for Egyptian agricultural and industrial development. Some 600,000 feddans on the northwestern edges of the delta adjoining Minufiya province are now being reclaimed by irrigation works. A further 600,000 feddans are scheduled for later reclamation, and it is planned eventually to provide homes in this area for 1,200,000 persons.

This is virgin territory, and it will take several years to condition the soil, but crops which take little out of the soil, such as melons, tomatoes, cucumbers, squash, castor-oil plant, and berseem, have already been gathered. Model villages are being built, electricity and running water installed, and the entire project is being worked by modern machinery on a cooperative basis.

The farmers and maintenance men of Mudiriat al Tahrir are chosen carefully for superior physical and mental qualities. A high proportion of

them are ex-servicemen, physically fit, literate, and accustomed to discipline. They are equipped to handle machinery, to learn scientific farming, to run the machine shops and the building projects.

The "liberated" Egyptian of the new province and his wife, both of them attired in serviceable uniforms (gone are the traditional tunic and veils), work the family five acres with the aid of lavish government gifts and low-interest loans. Cooperatives market their produce. They have houses—kitchen, bathroom, and two other rooms. Radios, movies, organized sports, and gymnastics displays occupy their leisure. Seriously taught birth-control measures are aimed at forestalling the overpopulation which is characteristic of the older settled areas.

As an example of what can be done in Egypt, Mudiriat al Tahrir is representative of Egypt's agricultural potential in the most literal sense. There is a likely flaw, however, in that these results could not have been achieved by the random selection of landless fellahin from the remoter villages of Upper Egypt or by transplanting entire villages from the overpopulated delta. Mudiriat al Tahrir has good propaganda value and represents an honest ideal; but foreign experts who have worked closely with the project point out that this concentration of fellah talent will, if continued, deprive the most backward areas of the country of sorely needed natural leaders.

CHAPTER 16

INDUSTRY

Egypt's ambitions to leadership of the Arab world and to a position of leadership in world affairs are not matched by its present or its potential industrial power. The basic mineral resources—oil, coal, and iron—are either nonexistent or limited in quantity, and the hydroelectric potential of the Nile waters is still largely unharnessed. Industry, despite rapid development in the past 20 years, still employs less than 10 percent of the total working population and provides little over 10 percent of net national production. Large modern factories have appeared in the past generation, and considerable industrial diversification has been achieved in the postwar decade. Egyptian industry is nevertheless still largely devoted to the processing of agricultural goods, the manufacture of textiles, and small-scale production of consumer goods in which the small hand-operated shop plays a role of considerable importance.

Egyptian industry is largely centered in Cairo and Alexandria, both of which provide a favorable combination of adequate transportation and electric-power facilities as well as a sufficiently large labor force and proximity to market outlets. The industrial census for 1948 indicated that 17 percent of Egypt's industrial establishments, employing 24 percent of the total labor force, were located in Cairo, while 7 percent of the establishments, employing 21 percent of the labor force were located in Alexandria. The only major industries located outside of Cairo and Alexandria are the extractive industries, most of which are in the Eastern Desert; the foodprocessing industries, such as the sugar industry of Upper Egypt and the rice mills of the northern delta; and the cotton-ginning, spinning, and weaving establishments at Mahalla in the center of the delta.

Egyptian industry is not only concentrated geographically, it is also centered in a limited number of large establishments. While there are nearly 27,000 establishments engaged in industrial production, 64 large (over 500 workers) factories employ close to 40 percent of the total industrial labor force. The degree of financial concentration is even greater.

The structure of Egyptian industry is characterized by the coexistence

of large and small factories engaged in the same activity. In each industry the output of one or two large modern establishments exceeds the combined production of the many small and medium-sized firms. Rather than put these small, less productive competitors out of business, the large concerns prefer to peg their prices to those of the least efficient firm, a practice which thus enhances their own profits at the expense of the consumer. In recent years there has been a trend toward an increase in the number of large factories and in the number of very small plants (those employing less than five workers), while the number of medium-sized plants has gradually declined. Table 15 provides a rough indication of both the number of factories and of workers in the major branches of Egyptian industry.

In the past, factors other than the lack of basic natural resources have impeded Egyptian industrial development. Prior to the attainment of fiscal autonomy in 1933, the establishment by international convention of Egyptian customs duties at 8 percent of the value of the import posed no effective barrier to strong foreign competition. Dependence on foreign capital for most of Egypt's industrial development along with direct foreign ownership of much of its industries prevented industrial diversification through the emphasis on food-processing and other raw-material processing. The dominance of the landowning class in government circles, and consequent legislative favoritism accorded agricultural activities, limited industrial development by focusing attention on agriculture rather than industry.

Although these obstacles have all been at least partially surmounted in the past two decades, other severe problems plague Egyptian industrial development. The preference of wealthy Egyptians to invest in land, which has been called the "bottomless sink" of Egyptian capital, or in lavish mansions or other luxuries still afflicts industrial progress. A hoped-for result of the Land Reform Law of September 1952 is that limitation of the amount of land a man may possess will divert excess capital to industry. Inadequate private and governmental credit facilities constitute another obstacle. The narrowness of the Egyptian market resulting from the low purchasing power of the masses, the preference of the wealthy elite for European goods, and the dearth of skilled and semiskilled labor resulting from the predominantly agricultural background of the people are also factors. Finally, what might be called "the failure of entrepreneurship" -the absence of an industrial middle class with a tradition of modern business and industrial techniques-has played a significant part in the low vitality of Egyptian industrial development.

RAW MATERIALS

Oil, though limited in quantity, is Egypt's most important mineral

Table 13. Egyptian Industrial Establishments
Employing Over 10 Workers (1952)

Industry	No. of Establishments	Persons Employed
Food Processing	1,366	50,000
Beverages	88	6,000
Tobacco Products	30	11,000
Textiles	490	90,000
Footwear and Apparel	189	6,000
Wood Products	51	1,000
Furniture and Fixtures	170	7,000
Paper and Paper Products	45	5,000
Printing and Publishing	146	7,000
Leather and Leather Products	56	2,000
Rubber Products	5	1,000
Chemicals and Petroleum Refin	ing 112	14,000
Cement, Clay, and Glass	216	14,000
Basic Metals	38	4,000
Metal Products	177	6,000
Machinery	8	1,000
Electrical Machinery	9	1,000
Transport Equipment	18	1,000
Cotton Ginning and Pressing	101	26,000
Mining and Quarrying	32	5,000
Gas and Electricity	16	3,000
Miscellaneous Products	69	3,000
Total, All Forms of		
Industry	3,432	264,000

Source: Adapted from United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Development in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954.

resource. The total absence of coal and the relatively limited utilization of hydroelectric power have made oil the major source of fuel for both industrial and urban domestic purposes (see below, POWER SOURCES). Despite this almost exclusive dependence on oil, output, which reached a peak of 2,337,000 tons in 1953, has never been sufficient to meet expanding local demand. Oil consumption in that year exceeded 3,200,000 tons, for a high 9.5 gallon per capita consumption. More significant for the coming years is the fact that, at the present rate of production, Egypt's known oil reserves will be exhausted by the mid 1960's.


Approximately half of Egypt's present oil output is produced at Ras Gharib, south of Suez, while the remainder is supplied by relatively recent operations at Sudr and Asl located slightly farther south. Production from the latter two fields has more than offset the abandonment of the exhausted Gemsa and Hurghada fields.


Oil refining is carried on both by the government and by private concerns. The major refinery is owned by the Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Company, a private firm financed by British and Egyptian capital. It has an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons. The government owns and operates a refinery of almost equal capacity. Both of these refineries are located at Suez. The government has signed a contract with a private Egyptian company to construct a third refinery, with a capacity of 200,000 tons, at Alexandria.

Transport of oil is by means of pipelines, oil tankers, rail, and trucks. The major pipeline from Suez to Cairo has only recently been completed and is expected to carry 2 million tons of oil yearly at a cost approximately one fourth that of overland transport.

The exploitation of Egypt's oil resources by foreign companies has been subjected to severe pressures in the postwar period. Legislation during the years preceding the abdication of King Farouk raised oil royalties to a level which ultimately proved to be prohibitive, discriminated against foreign companies in regard to licenses, and limited the companies' power with respect to control of operations and the transfer of profits. So restrictive were the conditions during this period that the major foreign companies refused to accept them. Standard Oil of New Jersey abandoned its licenses and withdrew from Egypt, and Socony Vacuum and Anglo-Egyptian Oil suspended all exploration operations.

Legislation passed under the Naguib and Nasser regimes, however, in effect canceled early postwar legislation regulating foreign business and recreated conditions more favorable to foreign investment. The Mines and Quarries Law No. 66 of February 1953 has opened oil concessions to foreigners on an equal footing with Egyptians and has liberalized provisions relating to profit transfers, etc. The new policy has brought about a revival





and expansion of foreign enterprise in Egypt. The old American and English companies renewed their activities, and new firms, including one French and one German, entered the field. Today, active exploration for oil is underway in the Eastern and Western Deserts as well as along the coast of the Gulf of Suez.

Other Minerals

Egypt has a known iron ore deposit of well over 150 million tons, centered in an extensive area east of the Nile near Aswan, as well as lesser deposits in Sinai, in the Eastern Desert, and near the northwestern oases. As yet none of these deposits have been worked, although it was expected that the completion of the Aswan Dam would create greater interest in the possibility of iron ore extraction.

Phosphates rank second among Egypt's exploited mineral resources. Peak phosphate output was reached in 1951 with the extraction of 550,000 tons from two major deposits. Phosphate extracted from the deposit near Esna is converted into superphosphates and insecticides for local use, the output (90 percent of the total) of the other, near Quseir, is exported.

Manganese mined in Sinai and at Hamata in the southeastern desert is exported mainly to the United States, salt produced from the Mediterranean salines and at Wadi en Natrum finds a ready market in the Near East. Gold, natron, and tale are exploited, but their output is small.

Quarrying is carried out on a large scale; in 1951 some 2, 250,000 tons of limestone and 250,000 tons of clay were extracted for conversion into fertilizers and cement. The extraction of basalt for road construction that year amounted to 200,000 tons, and more than a million tons of sand were used in brickmaking.

Agricultural Resources

Egyptian agriculture supplies the country's industries with a considerable amount of the necessary food and textile raw materials. However, a number of industries such as those producing manufactures of silk, rayon, and jute are almost completely dependent on imports from abroad (see Chapter 15, Agriculture).

PROCESSING INDUSTRIES

The processing of agricultural products occupies a large sector of Egyptian industry. In 1952 there were approximately 60,000 workers

employed in some 1, 400 food processing establishments varying in size from small one-man shops to large modern mills. Sugar refining, perhaps the most important of this type of industry, typifies the monopolistic form of industrial development in Egypt. One firm, the Société des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d'Egypte, controls all stages of the refining process. Well over 27,000 workers are employed in its refinery at Hawamdich, the third largest in the world, and in its five crushing plants along the Nile at Sheiky Fadl, Abou Kourkas, Airmant, Nag Hamadi, and Kom Omboa. The same firm also owns the country's major alcohol plant at Tourah. Only the molasses industry located in the same area seems to have escaped from the control of this major firm. Although the greater part of the sugar refined is locally produced, raw sugar is also imported from abroad. The efficiency of the refining industry is undisputed, but prices are high as a result of the high price of local and imported sugar cane. These high prices are in turn passed on to the consumer or the confectionery and chocolate industries which account for one quarter of Egypt's sugar consumption.

Other food-processing industries include grain milling and rice bleaching, the production of macaroni and biscuits, the canning of vegetables, fruit, fish, and meat, the dehydration of onions and garlic, the production of starch from rice and maize, and the production of glucose, as well as of vegetable, cotton, linseed, and sesame oils. Sesame and linseed oil are used both for cooking purposes and in the manufacture of soap.

Of the total volume of milk produced in Egypt, only 10 percent is consumed in liquid form; 60 percent is converted into butter, the remainder into cheese. Beer is manufactured from local barley, but part of the malt and all of the hops are imported. Various wines are produced, but in insignificant quantity. American soft drinks have become increasingly popular in the postwar decade, and two large factories cater to the local demand.

One of the major obstacles confronting the food industries as a whole and the beverage industry in particular is the lack of adequate refrigeration facilities. Practically all of the present limited refrigeration capacity is located in the large cities of Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said; in the smaller cities and rural areas refrigeration is practically unknown.

MANUFACTURING

Textiles

In terms of the value of production and the number of workers employed, textile manufacturing is by far Egypt's most important industry. About one fourth of the industrial labor force is currently occupied in the

various phases of textile production. Cotton weaving is carried on by a number of jointly financed British-Egyptian firms utilizing automatic looms, and by countless small firms using hand looms. Although hand looms are found everywhere in Egypt, there is some degree of concentration in the traditional textile centers of Mahalla el Kubra, Paliyub, Damietta, and Cairo. The mechanical spinning and weaving industry is even more highly concentrated, with 45 parcent and 42 percent of the mechanical looms being located in Mahalla el Kubra and Alexandria, respectively.

Other products of Egypt's textile industry are wool, silk, and rayon. While wool production is insufficient to meet local demands, silk and rayon produced in ever-increasing quantities meet both Egyptian needs and those of the Sudan. A large jute factory manufactures burlap and twine, and a second one is soon to be constructed. The jute utilized is largely imported from Pakistan.

The hosiery and knitwear industry, though of recent origin in Egypt, has developed rapidly. At least half of the population's hosiery needs and almost all of its knitwear requirements are currently met by internal production.

In order to facilitate the marketing of cotton yarn and cloth, a Cotton Spinning and Weaving Industry Assistance Fund was established in May 1953. Financed by a special levy on cotton yarn and cloth, the Fund includes among its projects the establishment of research institutes and laboratories as a first step in raising technical standards.

Paper, Leather, and Tobacco

Paper is produced by two large firms in Alexandria and a number of small firms in Cairo using rice straw and waste paper as the basic raw materials. Domestic production of writing paper and newsprint has been started, but the bulk of products to meet such needs is still largely imported. The major output of the leather industry is footwear, produced in a dozen large and medium-sized plants and in a number of small shops. A special government shoe factory which sells shoes below cost to the poorer classes has recently been established. Other leather products include excellent quality belts, bags, and gloves. The tobacco industry in Egypt is composed of some 36 firms and employs some 13,000 workers. Production is sufficient to meet local demand, but all of the raw tobacco must be imported.

Chemicals

Egypt's chemical industry originated in the demand for fertilizers

and has been devoted largely to the production of superphosphates and nitrates. The production of superphosphates has expanded sevenfold in the postwar decade, but present output equals only one tenth of the estimated 200,000-ton need. To supplement this, a large modern calcium nitrate factory was put into operation in 1951. This plant, using the gas from the nearby government refinery, is at present the only factory in the Middle East using oil refining gases for the production of fertilizer. The production of calcium nitrate is, however, still far below the planned annual production of 200,000 tons. A very small portion of the demand for fertilizer is currently met by the production of organic fertilizer in Cairo and the local conversion of refuse into fertilizer throughout Egypt.

Egypt's pharmaceutical industry—a postwar innovation—has grown rapidly. One Egyptian product, Khelline, which has proved effective in the treatment of heart disease, is widely exported, and an attempt is being made to exploit the numerous and varied Egyptian medicinal plants.

Soap, matches, and perfume are other important products of the Egyptian chemical industry. Of lesser importance are such chemical byproducts as plastics, glue, varnish, paints, and ammonial, nitric, and sulphuric acids.

The Metallurgical Industry

Egypt's metallurgical industry, largely confined to the iron and steel mill at Aswan, is still small and remains severely handicapped by the necessity of importing raw materials. This need will increase as the stock of scrap metal left in Egypt during World War II diminishes. The remedy to this dilemma, already projected by the Egyptian Government, is the establishment, south of Cairo at Helwan, of an iron and steel industry based on Egypt's own iron deposits. A large factory utilizing German machinery and technicians is being established for this purpose, but its future scale of operation will depend upon the progress of the Aswan Dam project.

In addition to iron and steel, Egypt currently produces limited quantities of copper and lead, as well as a wide variety of finished metal projects ranging from metal furniture to razor blades. The most recent development in the metallurgical field has been the establishment of munition and small-arms factories.

Construction Materials

Egypt's cement industry, favored by the proximity of its basic raw materials, limestone and clay, to its main market, Cairo, has expanded

considerably in the postwar period. Output, including superconcrete and sulphate-resisting cement, rose from 368,000 tons in 1939 to 1,130,000 tons in 1951, and now meets all domestic needs. Employing over 3,500 workers, the cement industry is controlled by three large firms, all of which utilize the most modern equipment. Machinery for a new cement factory at Helwan is being supplied by Czechoslovakia. There is also a large output of cement products such as pipes, electric transmission posts, telegraph and telephone standards, and cement bricks and tiles. The production of gypsum and bricks has equaled that of cement. One of the more recent developments in this field has been the manufacture of high-temperature refractory bricks, for use in the steel, cement, and glass industries. Glass, in the form of window glass, bottles, tumblers, and lamp glass is produced, but in insufficient quantity for domestic needs.

The majority of the above-mentioned products are utilized in the rapidly expanding construction industry. Concentrated almost exclusively in the larger cities—Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said—the construction industry employs well over 110,000 workers on a full-time or part-time basis.

Engineering and Repair

Egypt's role as an Allied supply depot during World War II led to a great increase in its engineering and repair facilities. These consist mainly of repair shops and yards, such as the railway workshop in Cairo, the tramway workshops in Cairo and Alexandria, the large shipyard at Suez, and of assembly plants, such as the Ford factory at Alexandria, which assembles cars and tractors. To an increasing extent, bodies of trucks, buses, and trams are being made in Egypt, and the output of spare parts of all kinds is rapidly expanding. A rubber tire factory has also been inaugurated at Alexandria. A wide variety of electric apparatus is produced, including refrigerators, electric bulbs, fluorescent and neon tubes, batteries, and copper and plastic fittings. Approximately 5,000 radio sets are assembled each year. The role of these more modern industries as centers of technical training is of scarcely less importance than the goods they produce. The development of on-the-job technical training fostered by the war is thus constantly being renewed and expanded.

POWER SOURCES

Power in Egypt is based largely on domestic and imported oil. While imported coal was formerly more widely used, its high cost led to a shift toward oil as power needs expanded. The amount of coal used in generating

power is now insignificant, while the amount of oil has increased sixfold in the past 15 years—to approximately 3 million tons. At the present time oil is used to fuel about 80 percent of Egypt's installed horsepower in industrial enterprise. Steam and electricity make up the remainder.

Electric output in Egypt, practically all thermal, is both limited and costly. Production, shared equally by private enterprise and public bodies, is almost all confined to the large urban centers.

Water power, though potentially important as a source of electrification, has remained relatively undeveloped. Its future use depends largely on the outcome of the Aswan Dam project, completion of which is expected to increase Egypt's electrical capacity by close to 150 percent. The government is meanwhile fostering other projects aimed at increasing electrical production and providing wider distribution. Three thermal plants were scheduled for completion in 1954: one at Talkha with a capacity of 42,000 kilowatts, and two smaller plants at Edfu and Nag Hamadi with a combined capacity of over 11,000 kilowatts. The capacity of the North Cairo station is being increased by 65,000 kilowatts, while another station is being installed in South Cairo, with a capacity of 135,000 kilowatts. The announced aim of Egypt's Industrial Expansion Committee is complete electrification of Egypt within a 20-year period. This entails an eightfold increase over the country's present capacity.

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

Industry in Egypt is an amalgam of large modern industrial plants and small tradition-oriented shops. The gap between the two is currently bridged by medium-sized establishments, which, however, are steadily declining in number. The plethora of small firms is evident in the 1947 industrial census, which noted that 68 percent of all Egyptian industrial enterprises employed less than 5 persons while an additional 20 percent employed between 5 and 10. The same census also confirmed the importance of the large firm in the industrial sphere. Some 60 large establishments employed more than 40 percent of the total industrial labor force and accounted for half of the total industrial output. This pattern of large and small firms has been accentuated in the postwar period. In the 3-year period following World War II, the number of large establishments increased from 45 to 64, or by over 42 percent, and the number of small shops increased from 18,000 to 23,000, or about 27 percent. The same period witnessed a decline in the number of moderately sized establishments which are the only effective competitors of the larger companies.

The predominance in the majority of Egyptian industries of one or

more extremely large firms has produced monopolistic or near-monopolistic conditions in large segments of Egyptian industry. In cotton spinning, for example, two large firms own 77 percent of all mechanical spindles and two other companies own an additional 13 percent. Twelve other firms share the remaining 10 percent of all mechanical spindles. The cement industry until 1950 consisted of two large firms, linked by a cartel arrangement and operating through a joint selling agency. In the cigarette industry, one company has a controlling interest in nine cigarette companies, while in the beer industry, the amalgamation of the two large Cairo breweries in 1939 was followed by a selling agreement with the Alexandria brewery. Two firms, linked by a sales agreement, control the salt industry. And, as noted earlier, the most imposing single monopoly is the sugar industry in which one firm, the Société des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d'Egypte, owns not only the one sugar refinery but all of the sugar crushing plants and the major alcohol plant.

Despite the monopolistic conditions that prevail in many industries, the large modern enterprises, which dominate in a number of fields, have not moved to consolidate their control. It appears that in general they prefer to preserve nominal competition, while augmenting their profits, by selling their products at the same price as the least efficient producer in the field. The maintenance of prices based on production costs of the least efficient producer is made possible by the current high protective tariffs which shelter Egyptian industry from outside competition (see Chapter 17, Domestic and Foreign Trade).

A considerable degree of vertical integration has accompanied the growth of monopolies. Vertical integration, or ownership by one company of a number of firms supplying each other at successive production stages, is best exemplified by the Société des Sucreries et de la Raffineric d'Egypte. In addition to ownership of the country's one large refinery and all of the crushing plants, this company undertook to build its own narrow-gauge railway and to develop its own river fleet. Originating as a response to the need to assure a steady flow of raw materials during the embryo phase of Egyptian industrial development, the system of vertical integration is now an established feature of the economy.

The monopolistic character of Egyptian industry, coupled with the system of high protective tariffs, enables the more modern establishments to reap handsome profits during the good years and to avoid undue loss in the lean ones. Since, in the main, Egyptian industries cater to rather simple and constant needs, the stability of profits has been relatively assured. Profits of 22 firms in the textile industry in 1950 were well over 20 percent of the shared capital. The importance of tariff protection is suggested by

the failure of less sheltered industries to reap profits as great as those that enjoy high tariff protection.

OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY

Until comparatively recently ownership of industry was largely in foreign hands, mainly British. After 1933 (the year Egypt gained fiscal autonomy) Egyptian nationals in increasing numbers became industrial proprietors. The latest industrial census (1948) reveals the rapidity of this development. That year there were approximately 30 Egyptian proprietors to every foreign owner, although foreign ownership is still strong in many of the large traditional enterprises. British investment in textiles is a case in point. The decreasing dependence of Egyptian business on foreign capital is indicated by Table 14. The percent of Egyptian ownership in the smaller nonincorporated enterprises is undoubtedly even higher.

Table 14. Share of Egyptian and Foreign Capital in Joint Stock Companies, 1933-48

(LE millions)

Period	Egyptian	Foreign	Total	Egyptian % of Total
Before 1933	6.0	60.7	66.7	9
1933-48 (newly formed				
companies)	21.0	5.7	26.7	79
1933-48 (increase of				
capital)	19.3	5.2	24.5	79
Total	46.3	71.6	117.9	39

The Banque Misr (see Chapter 12, Financial System) played a leading role in effecting this transfer of ownership. In addition to providing credit to industrially minded Egyptians, the bank itself founded 18 firms with activities ranging from spinning and weaving to insurance, fisheries, airlines, and films (films are exported throughout the Arab world; see Chapter 9, Diffusion and Control of Information). A contributing factor was the assistance given Egyptian firms by the Egyptian Federation of Industries created in 1922. This organization of the most powerful Egyptian industrialists has strongly influenced government legislation on tariffs and labor questions in a manner favorable to industrial development, and it has

been important in sponsoring and encouraging the extension of Egyptian industry,

The passing of industrial control from foreign to Egyptian hands has been accompanied by the partial transfer of industry from family and partner types of ownership to corporate ownership. Again this trend has been most marked in the newer industries. While the ownership of industry in the early 1930's was largely unincorporated, by 1940 well over 50 percent of all industrial capacity was corporate in form. Although more recent figures are lacking, it seems certain that this percentage has increased considerably. The transfer of industry from individual and family ownership to corporate ownership is significant as an indication of increased awareness on the part of the Egyptian middle class of the possibilities of this form of industrial organization. Inasmuch as it was previously automatically assumed that a company which turned to the public for funds must be in dire straits, the recent successes achieved by certain firms in their appeal to the investing public is significant.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

With the exception of the government -owned Suez Oil Refinery, there has until recently been very little direct government participation in industry. Indirect government action has, nevertheless, been influential, Tariff protection appears as the most important single device by which the Egyptian Government has promoted industry. Since the attainment of fiscal autonomy in 1933, the government has repeatedly raised tariffs on such manufactures as textiles, leather goods, and chocolate. Tariffs on raw materials and machinery necessary for domestic industry, however, remained stable until 1950, when they were reduced to an insignificant figure. While stimulating the growth of industry in Egypt, protective tariffs frequently also have been injurious to the Egyptian economy by serving as a protective barrier behind which inefficiency is permitted to survive. The lowering of tariffs might weed out the most unproductive of these industries, provide a more rational base for further industrial growth, and help lower the cost of living.

Government credit also has contributed to the expansion of industry. Formerly accorded through the Banque Misr, government loans to industry are now distributed through the Industrial Bank established in 1949 (see Chapter 12, Financial System). A major problem thus far encountered by the Industrial Bank is the faulty business practices of many entrepreneurs. For instance, proper bookkeeping, which would permit an assessment of the soundness of a prospective borrower, is frequently lacking, and therefore a loan is depied

Other government aid to industry has taken the form of occasional subsidies, such as those to the sugar industry, or preferential treatment of Egyptian firms in the granting of contracts, the establishment of pilot plants for carpetmaking, and wool weaving, and encouragement of industrial research. Important government research institutions are the Industrial Research Institute and the Mining Research Institute.

In the postwar period the government has entered more directly into the industrial field. It has established certain factories catering solely to government needs, such as a small-arms factory and a mint. It has undertaken to buy the products of certain firms-for example, those of the tire factory-and it has participated with private capital in establishing certain basic facilities such as the steel mill. Moreover, since the advent of the Naguib and Nasser regimes the government has discontinued its practice of granting benefits to industry with one hand and in effect taking them back with the other through simultaneous benefits to agriculture which raise labor costs or otherwise adversely affect industry. While, traditionally, taxes on industry have been heavier than those on agriculture, Law No. 340 (September 1953) accorded tax exemption for an initial period to all investments in industry, mining, and power projects. The Land Reform Law of September 1952, limiting the size of agricultural domains, will, it is hoped, provide the double benefit of restricting the power of the landowning class and diverting investment into the industrial sphere. A third long-range benefit will accrue to industry if the purchasing power of the peasants is raised, thereby enlarging the home market for manufactured products Finally. large-scale government projects such as the Aswan Dam will benefit industry as well as agriculture by providing hydroelectric power.

PROSPECTS

It seems certain that the active political and economic program of the Nasser regime, coupled with the belief—shared by most other economically undeveloped nations—that industrialization is the panacea for all internal problems and external weaknesses, will promote Egypt's industrial growth. This emphasis is evident in the place given to industry in Egypt's recently announced 10-year plan. The supervision of this plan has been placed in the hands of the recently created National Resources Development Board and the National Production Council, who are authorized to spend \$574 million during the first half of the program.

A major problem confronting the Nasser regime is the need for foreign capital. Without foreign aid, Egyptian industrialization can be carried

forward only at the expense of the mass of people or by measures detrimental to the growing middle class. Middle class groups have reportedly already opposed a number of Nasser's economic and social schemes; despite their desire for economic progress, they fear that they may be obliged to finance these ventures. Egypt's present position vis-a-vis the western powers, resulting from the seizure of the Suez Canal and the reported confiscation of foreign-owned firms, must be expected to discourage further private foreign investment, thus creating an even heavier reliance on limited domestic capital.

Effective industrialization also depends on factors which transcend the industrial sphere itself. The living standards of the large mass of Egyptians must be substantially raised before an adequate domestic market for the products of industry can be achieved. A trained industrial labor force—and progress is being made in this direction—freed from its agricultural traditions and outlook should be created and given a place in national development. Many of the antiquated business techniques and attitudes, which worked half a century ago, need modification or should be abandoned completely if the demands of the present day are to be met. Ways should be sought to eliminate the worst features of the cartelization of industry—features such as artificially high prices and the preservation of inefficient and unproductive enterprises. These abuses, which have accompanied the development of business enterprise in Egypt, have encouraged ready acceptance of anticapitalist propaganda by the many Egyptians who feel that such practices must be characteristic of capitalism in general.

Finally, it is essential that an effort be made to come to terms with the problem of scanty resources. Industrial development plans need to be matched to the realities of raw material availabilities and to the requirements of a balanced development of the economy as a whole.

CHAPTER 17

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TRADE

DOMESTIC TRADE

The story of domestic trade in Egypt is very different from that of other Middle Eastern countries. At the turn of the century the Egyptians had long been considered the least commercially minded of the peoples of the area. The bazaars of Cairo were small and undiversified compared with those of Damascus, Aleppo, or Baghdad. When the land bridge between Africa and Asia declined in importance, relative to the rise of western maritime enterprise, Egypt quickly lost any pretensions to commercial ascendancy over, or even equality with, the great trading centers of the Fertile Crescent.

Egypt's native population in the early nineteenth century consisted mainly of landowners and peasants; "trade" was beneath the dignity of the former and beyond the dreams of the latter. There was some lively though comparatively small-scale commercial activity in the cities, and a large foreign population, sensing a potentially lucrative market, moved in, pushing the small Egyptian merchant aside,

Many Egyptians remained as village and urban storekeepers and peddlers, but above this level foreigners completely dominated Egypt's commercial and financial life, as well as what little industrial activity there was. In 1905, Lord Cromer characterized the situation in a report to the British Government:

Bootmending, as well as bootmaking, is almost entirely in the hands of Greeks. The drapery trade is controlled by Jews, Syrians, and Europeans, the tailoring trade by Jews.

Though foreign influence was more immediately obvious in the cities, trade in the countryside was hardly less affected. Stall holders in the markets of the small provincial towns and large villages were Egyptian for the most part, but the suppliers of their goods, other than local produce offered in small retail quantities, were almost always Cairene or Alexandrian

merchants of foreign origin. The buyers of the bulk farm products, which then were offered for sale in limited quantities in the villages, also were almost entirely non-Egyptian.

By the time Egypt achieved political independence in 1922, the realization that political freedom could only be consolidated by economic independence had become widespread in the more articulate Egyptian circles. After World War I, Banque Misr (a large commercial bank, the first one to be founded entirely with Egyptian capital) began to found Egyptian companies in such fields as printing, cotton ginning, the cinema, transport, and navigation. The success of these enterprises—which later were augmented to include silk weaving, cotton spinning and weaving, sales organization, insurance, mining, quarrying, and the production of vegetable oils—was large—ly due to the bank's help (see Chapter 12, Financial System).

Progress has none the less been slow, especially in larger business. As recently as 1951 a same; showed that in finance, commerce, and indusmy some 31 percent of the enterprises were Moslem Egyptian, 4 percent Copt, 17 percem jewith, 12 percent Syrian or Lebanese, 9 percent Greek or Armenian, and 31 percent European, excluding Greek. The capital investment profine is somewhat different. Whereas in 1933 the amount of share and bond capital originally subscribed by Egyptians was only 9 percent of the total, in 1948 it has then to 39 percent. During the period 1946-48, Egypmans conmittees 84 percent of all new capital subscriptions and increases of capital of existing companies. Moreover, in recent years a substantial amount of these and point capital originally subscribed by foreigners has changed hands and is now held by Egyptians. But, since the acquisition of land or omicings and semains of far the preferred form of capital investment among Egyptians, the sate of incustrial capital expansion has not shown any scaro loward mend. Such growth as has taken place is due mainly to the operations of a small number of family groups,

Since the advent of the new regime in 1952, in which a burgeoning Arab manipulation found expression in the looting and burning of many non-Modern enterprises there has been an even more rapid Egyptianization of small business. The pagger furns managed to pull through in spite of their foreign antecedents, but the recem hostilities in Egypt have led to further talk of expropriation and nationalization, especially of British, French, and lewish concerns. Even so, in the modern centers of the principal cities, as well as in the bazaars, the prominence of European, Syrian, Armenian, and lewish names continues to give the impression that as far as big business is concerned foreigners still hold the reins.

The Individual in Trade

Bargaining Patterns. The bargaining pattern of the Middle East

embodies a highly ritualized procedure. Elaborate greetings are exchanged, the merchant and the prospective buyer name their first prices, and the bargaining process begins. The amounts named in the opening moves indicate the respect in which the parties hold each other. Both may have a compromise price in mind, but a deliberately unreasonable opening bid means that neither party is sincerely interested in concluding a deal or, perhaps, that personal dislike is involved; in such cases, formalities are quickly exchanged and the matter is closed.

Businessmen, who are aware of current prices and are able to assess quality, therefore make sure that their negotiations are marked by reasonableness and courtesy. As the margin between asking price and offer narrows, the parties become more alert and business may be protracted for hours or in some cases days, as each maneuvers for a bargaining advantage. When agreement is reached, a verbal contract is sufficient, no matter how large the deal—another example of Middle Eastern dislike and suspicion of formal contracts and respect for the pledged word of the individual.

Quite often the profit made by the seller would seem to western observers too little to justify an hour or more of coffee drinking, political discussion, and commercial juggling, but neither the shopkeeper nor his client would dream of doing business in any other manner. A sharp and persistent bargainer gains in social prestige. To refuse to bargain and to adopt an attitude of "this is my price, take it or leave it" is to insult the older type of bazaar merchant and to fly in the face of tradition

Yet even in the bazaar, western patterns are making inroads. The younger merchants, especially those who deal in commodities for which their manufacturers suggest retail prices, are beginning to mark their goods with fixed prices in the manner of the westernized stores in the main streets. The sign "Prix fixe" (fixed price) is often prominently displayed in store windows to discourage bargainers. Bargaining will no doubt eventually be confined to articles made by local craftsmen, whose skills put into their products something much above the intrinsic value of the media in which they work. But in the less accessible bazaars of the provinces and in the country markets the old ways undoubtedly will persist for a long time.

The Country Market

The weekly market day in an Egyptian town or large village is an event of the greatest social importance. The markets, which draw great crowds, are usually held on waste land outside the town centers; sometimes they are enclosed, sometimes not. The Egyptian Markets Company, an organization which plans market facilities, now has many markets, mainly in the delta, which may be recognized by their orderly layout and the iron

railings surrounding the area. The company takes a toll of only 1 or 2 piasters (about 3 to 6 cents) from each seller.

Usually held on Fridays, markets last from dawn to midday, then the men adjourn to the mosque for the weekly sermon. Vendors of both sexes arrive at daybreak, choose a spot to lay out their wares, and squat down to wait for customers. When buyers arrive, the business of the day is under way; the market becomes a place of noisy bargaining, dust, and confusion. Piece goods and hardware are sold by professional merchants, who come from the principal town in the district or move on the market circuit and who get their stock from wholesalers in the cities. Butter, vegetables, poultry, and eggs are sold by the fellahin, or by their wives, who are usual ly the more skillful bargainers.

Customers of the country market are fellahin who need manufactured goods which they cannot produce themselves. Provisions also have to be bought, according to need, opportunity, or means. The fellah's wages or the income from his crops have not kept pace with the rise in prices since the war, and his purchases of staples have been noticeably restricted in the past few years. Since 1939 the prices of meat, kerosene, cooking oil, tea, sugar, coffee, and cigarettes have all more than tripled, and some have in creased as much as five times. The fellah is, of course, able to obtain higher prices for his chickens, eggs, clarified butter, rice, or lentils, but, since these products are bought mostly by townsmen or by agents who buy for resale elsewhere, the fellah is more often than not bested in the deal, especially in barter transactions. Barter trading is fast dying out in Egypt, even in the most rural areas; coinage is in general use and is willingly accepted, but banknotes are still regarded with some suspicion.

Cereals and cotton are bought up by middlemen or agents of the big firms in Cairo or Alexandria. The provincial market price of cotton varies widely according to its quality, the condition of the market, and the hardheadedness of the fellah. Smaller amounts of cotton, bought by small merchants from gleaners, vary similarly as to price. For other goods the variation is less. In general, prices are lower or higher according to the distance of the market from the Nile, the season of the year, or the fluctuation of supply and demand.

The sociability of the weekly markets provides an impetus to domestic trade at this its lowest level. All look forward to the few hours of relief from the monotonous daily routine. News and rumors are exchanged, best dresses are aired, and, since the fellah is a volatile spirit, a few heads are usually broken. In short, the social significance of the market complements its commercial importance.

The Bazaar

Egypt's city bazaars resemble those found elsewhere in the Middle East, but under the impact of heavier and longer-continued western influence they have undergone more change and are less the focus of urban trade than those in other countries in the area. The Egyptian bazaars, to an ever-increasing extent, are supplying goods and provisions for a "westernized" population.

The Mousky bazaar in Cairo provides an excellent example of this process. Originally, and still to a very large extent, a gold and silver market, it is now also a center of trade in almost every article which has any place in modern Egyptian living, rural or urban. Aside from the objets d'art and the craft work in precious metals, copper, and tin, many items in the bazaar are mass-produced abroad, but all items are offered for sale in the traditional idiom of bargaining.

Bazaar merchants are of two general types, the established shop-keeper and the speculator. The established shop is usually a family concern, its owner having inherited the place of business, with its stock of goods or its craft specialty. The effort of the established merchant is directed to maintaining the continuity of his function in a particular kind of business. The speculator, on the other hand, concerns himself with whatever type of goods may prove profitable at the moment; and he is intent on minimization of invested capital. The storekeeper inherits a relatively stable clientele, and he stocks—or, if he is a craftsman, produces—items for which there is a fairly steady demand. The speculator, operating on the fringe of the bazaar area, engages in a profitable but less stable business, and he is more subject to the vagaries of the consumers' market; he buys daily what he expects to sell.

Farther down the economic scale than the established merchants and the speculators are the peddlers. They are by definition supposed to seek out their customers, but their activity is not purely random. As extensive a ritualized relationship exists between the peddler and his customer as between the well-established merchant and his clientele.

Bazaar shopping presents aspects which the western mind finds it difficult to comprehend. The fact that hinges are bought in one store and screws to fit them in another is of no moment to the Middle Eastern merchant or his customer, and it is not unusual to buy a flashlight case in one store and battery and bulb in another. Such arrangements are only a facet of a larger pattern remarkable for its lack of attention to such complementary details as hinges and screws—and for its leisurely approach not only to business but to life in general. The situations arising from this lack of precision,

however, dovetail with the Middle Eastern emphasis on sociability: since the purchaser is forced thus to circulate among the stores, social and business contacts on the personal level tend to multiply and be strengthened.

The Government in Business

Egypt's government, in contrast to governments of many under-developed countries, has taken little direct part in industrial and commercial development. The only large government enterprise is the oil refinery at Suez. The Administration has, however, pursued a vigorous policy of indirect assistance, which in the sphere of domestic trade has taken the form of tariff protection. Between 1930 and 1939, duties on commodities competing with the products of Egyptian industry were repeatedly raised; this process continued during World War II and into postwar years.

The very survival of much Egyptian industry depends on such tariff protection. In 1946 the price of Egyptian sugar was much higher than the world price; similarly the cost of locally produced matches, varnishes, confectionery, cotton textiles, woolens, rayon, rubber, and paper, to name only a few examples, are well above import prices.

Other government services include some research and prospecting, establishment of pilot plants for carpetmaking, wool weaving, and carpet manufacture, subsidies at various times to the sugar, cotton, and cinema industries, and loans and credit facilities for merchants and industrialists. On the other hand, little effort has been made to induce manufacturers to produce socially necessary goods which bring relatively small profit, such as cotton cloth for mass consumption.

The government also participates—somewhat ineffectually—in the marketing of grains. In the case of wheat a specified portion must be sold to the government at a fixed price. The requisitioned wheat, augmented by supplies imported from abroad to meet the country's growing deficit, is sold to millers by the Ministry of Supply. In order to keep the price of bread within reasonable limits, the government has to sell its wheat at a considerable loss.

The cereals market as a whole is poorly organized. The absence of silos, of which there are still only a few, is responsible for considerable loss in storage. The looseness of government control, the consequent wide variations in grading and purity, and the absence of standard weights and measures are factors also contributing to the general inefficiency. The usual marketing procedure for nonrequisitioned grain is for the grower to sell his crop to the village trader, who in turn sells it to a bank which maintains a granary (shoona). The grain is then either resold to the village agent of

one of the big city traders or sent by boat to the riverside markets of Cairo or Alexandria, where it is bought by a city trader Large growers, however, often pass over the village trader, depositing their crop in the bank shoona and selling it directly to a city merchant either through the latter's village agent or in Cairo or Alexandria. Similarly, mills often buy their requirements direct from the grower.

The government controls the marketing of cotton, but the disposal of the cotton crop is a matter of foreign and not domestic trade.

Stock Exchanges

The Koran specifically disapproves of both gambling and usury, and the taking of profits from capital investment is still viewed in that light by conservative Moslems, although the younger generation in the cities is developing a different attitude. Even among the moneyed members of the latter group, however, there is a tendency to invest in such physical assets as land and houses, in preference to intangibles whose fluctuations are only dimly understood, and this has a restrictive effect on the market. The penchant for ostentatious consumption, particularly in the form of jewels, further diverts money which might otherwise be placed in the market. These factors leave stock and share manipulation in the hands of a relative few, and explain the small turnover on the Egyptian exchanges (total quotations on the Cairo exchange in 1951 had a nominal value of only LE 200 million and a market value of LE 386 million). It is still too early to say whether the "emancipated" younger generation of Moslems will become sufficiently interested in the stock market to increase its importance in the future. It is noticeable that the leading Egyptian newspapers still continue to publish very little market news, apparently in the absence of any appreciable demand for such information.

Egypt's two stock exchanges at Alexandria and Cairo are in theory subject to government control. In practice this amounts to little more than the requirement that the exchanges observe their own internal regulations, although in periods of falling prices—to which the Egyptian market is prone—the government may fix minimum quotations to halt the decline. As in other spheres of large-scale enterprise in Egypt, the market professionals are for the most part non-Egyptians; the market at Alexandria, in particular, is noted for its Levantine character. Predominantly cotton—future speculators until the recent closure of the futures market, the operators transferred their activities to other commodity stocks between 1952 and 1955, during which period the futures market was closed. The relatively small number of speculators and the consequent importance of individual transactions combine to

make the Egyptian stock market peculiarly sensitive to any shock, and violent fluctuations have rocked the exchange on several occasions during the past few years.

Monopolies

Several factors have combined to promote monopolies in Egypt, and monopolies or the conditions which encourage them are to be found widely distributed in Egyptian industry. The principal causes of this situation are the dearth of capital and the fact that only a small number of entrepreneurs—many of them non-Egyptian—are interested in organizing businesses. Other factors are the localization of industry, the effect of the high tariffs, and the government's attitude in helping the big combines and approving both the setting up of cartels in transport and cotton-processing and further amalgamation in the textile industry. The government, however, exercises some control over the cartels by price—fixing.

The form of monopolies has varied. A leading Egyptian economist points out that in cotton ginning overinvestment led to intense competition, and that a process of combination or amalgamation in this field began as early as 1905. Attempts at cartelization, however, failed, owing to the large number of firms which had sprung up and to the wide variation in size and operating conditions among them In 1937, under the aegis of both the government and the Egyptian Federation of Industries, an agreement was reached fixing rates and establishing quotas. Furthermore, since 1934 the two largest cotton firms have marketed their goods through a joint selling organization; combinations or sales agreements are also to be found in the brewing, cigarette, sand-brick, plaster, and cement industries. The most important single monopoly is the sugar industry, which reached its present stature during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Many foreign monopolies have had establishments in Egypt and operated either directly or in partnership with local merchants and industrialists; recent events, however, have made their future uncertain,

Transport

Egypt, provided by nature with a flat terrain which offers few obstacles to any form of transportation, possesses a network of railroads, waterways, and airlines equaling those of many countries which in other respects have reached a much higher level of economic development.

Railroads. Egypt has about 2,700 miles of state railroads in operation and something under 1,000 miles of privately owned railroads in the

delta and the Nile Valley. This approaches the Western European standard in terms of mileage per unit of inhabited area, and meets existing freight and passenger needs. The country falls naturally into two transportation zones, Upper Egypt and the delta. Upper Egypt is served by a double track as far south as Aswan, while the delta has a rail network as dense as any in the world. The only weak spot in this railroad network is the lack of lines running from east to west across the delta. Rolling stock, which was put to very heavy use during World War II, has now largely been replaced, and 80 percent of the locomotives are oil burners. State ownership puts the railroads in a strong position to compete with road and river traffic; competitors have been fought by means of administrative and economic action, though the other forms of transportation are continuing to make inroads into railroad passenger and freight business.

River Navigation. Egypt's navigable waterways total roughly 2,000 miles and are divided almost equally between the Nile and the canals. Most of the latter are navigable throughout the year, though boats drawing more than 56 inches are liable in winter to run into difficulties. Egyptian geography is such that the railroads and the waterways run parallel to each other, thus being brought into a competition in which the river fleet of over 12,000 sailing craft and barges (all built locally) has measurably increased its share of traffic since the war. (For discussion of ports, see below.)

Roads. Roads in the cultivated part of Egypt total about 8, 200 miles (an increase of 2, 500 since 1939), but only 1, 500 miles of these may be described as first-class roads. The number of vehicles is increasing rapidly. The total in 1951 was 102,000; two thirds were of American make, and 20,000 were motor buses and trucks. The quantity of goods carried via road has risen rapidly during recent years. The motor bus has become an important institution in the countryside, particularly in the delta. The fellahin are now avid bus riders, and on market days the buses are crammed with people, garden produce, eggs, and live (often uncrated) poultry.

Air transport has also had a vigorous growth following the impetus given it by the war. There are two domestic airlines, both government-subsidized, which in recent years have had a steadily increasing passenger and freight business.

Animal Transport. Egypt's few Bedouin continue to deal in and breed camels, but their living becomes more precarious as automobile transport replaces the traditional camel caravan. The old caravan routes, from the west and southwest through the oases to the delta, bear less traffic each year as more desert trails are improved sufficiently to take motor traffic; the road and rail system which leads through Sinai to the countries of the northeast is well developed (see Chapter 3, Geography and Population).

Of the few ways left to the camel caravan operator to be assured of a cargo, the most important is to take the risk of running contraband, usually in the form of narcotics or guns. In general, contraband-running has harmed the traffic, since desert patrols have imprisoned for smuggling a good proportion of the decreasing number of people capable of training camels and organizing caravans.

The donkey is still used widely as a beast of burden in the delta and the Nile Valley. Nearly every fellah still possesses a donkey, which is used for carrying both produce and members of the family, though its employment as a carrier on market days is lessening as more country buses link up the villages.

Competition. In spite of government backing, the railways have lost ground steadily since 1930. Since the end of World War II more goods have been transported by river and canal than by rail, and motor buses have cut deeply into passenger traffic, which until recently had been a virtual railroad monopoly. Trucks now exceed the railroads in annual freight tonnage. The railways have reacted by cutting rates and have used their government sponsorship to initiate discriminatory legislation against other carriers; they have been authorized to organize transport on roads running parallel to railroad tracks and they have obtained a controlling interest in the stock of certain trucking companies. The Consultative Transport Council set up in 1939, ostensibly to coordinate transport, contained no representatives of river navigation, road carrier, or even private railways.

Any solution to Egypt's problem of transport coordination is rendered difficult by both economic and geographic factors. In the first place, the nationalization of railways places on the taxpayers the burden of continuing losses; secondly, most roads and waterways, since they run parallel to the tracks, cannot serve as feeders. This situation may be remedied to some extent when railroads are completed across the delta; in the meantime the government's alternatives are limited to the maintenance by legislation of the favored position of railroads, or to permitting open competition that will bring down rates but lead to uneconomic duplication of services.

Potential.

The condition of the domestic market is a serious hindrance to the development of Egypt's domestic trade. During the present impossibility of production for export on a large scale, the speed of industrial and commercial growth is limited by the size of the domestic (largely rural) market. As long as per capita income remains at its present low level, thus restricting the commodities which the average Egyptian can purchase each year to the

most basic necessities, the domestic base of a modern industry is lacking. Egypt's rich, who preferred (until the recent improvement in the quality of Egyptian products and the steady rise of import duties) to buy foreign goods, have done little to help the situation. The narrowness of the domestic market, coupled with the absence of almost any exports other than cotton and a little rice, will set rigid limits on the expansion of Egyptian industry for a long time to come.

FOREIGN TRADE

Egypt is predominantly an agricultural country that has become dependent on an advantageous foreign trade for the maintenance of its economic and political position. Cotton, the main crop, must be largely sold abroad, and the price and annual volume of Egyptian cotton on the world market are a gauge of the condition of Egypt's economy, for this is how the country acquires certain necessities of life and most of the raw materials for its industry.

Self-sufficiency in foodstuffs—at a very low standard of living—has been relinquished in the interest of cotton production, and Egypt must now import large quantities of wheat. This requires reserves of foreign exchange agreements under which wheat-producing countries will accept Egyptian pounds, and resort to foreign loans so that wheat may be purchased when it is needed. The rudimentary condition of Egyptian industry contributes to Egypt's dependence on foreign trade ~a factor which takes on special importance in the present period of militant Egyptian nationalism. The industrial plant can satisfy neither the basic demands of the population nor the requirements of a much enlarged and growing military establishment. To meet these needs, Egypt must look to foreign trade. With industrial growth, which will be hastened or retarded by the treatment accorded foreign investors, some sectors of the economy will achieve greater independence, but Egypt will never lose its dependence upon foreign sources for raw materials to feed its industry (see Chapter 16, Industry). All of these considerations constitute a vulnerability and a more or less compelling limitation of the freedom of Egyptian economic and political decision today. They also account for the concentrated attention Egypt's policy makers give to foreign economic relations.

The Suez Canal

The Suez Canal, a narrow valve through which passes most of the trade between Europe and Asia, gives Egypt a strategic importance in

international economic relations that far exceeds any direct Egyptian contribution to the process of trade itself. No foreseeable shift of global trade routes or change in the pattern of world industry is likely to diminish greatly the ultimate economic, political, and military significance of the Egyptian land bridge between Africa and Asia and the water artery which cuts through it. The Suez crisis, beginning in mid-1956, bore witness to this fact. Geographically a focal point of great power interests, Egypt has acquired a prestige which is related, not to its own strength, but to its capacity to jolt the balance of world power in serving as a kind of strategic fulcrum of forces outside itself.

When Egypt under the pharaohs was the dominant power in the Mediterranean world, Egyptian canal builders connected the Nile cities with the Red Sea for trade in gold, ivory, spices, and other commodities from the eastern coast of Africa and the areas bordering the Persian Gulf. The first canals were cut from the port of Clysma (Suez) on the Red Sea to the Bitter Lakes and through the Land of Goshen to connect with the then easternmost branch of the Nile north of Bubastis (near present-day Zagazig). Later, a more direct canal was cut to the main body of the Nile at Babylon (Cairo). For many centuries these waterways alternately filled up and were cleared for use. Their neglect was often deliberate, out of fear that they would facilitate the approach of foreign invaders from the east.

With the rise of modern Europe and the growth of industry and seaborne commerce, men began to think again of canal-building in Egypt, this time from the Mediterranean itself to the Red Sea. France took the initiative, and the Suez Canal was brought to completion in 1869 under the leadership of the French promoter Ferdinand de Lesseps. Numerous obstacles had to be overcome, only one of which was the widely held conviction that the level of the Red Sea was more than 30 feet higher than that of the Mediterranean. More serious was the opposition of Britain, which, throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, was in competition and frequently in conflict with France in the eastern Mediterranean. The British feared the alterations in the status quo that it appeared the Canal would bring. To a canal that would be subject to French or international influence, they preferred the existing communications across Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula or a railroad transshipping line. Only upon its completion did the British begin to recognize its vast strategic and economic importance to the growing Empire, an importance that has probably increased through the years, particularly from the strategic standpoint, to the point where the control of the Canal can affect literally the very survival of Britain and other great powers as they are presently organized. From the beginning, Britain has maintained its position as the largest user of the Suez Canal, for

as the British Empire shrank, the Commonwealth, in which international commerce and trade are of vital importance, expanded.

Total traffic passing through the Canal in 1950 reached a total of 81, 795, 523 Suez net tons. For Europe, the Canal is a lifeline to vital sources of food and industrial raw materials in the Middle East. For Asia, it is no less important as the route by which western manufactures and such products as wheat, flour, cotton, and tobacco reach it. The volume of freight passing through the Canal is illustrated by the figures for various products which came to the United States through it in 1955 76 million pounds of tea from British East Africa, Ceylon, and India; 16 million pounds of black pepper from Ceylon and India; 2 million pounds of cloves from Madagascar, Pemba, and Zanzibar; 25,000 tons of cashew nuts from India; 289 million pounds of dry sheet rubber and 90 million pounds of latex rubber from Malaya. Canal cargoes to Europe, largely from Australia and New Zealand, average annually 30 million bushels of wheat, 1 billion pounds of wool, 550 million pounds of butter, 4 million cases of canned fruit, 45,000 tons of raisins, 575,000 tons of meat, 11,000 tons of dried eggs, and 20 million dozen shell eggs. In addition, an average of 400,000 bales of Sudanese cotton come through the Canal,

Until mid-1956 the Canal was administered by an Egyptian company, in which foreign interests exercised control through representation on the board of directors and domination of the company bureaucracy. The Egyptian Government, asserting its sovereign rights, nationalized the Canal in July 1956. Behind the decision lay a complex of reasons, most of them connected with the national ambitions and resentments of Egypt's military regime, which, in taking this step, acquired a means of pressure on the French and the British—especially the latter, who had ruled Egypt from 1882 until after World War I (see Chapter 10, Effect of National Attitudes on Domestic and Foreign Policies).

The Suez Canal Company concluded an agreement with the Egyptian Government in August 1949, setting forth new conditions of administration more favorable to Egypt, including a provision enlarging the country's representation on the board of directors. Presumably, this agreement met the demands of the existing Egyptian Government, but the military regime which came in two years later regarded anything less than complete control as a limitation of Egyptian sovereignty and independence. The crisis precipitated by that regime's recent moves highlighted the magnitude of the international stake in the Canal and the implications of the transfer of its control to a single nation. Any shutdown for whatever reason—pilot failure, inefficient administration, a users' boycott, a political decision by Egypt, or armed conflict in the area—immediately causes shortages, higher prices, and enlarged demands for American aid in the countries affected.

Table 15. Survey of Egypt's Foreign Commerce

(in thousands of Egyptian pounds)

	Gold Bullion and Legal Specie	1,638	4 1	8 9 11 8	1 8 1 5	23	\$ 6 9 8	3 8 6	262	† 1 1 2	203	1 1 1	1 1 1	1 1 1	8 8	E : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Exports	Imported	741	307	536	1,549	3,056	3,529	5,312	3,858	2,361	2,126	2,468	2,438	2,264	1,482	1,565
	Egyptian Products and Manufactures	32, 451	27,811	18.748	25,030	26,921	41,629	63,680	85,716	140,740	135,671	172,958	200, 639	142,851	135,863	136, 708
	Total M	34,830	28, 319	19.284	26, 579	30,000	45, 138	68,992	89,836	143,101	138,000	175, 426	203,077	145,115	137, 345	138, 273
	Gold Bullion and Legal Specie	333	40	231	124	525	795	2,153	2,216	11,665	10,710	11,016	44,103	5,110	213	102
Imports	Merchandise	33,757	31, 337	33, 100	39,071	50,482	59,64	81,094	100,246	161,209	167,519	204,681	235,840	220,690	176,796	160,175
	Total	34,090	31, 377	33, 126	39, 195	51,007	60, 474	83,247	102,462	172,874	178,229	215,697	279,943	225,800	177,019	160,277
	Year	1939	1940	1941	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954

Source: Compiled and adapted from République d'Egypte: Ministère des Finances et de 1/Economie, Département de la Statistique, Annuaire Statistique, 1951-1952, 1952-1953, et 1953-1954, p. 306.

EGYPT'S POSITION IN FOREIGN TRADE

Egypt participates in international economic relations directly as a trader and indirectly as a transshipper of imported goods. As seller, the country is an important source of certain raw materials, agricultural products, and finished goods. As consumer, it provides a market for certain agricultural products, large quantities of finished products, and, in the present political situation, large amounts of war materials. (See Table 15 for a survey of Egypt's foreign commerce from 1939-54.) Egypt's ability to buy abroad is closely linked to its success in selling its own products to others. It has little mineral wealth that can be used to purchase necessities abroad. To the extent that it ties the purchase of war materials to its own exports of such vital items as cotton, as it has lately been doing, it reduces its capacity to buy necessities lacking at home. The dependence of Egyptian foreign trade upon the ships of other nations is a further disability in the country's international economic position. The Suez Canal crisis, which resulted in the freezing of Egypt's funds abroad, immediately produced difficulties that illustrated the degree of the country's dependence upon foreign trade

FOREIGN TRADE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Egypt in the nineteenth century was a self-sufficient country producing a variety of food crops for home consumption. With the introduction of cotton, the economy began to change and to be regulated by the value of the annual cotton export. Egypt's imports are made up in considerable part by durable manufactured goods, luxuries, and semiluxuries. Since such items are not staple necessities, their import may be postponed, and, in consequence, their volume fluctuates with the export earnings of the cotton crop. The growth of the population and the devotion of much land to cotton production in recent years, however, have made necessary increased importation of wheat to supplement the food supply. This need cannot be postponed, and, in the event of a decline in Egyptian exports or the application of economic pressure or sanctions by other states, the country must resort to extraordinary devices in order to maintain the volume of wheat importation—a major economic vulnerability.

For the past several years exports have represented about one fifth of Egypt's national income, with imports remaining a little higher. In broad economic terms, Egypt fits into a category of underdeveloped countries in the subtropical zone. Typically, in such countries, per capita income and per capita exports and imports are low. But the proportion of exports to national income is high, ranging from 20 to 40 percent. The development

Table 16. Survey of Egyptian Foreign Commerce by Principal Ports
(in thousands of Egyptian pounds)

		Exports of Egyptian	Exports of Imported	
Port	Imports	Products and Manufactures	Merchanouse	Year
Alexandria	146,863	163, 927	753	1950
	186,639	183,628	1,002	1951
	191,159	136,981	574	1952
	148,726	128, 352	482	1953
	126,726	128,525	479	1954
Port Said	29,622	3, 576	439	1950
	26,655	10,628	536	1951
	13, 491	2, 341	621	1953
	15, 187	2, 492	244	1954
	·	·		
Suez	18,651	2, 924	221	1950
	15,059	3, 643	298	1951
	10,849	3, 140	357	1952
	12,083	3, 337	112	1953
	15, 366	3, 521	185	1954
Other Ports	128	1, 333	999	1950
- 11-11	147	2, 137	155	1951
	200	1, 466	81	1952
	450	1, 366	78	1953
	254	1, 566	34	1954
	207	1,000	0.	2007

Source: Compiled from République d'Egypt: Ministère des Finances et de l'Economie, Département de la Statistique, Annuaire Statistique, 1951-1952, 1952-1953, et 1953-1954, p. 307.

Egyptian Imports (in Egyptian pounds)

	1951	1952	195
Vegetable Products	55,688,903	56,007,090	41,55
Live Animals and Animal			
Products	3,695,350	3,031,943	2,64
Fat Products; Animal or			
Vegetable Lard; Oils; Waxes;			
Edible Fats	4,042,933	4,807,059	3,77
Food Products; Soft Drinks;			
Alcoholic Beverages; Vinegars;			
Tobacco	9,908,873	14,743,520	9,67
Mineral Products	15,994,343	18,256,237	15,14
Chemical Products; Pharma-	,,,_,_	,	
ceuticals; Dyes; Varnish;			
Perfumes; Soaps, Candles,			
etc.; Glue; Gelatine; Explo-			
sives; Fertilizers	26,846,227	25,762,001	22,67
Skins; Hides; Leathers; Furs	,		
and Their Products	526,690	370,785	28
Rubber and Rubber Products	2,331,563	2,210,577	1,76
Wood; Cork; Products from These	_,,	-,,	2,
Materials; Products Made from			
Materials for Plaiting	12,405,901	7,816,903	8,29
Paper and Its Applications	8,474,637	7,110,483	5,65
Textile Materials; Products from	0,1/1,00/	.,110,100	5,05
Such Materials	26,202,880	18,681,670	15,40
Footwear; Hats; Tarbooshes;	20,202,000	10,001,070	13,40
Umbrellas, Parasols; Canes;			
Articles of Fashion	281,181	145,727	10
Pottery; Glass; Other Mineral	201,101	440,121	10
Work	3,965,782	3,177,204	2,35
Precious Metals; Pearls;	5,,05,102	3,111,204	2,33
Precious Stones; Moneys	49,113,338	7,540,097	43
Common Metals; Works in	-,,,	.,020,07.	1.0
These Metals	16,925,331	15,731,215	13,91
Machines and Apparatus;	,,,	,,	22, /2
Electric Material	22,476,402	24,767,811	18,94
Means of Transport	13,548,743	10,532,298	9,01
Instruments and Scientific	,,	,,	/, 01
Precision Instruments	2,647,457	2,778,923	2,29
Arms and Munitions	2,778,015	460,085	98
Merchandise and Various			,
Products Not Otherwise			
Accounted For	2,052,732	1,800,083	2,06
Objects of Art and for			_, 50
Collection	36,762	69,394	
Total	2 79, 944 , 0 43	225,801,105	177,01

Source: Compiled from République d'Egypte: Ministère des Finances e 1952-1953, et 1953-1954, pp. 308-309.

Exports of Egyptian Products (in Egyptian pounds)

	1951	1952	1953	1954
85	18,160,571	4,248,778	4,814,219	7,024,357
47	459,831	284,011	281,111	278,683
33	199,687	39,154	2,050,299	636,955
39	1,142,864 3,239,391	831,556 2,620,508	2,090,128 2,624,049	1,026,132 2,760,112
32	1,820,914	1,628,304	1,774,832	1,905,618
321 134	221,779 2,757	186,720 4,801	272,469 4,015	346,480 4,670
321 326	78,556 398,327	162,684 434,083	197,774 472,311	240,138 624,076
164	174,248,845	131,667,662	120,440,610	120,433,290
503	103,105	192,099	188,125	204,387
125	34,813	20,452	33,970	50,367
898	91,013	69,919	17,629	94,175
587	108,174	96,191	188,950	397,328
4 15	21,718 80,668	3,148 3,240	6,497 6,835	36,142 3,479
406 596	2,968 81	4,131	1,716	3,908 650
821	204,099	342,156	394,146	626,349
239	13,890	11,791	3,437	11,204
, 266	200,639,051	142,851,388	135,863,122	136,708,500

Département de la Statistique, Amuaire Statistique, 1951-1952,

of exports has been initiated and carried forward mainly by foreign capital devoted to the expansion of a limited number of raw materials needed by the industry of Europe or North America.

As Table 1 shows, the volume of Egypt's foreign trade greatly increased between 1945 and 1950 In this, imports were particularly significant, but the rising prices of the main export commodities-cotton and ricealso produced large increases in the value of exports. In 1950, excluding exports to the Sudan, less than 4 percent of Egypt's exports by value were manufactured goods. Clearly, the country's small protected industry has not been able to outstrip internal demand and to contribute significantly to external trade. Internal demand, of course, is constantly increasing, and raw materials for manufactures remain in short supply. The customs duty, averaging 20 percent, ad valorem, has been designed not only to keep down the purchase of foodstuffs and luxury items but to increase the importation of raw materials as an assistance to industry (Customs revenues are a major source of Egyptian Government income.) Cotton and cotton by-products have generally formed about 80 percent of total exports by value The average annual Egyptian cotton export from 1934-38 was 375,000 metric tons. The figures for 1949, 1950, and 1951 were 359,000, 387,000, and 255,000 metric tons, respectively. Egypt is thus second only to the United States as a cotton exporter. Rice, various vegetables, phosphates, manganese ores, mineral oils, skins and hides, and raw wool also are exported in varying quantities. Principal imports are fertilizers, wheat, flour, boilers, machinery, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, metal manufactures, oil products, cotton goods, woolens, silks, rayon yarns, jute sacks, timber, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, sugar, tea, coffee, and paper

Table 17 indicates the relative value of Egyptian imports and exports by main types.

The Pattern of Egypt's Foreign Trade

The United Kingdom until recent years occupied first place in Egypt's foreign trade. That relationship declined during World War II, leaving a large gap in Egyptian trade with Europe as a whole and accompanied by a compensatory increase of trade with the other countries of the Middle East, the United States, and India. The postwar years have brought a resumption of Egypt's trade with Europe, but not the restoration of the position of the United Kingdom, with which Egypt's trade continued to decline relatively, due especially to a drop in Egyptian cotton exports in 1951 and 1952 and an increase in trade with the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and the wheat-producing members of the British Commonwealth. Since the advent

Table 18. Egyptian Foreign Trade by Principal Countries, 1953-54 (in thousands of Egyptian pounds)

Country of Origin or Destination	1953	1954
Imports, Total	177,004	159,786
Exports (including re-exports)	135,345	138,244
Trade Balance	41,659	21,542
Leading Markets		
India	15,946	18,225
France	18,095	15,924
United Kingdom	14, 925	14, 491
Western Germany	9,057	11,518
Italy	10,291	10,515
Japan	8,005	6,814
United States	5,739	6,596
Czechoslovakia	3, 323	6,035
Switzerland	5,547	4, 262
Communist China	3,621	3, 965
Other	40,796	39,899
Total	135, 345	138,244
Leading Sources		
United Kingdom	17,380	20,078
United States	28,357	17,783
Western Germany	18,323	17,773
France	15,440	15,980
Italy	13,895	12,485
Ceylon	4, 340	6,464
Saudi Arabia	4,967	5,617
Netherlands	5, 373	5,110
Belgium	3,538	4,997
Sweden	4, 321	4,948
Other	61,070	48,551
Total	177,004	159,786

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Economic Developments in Egypt, 1954 (World Trade Information Service: Economic Reports), p. 7.

of the Egyptian military regime in 1952, there has been a trend toward increased trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China. This development accords with Egypt's militant rejection of many former ties associated with the period of British control, and it occurs at a time when the Soviet Union is mounting a political-economic offensive in the Middle East.

The trade of all Middle Eastern countries-except Syria and Lebanon-increased with the Communist states in 1954 and 1955, and Egypt, with Turkey, was in the lead in this development. Egyptian exports to the Soviet area rose from 12, 2 percent of the country's total exports in 1953 to 14.2 percent in 1954, and they reached 24.9 percent in 1955. By comparison, exports to Western Europe declined from 48.4 percent in 1953 to 45, 3 percent in 1954, and to 35 percent during the first nine months of 1955. Exports to India and Japan increased in 1954 but declined in 1955. Egyptian imports from the Soviet area changed but slightly during the same period-from 6 percent in 1954 to 7 percent in 1955-while imports from Western Europe increased considerably. The Suez crisis of mid-1956, however, seems likely to result in a further shift of Egypt's trade toward the Soviet area. Until 1956 the Egyptian Government had followed a policy of balancing trade according to the availability of exchange and of favoring capital goods and essentials over nonessential consumer goods. It seems likely that the 1956 crisis marks the beginning of a period in which political considerations will supersede economic concerns in the charting of Egypt's foreign economic relations.

The dramatic decline of the British commercial position in the Middle East illustrates the intermeshing of trade and politics. Some of the factors are ostensibly economic. British trade is affected adversely by the higher cost of British products, which averages 20 percent more than equivalent foreign goods. With the growth of Middle Eastern buying power, the battle for markets in the area has intensified and the number of competitors has increased. British prestige might formerly have compensated in part for higher British costs, but this advantage is no longer present. With the Middle Eastern states now attempting to implement dynamic foreign policies, they are tending to use for political purposes the trade and economic opportunities afforded them. Their enhanced political prestige may permit them to reap economic advantages in areas where formerly it would have been impossible.

The decline of British cotton purchases from Egypt in 1951 and 1952 was interpreted by an important segment of Egyptian opinion as a deliberate effort to bring pressure on Egypt by boycott. In turning to the Soviet bloc, Egypt at once found a new outlet for its cotton and a means of political retaliation against Britain. The seeming long-term security of the type of

trade agreements offered by the Soviet area has an appeal for both Egyptian governmental and business circles, and there is a tendency to accept at face value the claim of the Communist countries that they desire only equal and mutually profitable commercial relations, in contrast with the "exploitive" motives of the West. Even the most moderate Egyptian opinion holds that Britain must reassess its economic relations with Egypt and adjust them to fit the country's drive toward large-scale industrialization.

Foreign Aid

A new development in Egypt's foreign economic relations is United States aid, which, in introducing American influence into the area, constitutes one more factor in the changing pattern of power relationships in the Middle East. Under a basic agreement made in November 1954, the United States made available to Egypt \$40 million from 1955 development assistance funds. Of this, \$32.5 million was in grants and \$7.5 million was a 40-year loan which could be repaid in local currency at Egypt's option. By the end of 1955 these funds had been apportioned for railway, highway, and waterway improvement, potable water systems, Ministry of Public Works machine-shop equipment, industrial consultant services, and for Egyptian imports from the United States to make local Egyptian currency available for development projects. Another agreement in December 1955 provided for Egyptian purchase of 80,000 tons of American surplus foods, to be paid for in Egyptian currency, which, subject to supplemental agreement, was in turn to be devoted to Egyptian economic development.

In addition to development assistance funds, the United States has also given technical aid. Based on an agreement concluded in May 1951, it amounted to \$20,446,165 between 1952 and 1955. In addition, an American firm under contract to the United States Foreign Operations Administration until June 1956 conducted a survey of Egyptian industrial opportunities. Technical assistance has been rendered in the fields of agriculture, natural resource exploitation, health, education, housing, public administration, transportation, and communications.

Egypt has also received technical assistance from the United Nations, which in 1955 amounted to \$720,000.

Balance-of-Payments

Egypt's prewar balance-of-payments is difficult to assess. A small import surplus showed in the years 1920-38; it was financed in part by net specie exports. Additional debit items were: estimated annual interest

Table 19 · Balance of Payments, 1950-54 (millions of Egyptian pounds)

CURRENT TRANSACTIONS	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Receipts			145 /	135.3	139.8
Exports	188.5	201.9	145.6	7.1	7.1
Shipping	7.5	7.3	6.8 26.6	29.1	30.6
Suez Canal Dues	26.2	26.4		6.3	5.0
Interests, Dividends, etc.	4.6	4.9	4.8	9.0	5.6
British Army Expenditures	15.0	14.7	5.8		34.1
Others	26.7	37.0	29.1 218.7	28.3 215.1	222.2
Total	268.5	292.2	210.1	215,1	222,2
Disbursements					
Imports	221.7	241.9	210.5	165.2	150.7
Shipping	7.0	6.1	6.9	6.3	6.8
Interests, Dividends, etc.	15.8	17.4	16.9	17.4	18.1
Travel and Maintenance	10.3	15.3	11.6	9.6	13.0
Egyptian Government					
Expenditures	5.1	6.3	5.7	6.6	9.4
Other Disbursements	19.0	20.4	20.5	17.9	20.6
Total	278.9	307.4	272,1	223.0	218.6
Balance of Current					
Transactions	-10.4	-15.2	-53.4	- 7.9	+ 3.6
CAPITAL REMITTANCES					
Net Capital Inflow or Outflow	- 3.6	- 4.6	- 2.0	- 0.4	- 0,3
Over-all Surplus or Deficit	$\frac{-3.6}{-14.0}$	$\frac{-4.6}{-19.8}$	- 2.0 -55.4	- 0.4 - 8.3	+ 3.3
Accounted for by the					
following changes:					
Sterling Balances	-29.0	-54.4	-40.1	+ 3.7	- 2.2
Other Foreign Exchange					
Holding 8	+ 7.1	+11.1	-17.7	- 7.8	+ 9.1
Monetary Gold	+15.9	+26.6			
Other Items	- 8.0	- 3.1	+ 2.4	- 4.2	- 3.6

Source: Adapted from République d'Egypte: Ministère des Finances et de l'Economie, Département de la Statistique, Annuaire Statistique, 1951-1952, 1952-1953, et 1953-1954, p. 317; Issawi, Charles, Egypt at Mid-Century, An Economic Survey, p. 205; National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, VIII, No. 2 (1955), p. 89.

payments of LE 3 million, insurance premiums, remittances, and expenditures by pilgrims and tourists. Credit items were the annual local expenditure of LE 2 million by the Suez Canal Company, annual expenditures of about LE 2 million by the British Army, and tourist expenditures in Egypt of about LE 1 million. During World War II a large import surplus of LE 98 million was more than compensated for by Allied military expenditures of LE 314 million. By the end of the war, Egypt had acquired sterling balances of LE 400 million.

The postwar years through 1954 show a heavy import surplus which, except for 1949 and 1954, has not been offset by a consistent surplus in invisible items (fees and payments of various kinds, tourist receipts, etc.). However, 1954 was the first year of real surplus in the balance-of-payments, since the 1949 surplus was only a nominal one in that it derived from revaluation of dollar reserves following devaluation of the currency. The 1954 situation was assisted by a good wheat crop, which reduced the expenditure for imports, and by improvement in the terms-of-trade and a rise in other receipts. Other items that can work for or against a favorable balance-ofpayments in Egypt are transit trade transactions, including international transactions financed by intermediaries in Egypt, increases or decreases of receipts from Suez Canal dues: rise or decline of the tourist trade: fluctuations in revenue from foreign security holdings by the National Bank of Egypt; increases or decreases in shipping disbursements; remittances of interest dividends, and other revenues, and the extent of Egyptian governmental and private expenditure abroad

Table 19 provides details on the balance-of payments situation through 1954. The figures for 1955, complete through September, show an over all deficit of LE 27 4 million. This deficit was brought about by a fall of LE 12 5 million export proceeds, due to the slower movement of cotton, and a rise of LE 30 4 million in payments for imports, largely of capital goods.

In June 1947 an Anglo-Egyptian agreement provided for the withdrawal of Egypt from the sterling area and the gradual release of Egypt's sterling balances. At that time the total balance of sterling held to Egypt's account in London by banks operating in Egypt was LE 347 million. In keeping with the terms of the agreement for the gradual release of the sterling, this figure had fallen to LE 180 million by December 1952. Under the agreement Egypt was allowed the unrestricted use of free sterling and the sterling proceeds of Egyptian exports in any monetary zone, although the subsequent abandonment of sterling dollar convertibility removed the significance of this provision. (See Chapter 12, Financial System.)

The predominance of cotton in Egyptian exports makes it possible

to discern the terms-of-trade by comparing the prices of cotton with import prices or, when the latter are not available, with wholesale prices. Thus taking the terms-of-trade in 1953 as 100, they had risen to 116 in 1954. There was a further rise in 1955, due perhaps to the reopening of the Alexandria futures exchange. Excluding the possibility of adverse political developments, prospects seem good for continued improvement. Egypt's dependence on cotton, however, constitutes a vulnerability which the government is seeking to diminish by a greater diversification of agricultural production (see Chapter 15, Agriculture).

Government Trade Policy

Egypt's ambition to draw the Arab states together under its leadership is reflected in a trade policy aimed at inter-Arab economic cooperation. Attempts have been made to widen the original scope of 1953 trade agreements between these states, and a meeting at Cairo of the Arab League Economic Council in January 1956 approved additions to the list of goods given preferential treatment among the states of the Arab League. Egypt and other Middle Eastern states have sought to initiate or promote trade with the Soviet area and with mainland China through bilateral or barter agreements. In purely economic terms, the difficulties these countries face in finding markets in western Europe and in North America play a large part in this development. Egypt, in particular, has also suffered from changes in the foreign payments situation. Only Egypt has had much trade with mainland China, but it has until recently lagged behind Iran with respect to trade with the USSR. Egypt's trade with the Soviet area has developed a growing export surplus, the adjustment of which is provided in various trade and payment agreements. In this connection, it may be noted that Egyptian statistics show a smaller Egyptian export surplus with the Soviet bloc than do the statistics of the International Monetary Fund.

A series of payments agreements has been made with the following countries: Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, the USSR, Yugoslavia, Greece, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Ceylon, Indonesia, India, and Japan. Some of these agreements contain trade commitments as well as payment arrangements. To the list should also be added the agreement with Britain for the release of sterling balances. The payments provisions of these agreements concern such matters as maximum and excess balances and denunciation procedures.

Foreign Investment

There have been many indications that the Egyptian government wishes to encourage the investment of foreign capital in Egypt, despite the "Egyptianization" order of 1957 affecting foreign banking and insurance companies (see Chapter 12, Financial System). The government has established regulations designed to encourage such investment while preserving the control of joint stock companies by Egyptian subscribers. Meanwhile, there has been a decreasing dependence of Egyptian business upon foreign capital. It remains to be seen whether significant amounts of foreign capital can be attracted under prevailing conditions. The British, for their part, have not desired heretofore to stimulate the industrial development of Egypt but rather wished to preserve markets there. The trend toward predominantly Egyptian ownership of bond and share capital will probably continue. The movement in the direction of closer economic and political relations with the Soviet area could lead to Soviet participation in the ownership of Egyptian enterprises. That event, in bringing Egypt to the threshold of the Soviet orbit, could only worsen the prospects of Egyptian-Western economic and political relations.

CHAPTER 18

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

PUBLIC WELFARE

Egypt is a country in which the great mass of the population is undernourished, ill-clothed, and inadequately housed. It is also a country in which vast social inequalities have for centuries permitted a small elite group—often foreign in origin—to enjoy a life of ease and plenty.

The poverty of the rural population has not, however, led to any considerable social unrest. The <u>fellah</u> would cheat his landlord and steal from him, but seldom did he feel sufficiently sure of himself to challenge his authority. The government was viewed as an agent of oppression and little was expected from it in terms of social welfare. This resignation of the masses is explained in part by their relative weakness vis-à-vis the landowning and governing classes, and also by the fact that, historically, Egyptian agricultural production had kept the population somewhat above the bare subsistence level.

During the past 100 years, however, the standard of living of the Egyptian masses has been deteriorating. The 100 percent increase in the population during the past 50 years has reduced the per capita amount of food available, and with the change from a subsistence- to a cash-crop economy the fellah, no longer able directly to satisfy his own needs, has become more vulnerable to the rapaciousness of both landowner and government. Led by nationalist leaders to believe that his misery and distress are attributable to British oppression, he has little notion of the multiple sources of his difficulties or the measures which might begin to correct them.

Egyptian governments during the past two decades have felt compelled to make at least token attempts to improve the conditions of the masses. Rural welfare centers have been inaugurated, comprehensive social security legislation has been enacted, and under the Nasser regime minimum-wage laws have been passed and some land redistribution has been effected. Model villages and even a model province have been established in an attempt to dramatize these ventures.

By and large, however, the limited gains achieved by such reforms have in great part been offset by the population increase, and since 1954 the interest of the present government in the welfare of its citizens has been diverted by international developments. Money earmarked for social welfare is expended on armaments, and it is the Egyptian fellah who will suffer most from the mortgaging of the cotton crop to the Soviet bloc.

Standards of Living

The average per capita income of Egypt is lower than that of the other Mediterranean countries with the possible exception of Algeria Moreover, the distribution of income is probably more uneven in Egypt than in the majority of these countries. Recent studies on the consumption patterns of the Egyptian population indicate a decline in the average level of living and a widening of the gap between the consumption levels of rich and poor. For example, the consumption index for the principal cereals declined from a per capita annual consumption of 309 kilograms in the late 1920's to 245 kilograms in the late 1930's, and slipped below the 200 level during the war period

The low living standard of the Egyptian fellah may be illustrated by two examples. Of 219 families in one village recently studied, over 40 percent had an annual income of less than 30 Egyptian pounds (about \$85) while only 20 percent had an income of over 150 Egyptian pounds (about \$430). Of 1,071 families studied in another village, 5 percent had an annual income of less than 12 pounds (about \$34), 61 percent an income of 12-60 pounds (\$34-\$170), 27 percent an income of 60-120 pounds (\$170-\$340) and only 7 percent an income over 120 pounds.

This low income level is reflected in meager diet, poor health, and inadequate housing. Twelve percent of the families in the Qalyu-biya study subsisted primarily on bread and cheese, another 56 percent supplemented this occasionally with milk and vegetables, 25 percent ate some meat, and only 6 percent ate vegetables and meat regularly. Although the diet of the fellah is sufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements for growth, work, and reproduction, the lack of protective foods when combined with unsanitary housing and unhealthy working conditions means that the burden of disease carried by the population is heavy.

The bulk of the peasant's income is spent on food; Ammar's study of Sharqiya revealed that 58 percent of the families devoted over half their expenditure to food. For two thirds of the sample, tea_coffee, and cigarettes accounted for 20 percent of the budget, while clothing absorbed 5 to 15 percent. No rent was demanded for the mud huts the fellah family

occupied. The other main item of expenditure was on kerosene for fuel and lighting. Comparatively large amounts are spent on funerals, weddings, festivals, and local cult practices, and only insignificant amounts are devoted to such items as education and medical services. Exorbitant interest rates on loans absorb any remaining income.

Many of the urban industrial workers and craftsmen enjoy living standards only slightly superior to those of the fellahin, while the plight of some among them is even more desperate than that of the poorest farmer. Although the income of the urban worker is generally greater than that of the peasant, his living costs are also higher.

A report presented in 1941 by the Egyptian Association for Social Studies based on a study of over 3,000 family budgets gives some indication of the conditions prevailing among the most unfortunate of the urban working families. This report reveals the following composite picture: a family of 5 persons living in 1.6 rooms, working 37.2 weeks per year, having a total regular monthly income of 176 piasters (about \$5; 100 piasters equals one Egyptian pound) and spending monthly about 195 piasters for all purposes, the difference being made up by begging and assistance from relatives. Of this budget, 121 piasters goes for food, 25.3 piasters for rent, 23.4 piasters for clothing, 3.8 piasters for amusements, 3.9 piasters for medicines, and 17.5 piasters for miscellaneous items, chief among which is tobacco,

The Traditional Theory of Public Welfare

Public welfare in the Moslem tradition is based on the principle of mutual responsibility of all members of the community. This principle, drawn from the Arab past and expounded in the Koran, has been honored in theory and often neglected in practice, but its fundamental tenets have never been challenged. Islamic theory recognizes natural inequalities among men and sanctions differential rewards for different degrees of talent. At the same time, however, it looks with disfavor upon class distinctions based on wealth and imposes a moral obligation on the wealthy to assist the less fortunate members of the community.

Almsgiving (zakat), one of the five pillars of Islam, represents a means of applying this ideal of mutual responsibility among members of the community (see Chapter 23, Religion). The giving of alms is a moral obligation, and the amount given is left to the discretion of the giver. At times in history, however, zakat has been imposed as a compulsory tax on property, including money and merchandise. Even soldiers' pensions were not exempt. The exact amount of this imposition varied, but generally

it averaged 2 1/2 percent. It was collected through regular officials and administered from a central treasury to support the poor, build mosques, and help defray government expenses. Precedents for government taxation for public welfare purposes are, therefore, not lacking. The principle of almsgiving was defined, moreover, not as charity but as the duty of those who gave and the natural right of those who received. In addition, free-will offerings (sadaqat) are given, as a means of expiation, to the poor, the needy, orphans, and travelers.

Waqfs, or bequests, are another reflection of early public welfare measures. Under this system a man could establish a secular endowment for his heirs or a religious one for charitable purposes. The endowment could not be sold or otherwise alienated but had to be held in perpetuity with only its yield utilized for its beneficiaries, Secular Waqfs no longer exist, and the religious Waqfs have all been taken over by the government, their funds being managed by the Ministry of Waqfs (see Chapter 23, Religion, Chapter 15, Agriculture).

Supplementing, but at times conflicting with, the principle of communal responsibility, is the ideal of family solidarity which was firmly established in the Arab world long before the advent of Islam. In the Koran this ideal took the force of a moral duty. The sense of obligation to family has been far stronger than the feeling of community responsibility. Thus, a wealthy man would bequeath his property to a charitable Waqf on the condition that it be used for charitable purposes only after his line had become extinct

Despite modern welfare blueprints and programs, almsgiving, Waqfs, and the self help of the family have not lost their traditional importance in Egypt. A United Nations survey of poor Egyptian rural families indicated that 10 percent of their total income was derived from relatives and more than 6 percent from private or institutional charity. Urban indigents derived 13 percent of their income from relatives and 3 percent from institutional charity.

The Modern Approach to Public Welfare

The old family and village welfare practices continue but they have not sufficed to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding population or to answer the problems created by industrialization and urbanization. Many families and whole villages in Egypt are too poor to render effective assistance to their members in time of trouble. Neither the knowledge nor the material means needed for the solution of the problems posed by modern developments is available within the confines of the family or the village

During the past generation attempts have been made, mostly on the initiative of Egyptians trained in western countries, to alleviate the wide-spread and growing misery of the Egyptian population by adopting modern public welfare techniques. These attempts have been characterized by increased activity on the part of the central government and a relative decrease in the importance of private welfare institutions. Along with this change has come an attempt to widen the scope of public welfare activities and to provide comprehensive coverage. A step in this direction was the creation in 1953 of the Permanent Council for Public Welfare. Composed of the Ministers of National Guidance, Waqfs, Social Affairs, Municipal and Rural Affairs, Public Health, and Education, the Council is responsible for coordinating the activities of private and governmental welfare agencies. A second important change is the stress on rehabilitation and self-improvement as contrasted with direct relief.

The Rural Social Centers

Inaugurated in 1936 by the Egyptian Association for Social Studies, the Rural Social Centers program represents an attempt to deal simultaneously with the three basic and related problems confronting the fellah: poverty, ignorance, and disease. The experimental efforts of the Egyptian Association proved so promising that the program was taken over in 1939 by the newly created Ministry of Social Welfare. Since then the number of rural centers has increased; by 1950 there were over 125 centers serving nearly 1.5 million peasants. Lack of funds and trained personnel have prevented the realization of the government's objective of 30 to 40 new centers a year.

The Rural Social Centers reflect some modern western trends in public welfare philosophy and techniques. Financed largely by the central government and staffed by members of the central administration, the centers nevertheless encourage local initiative. The government will consider the creation of a center only upon the request of a community, and will provide financial assistance and trained personnel only after the community has demonstrated the seriousness of its interest by itself contributing money, land, and labor.

To carry out a concentrated attack on all aspects of village back-wardness the Ministry of Social Affairs assigns to each center—when the limited number of qualified personnel permits—an agricultural social worker, a health and welfare nurse, a doctor, a qualified laboratory assistant, and a club leader. The duties of the agricultural social worker include operation of a demonstration plot, distribution of improved seed,

education of the peasants in the control of plant insect pests, training in improved methods of livestock raising, and encouragement of agricultural diversification. In addition he promotes rural and home industries—utilizing local materials—thus permitting the fellah to make beneficial use of his unemployed time.

The health services of the centers emphasize both the cure and the prevention of disease. They try to persuade the women to have their children at the clinics, where proper care can be given. As inducement, the mother is provided with free food for one week after childbirth and the baby is given two sets of free clothing. Moreover, each child born at the clinic is eligible for regular medical care up to 2 years of age. The health service also carries on extensive campaigns through posters, lectures, and films to educate the fellah in disease prevention.

The social and cultural services of the centers include a program of elementary education for adults and various clubs designed to channel the leisure of the peasants along constructive lines. The centers also attempt to provide education in self-government. All male members who contribute to the center participate in the election of a council. The council appoints members to a number of committees concerned with community functions; there is a committee for conciliation of disputes, one for charity, for economics and agriculture, for education and recreation, and for health and cleanliness.

Although the centers have been criticized for lack of achievement, they have clearly had some success in raising agricultural incomes and improving health conditions. More important perhaps is their promise for the future—By their emphasis on local initiative and local self-management, they help to arouse new awareness and new interest on the part of the fellah. The petential effectiveness of the program is indicated by the fact that wherever a center has been established surrounding communities quickly begin to take interest and ask for a center for themselves.

Unfortunately, the size of the initial local contribution automatically excludes the poorest rural communities from participation, and these are among those most in need of the program. The Ministry of Social Welfare has attempted to overcome this problem by the formation of Rural Reform Societies, which carry out many of the same projects under the direct supervision of, and with financial assistance from, the Ministry.

Other Rural Welfare Measures

The problem of assisting workers on the big estates is being approached through special legislation which, while it has not been consistently

enforced, has been important as an idea and a precedent. A law of 1950 required estate owners to provide certain sanitary arrangements and improved housing for the workers, and also in that year agricultural laborers were in theory covered by the country's new social security legislation. Other laws in 1953 established the minimum agricultural wage at about one Egyptian pound (\$2.87) a week and regulated the terms of land tenancy. The Land Reform Law of 1952, which provided for breaking up the large estates and redistributing the land among the peasants, was an ambitious effort which has had only limited success.

The Social Security Act of 1950

The Arab world's first social security legislation was enacted in Egypt in 1950. Covering the entire population regardless of location or occupation, the Egyptian Social Security Act provides for the payment of pensions and allowances to widows with children, to orphans, disabled persons, and men and women above 65 years of age. The full pensions consist of three elements: a basic sum, family bonuses, and allowances for dependents. The provisions affecting dependents appear to have been designed to discourage both polygamy and high birth rates, for only one wife and not more than three children are authorized to receive an allowance. Payments under this act—at least in theory—compare favorably with prevailing wages. A widow with three children, for example, was to receive about 230 piasters monthly (about \$6,50).

A major criticism leveled at the Egyptian system is that it obliges a country whose productive capacity suffers from the lack of technicians to spend on the aged money which might be more usefully applied to developing the productive capacity of the young. Investigations have in fact indicated that at least 50 percent of the households receiving pensions include dependents other than the wife and children of the earner. As yet, however, the system has not been fully put into effect. Minimum estimated expenditure on the plan was set at 6 million Egyptian pounds. Actual expenditure on social security is not known, but appropriations for the Ministry of Social Welfare, which is charged with implementing the program, are less than 4 million pounds.

Social Insurance Legislation

The only compulsory social insurance legislation now in force in Egypt is a workmen's compensation scheme established in 1936 and amended in 1942 and 1950. This scheme applies to employees and apprentices in

industrial and commercial enterprises and also to those in agriculture if they are employed solely in tending power-driven machines.

Injuries suffered at work and occupational diseases are compensable under general legislation passed in 1936 and 1950. Protection in the form of individual employer liability is afforded to workers in industrial and commercial concerns with 5 or more employees by the provisions of an Act of 1944. Employers of over 100 employees must retain a doctor and furnish necessary medicines without charge. Employees who are absent because of illness may receive up to 30 days of sick leave per year at half pay. If incapacity continues beyond certain time periods, the work contract may be terminated but the employer must pay a lump-sum indemnity to the worker. There is also provision for benefits in kind—free medical care, pharmaceutical supplies, and hospitalization. Women workers receive 50 percent of their wages from their employer during the two weeks immediately following a confinement.

The employees of a number of firms operating in Egypt also receive some protection from provident funds established by the employer. Among the larger funds of this type are those of the Suez Canal Company and the Shell Company of Egypt. The types of benefits vary from fund to fund, taking the form sometimes of lump-sum payments, in other cases of periodical payments. These funds are supported either by employer contribution or by joint employer-employee contributions.

Egyptian civil servants are covered by a special insurance plan. There are also a number of intra-professional insurance plans.

Other Welfare Activities

A number of other welfare activities are carried on through combined public and private action. One of the most important of these is concerned with the problem of juvenile delinquency. Private organizations receiving financial assistance from the government have established centers in Cairo and Alexandria to assist the courts in dealing with juvenile offenders. Special juvenile courts handle cases pertaining to minors, and, although there are no special detention facilities for juveniles, the Prison Department has a new social service division which devotes particular attention to juveniles. During their confinement in prison minors receive school instruction and are also given vocational training.

The government operates a number of orphanages, a psychological clinic, nursery schools, and a school for the training of social workers. The work of these institutions is supplemented by the efforts of private organizations, and Egyptian women have been particularly active in these activities.

International agencies, including the United Nations International Emergency Fund and the World Health Organization, have provided valuable financial and technical assistance.

A critical postwar problem was created by the closing down of the British wartime factories in Egypt. Although many of the workers in these establishments found other employment in industry or agriculture, the government in 1956 was still finding it necessary to appropriate over 4 million pounds annually for their relief.

The Arab refugees displaced from Palestine during the Arab-Israel conflict of 1948 represent an additional large-scale welfare problem. Egypt has, however, done little or nothing to aid these people, apparently on the ground that any alleviation of their difficulties might dull their eagerness to return to their homes in Israeli territory or imply a tacit recognition by the Egyptian Government of the State of Israel.

Recent Trends

Despite the long tradition of public welfare in Egypt and the recent application of modern public welfare ideas, Egypt is, as it was in the past, a country of marked economic and social inequality in which certain groups are favored to the detriment of the majority. A study of the current Egyptian budget is indicative in this respect. The 1955-56 budget, for example, provides for the expenditure of almost 50 million Egyptian pounds—over 20 percent of the entire budget—on such programs as pensions, cost-of-living bonuses, social security, and other welfare activities. Of this, however, at least 40 million pounds are expended in the form of pensions and high cost-of-living bonuses for government workers who in terms of salary alone enjoy a higher standard of living than all but a moneyed minority of the Egyptian population. Only about 10 million pounds are thus available to finance more general measures of public welfare.

Despite President Nasser's verbal championship of the fellah, government appropriations designed to ease the misery of the poor have decreased during his tenure. Expenditures for subsidizing the cost of living by permitting merchants to sell basic goods at reduced prices have dwindled from 15.5 million pounds in 1953 to 2 million pounds in 1956. During the same period total budget expenditures have increased by 32.3 million pounds, but appropriations for the Ministry of Social Welfare have increased by only about 300 thousand pounds. During the past five years the three programs designed to benefit the mass of the population—social security, Rural Social Centers, and subsidization of the cost of living—have been considerably curtailed for lack of funds.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

Nature and man have made Egypt one of the most disease-ridden countries in the world. In spite of recent improvement, not only does Egypt still have a low life expectancy rate (under 50) and a high infant mortality rate (approximately 140 per 1,000), but also the vast majority of those who survive suffer from malnutrition and chronic illnesses.

Overpopulation is a major factor which contributes to Egypt's health problems, but there are numerous and varied other factors. The fellah confined to a small parcel of land or employed as a farm laborer, scarcely ekes out a living at subsistence level. Malnutrition leaves the mass of the population vulnerable to the multitude of diseases which abound in Egypt. Overcrowding, another result of population pressure, contributes to the prevalence and severity of the epidemics which sweep the country. A climatic factor is present in the sandstorms, which contribute to chronic eye irritation and respiratory diseases, and in the sudden temperature changes, which dispose persons in the coastal area to respiratory ailments. Finally, the heavily populated Nile delta abounds in numerous forms of animal and plant life—including malaria—carrying mosquitoes, lice, rats, and snakes and ragweed—which take their periodic toll in the form of discomfort, sickness, and death.

Natural factors are reinforced by human failings. The ignorance, apathy, and superstitions of the majority of the population are serious obstacles to the achievement of even a modest level of personal hygiene or successful application of the techniques of preventive medicine. Koranic injunctions to be fertile encourage rapid population increase, while other Moslem precepts support certain habits which ultimately are detrimental to health or which stand in the way of improving general health standards.

The Egyptian Government has so far not had much success in its efforts to cope with the most serious problems. Health and sanitation projects, too few in number and poorly financed, have not been satisfactory either from a purely material or a socioeconomic point of view. The shortage of trained medical personnel and the tendency of the country's urbancriented doctors and nurses to concentrate in Cairo and the few other cities have imposed an absolute limitation on the medical services available to a rapidly expanding rural population.

Many of the steps which Egypt might take to improve the present situation seem blocked by precisely those failings which render them so necessary to people. The partial remedies of the postwar period, though encouraging, appear hardly more than palliative, and they are steadily being vitiated by the relentless growth of the population.

Concepts of Disease and Treatment

Egyptians, with the exception of the urban middle- and upper-class groups, view problems of health and disease in radically different terms from those which prevail in the modern western nations. For the mass of the Egyptian peasantry and urban workers, disease is not a temporary suspension of good health. Rather, chronic illness of one kind or another is almost the norm, so much a part of existence as to be taken for granted. Although endowed with a robust physique and hardened by heavy labor, the fellah usually falls prey at an early age to one or a number of debilitating diseases. So long as he can continue to work he is not prone to consider himself in need of medical attention; having learned to live with illness, he is not apt to seek medical help—which in any event is readily available to relatively few—until he is no longer able to follow his daily routine.

Traditional religious beliefs powerfully affect popular views about health and disease. Accepting that there is no mediating power between the Creator and His creation and that all things and events proceed from God's universal and absolute will, the majority of Egyptians tend to see sickness and death as manifestation of the Divine Will. Pagan beliefs and superstitions have persisted within the framework of Islam in the countryside, and many of these relate directly to sickness and health. One of the most widespread folk beliefs is that jinns (spirits) have power to do men good or evil. Another is that the "evil eye" brings sickness and death to its victims. As a result of the persistence of these ideas, sorcerers-preferably Copts, who are thought to have power to control or ward off these forces-are much in demand. Children are commonly safeguarded against the evil eye by a blue bead hung on a thread around the neck; sometimes a favored son is dressed as a girl-to trick the evil eye. The preliminaries to childbirth include various practices designed to bring the child full health and happiness and it is widely believed, for example, that if an expectant mother occupies her time gazing at pictures of good-looking men her child will surely be a handsome son.

Although the government and a number of private foreign and Egyptian organizations are attempting to dissipate these superstitions and to educate the fellahin through lectures, demonstrations, and films on personal and social hygiene, they have had limited success. The fellah's beliefs represent an outlook which has the sanction of long tradition and which is bolstered by his present circumstances, rather than arbitrary notions to be dispelled by rational argument alone.

Poverty and lack of medical facilities and personnel are obvious and major factors in the poor physical condition of the fellah. Of those who

have learned to want medical aid, many are denied it by poverty or lack of local facilities. Hospital treatment is out of the question for most, and where it is available, the peasant is apt to be reluctant to go to a hospital, fearing to leave his wife and children and apprehensive about his ability to maintain the family while away. Most often he places his trust in providence and continues to rely on the mizayen (barber-surgeon) or some other folk practitioner for treatment.

In hundreds of villages the mizayen continues to be the most prominent medical practitioner. His is a practical rather than a magical skill, and, in addition to his tonsorial duties, he treats wounds, pulls teeth, dispenses purgatives, performs circumcisions, administers vaccinations, and serves as village coroner. Another important professional personage in the village is the midwife, whose calling is transmitted in families from mother to daughter. Crude as are the methods of the midwife, her position is doubly secured—by the lack of doctors and by Egyptian ideas of modesty which for most country people would make the performance of the midwife's duties by a man unthinkable.

As stated, villagers and the uneducated in general invoke the aid of magic and sorcerers in meeting their health needs. The village sheikh, an older man noted for his learning and wisdom, is widely believed to possess magical remedies and fertility charms. In this case, no clear distinction seems to be made between the efficacy of magic and prayer. Thus it is common for the sheikh to be asked to write a prayer or a Koranic text on a piece of paper to be placed in a jar of water. When the water is drunk by a childless couple, it supposedly has power to make them fertile.

These several village practitioners—mizayen, midwife, sorcerer, sheikh—seem not to be in competition with one another; each performs a special function and caters to a particular need. The pattern is one that would allow, without any great resistance, the introduction of still another practitioner—the modern doctor and medical specialist. This has been borne out by the experience of mobile hospital units in Egypt; it has been demonstrated that the fellah is capable of accepting modern medical treatment if it is brought to him. Once the confidence reposed in the folk practitioners is transferred to the physician, the peasant submits himself to even the most painful treatment in the blind faith that every ailment must have its cure,

Diet and Nutrition

The provision of an adequate diet for its people is perhaps Egypt's greatest health problem. The food consumption of the mass of the population

is deficient in the balance of elements essential to health as well as in quantity. Since Egypt's transition from a diversified agriculture to the production of cotton for export in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the fellah has raised insufficient food for his own consumption and his meager earnings from cotton have not been enough to meet his needs. This problem becomes yearly more critical as the population steadily increases.

Lacking both variety and abundance, the diet of the majority of Egyptians is dominated by a single staple, bettai (maize bread), which provides 80 percent of their caloric intake and 50 percent of their protein intake. In the south, millet and wheat are more widely used as a maize substitute. Vegetables and fruits are available in limited quantities. These include onions, eggplants (the potatoes of the Middle East), tomatoes, turnips, cucumbers, green peppers, lettuce, green beans, lentils, marrows, citrus fruits, and dates. At most, 10 percent of the average Egyptian's caloric intake is obtained from these products; to them may be added an occasional egg and a coarse sour variety of cream cheese made of goat or buffalo milk preserved in salt water (crude salt is obtained from Damietta).

Meat is an expensive delicacy rarely enjoyed by the fellah. A prosperous peasant family might have meat once a week; the poorer families see it only at festival times or when an animal has been killed by accident. Pork, considered unclean and prohibited by Koranic injunction, is eaten only by Copts and the non-indigenous minorities. Fish is available to those living on the banks of the Nile or near a lake.

Water and tea are the main beverages of the fellah. Coffee, more expensive, is better known in the cities than in the countryside. Water, drawn directly from the irrigation ditches, is invariably contaminated, and as a rule little effort is made to purify it. The black tea consumed by both adults and children has been described as the national drug of Egypt. Concentrated by being boiled into a thick, black, syrupy liquid, it is a powerful drink, detrimental to both stomach and nerves.

As a rule, the peasant eats three meals a day: at sunrise before leaving for work (fitr); about 10 a.m., in the fields (ghada); and at home at dusk (asha). In the fields the fellahin may be seen at the midmorning meal, sitting cross-legged on the ground, eating with their fingers from the common bowl and drinking from a bottle passed from hand to hand. The evening meal, the chief one of the day, consists of hot food cooked over an oil stove or in the household oven, heated by means of strawed cow dung.

Sanitation

The lack of pure water is a major health problem in Egypt. Cities

and villages all depend on the Nile for their water supply; cities have filtration and chlorination plants, but relatively few villages know this protection. Even where pure water has been provided, the fellah is apt to go on drinking the untreated waters of the Nile—his wife may find it inconvenient to go to the pump, the smallest fee for the pure water will seem too much, or, if he is not one of the many who believe that raw Nile water will enhance his fertility, he is convinced that it is pure by reason of the river's flow. Even more polluted than the Nile are the irrigation canals, which are laden with human and animal waste—and continue to be a major source of water supply.

The general sanitation of all but a few "model" villages is extremely poor. Dust beclouds the air of narrow alleys strewn with offal and rubbish. The village birka (reservoir) is usually a greenish pool of stagnant water which provides drinking water, a bathing place for the children, and a laundry for the women. There is also the inevitable village dump where dirt, dung, and carrion are constantly being heaped and left for the village dogs or birds to dispose of. Sewage disposal facilities in the village are few and primitive. Pits dug near the houses serve as latrines, as do the irrigation ditches in the field.

The handling of food is another source of illness and contagion. Foods retailed in the shops are exposed to dust and flies. Fruits and vegetables are frequently grown in soil on which raw sewage has been used as fertilizer; they are often washed in the polluted canals en route to the market. Dairy herds are not inspected, and the sanitary quality of milk is not controlled. There is little supervision of meats before and after slaughtering and little refrigeration capacity to keep it fresh after slaughtering.

Incidence of Disease

Weakened by malnutrition and living in unsanitary and crowded surroundings, the Egyptian is prey to an impressive array of debilitating or fatal diseases. Prominent among these are bilharzia, hookworm, trachoma, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, typhoid, paratyphoid, typhus, diarrhea, enteritis, and malaria. Less common—but more difficult to control—are yellow fever, meningitis, pneumonia, leprosy, and occasionally bubonic plague.

Chief among Egypt's debilitating diseases is schistosomiasis, commonly known as bilharzia. In 1949 the Ministry of Public Health estimated that 14 million persons, or about two thirds of the total population, suffered from this infection. Among the peasants, bilharzia spreads primarily from their habit of relieving themselves in the irrigation canals or on the canal

banks. The eggs of the parasite that causes the disease are passed by the human subject, hatch into larvae which penetrate the body of a snail, and after a period of further development enter human beings through the skin. In the body, the parasite, a blood fluke, attacks various organs, causing low vitality and lassitude. Bilharzia is most widespread in the delta, where the extensive system of perennial irrigation, by keeping the ground moist throughout the year, favors the disease-producing organisms. The incidence of bilharzia is several times higher among men than among women—apparently because men spend the greater part of the day working barefooted in the irrigation canals.

Other common disease-producing parasites are hookworms, round-worms, and beef and mutton tapeworms. The incidence of hookworm infection varies throughout the country but averages about 50 percent. Round-worm infection is less widespread but is common, particularly in the south-central portion of the delta. A fluke, transmitted to humans in mullet and certain other fish, is prevalent around the lakes of the northern littoral of the delta.

Trachoma and other eye diseases are pernicious ailments in Egypt, Dust, heat, glare, and blown sand, helped out by flies and dirty fingers, combine to inflame and infect the eyes. Approximately 90 percent of Egypt's population suffer from eye diseases, and an estimated 2 percent are blind. Trachoma was diagnosed in over 98 percent of some 13,000 children recently examined in Cairo primary schools. Acute purulent conjunctivitis is equally prevalent, and a large number of young children are affected repeatedly with resultant damage to the cornea. Prayer recitation accompanied by the rubbing of saliva into the eyes is still the popular remedy for these eye conditions.

The tuberculosis rate, although not definitely known, is believed to be high. An analysis of over 50,000 tuberculin tests performed between 1937 and 1947 showed 73.4 percent positive reactors among individuals under 5 years of age; 63 percent at 5 to 10 years; 73.5 percent at 10 to 15 years; and 86.4 percent among adults. Bovine tuberculosis is highly endemic among the local cattle, but human infection from this source is no doubt restricted by the almost universal habit of boiling all milk.

Typhoid and paratyphoid are endemic in all parts of Egypt, and serologic tests performed in a village near Cairo in 1949 produced data which, if representative, suggested an infection rate of 1,400 per 100,000 population. There are indications that the incidence of typhoid and paratyphoid has increased in urban areas in recent years as a result of rural migration to the cities.

Syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, and other venereal diseases are widespread; it is estimated that about 20 percent of the population are infected. The Egyptian Government attempts to control prostitution by licensing brothels and prostitutes, but the medical inspection of prostitutes is impossible, since any woman may avoid examination by claiming to be married.

Malaria is mildly endemic throughout the Nile Valley and on occasions has reached serious proportions in parts of Faiyum province, the Suez region, and the western oases. The infection rate averages from 1 to 5 percent in Upper Egypt and from 3 to 10 percent in the delta, with the areas of greatest incidence there being the vicinities of the rice fields and lakes. Occasionally a severe malaria epidemic occurs, such as that caused between 1943 and 1945 by the introduction of Anopheles gambiae from West Africa. It is estimated that on that occasion there were between 1 and 2 million malaria cases in the provinces of Qena and Aswan.

Typhus fever, a louse-borne disease, is endemic in the delta region. Its incidence has been particularly high in Beheira and Gharbiya provinces where most of the land is divided into large estates worked by transient laborers living under primitive conditions with little or no medical care. The migration of a number of these workers to Cairo, Alexandria, and the ports of the Suez Canal during World War II led to an increase of typhus in these centers. In recent years typhus has been considerably reduced by the use of DDT.

Bubonic plague, which flared into epidemic proportions in Alexandria in 1899, is always a threat in Egypt. Throughout the country the crevices in the stone embankments of the canals and the numerous dovecots in the fields and on the roofs of houses provide excellent shelter for rats, the carriers of the fleas which transmit the plague. The rise in incidence of the plague in August and September is attributed to the fact that the rats flee from the embankments in those months in order to escape the floods and take refuge in the adjacent houses,

Medical Facilities and Personnel

The Nasser Government has emphasized its intention to improve conditions in the related fields of health and sanitation, and one of its major criticisms of the monarchy which it deposed has been that the latter neglected the health and other needs of the fellah and the urban worker. Among the early steps taken by the new regime was the establishment of the model Liberation Province (see Chapter 15, Agriculture), in which villages were to have, among other things, improved housing, modern sewage

disposal, water purification, and medical facilities. However, the budget of the Ministry of Public Health remains far below what would be required for the realization of all the announced aims of the government.

The Ministry of Public Health

Egypt's Ministry of Public Health was set up in 1936. Prominent among the dozen or so independently operating divisions into which it is organized are the Departments of Preventive Medicine, Rural Health, Social Hygiene, and Endemic Diseases Research and Control. From the viewpoint of organization, the major criticism leveled at the Ministry is that, although the number and names of the various departments undergo constant change, there is always overlapping of responsibility and duplication of function. The Ministry is also criticized on the ground that its departments, with their headquarters in Cairo, have little real knowledge of the problems of the fellah and tend to embark on programs which are too theoretical or merely imitative of western models.

Medical Facilities

Neither medical facilities nor personnel are sufficient in number and quality to meet the needs of the country, and this deficiency is rendered more marked by the tendency for the medical institutions and personnel to be concentrated in the few large cities while the rural areas are neglected.

Approximately 95 percent of the hospitals in Egypt are maintained by the government. The remainder, located almost exclusively in the urban centers, are operated by religious societies or private groups, the latter usually for the benefit of foreign groups. The Coptic and Jewish communities in Cairo each maintain their own hospital.

The Ministry of Public Health operates four general hospitals and two children's hospitals connected with the university medical schools in Cairo and Alexandria. Hospital bed capacity in Cairo is about 3, 700, in Alexandria about 650. In the capitals of each of the provinces and in the governorates the Ministry maintains general hospitals which range in size from 100 to 150 beds. It also in theory provides a hospital of 20 to 30 beds or more in each markaz (district).

The departments of the Ministry also operate hospitals for the treatment of particular diseases. Among these, there are hospitals and traveling clinics for the treatment of trachoma and other eye diseases, leprosy colonies and clinics, tuberculosis sanatoriums and clinics, centers for the treatment of malaria, ankylostomiasis, bilharzia, venereal diseases, and centers

for maternal and child welfare. Mental hospitals are located at Abbasia and Khanka. A number of the rural health centers also have facilities for the care of emergency cases.

The Laboratory Department of the Ministry operates a central laboratory in Cairo and provincial laboratories in Alexandria, Port Said, Luxor, Assiut, Tanta, and El Mansura. There are three medical schools in Egypt. Two, the Kasr el-Ainy Faculty of Medicine and the Abbasia Faculty of Medicine, are affiliated with Cairo University; the third is established at Alexandria University. There are also schools of dentistry, pharmacy, and veterinary medicine at Cairo University. Nurses' training schools are connected with the Kasr el-Ainy and the Demerdash hospitals in Cairo. Short courses are offered by several sections of the Ministry of Public Health for the training of assistant nursing personnel.

Medical Personnel

In 1950 there was one doctor to every 1,000 inhabitants in the cities and one to every 13,000 rural inhabitants. There is a similar lack of trained nurses and other health personnel; in 1950 the entire country had only 640 dentists, about 900 nurses, slightly over 500 scientifically trained midwives, about 550 veterinarians, approximately 1,600 pharmacists, and some 750 medical technicians.

Recent government attempts to attract more Egyptian youth into the medical profession have increased the number of students, but the quality of training is reported to have declined. Moreover, there is a serious educational problem in the widespread cheating on examinations and the tendency of the average Egyptian student to rely on rote memorization rather than independent thought (see Chapter 21, Education).

Another problem is the reluctance of doctors and nurses to settle in the rural areas where their services are most urgently needed. In this there is reflected the traditional gap between Egypt's rural mass and its urban elite, a gap which in the case of doctors or other modern professional persons is widened by the alien character and special prestige of their westernstyle training. One consequence has been a tendency for some doctors to concentrate on the possible rewards of their profession rather than on its duties. With the ideal of service to the community little developed, the physician is likely to practice with an eye to financial return and social prestige rather than medical need.

CHAPTER 19

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The vast majority of Egypt's people live in villages each of which tends to be a self-contained unit. Largely self-sufficient in material things and left to their own political devices in local matters, Egypt's villages are so many small societies, sharing in a common cultural tradition but largely isolated from each other in the concerns of daily life. The people of the towns and cities are dependent upon the agricultural base of the villages, but they live in a separate urban world that is socially and culturally very different in construction from village society, with which it has little direct intercourse.

Across this gap between town and country the points of contact are few and discontinuous. From the time of the pharaohs, government inspectors and officials—the functionaries of a distant taxing and conscripting government-have operated in the countryside, as have the agents of absentee landlords who came periodically to give orders or to collect rents. The absentee landlords, living in the city, usually maintain homes in their respective villages; though they visit these homes periodically, they generally remain aloof from the villages and village interests. What little the villager knows of urban life comes mainly through the bazaars and weekly markets, where he sells or exchanges his products for personal necessities; on such trips he may have occasion to frequent cinemas, coffeehouses, mosques, and the law courts. Service in the army and exposure to the media of mass communication are making the fellah more familiar with the town, but the rural and the urban segments of Egyptian society are still remote from each other. The villager continues to feel inferior to the townsman, and he looks on the representatives of the landlord and the government with distrust; the educated townsman considers himself superior to the peasant, who is dismissed as ignorant, doltish, and constitutionally incapable of bettering himself.

Even the increasing migration from the countryside to the towns seems to have had little effect upon the urban-rural gap. In recent decades there has been a steady, large-scale movement from the villages and the

nomad camps to the towns, but it has been mainly a one-way shift, with very little movement in the opposite direction. Whole families have moved from the villages seeking to better themselves, and more than half of the men discharged from the army move to the cities. Some of these make good, usually as small shopkeepers, while others have simply been absorbed into the ranks of unskilled servants and laborers. A few who have prospered return home to invest their savings in land and enjoy enhanced prestige among their fellows, and some of the failures return to their villages in disappointment; in general, however, peasant families who have moved to the towns—however harsh their experience there—are reluctant to return to their villages.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

The separation of urban and rural Egyptian society has resulted in differences in the social stratification of the two groups. There is, however, an over-all pattern of social ranking which applies in town and country, since the same basic criteria of status and prestige are recognized in both.

Egyptian society, whether urban or rural, has until recently emphasized land ownership as the primary source of social status. It was this rather than any principle of inherited class status which constituted the basic criterion for the order of the rungs of the social ladder. Egyptian society has not been characterized by any system of fixed classes or by an aristocracy based on inherited titles and associated lands. A family's status depended on the amount of land it inherited or acquired; the ability to accumulate more land was enhanced by favors granted in court and by appointments received in the government. By the same token, a family could lose status directly by loss of its lands—or by falling afoul of the government authorities, which usually resulted in loss of lands. Status could be acquired in other ways—by promotion in the government, by advancement in the professions or in the army, or by advantageous marriage—but rise in status had to be confirmed through the subsequent conversion of wealth to landholdings.

Since social status was based more on wealth than on occupation, it was common for landowning families to intermarry with families of wealth or position that was based on commercial interests or high governmental or army posts. This created in the upper levels of society a diversity of interests combined with a consolidation of riches and power. On the lower levels of urban society, however, where occupations tended to be inherited, marriages were usually contracted within a particular craft group rather than between different groups. With the growth of middle-class interests in industry and the professions, however, marriages are taking place among

various occupational groups; this is contributing to the establishment of new areas of wealth and influence.

As a result of the mobility inherent in the system, Egyptians are less conscious of class distinctions, as such, than of the more extreme and obvious manifestations of status. In effect there have been two large class divisions: the rich of the cities and the predominantly rural poor. Since the wealthy landlords were also the possessors of political power, the cities became the domain of the "rulers" and the villages the territory of the "ruled." The social distance between the extremes was thrown into relief by the fact that the ruling class was largely of foreign origin. Between these two extremes existed an urban middle-class group, also largely of foreign origin, but it was small and politically insignificant. The westernization of Egyptian urban society, beginning in 1820 and accelerating under British domination, served further to widen the gap between town and country, for it was the educated and well-to-do of the cities who acquired the veneer of western culture with its special symbols of wealth, power, and prestige.

Westernization nevertheless brought with it the first signs of a shift in the economic and political center of gravity in Egyptian society. Previously small and ineffectual, the middle class of the towns responded eagerly to new commercial and political techniques; its indigenous components began to expand relative to the foreign components, and it began to emerge as a threat to the old ruling groups. This threat became a reality in 1952 when the essentially middle-class elements of the army overthrew the monarchy and the government, expropriated the lands of the royal family, and drastically reduced those of the wealthier and more powerful landlords. That this upheaval is essentially a phenomenon of the cities, with little contribution from the rural areas, seems clear enough so far. What is not so clear is its exact nature; and, in view of the present regime's continuous international political involvements, the domestic social program becomes difficult to evaluate.

THE EGYPTIAN CLASSES

Urban Society

The Upper Class. From early Ottoman times until the assumption of power by Mohammed Ali, Egypt had neither an hereditary aristocracy nor an hereditary royal family. Mohammed Ali's family, however, assumed a quasi-royal status which became hereditary in fact with the accession after World War I of Mohammed's descendant, Fuad I. Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century the ruling family formed the center of

a court around which clustered a horde of wealthy landlords seeking to exchange their support for royal favor. Upon them such titles as pasha and bey were bestowed by the monarchy, but no titles were hereditary, expiring with the death of the holders. Impermanent though they were, these titles were highly coveted, for they carried political power, influence, and certain privileges which usually led to the accumulation of still more wealth and consequently still greater influence.

With this inutually reinforcing combination of affluence and political power, the great landlords were able to establish themselves firmly as an "elite" group at the top of the social scale. Collectively they controlled a disproportionate amount of the country's basic source of wealth (see Chapter 15, Agriculture), and consistently they provided the majority of the cabinet ministers, members of parliament, and high-ranking army officers. From such positions, further strengthened by inter-marriage, they were able to control a top-heavy bureaucracy as well as the army and the police force, largely by the appointment of relatives and the use of patronage. They profited furthermore from the support of leading religious figures such as the Grand Mufti, the ulama (learned men), and the leading imams (prayer leaders), all of whom viewed with alarm the growing secularization of the middle-class intellectual and professional groups.

Until 1952 this elite had little difficulty in maintaining its privileged position and effectively insulating itself from the rest of the population. Composed largely of persons of non-Egyptian extraction, notably Turks and Albanians, the ruling elite often scorned to speak Arabic, which it regarded as the language of the mob, and it affected so great an appreciation of European arts and letters that its members contributed little or nothing to the revival of indigenous culture, which came as a reaction to western influence. (See Chapter 22, Artistic and Intellectual Achievement.) Conspicuous for its lavish spending and display of wealth, the group remained impervious to the growing unrest of the middle class and the misery of the peasants.

When on July 23, 1952, a group of junior army officers seized power, their principal target was the old elite. The royal family and those closest to it were divested of lands, and the holdings of lesser landlords were drastically reduced. All titles of class and nobility were abolished. With the loss of their privileges, large numbers of wealthy people fled the country; those who remained sought cover by withdrawing from public life. The traditional privileged isolation of this group made its removal a matter of little consequence to other segments of Egyptian society. Wealth still remains the principal criterion for social status, but social acceptability seems now to be established on a broader basis than the mere possession of land.

The Middle Class. The forces which erupted in 1952 were the culmination of a steady process of secularization and westernization that brought with it an increasing social, economic, and political awareness on the part of the Egyptian middle class. The long-standing political ineffectiveness of this group was due to several factors. In the first place, it had never been numerically large. Secondly, it lacked cultural or social homogeneity and showed little solidarity in terms of common goals; many of its members belonged to foreign minorities which were socially self-contained and politically less effective than their Egyptian counterparts. Thirdly, the upper levels of the Egyptian middle class were composed of professional men, newspaper editors, wealthy merchants, industrialists, some western-educated intellectuals and technicians, and the higher clergy, all of whose traditional values and ambitions led them to emulate the upper class rather than to threaten its status.

On the other hand, it was precisely within the upper-middle class that western influences produced the first visible signs of the stirring of social conscience and public spirit. Most of the welfare organizations and other projects for the public benefit were initiated by members of the upper-middle class. Such agitation as there was against the Egyptian agrarian system was also the work of some of the members of this group, who saw that the traditional preoccupation with land was tying up capital which might have been used for the industrial and commercial development of the country.

Just below this heterogeneous level of the middle class there is now a growing urban lower-middle class element. Largely indigenous in character, it is made up of the minor civil servants, small merchants, artisans, factory foremen, skilled workers, elementary schoolteachers, and assorted employees in the service trades. In contrast to the higher levels of the middle class this group shows its more or less recent rural antecedents in manners and dress. Little involved in the western-inspired reformist movements of an earlier period, the urban lower-middle class today is responding fervidly to the nationalist and anti-western slogans of the Egyptian Government.

The Lower Class. The urban lower classes, largely illiterate and desperately poor, include nonskilled factory workers, porters, peddlers, street entertainers, and assorted drifters. Apart from their various occupational distinctions, the members of this general group show considerable social differentiation among themselves. Some of this is based on the tendency in the Middle East for occupational groups to form social clusters almost like castes—particularly among families that have pursued particular occupations for centuries, passing a trade or skill from father to son and marrying within the occupational grouping. This tendency exists also among

those members of the middle class that still follow traditional occupations, but it is more pronounced among the lower classes. Other factors which contribute to social clustering are common ethnic or regional origin and religious affiliation. The most tightly integrated social clusterings are those in which occupation and other ties coincide to produce a special awareness of group affiliation. Domestic servants in Egypt constitute one of these groups. Most cooks, butlers, and houseboys come from Upper Egypt or below the Sudanese border; clannish in their largely hereditary calling they are punctilious about gradations of status within their own group (see Chapter 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Rural Society

Social differentiation is much less pronounced in the villages than in the city. Leaving aside the largest landowners, who are usually absentees, there are not very wide social gaps between resident peasant landowners, tenant farmers, and hired laborers. Differences in status are especially lessened by the fact that the most important extended kin groups may include both poor and wealthy members. Here the equalizing influences of traditional kin obligations tend to override the more obvious differences in economic status.

Below the level of the absentee landlords and some local representatives of government, the social hierarchy of the countryside tends to be self-contained. A village mayor, for example, may be highly respected by the fellahin, whose firsthand knowledge of the world is limited to the confines of their own village and perhaps two or three neighboring villages and the nearest provincial market center; yet on the national scale a village mayor would be identified with the lower-middle class, as would also local government employees, village merchants and moneylenders, the small peasant landowners, local religious leaders, and such other literate persons as letter writers, postmasters, and teachers.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

The Islamic ideal of human equality theoretically leaves the way open for upward movement from the bottom to the top of Egyptian society. With the removal of the hereditary royal family and the present regime's reiteration of its concern for the "common man," this ideal has taken on somewhat more visible substance than it had prior to 1952. The obvious practical limitations to social mobility remain, however, and the parvenu who attempts to break into the ranks of the old landed elite is likely to meet with scorn

Formerly, a wealthy merchant would invest in land in the hopes of marrying his daughter to a member of an established landed family. A wealthy doctor, having accumulated sufficient money, would buy an estate on the delta, hire a manager, and retire from practice. In this way members of the middle class—or at least their descendants—managed to move into the ranks of the upper class. The converse was also true. Egypt even before World War II was witnessing the decline of certain elements, notably both the smaller artisans, whose traditional trades had become less lucrative with the introduction of modern industrial techniques, and the heirs of landowners, whose estates had been made uneconomical by fragmentation.

Today, while wealth in land is still the principal means of confirming status, other factors are assuming greater importance. Success in incustry or international commerce is now a factor in social status and prestige. Government service is increasingly popular among young Moslems, who are moving into clerical positions formerly held mainly by Copts.

In keeping with this trend, education is assuming greater importance as a means of rising on the social scale. Where once literature, the fine arts, and religious studies provided prestige for the individual, now training for commerce, industry, and government opens the way to wealth and position. Even the urban lower classes are becoming increasingly conscious of the advantages of education over the mere accumulation of small savings as a means to social position.

For the majority of the people, however, the new possibilities for social advancement are still overshadowed by practical limitations. For the villagers and the bulk of the urban workers an economically and socially "useful" education is still largely unobtainable. Conscious of this, most of them pin any modest hopes they may have for self-betterment on the traditional devices. The ambitious fellah may be able to increase his landholdings and provide his sons with dowries for brides from wealthier and more influential families. Alternatively, he may marry his daughters to men from more socially secure families. The efficacy of these means is considerably reduced by the ease and frequency of divorce.

The majority of the Egyptian population thus is still held by a kind of social inertia, and the direct impact of the modern forces making for social change has been felt most strongly by the middle and upper classes of the cities. Isolated by their poverty, most Egyptians have tended to see in the will of God a sufficient explanation for a harsh and narrow existence they could not mend. Today, however, a new factor has been introduced: the recent Egyptian aspirations to power are of a degree and kind that will require, if they are to be achieved, the transformation of the traditionally passive Egyptian mass into a source of active political, economic, and

military strength. The success of the government in hastening this process will hinge by and large on the consistency with which it carries out its stated programs of social reform.

POSITION OF THE MINORITIES

Indigenous Minorities

There are 1,500,000 Copts in Egypt, and until the government began to apply discriminatory pressures after the Israeli invasion of Sinai in 1956 there were over 60,000 Jews.

The Coptic Christian indigenous minority in Egypt is represented on all levels of the social scale. The social organization of Coptic and Moslem villages is practically identical, and Coptic and Moslem elements in mixed villages have for the most part lived together amicably. The Copts, most of whom are literate, have always been prominent in civil service posts and in business administration and banking. On the whole, they have been loyal supporters of the nationalist movement, and their active participation in domestic politics has helped to protect their minority rights. In recent years a growing number of educated Moslems have competed for posts traditionally held by Copts, and in the present period of intense Moslems and Copts, although the only overt evidence of this is the tendency for the government to favor Moslems when making official appointments.

Before 1956 the Jews, an urban group, were found mainly in the upper and middle classes. Occupationally they were usually self-employed businessmen or employees in banks or commercial enterprises. In the period just after World War I, Jews were also increasingly to be found in the professions, particularly medicine and law, and in the entertainment business as cinema owners and night-club proprietors.

The Egyptian Jews generally preferred to make their investments in banks or on the stock exchange; only rarely did they become landowners, though some families have been known to do so. Up-to-date information on the situation of those Jews who have remained in Egypt is scanty and unreliable.

Foreign Minorities

The monopolization of Egyptian banking, commerce, and industry by non-Egyptians led to the establishment in Egypt of foreign colonies, among which the Greek, Armenian, Syrian, Lebanese, Italian, French, and British (the last including many Maltese) were the most prominent. Of these the western European groups remained largely self-contained. The British and French were usually in a position to deal with the Egyptian upper and upper-middle classes on socially equal terms, but many Italians entered such businesses as catering and building and tended to be in contact with a wider section of the Egyptian social spectrum.

Armenians, Syrians, and Lebanese are to be found in middle-class business circles throughout the country, and some of the Syrians and Lebanese, through wealth and long residence, have found acceptance in upper-class circles. The Armenians, who number many wealthy members in their community, also include a highly skilled artisan group—skilled, for example, in bookbinding and the restoration of works of art. Armenians are also prominent in artistic, literary, and musical circles. Among the Greeks there is a range from the wealthiest elements to the lower-middle class, as well as many poor and virtually illiterate Greeks (often from the Aegean Islands), who work in hotels and restaurants and as taxi drivers.

ASSOCIATIONS AND MOVEMENTS

Societies and Clubs

Until comparatively recently only a minority of Egyptians expressed serious interest in local or national associations and movements. Recreation was sought in family groups or groups of close personal friends. Clubs and societies which made demands on public spirit were patronized by few Egyptians and drew most of their support from members of the foreign minority groups. Political association was sporadic and centered on the personality of an individual leader more often than on a program. Teamwork was not understood, and the members of a group tended to court the leader rather than to cooperate with each other.

Western influence brought a change, and an almost feverish enthusiasm for organizational activity developed in upper- and middle-class circles. The rich have their country clubs and town clubs on the western pattern. Acceptance by the Mohammed Ali Club of Cairo was, and still is, the aim of the most ambitious members of the upper classes. Sporting clubs (the Club de Chasse, Royal Egyptian Automobile Club, and many others) are also much frequented by the well to do, and it is on this level that social intercourse among Egypt's ethnic groups has been most active.

The Egyptian middle class fashioned itself upon the elite in developing formal organizations, but their clubs tended to develop on broader lines as social and cultural groups and, above all, as athletic societies.

The cult of the athlete has for many years been strong in Egypt's middle class, and Egyptian athletes, particularly weight-lifters, wrestlers, and long-distance swimmers, are objects of popular adulation. Soccer is the national game, and the Egyptian soccer league has some excellent clubs. The Egyptian Jews have been prominent in recreational activities, and the Maccabi Club did much in promoting physical training spectacles and athletic meets. The Young Men's Moslem Association is the Moslem counterpart of the YMCA and engages in a similar range of activities.

The Coffeehouse

The great informal club of the men of the middle and lower classes of both town and country is the coffeehouse. The gregariousness of the Egyptian male is nowhere better demonstrated than in the coffee shop, where the narghile (water pipe) is passed around and where coffee, tea, and light refreshments are served to an endless stream of customers and card games and trictrac (backgammon) are played continuously.

It might seem strange to the observer that so many men in Egypt should apparently have so much leisure time, but the coffeehouse, usually in the vicinity of a market place or shopping center, is more than a place of recreation; it is much used for the dissemination of news, for the arrangement of marriage contracts, and for commercial transactions. Occupying a key position in the formation of public opinion, the coffeehouse is often also a center of political intrigue. In the countryside the coffeehouse remains one of the two places (the other is the mosque) where social affairs and the intricacies of village politics are discussed and where decisions are taken.

The older customers informally assume the role of arbiters of the discussions that take place there. The oldest and most valued customer is in effect chairman, and he is surrounded by others whose seniority and personal force have given them the prestige to take their place as leaders and judges in the coffeehouse arena. These men regularly occupy the same seats—which according to custom are strictly reserved for them—and should one of these seats be the only empty chair in the house no stranger or comparative newcomer would be allowed to sit in it. The only rule for acceptance in the coffee coterie is approval by the informal committee; once a man is accepted, the only admission fee is the price of a cup of coffee. To be shunned by the leaders is to be banished, and the rejected customer must seek a welcome in another—often a rival—institution.

Nominally merely a public place of refreshment, the coffeehouse sooner or later takes on many of the aspects of a private club. Customers

do not go the rounds of the coffeehouses; they stick to one, or two at the most, where they are welcomed and where they can develop their social, commercial, and political relationships in congenial surroundings.

Village Organizations

The life of the village is predominantly the life of the family, the hard-working existence of the fellah leaves little time for recreation. The tedium of everyday life is relieved for the men by visits to the coffee-house and for the entire family by visits to that important social institution the weekly market (see Chapter 17, Domestic and Foreign Trade). The visits of traveling animal circuses or mobile cinema units provide occasional amusement. Political campaigns produce an ephemeral group consciousness.

The school is now becoming more of a center of village activities, and the perceptible, though slight, improvement in basic education is preparing the ground for more formal types of association.

Other Organizations

Western contact has brought to Egypt trade associations and chambers of commerce, and these have replaced the decaying commercial and craft guilds. Professional associations, many of them sponsored by universities, are gaining ground. A flourishing Red Crescent (counterpart of the Red Cross) has developed concomitantly with an awakening awareness of social problems. The Egyptian Social Leaders Group and such bodies as the Alexandria branch of the Union of Social Welfare Specialists have submitted papers to United Nations seminars. Women's organizations, some of them purely local, others having international affiliations, have been in operation in Egypt for the past 35 years. Their growth has been steady, and the feminist movements (the Egyptian Feminist Union and the Daughters of the Nile) in particular have gained much social and political importance in recent years. A trade union movement has slowly developed along with the development of industry in the towns (see Chapter 14, Organization of Labor).

CHAPTER 20

THE FAMILY

The family in Egypt constitutes the basic framework within which the life of the individual, from birth to death, is worked out. It not only provides its members with support and social orientation in childhood but remains for them throughout life the primary vehicle for economic cooperation, social control, and mutual protection. The first loyalty of the individual is to his family, on whose wealth, welfare, and reputation his own are dependent. This strong tradition of kin solidarity does not mean that the individual has no area in which he may make personal decisions, but such areas are the incidental ones of day-to-day living; the large principles on which the Egyptian family is founded exert too powerful a force for the individual readily to depart from them. These principles are to be seen in the prescriptions relating to family religious obligations, marriage, employment, the protection—and to some extent management—of the family's property, and the defense of its honor.

Western influence and the general process of modern technological and social change are affecting the family as well as other aspects of Egyptian life, particularly in the cities. New economic forms are shaking the old self-sufficiency of the family, governmental institutions are pre-empting some of the welfare and control functions which in the past belonged solely to the family, and a rising Egyptian nationalism is articulating a political ideal of patriotism which may in time transcend the once exclusive loyalty to the kin and local group. But in the meantime many of the traditional patterns have been less uprooted than superficially abraded; and in the countryside—where live some 17,000,000 of Egypt's approximately 23,000,000 people—the family preserves its essential character.

Differences in religion and ethnic affiliation in Egypt are reflected in differences in the form of the family, and traditionally Egyptian law has sanctioned these differences, permitting each ethnic or religious community to manage its family affairs in its own way. Moslems may have as many as four legal wives, while Christians—most of whom are Copts—and Jews are limited to one. Rules of inheritance likewise vary from group to group.

The dominant pattern, however, is that of the 95 percent Moslem majority. The bulk of that majority is to be found in the agricultural villages scattered over the Nile delta and along the Nile in the narrow valley to the south. Each of these villages, which vary in size from a few hundred inhabitants to 10,000 or more, is a structure in which the basic building blocks are the several permutations of the Egyptian family.

FAMILY STRUCTURE

The basic principle determining membership in the Egyptian family is kinship reckoned in the male line. There are at least three kinds of groupings among kinsmen in the villages, in an ascending order of size, but a diminishing order of felt relationship and closeness of association. These are the household, often an extended family consisting of several generations: then the lineage or clan, composed of a number of related extended families; and in some villages a further grouping of the lineages or clans into two larger groups, each of which is thought to be descended from a common male ancestor. Land and wealth-like family, lineage, or groupdescend through males, and, if the competition of relatives for these things is a divisive factor, shared interest and the need for cooperative effort reinforce the unity of the household and to a lesser degree of the lineage. The preference for marriage between cousins contributes to the same end. In such a system, kinship and economic ties coincide with local residence, and the village tends to become the self-contained domain of a few large kin groups.

In all of these kin groups authority is vested in the senior, or most influential or able elder, male. On the level of lineage or clan authority, however, the direct authority of the father of a household thins out to a more or less compelling advisory power. The lineage and even the extended family, if its members do not happen to reside in one household, are only informal units of economic cooperation whose members may assist each other if they are on good terms. The basic unit of work and discipline is the household, and the larger kin entities tend to come to the fore mainly on public and formal occasions and in large matters of family discipline or mutual defense.

A typical household consists of husband and wife, unmarried children, married sons and their wives and children. The pattern varies, however, and a household may include the father's sister or daughter, a paternal niece or nephew if orphaned, or a paternal cousin. The bond is blood relationship to the father, and it includes grandparents as well. The household may also take in married brothers and their wives and children, all

living in the same compound, maintaining a communal guest house or room, and cooperating in group support. In one sizable Upper Egyptian village which has been carefully studied the average household numbered four persons; but a household may, although this is rare, consist of several dozen persons residing in a compound or series of apartments.

Beyond the household there is the group of related families, the lineage whose members regard themselves as related through a more or less remote male ancestor. Frequently this forebear is believed to be a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, in which case his male descendants assume the title "al Sayyid" (lord or master).

The sectional division of some villages into two groups of clans or lineages, each section regarding itself as descended from a common progentior is less well documented for Egypt than for other parts of the Middle East. Where the two sections exist, they are generally thought by the villagers to divide the local population and village area about equally between them. There are no restrictions on intermarriage or social exchange between the sections. The members of each are supposed to possess certain physical and personal traits characteristic of their group, and socially the two divisions may sometimes mark the lines of partisanship in village disputes.

Polygamy is allowed in Islam to the extent of four wives, but Moslem tradition places very strict rules around it. According to the Koran, all wives must be treated alike, so that polygamy is not easy. It is also expensive. In the 1937 census of Egypt nearly 97 percent of married men had one wife, less than 3 percent had two, .17 percent had three, and only .02 percent had four. When a man has more than one wife he is supposed to set up a separate household for each, but poverty may prevent this. Local opinion may demand that a man take as his wife the widow of his brother, even though he is already married. First wives have been known to urge their husbands to take a second wife—if she is young enough to be dominated by the older wife and can be made to help with the work of the household.

One story, possibly apocryphal, suggests the kind of arrangement which may be made. According to the account, a man who lived with three wives in a small house of three stories invited an American lady to meet "his wife." He first took the visitor to the ground-floor kitchen, where a Negroid Sudanese woman was at work. "I would like to introduce my wife," said the host. "She does the cooking for the family." He then took his guest to a second-floor room, where an Egyptian woman was mending clothes. "I would like to introduce my wife," he said. "She does the sewing for the family." They went on to the third floor, where a fair-skinned,

well-dressed Circassian woman was sitting at leisure in a parlor. "This is my wife," said the man. "She does the entertaining for the family." The balance of the visit was spent on the third floor.

RESIDENCE

Families become identified with the villages in which they reside; and passage of generations and the ownership of land strengthens that identification. While an individual may leave the locality to study or work in the city, his ties with the family, and hence with the home village, remain firm. The reluctance with which the rural Egyptian changes his abode, even temporarily, is illustrated by the experience of a man who owned large farms situated some 50 miles apart. On very generous terms he recruited villagers from one of his farms to go in an emergency to assist with the harvest on the other farm. The workers remained only a few days, grew homesick, and drifted back to their own village, leaving the harvest ungathered.

Fellahin households rarely move as units. To some places where industry is developing, such as Mahalla el Kubra with its textile mills, whole families are induced to move by the provision of good housing and various social services. The factory has found this necessary if it is to keep its employees, who would otherwise leave, after saving some money, and return to their villages. In the case of wealthier families, those members who have entered the professions may reside permanently in the cities, but they rarely lose touch with their kinfolk, though they may see little of them.

Within the village the pattern of residence is based on the paternal principle. Ideally, newlyweds live in the bride's household during the first few months of marriage, but after the birth of the first child the bridegroom brings his wife home to live in the house of his father. Actually, such factors as landownership and the compatibility of family members may alter the pattern; a young couple may go on residing with the bride's family if the groom is poor in land and if his services are needed by his parents-in-law. Again, brothers sharing the paternal household may quarrel and set up separate living arrangements; however, a separation is sometimes accomplished simply by closing the interior doors between the two parts of a house and converting each part into a detached apartment with a separate outside entrance.

AUTHORITY

For Moslem families the code covering personal and group conduct

is laid down in the Koran. In fact, from the Koran and the traditions associated with it is derived guidance for all conduct. Indigenous Christians and Jews, of course, have their own codes. In the case of the Copts, many of the details of group behavior closely parallel those of the Moslems with whom they share a common Egyptian cultural heritage.

All three of these religious communities apply a system of paternal authority in the family. In the Moslem immediate family of parents and children the husband is supreme. Technically, the wife and children are his possessions and the household is ruled by him. It may be remarked, however, that the personality factor is important here, as elsewhere, and that a strong wife will dominate a weak husband. In the extended family group ultimate authority usually rests with the senior male, though personality, ability, and wealth may bring about the selection of someone other than the oldest male. Matters of family policy, honor, relations with other families, etc., are determined by the head of the group in consultation with, and with the consent of, other ranking male kin.

Respect for masculine authority and seniority is carefully ingrained in the children. Much attention is paid to the formal deference owed by the young to their elders. Even a mature son may not sit next to his father in public. He should never sit while his father is standing, nor should he smoke in his father's presence. In any discussion with his parent he is expected to yield. Politeness to his father gives him standing in the community. Much hinges on the young man's receiving his father's elessing, and nothing is more devastating than the paternal curse. The eldest son, if he is favored, becomes a kind of crown prince, acting in many cases for his father and receiving special privileges; younger brothers and sisters are expected to obey him on pain of being reported to the father.

In keeping with the aura of respect and awe in which the father ideally moves in his family, he rarely becomes intimate with the children, and in their presence he maintains a formal demeanor with his wife. Affection between father and children may exist, but the tendency is to suppress its expression. A common saying is, "Al khof baraka" (Fear is a blessing).

Children know much greater intimacy with their mothers from the time of infancy on to adolescence. Respect and regard for her are enjoined by the Koran and the Prophetic tradition, which says that "Paradise is at the feet of mothers." The mother's influence over the young children, if less formidably sanctioned than the father's is very great. Later, sons tend to look to their father for direction while daughters continue to be guided by the mother. To the husband, the wife is expected to give her submission and service, obeying his commands and caring in every way for his wants.

Punishment of children may be by cursing, which can attain extreme eloquence at times, deprivation of food (especially meat), slapping, or whipping. The display of anger by the parent is in itself a punishment, and the manifestation of parental wrath is often far more effective than any other punitive action.

FAMILIARITY PATTERNS

Familiarity among relatives shows a definite patterning. Fathers do not joke with their children, and there is no levity between husband and wife. Nor is there any public showing of affection between parents; that would be shameful. From adolescence on, brothers do little joking with each other and traditionally were not supposed to go about together lest they attract the "evil eye." Half brothers and half sisters are not expected to be on good terms, since they have not been nursed from the same breast and are rivals for the father's power and property. On the other hand, full brothers and sisters are expected to be cordial to each other. People generally feel more at ease with their mothers' families than with those of their fathers, since anything to do with fathers is associated with paternal sternness.

SEX

In the countryside the sexes are segregated from each other from adolescence onward; outside the family, men associate with men, women with women. In the more conservative villages men and women even try to avoid looking at each other when passing in the street, the women either turning the face away or drawing veils across their faces. In the mosques women, if present, are segregated; the same happens in some Christian churches, men and women sitting in separate sections. In the cities strict general segregation of the sexes is no longer the rule.

Children are separated as to sex at about the age of 12, when boys and girls begin to perform distinctive chores and avoid playing together. Schools have so far been segregated, but consideration is now being given to making secondary schools coeducational; the universities have been coeducational for about 25 years.

The traditional rules governing sexual behavior have been rigid, and in the villages they remain so. From adolescence onward, sex is something of which to be ashamed. Unmarried girls must disguise their bodily form with extra garments. Reproof by parents for any sexual laxity inflicts acute embarrassment and shame on the offender. Premarital sexual

relations are violently disapproved of. Adultery is at the least an occasion for divorce and often precipitates violent reprisals against the offenders.

CONFLICT

Jealousies arise in families, especially between half brothers and half sisters, each side watching carefully that the other receives no special favors from the father. Marriage arrangements are another source of intrafamily strife. When, in selecting a young man's wife, there is a choice between cousins on the father's and the mother's side, the losing branch may take its defeat badly. If an open quarrel breaks out, as not infrequently happens, a family council is called, which may or may not be able to end the enmity. Quarrels and splits within the family and violent feuds between lineages are common features of Egyptian village life. In one village a feud has been going on for about 150 years. How it started is not known, but rivalry has been bitter, with frequent bloodshed and killings. A family which loses a member in a feud of this kind feels in honor bound to take the life of one of the rival family. If the authorities arrest and execute one of the feuders as a murderer, that in turn automatically assures that some member of the other family will die. And so the feud continues,

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

The strict religious regulation of marriage (varying in the several religious communities) is today supplemented by secular codes which apply to all, though these are no doubt often violated—as with the prohibition against boys marrying before the age of 18 and girls before 16. Among Moslems marriage is concluded as a secular contract between families of the bride and groom. Preferred marriage partners are cousins—an arrangement which keeps intact family property by uniting individuals who are already bound by collateral family ties.

The marriage contract stipulates certain conditions binding on each party, and in recent years there has been an increasing tendency for the bride's parents to add conditions pledging the husband to take only one wife, guarantee her a certain level of maintenance, etc. Each bride has a dowry which the groom must match before the wedding. This bride price goes to the wife as indemnity in the event of divorce. The system puts a high premium on desirable young women from wealthy families, and many men, unable to match the dowry of an acceptable bride, marry late if at all.

The marriage contract, signed by the fathers of the bride and groom, is not valid until certified by a Moslem official and witnessed by one person

for each party. When the contract is duly certified, the opening chapter of the Koran (al Fatiha) is recited; then a feast is held at which the women of the bride's family sing and give the traditional cries of joy. On an agreed date about a fortnight later (during the interval the bride and groom remain apart while their families and friends prepare them for living together) a procession takes the groom to the bride's home, where he is allowed to see her. He remains with her family, but he may not sleep with his wife until the fourth night, which marks the beginning of the couple's life together. The groom from then on, whether or not he has known his wife's parents previously, maintains a formal reserve toward them.

Divorce is authorized under Moslem law at the will of the husband. In recent years, however, the right to divorce has been given to increasing numbers of wives by writing it into their marriage contracts. To become valid, divorces must be formally registered with the government. There are usually more divorces in the first two years of married life than later. A divorced (or widowed) wife usually returns to her father's house unless she has mature children with whom to live.

Marriage practices among Christians and Jews differ in many respects from Moslem customs. The wedding ceremonies are conducted by priests or rabbis. There is probably more likelihood of prior acquaintance between the young people, and women are not secluded as among the Moslems.

One Moslem proscription affects intermarriage among Egypt's ethnic groups—a Moslem may not marry a non-Moslem. On the rare occasions when this ban is disregarded the couple may find it difficult to live in the bride's home community. When a man marries a non-Moslem woman, the wife may retain her religion, but her children are registered as Moslems; after the age of 7 for boys and 9 for girls the mother may lose control of them if she has not become a Moslem or if she has been divorced.

CHILD TRAINING

In the rearing of the Egyptian child strong emphasis is placed on teaching him to conform to the patterns laid down by his elders and to avoid any action which might bring discredit on his family. Proverbs make learning easy, and almost every situation has a proverb to fit it. The advantages of cooperation and reciprocity, for example, are eloquently condensed in the aphorism "Hand washes hand," Originality is discouraged, and the popular acceptance of the immutability of man's fate is brought home to the child in his early religious teaching.

Both boys and girls must learn as soon as possible the duties they must assume as young adults, when ideally they will take over these

activities and give their parents leisure in their old age. Compulsory—but not yet universal—primary-school attendance occupies part of the time of a percentage of the children between the ages of 6 and 12. In the fields, boys under 13 are given the lighter tasks such as directing the flow of water in the irrigation ditches. For boys over 13 there are the heavier tasks of carrying fertilizer and of lifting water in the shadoof (bucket on a counterbalanced pole); when a boy's mustache begins to grow he becomes a full fledged man, taking his place as a working adult in the community.

The girls also follow a course of training in the tasks which they must learn, from watching over smaller brothers and sisters to learning to bake. After a girl is 16 she is much more restricted in her movements than a boy, and from then on if her family is conservative she is largely secluded. Today, more and more girls are attending primary schools, and secondary-school enrollment of girls is rising rapidly.

The contemporary growth of formal education outside the home is making for changes in the outlook and behavior of Egyptian youth, especially in the urban areas. During the recent Suez Canal crisis brigades of schoolgirls were organized and trained for military duties, a function formerly reserved for males. Increasingly, the rigid family controls of the past are giving way to state controls, and these involve new values and wider loyalties than those of kin group and village.

CHAPTER 21

EDUCATION

Education in Egypt represents an amalgam of the centuries-old, religiously oriented Islamic tradition on the one hand and a western-inspired secular system on the other. Against this background of Moslem religious teaching and westernized liberal education a new, more unified, and highly nationalistic educational system has been emerging for some time; Egypt's post-revolutionary rulers are actively fostering its development.

THE ISLAMIC TRADITION

At the pinnacle of Egyptian traditional education is the University of al-Azhar, the world center of Islamic learning, in Cairo. Affiliated with it are a number of institutes in Cairo and provincial centers which offer preparatory religious training at the primary and secondary levels. Below these are the village religious schools (kuttabs), which are now dying out but until the nineteenth century were almost the only schools in the Middle East.

A1-Azhar

Founded in 975, al-Azhar attracts students from the whole Moslem world. In 1954 its enrollment of over 30,000 included several thousand foreign students from some 30 Asian and African countries. Originally the curriculum was entirely devoted to Moslem religious teaching and Arabic studies, but in the present century secular subjects such as mathematics, history, geography, and the natural sciences have been added. Currently both military and physical training are also emphasized.

After nine years' preparation at an al-Azhar institute in Cairo or in a provincial town a student is eligible for a four-year course at the Colleges of Islamic Law, Theology, or Arabic Letters. He then has a choice of further specialization to prepare him to teach or to become a religious judge (qadi), and may take degrees roughly equivalent to the master's or doctorate.

Al-Azhar is governed by a body of learned professors (ulama) headed by the Sheikh al-Azhar, rector of the University, who is appointed by the government and recognized as supreme religious leader in Egypt. The Sheikh al-Azhar generally exerts considerable influence throughout the country in political as well as religious matters.

The Kuttab

Kuttab is an old Arabic word connected in origin with the root ktb, which has to do with writing. It means "the place where the Holy Book is learned." Situated in or near the mosque, the kuttab is still the only school in many villages, and there is sometimes opposition to the new government schools on the ground that they do not provide a proper religious atmosphere. This attitude is reinforced by the villagers' ingrained suspicion of governmental authority.

Originally, kuttabs were financed largely by waqfs (charitable foundations). In 1906 they came under the supervision of the national government, which in return for financial aid insisted upon the inclusion of the three R's in the curriculum. The basis of learning in the kuttabs, however, is still the memorization of the Koran; reading and writing are of secondary importance. In addition to teaching village children (until recently almost exclusively boys), the kuttab teacher, who is addressed as "sheikh," may also function as imam (prayer leader) of the mosque, and he usually exercises considerable influence over the beliefs and attitudes of the adult villagers.

A family gains prestige by sending its children to the kuttab, but the time spent there is often regarded as an economic loss, since peasant children commonly help in the fields from a very early age. Usually, it is the younger brothers who attend the kuttab while older ones work on the land. In the tradition of the kuttab, practical training for economic tasks is left entirely within the province of the family. Pupils are expected to memorize the Koran by the fourth year at the kuttab, but the demands for child labor prevent many from finishing the course. The minority who do complete it generally go to one of the institutes of al-Azhar to prepare for religious work or teaching.

Traditional Teaching Methods

The Arabic word for pupil or student, <u>talib</u>, literally means "seeker." In the Islamic tradition of teaching, oral communication and memorization are considered the best methods of transmitting knowledge. A good

memory is highly valued, and memory training is started at the preschool

age by the family.

Traditionally, seeking knowledge for Moslem scholars has been, not so much a question of probing the unknown, as a process of learning the known, which is seen as eternal and unchangeable. The amassing of information and deduction from accepted premises constitute knowledge. A man is honored as learned on the basis of the amount of the Koran and the number of prophetic traditions he can quote or the proverbs he can marshal in argument. (The Koran is frequently invoked to substantiate a point even in discussions of nonreligious matters.) This emphasis on rote learning has left a deep imprint upon secular education in Egypt and frequently conflicts with westernized teaching and experimental methods. Students are so conditioned to memorization as the major process of learning that even at the university level they are often embarrassed and resentful when called upon to exercise reason or initiative. Facility of verbal expression ranks high as an attainment of the educated man, and eloquence and diction tend to take precedence over substance.

WESTERN INFLUENCE

Secular education in Egypt had its origin with the absorption of Egypt in the Ottoman Empire in 1517, but did not develop extensively until the period of French influence in the nineteenth century. Napoleon's invasion brought many French scholars to Egypt, and later Mohammed Ali (1805-48) set up schools on the French model with the help of French experts. He also sent many students to Europe. Upon their return to Egypt they exerted a considerable westernizing influence by translating European works on history, medicine, law, science, literature, and economics.

The foreign—largely mission—schools, which date from the rule of Mohammed Ali, constituted another agency of western intellectual penetration into the country. By 1878, 52 percent of Egyptian boys in school were in European-administered institutions. Although American missionary activity in the Near East initially centered in Lebanon, its influence was beginning to be felt elsewhere in the Arab world by the late 1800's.

With the British occupation, the Ministry of Education came under British control, but neither the French language nor French influence was really displaced. French is still widely taught, and French educational methods are still employed in university colleges of liberal arts and law. The British, apart from insuring an adequate supply of trained clerical help in government, did little in the educational field other than continue the practice of sending selected young men abroad to study. In fact, their

failure to provide more schooling for the mass of the population has been the most criticized aspect of their rule, and is remembered with resentment and bitterness among Egyptians even today. By the turn of the century dissatisfaction with the British response to insistent demands for the expansion of educational facilities produced a movement for the establishment of schools by municipalities. Many private schools were also founded about this time, including in 1908 what is now Cairo University. In 1908, also, popular pressure caused English to be replaced by Arabic as the principal language of instruction in government schools. With the achievement of independence in 1923, Egypt embarked upon an ambitious program aimed at providing free public education, and by 1955 there was a total school population of nearly 2 million.

The end of British rule, however, by no means brought about the end of British influence in educational policy. English remained the language of instruction in many private and foreign schools, as well as a principal foreign language in state schools. The teaching of science, medicine, and engineering in the universities is still based on British patterns. Dating also from the period of the British occupation is the popular conception of education as a means to government position. Western influence as a whole has retained its hold on Egyptian education through the number of foreign schools still functioning and through the current prestige of the secular trained intellectuals, particularly those who have studied abroad. These, rather than the traditional religious leaders, are increasingly looked to for leadership.

ORGANIZATION OF GENERAL EDUCATION

The administration of education in Egypt traditionally has been highly centralized and basically authoritarian. The Ministry of Education exercises direct control over the school system, prescribing the curriculum, appointing teachers, and setting general examinations. This dictation of programs from above allows very little scope for initiative on the part of teachers. It has also involved frequent changes in educational policy with changes of ministries. Politics intrude into both administrative and academic appointments, and political considerations have often entered into such matters as the reinstatement of expelled students and the determination of grades.

In 1951 the separate systems of elementary schools (for the poorer segments of the population) and primary schools (leading to secondary education, which the poor could not afford) were united in a single system of basic education. Most private schools were taken over by the government;

those that remain as private—largely foreign schools—are not given state aid or encouragement and are closely supervised by the Ministry of Education

The Ministry of Education's proportion of the national budget rose from 4 percent in 1920 to nearly 13 percent in 1955, and free tuition is provided in both primary and secondary government schools. Free tuition, but not maintenance, is also available to over half of Egypt's almost 60,000 university students. Information is not available on the basis for the selection of scholarship students.

Although in 1933 education was made compulsory for all children between the ages of 7 and 12, the law has proved in practice impossible to enforce except in urban areas. This is partly due to rural suspicion of government-provided education and to the widespread view of villagers that the aims and methods of state schools are neither relevant to practical life nor suitable on religious grounds. An even more compelling factor in the evasion of school attendance is the paramount importance of children as a nonsalaried element of the agricultural labor force (see Chapter 13, Availability and Use of Manpower); they are regarded as an economic asset from an early age. Attendance has, however, been somewhat improved by the provision of a free midday meal, and the national system of compulsory primary education has begun to make real inroads into the village kuttab system.

There is a growing awareness even in rural areas of the value of government education in leading to prestige in the local community and to civil service positions. Great sacrifices are often made by provincial families in order that their sons may be educated in Cairo. In the decade 1943-53, school enrollment increased by 70 percent, but of 3 million school-age children only about half were in school, and secondary education was still largely the privilege of the urban middle and upper classes. Steady expansion of school facilities is planned by the government, and it is hoped that in the next 10 years they will accommodate the growing number of school-age children. Girls constitute about 35 percent of the school population now, as compared with 10 percent in 1913. Foreign schools have traditionally provided more places for girls in both primary and secondary education than have Egyptian schools, whether private or government. Boys and girls are segregated throughout the educational system below the university level except in foreign schools, which have recently been permitted to conduct desegregated classes.

Primary and Secondary School Curriculum

The system of public examinations has the effect of imposing a

uniformity of curriculum on all schools—at least for the large number of students aiming at government service, since success in the examinations is a requirement for official appointment.

In addition to religious training, the new six-year course of the primary schools includes instruction in Arabic, history, geography, elementary science, and arithmetic. French and English were previously taught during the last third of the course, but a law of 1953 removed foreign languages from the curriculum. The relatively large proportion of time devoted to the study of the Arabic language and literature is necessitated by the substantial difference between the classical written language and the spoken language.

A four year preparatory course and a three-year secondary school program that follows give access to higher education. The curriculum includes Arabic, French, English, mathematics, laboratory sciences, geography, history, civics, and art. Domestic arts and needlework are added for girls. Heavy nationalistic emphasis permeates the teaching of history and civics, and one of the main functions of current Egyptian public education is clearly that of inculcating patriotism. Physical training is also a fundamental part of the curriculum in all public schools.

A number of trade schools offer free vocational training as an alternative to the regular secondary course, but attendance is relatively small in a society in which the popular focus is on academic education leading to government and other white-collar jobs.

Universities

Apart from al-Azhar there are three Egyptian secular universities (Cairo, Ayn Shams, and Alexandria), another, the Mohammed Ali University, is projected for Assiut. All have curricula based on European models. Cairo University, the oldest and largest, was founded in 1908 as a private institution, became a state university in 1925. It has colleges of medicine, law, science, arts, engineering, agriculture, commerce, and Arabic studies. Women number about 3,000 of its 22,000 students.

Founded in 1920, the American University at Cairo is administered by an independent board of trustees in the United States and is modeled roughly along the lines of an American liberal arts college, with English as the language of instruction. It also offers a separate course which prepares students for Egyptian Government examinations, and there is an extension division designed to stimulate the development of adult education and social welfare programs.

A number of special institutes exist, especially in the fields of

teacher training and archaeology. There are also schools of applied engineering, arts, dramatics, and social service.

LITERACY

Despite a steady expansion of education facilities and a campaign against illiteracy initiated in 1944, it was estimated in 1956 that about 75 percent of Egypt's population was illiterate. In evaluating these figures it should be kept in mind that no clear-cut or standard criterion for literacy exists in Egypt. In one district a person may be considered literate if he can sign his name, in others, if he can read a sentence in print. People are also included among the literate on hearsay evidence. The spread of literacy has been retarded, not only by the general inadequacy of educational facilities, but also by the difference between colloquial Arabic and the classical written language. It requires a long time for a child to become literate because of the difficulty of learning to write a classical language which he does not speak, and the difficulty is heightened by the traditional methods of rote learning. (See Chapter 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages.) Many villagers-especially women-relapse into illiteracy after schooling. since they have little or no opportunity to put their reading and writing ability to practical use.

Moreover, the <u>fellahin</u> are only just beginning to realize the need for literacy in overcoming their traditional poverty. In urban areas illiteracy is recognized more directly as a handicap coinciding with low social and economic standing. By 1950, numerous illiterates were being taught in government schools, in the army, in prisons, and in classes organized by employers, cooperatives, and social centers.

EDUCATION UNDER THE NEW REGIME

Recent government publications stress the development of education as "one of the principal goals of the New Regime." Along with an expansion of facilities, there has been a marked intensification of the nationalistic tone of Egyptian education—a striving to lessen the influence of western viewpoints and to focus on the Arabic language, Egyptian history, and the geography of the Arabic world. At the same time there is borrowing of western techniques in the applied sciences, and the Egyptian Government is sending numbers of students to the United States and various European countries, including Czechoslovakia, to study technical subjects.

Heightened nationalism and current anti-western feeling have also resulted in a curtailment of the activities of foreign educational institutions

and more rigid specification of their curricula. Foreign schools in general and sectarian ones in particular have come to be thought of as divisive influences alienating the allegiance of Egyptian students and as potential instruments of foreign propaganda. They were particularly affected by a government decree issued in 1956 which required all schools to give each student instruction in his own religion. Since the Catholic and Protestant schools are strongly averse to teaching the Koran and lay foreign schools prefer to give no religious instruction at all, their approximately 40,000 Moslem students pose a serious problem to foreign institutions. By July 1956, many had agreed to teach the Koran but several had refused and will not reopen. The government order further specified that all foreign schools must close at 11 a.m. on Friday.

Another facet of educational policy under the new regime is a tendency to grant to the provinces some limited autonomy and scope for attention to local problems. Along with this recognition of regional variations has developed an increased governmental interest in technical education—particularly industrial and agricultural schools and adult vocational education.

Rural Education Advances

The emphasis on rural education is a noteworthy feature of the new regime's policy. It is also a cornerstone of the program of the rural social centers; the program dates from the early 1940's and has proved an effective instrument in the government's anti-illiteracy campaign. In this experiment Egypt has begun to break away from its earlier intellectualistic version of western schooling for the elite. A UNESCO training center has contributed further to making Egypt a laboratory in the Middle East for teacher training in the fields of agricultural techniques, rural industry, public health, adult education, and so on. Egypt thus has the lead among the Arab nations in the effort to educate youth for rather than against manual work and to inculcate loyalties to rather than away from the land.

Despite these advances, there is still an overabundance of academically trained Egyptians and a shortage of those equipped with badly needed practical skills.

Educational Problems

The major problem of Egyptian education has been aptly described as its "nonfunctional character." This lack of suitability to indigenous needs has begun to assume serious proportions in the shape of a yearly crop

of several thousand young men and women unsuitably educated for the positions that exist. White-collar unemployment now has reached a sizable figure, and there are grounds for the fear that an increase in unemployment among university graduates might furnish a fertile field for the development of Communist sentiments. Moreover, the dissatisfaction of many young people with any but government or other urban positions may well have serious economic repercussions. Often, higher education has proved a means for luring the more able students permanently away from their home communities where their training is badly needed.

The national government is, however, alert to this problem and is actively taking steps to integrate education more closely with Egypt's vital agricultural and industrial activities. But until basic attitudes toward the goals of education are changed there is likely to be a surplus of whitecollar workers. Education in the eves of most young people is still primarily a path to the comforts of city life and to a career in politics, civil service, law, journalism, or teaching,

Another basic and persistent problem is the chronic shortage of teachers and schools. Egypt's extremely high birth rate entails the need for a constantly expanding school system before anything approaching universal education can be more than a long-term aspiration. The difficulty of recruiting and training teachers of high caliber for the provinces is especially acute, since few are willing to accept the hardships and small rewards of rural teaching. The quality of the existing teaching force is undermined by a general lack of interest. All government teachers are civil servants and are inclined to prefer administrative posts in the Ministry of Education, where the chances of promotion are greater than in teaching.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG STUDENTS

Students in Egypt, as elsewhere in the Middle East, are conscious of themselves as a distinct and powerful group. They are fully aware that in a largely illiterate population the educated wield authority disproportionate to their numbers. At the university level, particularly, they tend to engage in political activities and to make their influence felt through strikes and demonstrations which disrupt discipline and often cause the suspension of classes. This channeling of energy into political activity is partly explained by the current ferment of ideas that tend to loosen the students' traditional roots and thus contribute to conflict and insecurity. Intensive political activity is also related to the almost complete lack of the clubs, societies, and other activities that are characteristic of university social life in the West.

Political parties and nationalist leaders have often incited students to political action. The Wafd (traditional nationalist party), for example, made frequent use of student demonstrations against the British. More recently, many students participated in the riots of January 1952; it is reported that Communist student leadership played a prominent role. "Freedom battalions" were recruited from several universities, and normal educational work came to a standstill for several weeks.

The actual strength of communism among Egyptian students is extremely difficult to ascertain. Many students describe themselves as Communist, but very few really know anything about communism. A large proportion apparently has identified communism with anti-westernism and social reform. Various student groups are subject to Communist direction—largely through Communist infiltration of various groups and organizations—and there is a widespread tendency among them to turn to communism as they understand it as the only possible solution for Egypt's pressing economic problems. The existence of Communist cells has been reported even in the traditionally ultraconservative al-Azhar, and there are grounds for fear that Communist influence among students will spread further if unemployment among university graduates is not held in check.

CHAPTER 22

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL ACHIEVEMENT

Artistic and intellectual expression has been of central importance in the Egyptian tradition-not for its own sake nor as a product of individual genius or virtuosity, but in terms of the Islamic faith with which it was identified and which supported it. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century Egyptian artistic and intellectual activity was almost exclusively religious in its inspiration. The visual arts, restricted in their scope by Koranic prohibitions, were conceived primarily as a means of expressing the glory of Allah. Jolal al-Din al Rumi, the thirteenth century Persian mystic, put it, "the external form [of the artist's work] is for the sake of the unseen forms; and that took shape for the sake of another unseen [form]." Similarly, intellectual expression was bound within the tight limits of the literal word of God as set forth in the Koran. After a brief flowering of intellectual activity in the early days of the Islamic conquest, Moslem thinkers turned to the exegesis of God's word and away from any original attempt to illuminate His nature. One student of the area writes that "all their [the Arabs'] intellectual powers were directed into the effort to build up the structure of the religious institutions of Islam and to make it dominant in every relationship of social life as it already dominated their mental life."

Out of these efforts emerged a remarkably unified pattern of life and thought. Religion provided the code by which life was to be governed; art, drawing upon religion, lent beauty to that life, and the intellect served to interpret and maintain it.

Restricted as it was to a narrowly defined interpretation of Islamic doctrine, creative activity in the Arab world for at least the 300 years preceding the nineteenth century emphasized an appeal to the emotions rather than to reason. The consequence for art and literature was an emphasis on inspired detail at the expense of over-all balance, unity, and coherence. The outcome of this emphasis has been described as "a series of separate moments, each complete in itself and independent, connected by no principle of harmony or congruity beyond the unity of the imagining mind."

Into this static context in the early years of the nineteenth century was exploded a dynamic western intellectual and artistic tradition in which both the rational and the emotional were present and tension was achieved in the conflict between the two. This alien tradition had an identity apart from religion, and it tended to destroy the traditional union of religion with other aspects of Egyptian life. Hereafter, the monopoly of Islam over Egyptian artistic and intellectual efforts was to decline, and in many cases these efforts were to be turned against religion itself. Once the initial shock was dissipated, the reaction of the Egyptian elite to western contact often took the form of slavish imitation. Years passed before any serious attempt was made to adapt western culture to Egyptian realities, and only recently has there been an effort to evaluate the western achievement in terms of its meaning to Egypt.

Today a number of points of view compete for favor and support, particularly among the elite. One (perhaps best exemplified by Sayed Koth's Social Justice in Islam) calls for complete rejection of all forms of western innovation and a return to a pure Islamic faith and practice. Another proposes adoption of western technique as a means of reviving the true values of Islamic culture. The relative success of these schools of thought often can be discerned in current artistic and intellectual productions and has some value as a barometer of the urban Egyptian reaction to western influence.

THE NATURE OF EGYPTIAN ART AND THOUGHT

Despite centuries of exposure to foreign influences, certain aspects of Egypt's art and thought continue to reveal their distinctively Egyptian origin. Among these, there is the emphasis on the fanciful. The versatility of the Egyptian imagination is one of the most striking features of Egypt's long literary tradition. The shipwrecked sailor who peoples a remote isle with beasts and gods (Middle Kingdom), the Coptic saint who converses with the dead from the underworld (Christian era), the Moslem hero who bends the ogress to his will (Islamic period), and the humble hawker of peanuts and melon seeds who becomes a wonder-working saint in the eyes of the Cairene doorkeepers (modern) all are typical of Egyptian fantasy. A love of the picaresque finds its outlet in tales of thieves and sharpers, humble men of the cities who, by a combination of audacity and craft, defy and outwit the rich and the mighty amid the acclaim of the dispossessed. Underlying many of the most persistent literary themes appears to be a desire to escape harsh reality or to fix blame for the common plight.

An important and persistent characteristic of Egyptian intellectual activity is the lack of interest in theoretical, as contrasted with applied,

effort. Historically, the Egyptians have not demonstrated any remarkable prowess in such speculative fields as theology or philosophy. The speculative literature of the last centuries of ancient Egypt was neither large in quantity nor profound in thought. Christian Egypt is remembered for its monasticism and mystical poetry rather than its theology. In the Moslem period the theories upon which Islam as a religion and as a body politic are based were developed in Medina, Damascus, and Baghdad, and the Egyptian contributions to them were minimal. A similar neglect of the theoretical is apparent in other fields. The pyramids constructed early in Egyptian history evidence a practical knowledge of the basic principles of mathematics, but it remained for the Greeks to actually formulate and develop these principles into a more complex and theoretical mathematics.

THE STATUS OF THE ARTIST AND THE INTELLECTUAL

Traditionally, the Egyptian artist and thinker, as the bearer and illuminator of his society's sacred knowledge, has participated in the glory and prestige accorded that knowledge. He was honored, not as the possessor of a particular talent, but as an instrument of God's creativity. The drift in our time of the Egyptian artist and intellectual away from religion has not brought any appreciable diminution of their status. Indeed, many Egyptians, caught in the conflict between western and traditional values, have ceased to look to the religious authorities and have turned instead to the westernized intellectuals for guidance out of the impasse.

Aware of the importance of arts and letters in the development of material pride and international prestige, the Egyptian Government has for some years been active in the support of artistic and intellectual talent. Students who in their early schooling show promise may be granted government scholarships for further study at home or abroad. The government also sponsors a number of permanent art exhibits which permit young artists to become known to the public. In special circumstances the government may itself finance artistic and literary projects or encourage certain types of work by holding competitions for which prizes are offered. The plethora of paintings giving the Egyptian version of the Port Said invasion in 1956 provides an example of the way in which Egypt's artists can rally—or be rallied—to a national cause.

Despite government financial and other assistance, it is difficult for the artist or intellectual to achieve prominence or financial security. The majority are obliged to practice their skills only as week-end hobbies. Others more fortunate are able to find positions in the schools, research

institutions, museums-most of which, it might be added, are owned or controlled by the government-or on the newspapers.

Beyond these observations, little has been recorded about the position, symbolic or social, of artists and intellectuals in Egypt. The importance of additional information on this point is indicated by the susceptibility of this group to international influence of all kinds and the strategic position they occupy in the communication of ideas within the country and in the construction of the national self-image.

THE ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND

Egypt was one of the earliest centers of advanced intellectual and artistic activity. Archaeological discoveries indicate that by 3000 B.C. Egyptians were working in practically all the fields of art. Both the Greeks and the Hebrews were influenced by developments in Egypt, and their own legacies to the western world incorporated more than a little of this borrowing. Later, Egypt played an important role in the cultural development of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern worlds, and it influenced and was influenced by the major civilizations of that region.

Ancient Egypt

Ancient Egypt employed many of the literary forms in use today. Poetry, important throughout Egyptian history, reached a high degree of elaboration. Prose also developed early, and by the end of the Middle Kingdom almost all of the characteristic modes of Egyptian prose were present—the tales of voyage and adventure, stories of heroism and war, and above all the tales of fantasy, wonder, and witchcraft. Prominent among such tales of fantasy is the Story of Sinuhe, the tale of an Egyptian who, accidentally learning of the violent death of King Ammenemes I, flees in fear to Palestine and there rises to a position of eminence and esteem. In the small compass of 350 lines the author of Sinuhe manages both a skillful personal portrait and an adventure story. The Story of Wenamun, written during the Twentieth Dynasty, recounts the travels of an Egyptian diplomat who might almost be a contemporary official.

The visual arts were among the earliest developed in ancient Egypt. While Egyptian art discoveries have been confined mainly to tombs, many of the buried objects were articles of everyday use, and in the elegance and beauty of their design reveal the importance of art in the daily life of the time. Outstanding examples of ancient Egyptian art are the works of the Memphis sculptors; the Great Pyramid at Giza, which exemplifies the

tremendous activity carried on in the construction of sacred buildings; exquisite pieces in jewelry, gold, and ivory; the drawings and paintings of the Theban artists; and masterpieces of heraldry and hieroglyphic calligraphy.

Egypt Between the Persian and Islamic Conquests

In the period between Egypt's absorption into the Achaemenid Empire of Persia in 525 B.C. and the Islamic conquest in the seventh century A.D., Egypt was successively influenced by the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Byzantine Empire. Of particular importance were the spread of Greek thought and the rise of Christianity, both of which were strongly felt in Egypt. With a few exceptions, however, Egyptians were not stimulated to any heights of philosophical speculation, and their contributions remained essentially concrete in nature. The elaboration in Egypt of Christian monasticism was a feature of this period, and the austerity and devotion of the Coptic-speaking Christians were famous throughout the Christian world.

Interest in the arts and letters, dormant and seemingly moribund during the Roman period, woke to life in Egypt under the influence of Christianity. Soon a whole literature, mainly translated from Greek into Coptic Egyptian, provided reading that included the works of Homer, Menander, Hesiod, Sappho, Pindar, and Aristophanes. Later, in the twilight of the Byzantine period, Egypt, which during the Roman period had been comparatively poor in writers, produced several of note.

On the eve of the Moslem invasion Egypt-particularly its urban elite—had for centuries been swept by diverse cultural currents. A Christian country, it nonetheless still retained a lively memory of its pagan past, and the Greek classics continued to form the essential base of a liberal education.

Moslem Egypt

Converted to Islam following the Arab conquest, Egypt contributed little to the philosophical development of this creed or to the later theorizing on the nature of the Islamic social order. The imaginative cast of the Egyptian mentality, however, was reflected in Egypt's role in the development of Islamic mysticism. Among the great mystical poets of Arabic literature produced by Egypt, most important were Ibn al-Farid (born 1181) and al-Busiri (born 1213) whose panegyric of the Prophet, Ode of the Mantle, is considered the most perfect example of its kind.

Another significant Egyptian contribution to Islamic literature was

in the art of the story. Native Arabic writing prior to the Egyptian contribution was poor in narrative literature and it had progressed little beyond the anecdote, in which it excelled. The stock of stories produced by Egyptians in the early Islamic period drew heavily on the past for themes. Strange tales and miraculous narratives were derived from Coptic tradition, and the literature of fantasy was employed to explain the many relics of Egypt's ancient glory. Soon, however, the more recent Islamic heritage began to be exploited in the same way, and incidents in the lives of great men of the time were depicted with consummate skill. Stories of ingenious roguery of city sharpers and thieves, usually with ironic reflections on the honesty and efficiency of the police, are also characteristic of Egyptian writing of that and subsequent periods.

Egypt had long been outstanding in the visual arts, and its contribution in this realm after the Moslem conquest was immediate and impressive. Egyptian craftsmen were recruited for service outside the country and were employed on the early mosques of Jerusalem and Damascus.

Limited by the Koranic prohibition against representing the human body, graphic art in Moslem Egypt found an outlet in the development of geometrical design in every imaginable kind of material. Bookbinding, which reached a high peak of perfection in Egypt, gave full scope to the geometric motif. It was in calligraphy that geometric design found its fullest expression in magnificent reproductions of the Koran and in inscriptions decorating the walls of mosques and other public buildings.

Little has been written on the influence of the Ottoman Turks (1517-1914) on Egyptian artistic and intellectual development. Whether or not Turkish rule was a factor in the intellectual and artistic stagnation in the Arab world under the Ottoman Empire, the common Arab view is that the Turkish period was a repressive and stultifying one.

THE ORAL AND LITERARY TRADITION

Skillful use of the written and spoken word in set speeches, poetry, and formal prose stands at the head of the arts in Egypt and other Moslem countries. More than a means of communication, language, manipulated according to highly formalized canons of taste, becomes an end in itself. A well-worded speech, a proverb, a verse of poetry, or a recitation from the Koran may prove conclusive where logic has failed. As one student has it, "Upon the Arab mind the impact of artistic speech is immediate; the words, passing through no filter of logic or reflection which might weaken or deaden their effect, go straight to the head."

The Influence of the West

Western cultural penetration has brought about significant changes in the forms of literary expression but has not diminished the status of that medium as the dominant artistic form. The major changes which have resulted from contact with the West have been the abandonment of the traditional Islamic poetry for western verse forms and the replacement of such traditional literary styles as the maqama (a type of strictly rhymed prose which lent itself to rhetorical virtuosity) by the novel and the short story. The drama is another artistic form borrowed from the West. Essays and biographies have become important literary forms during the past 50 years. Taha Hussein's The Future of Culture in Egypt is a well-known series of essays on diverse aspects of Egyptian cultural life.

A significant change in narrative form is reflected in the attempt to concentrate more on over-all balance, unity, and coherence and less on inspired detail. This effort has not been completely successful, however; even the most westernized authors feel compelled to present the reader with one climax after another to the detriment of story coherence.

Contact with the West enriched Egyptian literature but has not been an unmitigated blessing. The shift in emphasis from refined beauty of language to communication of information has made the old literary standards obsolete, but no coherent and generally acceptable set of new standards has been created to replace them.

Poetry

Of all literary forms, poetry has at once the greatest traditional value, the widest appeal, and the greatest emotional impact upon the Egyptian mind. In a society in which 70 percent of the population is illiterate, poetry—along with the folk tale—is most easily transmitted by word of mouth and remembered. Moreover, traditional Egyptian poetry was designed to appeal to the emotions of the many rather than the critical taste of the few.

Western influence has altered both Egyptian poetic style and content. In subject matter much of the new poetry resembles that produced in the West after World I: skepticism, disillusionment, and despair are the keynotes. One of the best works in this genre is Mahmud al-Aqqad's The Biography of Satan, which has been compared in theme to T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land. In Aqqad's poem Satan looks on humanity as so worthless as to be beneath his efforts to corrupt it, symbolizing the poet's own loss of faith. Referring to his own personal reaction to the West, the author

later wrote, "I was swept with an injurious skepticism...which shook all my basic beliefs...I could no longer see any wisdom or meaning in life. It became distasteful in all its forms and purposeless."

While al-Aqqad and many other Egyptian poets gave way to skepticism and disillusionment, other contemporary poets have followed a different road and attempted to find an answer to the social, economic, and political problems which beset Egypt. Social injustice, administrative corruption, and anti-western sentiment are common themes in their works. In much of the poetry of this school there is more than devastating criticism of contemporary life; there is a call to action. One such work directed against the corruption of the wealthy concludes:

Listen, my brother, crying is not enough; Only diamond cuts diamond.

Such poems, which depict the dream of throwing off the foreign and domestic oppressors and entering into a new and better world, represent a major current in contemporary Egyptian poetry.

Oral Literature

Telling and listening to stories is largely restricted to children and adolescents, although adults, who are apt to say that story-telling is a waste of time, probably tell stories to their children more often than they will admit. Stories play an important role in preparing the children to understand the norms and attitudes governing family and community life. Any living folklore is also in some degree indicative of current tensions, conflicts, and frustrations in the society in which it occurs. A study of the tales told by children in the Egyptian village of Silwa reveals three basic themes which recurred in almost every tale. The first theme was a concern with food, especially meat. The second touched upon the Oedipus complex and emphasized masculinity. The third was the theme of revenge and retaliation. In these stories, the principal actor commonly achieves success by trickery and chicanery. In one tale, for example, the cock, who is represented as the weakest of all animals, succeeds through cleverness in besting the more powerful animals.

In adult life an extensive literature of proverbs and wise sayings is brought to bear in daily conversation. In their very banality these sayings carry the force of immemorial usage, and they are highly effective counters in discussion and argument.

The Novel and Short Story

The novel and the modern short story were unknown in Egypt prior to western cultural penetration. These new literary forms were quickly adopted by Egyptian writers, and were employed to treat the problems and perplexities resulting from the western impact. The popularity of the novel and the short story among the small number of Egypt's literate reflects the shift in literary emphasis from formal beauty of language to the communication of information and the discussion of problems.

Contemporary Egyptian writers draw heavily for subject matter on their country's ancient and medieval past, but the focus of their interest is on the present. In its treatment of social problems, present-day Egyptian literature shows striking similarities to that of Russia in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Tewfik el-Hakim's Maze of Justice, for example, recalls Gogol's Dead Souls in its criticism of an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. But, where Russian novelists struck a note of hopefulness for the future, contemporary Egyptian literature is marked by almost unrelieved skepticism and disillusionment.

The Maze of Justice, a stinging satire on the red tape and the inhumanity of the bureaucratic legal system in Egypt, provides a vivid and realistic picture of Egyptian village life. One of the major themes of this work is the injustice which arises from the mechanical application of European law in a traditional Moslem community. A second theme is the ignorance and venality of an officialdom that uses its position to abuse and exploit a helpless peasantry. Human want, vengeance, and blood feuds also loom large in this portrayal of rural Egypt.

In another work, The Return of the Spirit, el-Hakim borrows the symbolism of the resurrection in the ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead to construct a novel whose theme is the reawakening of Egypt after the revolt of 1919. Western imperialism, and not Egyptian corruption and inefficiency, is made the main culprit.

Another important literary figure is Mahmoud Teymour. His short story Comedy of Death is a vivid portrayal of the greediness of man. In a different vein, his Amm Mitwalli is the tale of a humble peanut vendor who finds himself elevated to the position of a village saint as a result of the imaginings of the villagers. The story is characteristic of a genre which appeals to the Egyptian love of fantasy.

A third prominent Egyptian writer, Yusif Idris, reveals a detached humor and unsentimental pathos which go beyond the bounds of mere realism. Like el-Hakim, he makes much of the abuses arising from the attempt to impose innovations on a society which is not prepared to receive

them. Much is also made of the inefficiencies of officials and their tendency to hide their fear of responsibility behind legal justification.

The Autobiography and the Essay

Other literary forms borrowed from the West are the autobiography and the essay. Egyptian autobiographical literature provides a fund of information on Egyptian life and the changes of the past 50 years. The essay has served as a vehicle for the discussion both of the problems developing out of western influence and of the past failures and future hopes of Islamic culture

Taha Hussein's <u>The Stream of Days</u>, is perhaps the most widely read autobiography in the Arab world. The author, whose blindness has not prevented him from rising to the position of Minister of Education, vividly portrays life in an Egyptian family and scenes from student days at al-Azhar University Hussein has also written important essays. In the <u>Future of Culture in Egypt</u> he discusses, among other subjects, the failure of the Egyptian methods of education and the impoverishment of Egyptian life stemming from this failure.

Another essayist of note is Ahmad Amin, recently deceased. His autobiography, My Life, establishes the background for a reading of his six volumes of essays, The Outpouring of Thought, which deal with the changes of the past 50 years and the problems of today—the hard lot of the peasant, the weakening of family ties and religious authority, and the deterioration of morals. Amin is also concerned with the dichotomy in modern Egyptian education between the national and the ultra modern. He pleads the need for intellectual integration of the old and new as the best way to preserve and revive the Islamic heritage. He calls for language reform in behalf of the ideal of universal education.

Among lesser known contemporary writers might be mentioned Fikri Abaza, who deals with the problems of modern youth, Ibnat al Shati, the female spokesman of the <u>fellah</u> and Abd al Hamid Fahmi Matar who is the author of Education and the Unemployed.

DRAMA

The Egyptian Theater

The contemporary theater in Egypt was borrowed from the West, but the medieval Egyptian shadow plays—now giving way to the theater and cinema—have contributed to forming Egyptian taste in the drama.

Techniques common to the shadow plays (which are performed with puppets whose shadows are cast on a screen lighted from behind), such as the reliance on obscene words and gestures to provoke laughter and applause, have carried over to the modern theater, as have such traditional themes as criticism of the rich, the highly placed, the foreigner, and occasionally of such groups as the Copts or the Jews. One typical shadow play portrays the plight of the ignorant fellah who finds himself imprisoned and who is liberated only after his wife bribes the Coptic clerk with food, the village chief with money, and the district governor with her body.

Music, which was an essential accompaniment of the shadow play, is highly popular in the contemporary theater. Not only do musicals lead in drawing power, but few performances of any type can be financially successful without some reliance on music. Egyptian theater music as a rule, however, is not composed with the atmosphere of the play in mind, although in the last few years some efforts have been made in this direction.

In addition to foreign plays, Egyptian theaters offer three main types of indigenous drama. The first type is played in classical Arabic, has met with little success, and has not been able to compete with European plays; the second type is the Arab colloquial theater, which is devoted to romanticized history and social drama; the third is the so-called "popular theater."

The historical plays of the colloquial theater glorify the Islamic past and the great days of ancient Egypt. In these productions Arab honor and courage overshadow the feeble virtues of non-Arabs and also highlight their villainies. Typical of the social drama is The Children of the Poor, by Yusuf Wahbi. It traces the story of a girl, Bamba, whose mother has been seduced by a wealthy cousin. Bamba's uncle, to revenge his sister's honor, attempts to kill the seducer but fails and is sent to prison. Released from prison, he becomes a drug addict, finally puts the now syphilitic Bamba to death, and goes insane. Like The Children of the Poor, most of these plays are crude melodrama, but a few represent more serious efforts. These commonly employ such themes as the plight of the fellah or the effect on the family or on religion of westernization. Others, such as el-Hakim's Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, which revives a Koranic story about the early Christians, go back in history to expound more philosophical problems of man's place in the universe. The River of Madness, also by el-Hakim, has as its motif the compulsion exercised by society on the individual.

The third type of Egyptian drama—the so-called "popular theater"—is well received by both the rural and the urban population. It is an admixture of local humor and showmanship and some western farce and burlesque

techniques. Popular themes are government corruption, the naiveté of the fellah, and the peculiarities of the various religious and ethnic groups. An example is al-Rihani's Hasan, Cohen, and Marcus, in which a Moslem, a Jew, and a Copt combine in a business venture. Hasan, the Moslem, is the handsome, confident, cultured, well-dressed front man whose only expertise is in the public relations field; Cohen, the Jew, is the financial wizard; Marcus, the Copt, is the practical operator whose capacity for getting things done makes the enterprise a success. The "popular theater" also lends itself to the expression of antiforeign sentiment, and it has been used in this way in recent years in periods of particularly strong anti-western feeling.

Although most Egyptian comedy is broad farce, the works of a few playwrights are more subtle. An example is <u>A Tea Party</u>, by Mahmud Taimur, which in making fun of the uncritical imitations of western ways conveys a warning of the dangers of this course.

The Cinema

The Egyptian cinema closely parallels the theater in subject matter, dramatic technique, and musical accompaniment. The most popular films are melodramas featuring an assortment of evils--among which drinking, gambling, seduction, and rape loom large.

Both the political and religious authorities in Egypt are sensitive to the potential influence of motion pictures, which are widely popular. Government censorship can halt any politically distasteful film, but the religious authorities do not have that power. Aside from the negative controls of censorship, the government has encouraged such propaganda films as Bloody Palestine which vindicates the Arab defeat in the war with Israel in 1948,

The Dance

Dancing is not highly developed in Egypt nor is it greatly esteemed as an art form. The most popular form of this entertainment—the belly dance—is confined largely to the night clubs of the major urban centers, as is western-style dancing, introduced into Egypt in this century. The belly dance is also frequently seen in plays and motion pictures. In the villages folk dancing frequently accompanies weddings and other ceremonies, Ritual dances are also part of elaborate funeral services.

Egyptian music, important in the theater but by no means confined to that medium or to the concert hall, enters intimately into the lives of the people. Traditional melodies are heard in the cries of the street hawkers, the work chants of the fellahin, and the recitations of the Koran, and music constantly blares from loud-speakers in coffeehouses and other public places. The strength of the musical tradition in Egypt is evident in the ineffectiveness of Koranic prohibitions against music. Not only did music not decline under religious disfavor, but it eventually penetrated religious practice in the adhan, the call to prayer.

Unlike western music, much of which is the product of individual composers working according to fairly rigid rules, music in the Arab world has been improvised by the performer, guided by a tradition rather than by formal theory. Unable to write down what he sang or played, the performer would transmit his pieces by ear to his followers who in turn were free to introduce changes of their own. Even today, the ability to improvise and embellish a melody constitutes the criterion by which a performer is judged.

The traditional Egyptian orchestra consists of at least one wood wind, a drum, a tambourine, and a stringed instrument, the most common of which is the <u>rabab</u>, the one-string violin. More elaborate orchestras add other instruments, including the lute, flutes, oboes, and drums.

Like other aspects of Egyptian culture, music has been changed by contact with the West. Older rhythm patterns have been virtually supplanted by what is called the masmoudi rhythm, similar to a tango with the third beat omitted. Another development, which has only begun, is the attempt to introduce harmony into the traditional music. Western music, as such, has also been introduced into Egypt, and much western classical and popular music is heard in Cairo and the other large cities.

THE VISUAL ARTS

The visual arts have also been affected by western influence. The old art forms still find their highest expression in the architecture of mosques, in the intricately-patterned colored tile work used for decoration, in calligaphy, and in textiles. Alongside these traditional expressions, however, new forms have been introduced, especially in painting and sculpture.

Although modern art in Egypt draws on the Moslem religious tradition, it is much more self-consciously focused on the sculpture and tomb paintings of the Pharaonic age, and most of all it shows the influences of modern Europe. This development has been possible with the general

weakening in Egypt of the Koranic prohibition of the portrayal of the human form. Among the better-known contemporary Egyptian artists are Mahmoud Said, whose paintings of the labor of the Egyptian common people have at tracted world wide attention Hamad Abdalla, an abstractionist painter; and Fadilah, the most prominent Egyptian sculptor, whose works show much pre-Islamic influence.

The development of architecture has paralleled that of painting. While many of the buildings in the urban areas show the influence of southern Europe, particularly modern Italian models, there is also a trend back to pre Islamic Egyptian motifs. An example is the new resettlement village of Gourna designed by Hassan Fathi. Here Fathi has preserved traditional Moslem motifs for decoration but has drawn on ancient Egypt for such functional features as brick barrel-vault roofs (which require no expensive timber) and a simple but effective air-conditioning system that sucks a draft over a bed of moist charcoal. The two controlling ideas in the erection of Gourna are simplicity, which will enable the fellahin to build their own houses, and the use of local materials—chiefly sun-dried bricks made from mud and straw

THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE

The cultural self-image reflected in contemporary Egyptian art and thought is anything but a coherent one. Efforts to recall the grandeur of the Pharaonic past go side by side with attempts to establish Egypt at the head of a Moslem renaissance. And both of these currents are crossed by the artistic and intellectual tastes and ideals acquired in 150 years of contact with the West

Instability and change mark the environment of the Egyptian artist and thinker, and he must choose his materials and the principles for organizing them from a variety of different and often conflicting traditions. Like other Egyptians—if more self-consciously he tends to oscillate between the future and the past, between his own creative heritage and that of the West, between fear of extinction in the failure to advance and fear of extinction in the process of change.

Present-day Egyptian nationalism, with its idealization of an Islamic millennium and its readiness both to reject the West and to attempt to utilize western ideas and techniques, gives a superficial unity to Egyptian intellectual life. That unity is superficial because Egyptian nationalism is itself potentially divisive in the disagreements which exist about its proper ends and means. Should Egypt march back to the older Islam or forward to a new one? Should it be "Egyptian" as distinguished from 'Arab'

in an attempt to revive the glories of the ancient past? Is the intellectual life of the nation to be founded on a secular or religious principle? Since the West has offered, not a single set of ideals, but several sets, which of these should be retained or borrowed? These are problems for the artist and intellectual, no less than for the politician. Freedom to express choice in such matters is limited under the present regime, but the basic forces driving the Egyptian artist and intellectual to make a choice continue strong.

CHAPTER 23

RELIGION

Between 90 and 95 percent of the people of Egypt are Moslems. The religious minorities comprise the Coptic Christians (Catholic and Orthotic together numbering about 1,500,000), comparatively small numbers of latin Catholics and other Catholics in communion with Rome, members of various Donocox bodies, a few Protestants, and a Jewish colony which and recently numbered over 60,000 but has been much depleted as a result of recent political developments.

ISLAM

Itiam (the term means "submission" in Arabic) is the religion preached by the Prophet Mohammed, born in Mecca, Arabia, in 570 A.D. According to tradition, Mohammed received a call from God at about the age of 41, while he was engaged in solitary contemplation at the mountain of Hira. The calls continued, and Mohammed's preaching in Mecca against prevailing practices and beliefs earned the hostility of important personalities who forced him to flee to Medina with his closest followers. The fight (hira) in 622 marks the first year of the Moslem calendar. Having put fown the civil strife he found in Medina, Mohammed was able to repel the attacks of the Meccans and ultimately to bring the entire Arabian modernines index his control. Mecca became the holy city, and its principal induce, the Kaba (cube), a former pagan shrine with a black stone set in the east wall, became the central point of the annual Moslem pil-

In the theocratic order Mohammed, the Prophet, established, he became large, lawgiver, and social arbiter. He laid down the principles later incorporates in the Koran, the holy book of Islam, and the principles set form in the Sinna, the supplementary body of tradition of Islam.

After the seath of Mohammed in 632 the countries of the Near East russ most in rapid succession to Islamic conquerors, and as early as 640 me Aras commander Amr ibn-al-As began the invasion of Egypt, which

then had been a Christian country for several centuries. Six years later the Arab conquest was complete; little more than a generation later, Christianity in Egypt had been practically submerged by Islam. The Coptic Orthodox Church survived, however, and today has more than 1, 400,000 adherents

Since the Arab conquest the dominance of Islam in Egypt has never been threatened. There is no doubting the attachment of the great majority of Egyptians to Islam—an attachment in faith and observance which is probably more marked than that seen in any country with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia.

The Tenets of Islam

The fundamental article of faith of Islam is the testimony (shahada): "There is no God but God (Allah), and Mohammed is his Prophet." The recital of this phrase in full and unquestioning belief is all that is required for one to become Moslem. Other dogmas involve belief in a general resurrection, in the final judgment of all mankind, in the preordainment of every man's acts during life and of his ultimate fate. Four books of scriptural revelation are recognized: the Koran (disclosed to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel), the Pentateuch and the Psalms from the Old Testament, and the Christian Gospels.

The Koran, "the bountiful, the beneficial," sets forth all a man needs to attain salvation. The teachings of the four Gospels are accepted, but Moslems claim that the present texts are not as God revealed them. Other books interpreting the Koran but not regarded as divinely inspired are the Sunna and the Hadith—the traditions and sayings of Mohammed. There is a wide difference of opinion about the Sunna. Sunni Moslems—such as those of Egypt—accept the Sunna implicitly; the second largest Moslem group, the Shia, who live mainly in Iran and Iraq, reject the Sunna text as spurious and adhere to a tradition of their own.

Islam teaches that God has given to mankind a succession of revelations of divine truth through his prophets, and that each time the human race falls into error God sends new prophets to lead it back into the ways of truth. Altogether there have been over 200,000 prophets since the creation of man, but of these the great ones are considered to be Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and, the last and greatest, Mohammed.

The basic teachings of Islam (the "Five Pillars") closely parallel those of the Bible; insistences on the oneness of God, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, the spiritual value of pilgrimage are also features of both Christianity and Judaism. Many of the things prohibited by Islam—the

eating of carrion, blood, and swine flesh, the consumption of alcohol, engaging in adultery, gambling, and usury—are also prohibited or condemned in the Old or New Testaments.

Discipline

Prayer. Every Moslem is required to pray, in a prescribed manner, five times a day. The formalized prayer consists of a series of obeisances made first from a standing and then from a kneeling position; in the latter position the forehead must touch the ground. These movements are accompanied by the intonement of set prayers, some of which are brief Koranic texts. Men should, whenever possible, make their prayers in a mosque, though they are free to pray by themselves; women usually pray in the seclusion of the home. The early morning prayer is made as the first streaks of light appear in the sky before dawn; then follow prayers at noon, in midafternoon, at sundown, and finally when all is dark and quiet. Ablutions are required before prayer, and all prayer is offered facing the holy city of Mecca. On Fridays all males are expected to attend the mosque at noon to take part in communal prayer (the form of prayer advocated by the Prophet as being most beneficial) and to hear the Friday sermon. Friday is in no sense to be considered the equivalent of the Sabbath, however, since the Koran enjoins the faithful to return to their business after hearing the sermon. (Nevertheless, Friday has become a business holiday in Egypt as a result of western-derived social legislation. As a broken day, it was the obvious choice for a day of rest. Prior to 1952, Moslem-owned stores, if they closed at all, closed on Saturday or Sunday, the Jewish and Christian Sabbaths,)

Almsgiving. The Koran lays great insistence on the giving of alms (zakat). In early Islamic times almsgiving was morally obligatory, and zakat—one fortieth of a person's annual income—was customarily given either in money or in kind to "the poor, the needy, those employed in [the zakat's] collection, those who are to be conciliated, slaves and prisoners, debtors, and to mosques for the 'Way of God.' "Sadaqat, free-will offerings, are given principally to the poor, the needy, orphans, and travelers. Social conditions in Egypt are such that the prosperous man has no opportunity to forget his obligation of almsgiving; he is everywhere accosted by hordes of suppliants, many of them professional beggars, whose persistence is not to be denied.

Nowadays few, if any, Moslems pay the zakat as prescribed in the Koran. There is, however, a poor rate levied in three degrees according to ability to pay, the amount being determined yearly by a fatwa (decree)

of the <u>mufti</u> (religious leader and interpreter of the Koran) at the end of Ramadan. This charity, the <u>Sadaqat al Fitr</u> (Charity of Breaking the Fast), is distributed by the heads of families to the poor. The names of the recipients are not divulged.

Ramadan-the Fasting. The severest test of a Moslem's ability to carry out the dictates of his faith is met during Ramadan, the ninth month of the Moslem calendar. During this period all are required to fast from daybreak (reckoned as the moment a black thread may be distinguished from a white one) until the last ray of light has disappeared from the sky. The fast involves abstention from all food, drink, tobacco, as well as from all indulgence in worldly pleasure; exceptions are made in the case of the sick, the weak, soldiers on duty, and travelers. Ramadan is widely and vigorously kept in Egypt. Many sinners "cease to sin," drunkards and hashish smokers abstain, even many professional thieves curb their activities. Since the Moslem year consists of 12 lunar months and is shorter by 11 or 12 days than the astronomical year, Ramadan periodically falls during the midsummer heat, its observance then becoming a test of the utmost severity. The psychological effect of the fast is marked; as the month progresses the tempers of the people become shorter, personal violence and divorce statistics usually rise sharply, and riots are plentiful. The firing of a cannon at nightfall is the signal for all to repair home to break their fast. and, with hunger pangs increasing daily, it is not unusual for the evening meal to become a banquet which extends far into the night. Business in many instances comes almost to a standstill, household servants refuse to work. The tension is even harder to bear for the uneducated (who are likely to keep the fast more rigidly), and they tend to dramatize their sufferings to find favor before Allah. A somewhat more skeptical attitude toward full observance is to be found among the westernized elements of the population.

Children begin to observe the Ramadan fast around the age of 8. For their next few years they are obliged to fast until midday only; the later achievement of the first complete Ramadan fast makes an important milestone in a child's life.

Hajj—the Pilgrimage. The pilgrimage to Mecca is regarded as the ideal culmination of every Moslem's religious experience. The Koran refers to Mecca as the "Station of Abraham"; according to tradition the Kaba was erected by him. Adam is said to be buried in Mecca, and the tomb of Mohammed is even claimed by some to be there. The Kaba is not only the center of the earth, it is the center of the universe; it is the place where heaven and earth join, where God is met face to face.

The uncompromising insistence of the Koran on the true holiness of

Mecca has from the beginning made of the pilgrimage something which must be achieved at least once in a lifetime if humanly possible. Those who are too desperately poor to travel, however, are tacitly exempted, since authorities disapprove of a pilgrim's begging his way (although such begging is often done).

The departure for the pilgrimage is a great occasion in Egypt The ceremony of Mahmal, at which gifts of carpets and shrouds for the Kaba and for the tomb of Mohammed at Medina are presented and made ready for dispatch to Mecca, draws great crowds This ritual must be completed in order to give time for the presentation of the gifts at their destinations on the eighth day of Dhu al-Hijja, the last month of the Moslem year. Those who make the pilgrimage may assume the title of Hajji (pilgrim), which carries prestige in both religious and social circles.

Other Religious Observances Of the other feasts, Aid al-Kabir (the Great Feast) is the most prominent. Lasting four days, it commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, and it is marked by the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca Aid al-Saghir (the Lesser Feast), lasting three days, is also a time of high celebration and feasting marking the end of Ramadan, Mouled, the birthday of the Prophet, is a one-day commemoration, as is Ashura, the tenth day of Moharrem, the first month, on which the death of Hussein, the son of Ali, is remembered.

Jihad

In theory jihad (literally exertion) is a permanent struggle to make the word of God (the Koran) supreme. It is presented to Moslems as part of their collective duty to Allah—in a sense it is a sixth pillar of Islam. Mohammed himself recommended the feuding Arab tribes to compose their differences and divert their energies to the task of converting the world. The idea held by many non-Moslems that jihad is a "Holy War" is erroneous; the Koran makes it clear that Christians and Jews—"the people of the Book"—are not to be Islamized by force; the concept of jihad, however, has often been invoked by Moslem leaders wishing for political reasons to wage war on non-Moslem states. A recent example was the preaching of jihad by the Sheikh al-Azhar during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956,

ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS

The Moslem's relationship with his God is a personal and direct one, there is in Islam no communion of saints to intercede for sinners, there are no holy orders or sacramental institutions. Mohammed, the founder, was

born an ordinary man; the divine revelations did not change his nature. As Abu Bakr, Mohammed's successor, said: "Mohammed is dead."

The radical monotheism of Islam and the puritanism of its mood, combined with the aesthetic limitations of the Moslem's cultural heritage, left the believer with an arid, if physically exacting, liturgy. Islam either lacked or consciously rejected those elements that elsewhere made for the ceremonial sequences of the ecclesiastical year. In addition to being devoid of the high days and holy days which characterize Roman and Eastern Orthodox Christianity and are observed in varying degrees by Protestant sects, the religion of Mohammed has no institutionalized hierarchy. Theoretically, promotion from a lesser to a more important position lies on a demonstration of ability which attracts the favorable notice of the Ministry of Waqfs (Ministry For Religious Affairs) or the authorities of al-Azhar University. Actually, personal contacts, group pressure, and patronage play as important a role in religious promotions as they do in determining secular appointments.

Mosques are not in any sense hallowed or consecrated places; however ornate some mosques may be, they are all simply halls set aside for congregational prayer and for the delivery of the weekly sermon. The only appointed mosque officials are the <u>imams</u>, whose duty it is to lead in prayer and preach the sermon, and the muftis, interpreters of Islamic law who are attached to secular courts. The <u>muezzin</u>, who calls to prayer, is also appointed by the government, usually being chosen more for his fine voice than for his learning; he is frequently employed as a janitor of the mosque, sometimes living on the premises. In the smaller mosques the muezzin's duties may be performed by the imam. Since Islam provides for no formal ordination of imams, any reasonably qualified member of a group may act as prayer leader. In desert caravans, for example, it is still customary for any literate member—if there is one—to conduct prayer readings from the Koran.

The stipends for the imams and the muezzins are provided by the Ministry of Waqfs and vary considerably according to the size, location, and type of congregation of any particular mosque. The imam of Cairo's huge Mohammed Ali Mosque, which is attended by large numbers of important people, would receive a much higher stipend than the imam of a mosque in a smaller city or in the countryside. He would, moreover, need to be a highly distinguished graduate of the University of al-Azhar in Cairo—the oldest and most highly regarded of Moslem universities; the lesser imams, who live and work in unpretentious surroundings, are usually less well educated. Some in fact are only semiliterate and often receive such meager stipends that they are forced to make ends meet by doing

part-time manual labor, either as independent workers or employees.

If it is the duty of the imam to preach the Koran, it is the responsibility of the mufti to interpret. In the days before western civil and criminal legal systems replaced Islamic law in Egypt, the muftis, who handed down legal interpretations as derived from the Koran and Sunna, were persons of great importance. Litigants immediately sought a mufti known for his interpreting skill, and the controversies between certain learned muftis are famous. Many muftis became rich and influential. Today the adoption of secular law on the western model has reduced the influence of the mufti considerably, although the title is retained and the Grand Mufti of Egypt continues frequently to be called upon as an adapter of western law to Islamic tradition. Muftis are now paid by the government.

The leading Islamic dignitary in Egypt today is the sheikh (or rector) of al-Azhar University. In the absence of a hierarchy, this is an assumed rather than a defined pre-eminence, and would until comparatively recently have been challenged by the Grand Mufti. Theoretically, of course, no Moslem religious leader can be more than primus inter pares, and it is up to the individual to pursue his ambition independently, since there is no organization of which use could be made for this purpose.

In Egypt, as in Islam generally, birth is not an important factor in the success of a religious leader or the esteem in which he is held. The children of the wealthy classes rarely if ever seek their livelihood as imams or muftis. Either the candidates are drawn from families which have provided religious leaders for generations, or at the highest, they come from average middle-class families. Many begin as charity pupils in the religious schools.

ISLAM IN EGYPT

Egyptians are Moslems of the Sunnite rite, the largest of the Islamic groups. Generally referred to as orthodox Moslems—though the question of religious orthodoxy hardly enters into the questions dividing Moslems—the Sunni, in addition to insisting on the Sunna as the "true" tradition, acknowledge the first four caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali, (632-661), to be the rightful temporal successors of Mohammed (see Chapter 5, Legal and Theoretical Base of Government). The Shia, next in numbers to the Sunni, claim Ali, the Prophet's son—in—law, as his legal successor and discount the first three caliphs as well as the dynastic caliphs who followed Al. Other Islamic sects have varying attitudes towards the traditions, but Moslems everywhere are united in their unquestioning acceptance of the Koran as the revealed word of God.

The visitor to Egypt is immediately struck with the profusion of mosques and the large numbers of persons visiting them at all hours of the day. The hours of prayer, announced by the muezzin from the minaret, or now more frequently relayed by loud-speaker, are remarkable for the increased throngs of men and women who converge on the mosques.

The mosques are well attended throughout the week by men from all walks of life. Women of the poorer classes are also apt to visit the mosques every day, except on Fridays, but those of the wealthy and west-ernized groups are rarely seen there. Under the monarchy, Friday worship was an occasion for ostentatious professions of piety by the King and those surrounding him, and the tradition has been preserved by President Nasser. His presence at religious services in the course of his tours through the country has done much to rally the people behind the government. Realizing that the mass of the population has little understanding of Egyptian or Arab politics, Egypt's leaders are seeking support for government policy from the pulpit by appeals couched in the language of the Islamic faith.

A force working to strengthen the religious tradition is al-Azhar University, whose sheikh hands down rulings on interpretations of the faith and who is now virtually a government appointee. He therefore is not likely to be a man who would embarrass the secular authorities, who, respecting the strength of the Islamic tradition, are not disposed to interfere as long as the sheikh and his colleagues at al-Azhar continue to support national policy.

Folklore and Superstition

Formal religion and folk superstition continue to exist side by side, particularly in the countryside, and the fellah is apt to mingle the articles of his Moslem faith with a firm belief in the Evil Eye and the good or bad spirits called jinns. It is also commonly believed that prayers and the presentation of oil at the tombs of Moslem holy men (walis) will bring the granting of wishes. Protection from evil is provided by amulets, consisting of little scrolls on which a verse or two of the Koran has been written. The annual flooding of the Nile is still regarded with some awe, and there appear to be vestiges of a Nile worship which goes far back into Egyptian history.

Urban Patterns

In the towns religious patterns, like those of other aspects of life, are changing. Although many members of the upper classes continue to be

practicing Moslems, western scientific and secular influences are presenting problems which are increasingly difficult for Moslem orthodoxy to meet. In the absence of a radical reinterpretation of traditional thinking Islam has gradually given ground, and the adherence to the faith of large numbers of educated city dwellers is little more than nominal. It is among the lower-middle class and lower class of the cities that Islam maintains its strongest hold. Most of the superstition and folklore of the countryside, except for the use of amulets, have been discarded by these urban groups.

The Impact of Secularism

In the traditional Moslem world, religion, law, commerce, and social policies are held to be inseparable. The precept for every action can be found in scripture or tradition; therefore every deed is a "religious" one. To deny this is to deny Islam in its totality, and herein lies the crux of one of the greatest problems facing Egypt and the Middle East generally, for Islam, like all religions claiming to be divinely inspired, is threatened by the relentless penetration of the secularism of the modern age.

Moslem thinkers have reacted to the secular impact in a variety of ways. The first currents of secularism were felt in Egypt with the introduction of western innovations by Mohammed Ali (see Chapter 2, Historical Setting), but it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that ideas which had been maturing for years were coherently expressed. At that time the reformer Sheikh Mohammed Abdu advocated educational reforms designed to expand the curriculum of higher studies in Moslem countries and issued interpretations of the law which radically changed traditional attitudes towards banking and the acceptance and payment of interest. The gradual industrialization of the country and the necessity of orienting trade patterns to those of the western powers led to major changes in the economic life of the country. Secular civil law has now completely replaced the old religious code in Egypt with the exception of slight Islamic modifications in such matters as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The movement for the emancipation of Egyptian women is making much progress, particularly among the middle class. Members of the new generation of Egyptian women are beginning to take a larger place in public affairs as equals of the men, and their attitude towards Islam, like that of male intellectuals, is said to be tinged with skepticism. In addition, since Islamic custom had for centuries made second-class citizens of women and is still frequently invoked as a sanction for the preservation of the status quo ante, there is quite probably even hostility toward Islam among the leaders of Egyptian women's movements.

Another Egyptian reaction to the secularizing influence of the West has been the Moslem Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin). Founded in 1928 by the government schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna, who urged a return to Islam as preached by Mohammed, the Brotherhood grew rapidly. There were precedents for the organization in the long history of Moslem secret sects, and the religious coloring, the arcane ritualism, and the glorification of the Moslem past appealed strongly to many who were ready to translate discontent with the modern world into action. Whatever may have been the original purpose of its founder, the Brotherhood, reactionary and xenophobic in character, plunged deeper and deeper into political intrigue. Its originally religious goals, if not lost sight of, were de-emphasized in an extremist program of political action. The Brotherhood was finally banned as a subversive organization in January 1954.

The ulama (teachers, learned men), most of them nowadays graduates of al-Azhar, represent an influential but unorganized group, which at first gave considerable support to the Moslem Brotherhood. With the outlawing of the latter and the firmer establishment of the military regime, the ulama acquiesced to the government program and large numbers of them became active apologists for the government, not even opposing the secularization of education (see Chapter 21, Education).

As for the imams, since their stipends are provided by the Ministry of Waqfs (from the income from religious foundations), it is not surprising that many of them have allowed their pulpits to be used for political diatribes. The influence of the government may extend down as far as individual congregations—in that the mosques are maintained through grants by the Ministry of Waqfs and the withdrawal of this government support could have the effect of crippling a congregation.

Most important of all, perhaps, is that even before the 1952 coup the processes of government had become completely secularized. Finally, as a result of recent political developments a rapprochement between Islam and communism, until now unthinkable, may yet be contrived.

Three main intellectual positions characterize modernist thought in Egypt. One leading writer, Ahmed Amin, has stated that the reform of Islam will come about by separating science from religion and by practicing ijtihad—free interpretation. In this view Egypt must not merely imitate the foreigner but achieve a true understanding in terms of its own needs of the aims of western civilization. Another modernist group advocates that free interpretation be applied to all matters of doctrine and not, as the trend has been, to jurisprudence alone. A third position, of which the leading apologists are Sheikh Ali Abdel Razek and Mohammed Khalik, calls for the separation of religion from the state.

The growing cleavage between traditionalists and modernists has weakened Islam in Egypt and probably elsewhere in the Middle East, in spite of appearances to the contrary. High Egyptian government officials fulfill their religious observances, but for many the process appears to be more a matter of political convenience than religious conviction. Contradictions appear in the Friday sermons from week to week as the government line changes; government pressure on ulamas and imams has lessened their prestige. The deterioration of Islam as a system of ideas capable of competing with the secular ideologies of the present day is likely to accelerate unless the traditional dogmas are vitalized by rethinking and recasting them in terms of current problems and needs.

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Egypt's religious minorities number between 5 and 10 percent of the total population. By far the largest of these groups are the indigenous Copts, who number around 1,500,000. Other groups include Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant Christians, and Jews. Protestants are few in number though recently a fair number of converts have been made among the Copts.

The Copts

The Copts claim to be the descendants of the ancient Egyptians. Egypt was Christianized in the early days of the Church, but in the fifth century the greater part of the Copts seceded from the main body of the Eastern Church, to which they had been attached, on a doctrinal question which acquired more force because of national resentment of Byzantine rule and sympathy for the Patriarch of Alexandria in his struggle for supremacy in the Church.

Moslem rule in Egypt brought the conversion to Islam of large numbers of the native Christians, and even those whose loyalty to Christianity continued were influenced by the prevailing Moslem atmosphere and gradually adopted many of the externals of Islam The Coptic language, too, died out among the people as both a literary and a spoken language, al though it is still used side by side with Arabic in the Coptic liturgy

About 95 percent of the Copts are members of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Some 65,000 belong to the Coptic Catholic (Latin) Church. Numerically ascendant, the Coptic Orthodox Church is today in a serious state of decay. Its monastery-trained clergy show a general ineptitude in parish

and evangelical work. The ignorance of a large proportion of its priests is despised by the better-educated—and therefore more influential—Copts.

The Coptic Church has little political influence in Egypt. Poorly supported by its followers and spiritually stagnant, its disintegration, according to many accounts, is becoming a headlong process. Defections are numerous, both to other Christian bodies and to Islam, and many of the educated youth while nominally adhering to the Church are turning to agnosticism and atheism. Egyptian Moslems, more overt in their dislike of Jews and Europeans, actually respect these same groups more than they do the Copts, and this attitude is not improved by Coptic insistence that the Copts are the only true Egyptians. The Egyptian Government, while it does nothing to arrest the deterioration of the Coptic Church, maintains an attitude of easy tolerance toward it.

Other Christian Minorities

The Catholic and Eastern Orthodox religious minorities, other than the Copts, draw their considerable financial support from foreigners and persons of foreign origin living in Egypt. In 1947, these groups numbered about 275,000. The largest single group comprises Catholics of the Latin rite; members of the Greek Orthodox Church are only slightly fewer in number. Of the remaining groups, only the Greek Catholics, who employ the Syrian Melkite rite, number over 25,000.

The Christian minorities are almost exclusively urban groups, often very wealthy and extremely clannish. Irrespective of the Egyptian citizenship of some of their members, these groups as a whole are regarded as foreign, yet, despite the latent xenophobia of the area, most of the Christian minorities in Egypt have pursued their ways of life without suffering undue interference or persecution. In their turn, they have avoided involvement in Egyptian politics and any other conduct which might make them conspicuous.

The small success of Christian missions in winning converts among Moslems long ago dampened missionary enthusiasm in Egypt; if anything, the trend has been for Moslems to Islamize Christians. In the decadent Coptic Church, however, missionaries, particularly Evangelical Protestants, have had some success. The Coptic Catholic Church, established in the eighteenth century by European missionaries, is also drawing considerable numbers of converts from the Coptic Orthodox body.

The Jews of Egypt live mainly in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said and are divided into two communities—the Orthodox (Rabbinist) Jews and the Karaites—The latter accept the Scriptures but reject the Talmud (the body of Jewish civil and canonical law)—The two communities never intermarry and rarely mix socially in any way.

The Rabbinists include old Egyptian Jewish families as well as all the more recent arrivals from Europe. Among the latter are many eastern European Jews in whom such traces of Zionism as exist in Egypt are to be found. Culturally, like some other foreign communities, notably the Armenian, the Rabbinists are largely Gallicized.

The Karaites are all members of long established Egyptian families and are generally less prosperous than the Rabbinists. It is not unusual for the Karaites to be found as small merchants in the bazaars, wearing the customary galabiya and tarboosh and fitting completely into the general domestic trade pattern.

The depth of the devotion of Egyptian Jews to the beliefs and precepts of Judaism is difficult to gauge. Certainly liberalism has made great inroads on orthodoxy, and the religious devotion of many of the country's Jewish intellectuals is limited to the nominal observance of such days as Passover, New Year, and the Day of Atonement.

The Jew in Egypt has known little persecution in the past, but there is no doubt that his relatively superior economic position made him the object of jealousy and envy. The mass of the population is bitterly poor, but destitute Jews have been rare. Cultural factors also enter in. Islam forbade usury; the Jew was frequently a moneylender. Islam forbade indulgence in alcohol, the Jew was a drinker of wine. Despite anti-Jewish sentiments and occasional anti-Jewish outbreaks, however, the Jewish experience in Egypt has until recently been an agreeable one.

The position of the Jews in Egypt today is not clear. It is certain, however, that under the present regime no Jews will achieve the nation wide esteem in which the Harari and Cattawi families were held in the early part of this century. The outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 saw the departure from Egypt of the majority of overtly Zionist Egyptian Jews, some 25,000 going to Israel or Europe. A new exodus amid rumors of persecution followed the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in November 1956, and estimates of the Jewish population still in Egypt early in 1957 varied between 25,000 and 40,000.

CHAPTER 24

SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

In outlook and way of life a tremendous gulf lies between the more or less westernized upper levels of Egyptian society and the still largely tradition-bound majority. The fellahin (peasants) of the countryside might almost be living in another-and earlier-time than that of the educated urban Egyptian elite. Within the urban group wide differences in social patterns and beliefs set apart members of the professions, business executives, and absentee landlords from the depressed and largely illiterate city workers. Even this group, however, is better off economically, more accessible to modern communications media, and more receptive to change and innovation than are the fellahin. There is also a contrast between the mode of life in Cairo and Alexandria and that in the cities of Upper Egypt; the differences are reflected, for example, in the continuing social and economic restriction of women in Upper Egypt and their relative emancipation in Lower Egypt. Although currents of social change are flowing slowly toward Upper Egypt, Egyptians in this part of the country remain essentially more conservative in their outlook and customs than those of the delta, with their greater exposure to western influences.

Such differences in orientation dramatically reflect the western impact, but they also stem from a parochialism in social life and loyalties which is traditional in Egypt. The world of the peasant, for instance, revolves around his family, clan, and village. If asked for his identity he is likely to describe himself as a member of a certain village first, as a Moslem or Christian second, and as an Egyptian last, if at all. The current effort of the government to inculcate national patriotic fervor among the fellahin confronts a formidable obstacle in this problem of highly localized loyalties and the related one of popular distrust of governmental authority. Only farther up the economic scale, and generally in the urban setting, is there any developed consciousness of belonging to a larger society or any articulated sense of Egyptian nationalism.

Rural and urban differences are reflected not only in social outlook and ways of getting a living but also in recreation patterns. Rural

recreation is centered on family activities and religious ceremonies. Except for brief respites in the local coffeehouse, only such family events as religious feasts, weddings, and circumcisions break the monotony of the fellah's long hours in the fields. In the towns, on the other hand, new mass-produced media of entertainment modeled on western prototypes have gradually replaced traditional family-centered activities. Urban recreation revolves around coffeehouses, clubs, societies, and films. Hospitality, however, remains one of the traditional values shared by both groups; rich or poor, villagers or city dwellers, Egyptians place much emphasis on hospitality regardless of the expense or even sacrifice it may entail.

TRADITIONAL VALUES

Man and the Universe

Traditionally the Islamic explanation of man's place in the universe served as a basic unifying force in Egyptian life. Except for the relatively small non-Moslem minorities, the Egyptian people shared a common set of Islamic religious values. The Koran and the Hadith (sayings of Mohammed), together with their interpretation by religious leaders, were an elaborate guide for life that in terms of value transcended the mosaic of local and family exclusiveness. Even survivals of pre-Islamic practices among the fellahin underwent a process of unconscious reinterpretation and came to be regarded as native to the Islamic tradition. Islam sees man as inherently good, but weak and subject to the temptations of Satan. A major function of Islamic society was to protect its members against their frailty, teaching and disciplining them to subject themselves to the will of God.

In traditional Islamic society, social life was so minutely regulated by religious precepts that social values were largely indistinguishable from religious values. Moreover, strict observance of religious obligations early became a means for the attainment of social prestige as well as a religious duty. Similarly, the nomadic Arab virtues of generosity and courage acquired sanction in the Koran. An important consequence of this regulation of virtually all aspects of life in accordance with Islamic religious values was the tendency for Egyptians, like other Moslems, to adjust to and accept life, rather than to attempt to manipulate it or experiment with it. During the centuries preceding contact with the modern West, Islamic emphasis on resignation to the will of Allah contributed in Egypt to a lack of incentive for experimentation or original thinking. Philosophical speculation was largely restricted to interpretation of the word of God as revealed

in the Koran and the sayings of the Prophet. Traditional education was largely confined to the memorization and recitation of Koranic verses. Truth had been revealed for all time, and man's function was to serve it, not to question it.

The commonly quoted Koranic phrases "it is written" and "it was willed by Allah" symbolize traditional Egyptian attitudes toward the value of human endeavor. Man exercised no ultimate control over events in a world in which all things were ordained by God. Success was the manifestation of God's benevolence; failure was simply God's withholding of benevolence.

Man and Man

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of personal relationships in Egypt. The individual tends to be identified and rated not so much in terms of a notion of his own qualities and attainments as in terms of his place in a network of personal and kin relations. A man is important if he has powerful relatives and friends, and his relationship with them is one of mutual obligation. This pattern, with its emphasis, in matters of human preferment, on whom rather than on what one knows, places a premium on personal acquaintance and personal interaction between individuals. The essentially impersonal patterns which in the West are regarded as appropriate in business and government affairs find little response in the Egyptian, whose tradition tells him that security and success are to be obtained only through personal relations and the claims of personal acquaintance.

This preference for highly personalized relationships is nowhere more evident than in the bargaining process. Bargaining is the traditional and, despite the appearance of the western-style prix fixe store in the cities, the dominant way in which goods are bought and sold in Egypt. And what is more, the Egyptian has learned to apply the bargaining pattern to a wide variety of noneconomic situations. He finds it "natural" to bargain in almost any situation calling for agreement between two parties, and he also finds security and aesthetic satisfaction in the give and take of the bargaining process. It provides the opportunity for the parties concerned to demonstrate their virtuosity and to exchange gossip and opinions as well as to arrange a transaction. To refuse to bargain in the numerous situations in which it is normal to do so is regarded as a discourtesy.

The emphasis placed on the personal relationship is also reflected in the tendency to rely on oral rather than written agreements. Written agreements are employed, but there is a finality about them which is

distasteful to the Egyptian. Furthermore, insistence on a written contract is regarded not only as implying distrust of the individual's word, but as potentially prejudicial to the kind of personal adjustments to which most agreements in the Middle East are subject.

Man and Society

The primary role of the Egyptian family in the lives of its members, not only in their childhood but throughout life, puts it at the center of some of the most deeply felt Egyptian values and loyalties. The type of occupation to which a man may aspire, his standing in the community, and his range of choice in selecting a wife are all determined by the relative wealth, power, and prestige of the family. The individual in dealing with other groups finds his only firm security in loyalty to his family, and the attachment is a factor in the many crimes arising from the blood feuds that mark Egyptian village life: family honor must be safeguarded, even at the risk of life. Strong family loyalties also enable the Egyptian to adhere to separate standards of conduct and morality in dealing with relatives and outsiders. Within the family certain norms of obedience and industry are required; outside the family different standards of behavior and honesty may prevail.

Social Prestige. In Egypt wealth has always been one of the principal avenues to privileged social status and a sign of divine favor. Historically, wealth has been measured in terms of land, and ownership of agricultural land is still a prized goal for the city dweller as well as for the peasant. The possessor of wealth, as one who had received the blessing of God, was once and to a degree still is expected to display and use it in a manner designed to glorify God by benefiting others. Thus, in addition to luxurious living, socially sanctioned expenditures took the form of almsgiving and hospitality. One of the severest criticisms a tenant can level against his landlord today is lack of generosity, which is considered an offense against both God and one's fellow man. Even the poorest fellah strives to provide for his guests.

The traditional prestige attached to learning was enhanced by the fact that the learned man, as a person trained in Islamic theology, often functioned as religious leader, teacher, or judge. Religious knowledge, coupled with a mastery of classical Arabic, was looked upon as the highest achievement of learning, and the ability to quote Koranic verses, to trace the prophetic traditions, and to marshal religious proverbs in argument were the marks of higher education. Many fellahin families, despite their poverty and the need for help in the fields, managed to send their children

to village schools long enough to memorize something of the Koran.

Although governmental authority has long been feared and distrusted by the bulk of the Egyptian population, official position carries high prestige, and a government appointment remains the goal of secondary and higher education for most Egyptians. Those in positions of authority are expected to make a forceful display of their power, and it is generally taken for granted that they will use it for their own advantage. Egyptians are conditioned to expect authority to be exercised in an autocratic and arbitrary way, whether it be the power of the head of the family, the power of the landlord, or that of the government.

WESTERNIZATION

Western thought and technology have affected different segments of the Egyptian population in different degrees and ways. The strongest impact has been felt in the cities, and the sharpest and most vocal reactions have been those of the educated urban groups. Some Egyptians—religious leaders in particular—persist in a fundamental opposition to western values and institutions while advocating the adoption of western technology and educational methods as a means of developing the strength to resist the West. Others of a more "modernist" bent tend to espouse much of western, especially secular, thinking and to welcome western ideas as an aid both in revitalizing traditional Islamic values and in strengthening the modern Egyptian states. Still others reject both western values and technology as inimical to Islam and to Egyptian nationalism.

Whatever their conscious acceptance or rejection of westernization, urban Egyptians have been subjected to numerous western educational and other influences since the nineteenth century. This experience, whether through contact with foreign minority groups, travel or study abroad, or western-style education, has brought much imitation of the West; it has by no means always produced friendship with and understanding of the West. Those who have been quickest to adopt the outward trappings of western culture and to identify themselves with the West—often as a means of enhancing their social prestige—have frequently harbored feelings of inferiority and envy in the face of western power and achievements. The ambivalence and hostility arising out of this has been intensified by the surge of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the recent past.

Exposure to the West has not necessarily produced any real comprehension of western thought processes and values. This is especially evident in the type of Egyptian who has had schooling abroad or a western-modeled education at home. Despite western curricula, teaching methods,

and texts, Middle Eastern patterns of behavior persist—in particular, the practice of rote learning with its repressive effect on initiative and original thinking, and the tendency for eloquence and diction to take precedence over substance. Moreover, the western notion of academic honesty is apt to have little relevance for the Egyptian student, whose tradition tells him that cheating is clever rather than morally reprehensible.

Westernization in the towns has affected business, industry, the professions, and general patterns of life in matters ranging from recreation to dress. For the majority of city dwellers, however, western contact has brought a flood of ideas which have competed with and brought into question the traditional values—a process that has contributed to widening the gulf between the Egyptian elite and the masses.

The strongest resistance to western influence resides in the conservatism of Moslem leadership, centered at al-Azhar University, and in the durable habits and beliefs of the countryside. Both of these strongholds are slowly being worn down. The Moslem religious leaders, the ulama (learned men), in their opposition to western secularism have embraced the essentially secular spirit of the nationalism of Egypt's military government. Religion is called to the support of the program of the government, but government policy in its focus on secular leadership and goals is not calculated to strengthen the foundations of religion. In the countryside traditional patterns persist, but these too are being affected, however slowly, by the forces of change. The old isolation of the village becomes less complete as the fellahin develop new wants under the multiple influences of a cash economy and production for the world market. Increasing numbers of peasants are drawn to the towns, where a whole new set of forces come to bear on them. Little is known about the precise nature of the changes which are being wrought in the urban setting, but in both town and country the traditional controls and loyalties of kin group and locality are competing with the more extensive ones of a nascent modern political and economic order.

GLOSSARY

Meaning	call to prayer	feast	the Great Feast	the Lesser Feast	meal at home at dusk	the tenth of the month of Moharrem (from ashara: ten)
Arabic Transliteration	âdhān	cid	^c id al-kabir	cid as-ṣaghīr	Cashā'	cāshūrā"
Form Used	adhan	aid	Aid al-Kabir	Aid al-Saghir	asha	Ashura

bribe, gratuity

bakhshish

bettai (Egyptian)

bakhsheesh

maize bread

Meaning	reservoir	the house of war (non-Moslems)	the house of the Moslems	tax	council	the Special Council	blood money	hoe	opening chapter of the Koran	advice (or religious interpreta-	tion or decree given by mufti)	peasant	peasants
Arabic Transliteration	birkah	där al-ḥārb	dār al-islām	daribah	dīwān	ad-dīwān al-khuṣuṣiy	dīyah	fa's	al-fātiḥah	fatwa		fallāņ	fallāhin
Form Used	birka	dar al-harb	dar a1-islam	dariba	diwan	al-diwan al-khususi	diyah	ías	al-Fatiha	fatwa		fellah	fellahin (fellaheen)

Meaning	first meal at sunrise	tunic	buffalo	meal about 10 a, m, in fields	guard, watchman	saying of the Prophet (lit: saying)	the Pilgrimage	pilgrim (to Mecca)	commandant of police	quarter (of a city)	amulet
Arabic Transliteration	fitr	ja11ā bīyah	jāmūs	ghadā,	ghafīr	hadith	hajj	hajjîÿ	hākimdār	ḥārah	hijāb
Form Used	fitr	galabiya (Egyptian)	garnus (Egyptian)	ghada	ghafir	Hadith	Hajj	hajji (Egypt only) (haggi)	hakimdar	harah	hijab

Form Used	Arabic Transliteration	Meaning
hijra (hegira)	hijrah	flight of Mohammed to Medina (lit: migration)
himat a1-hima	himāt al-ņimá	protectors of the homeland
hukkam	hukkām	rulers, regional governors, judges
ijtihad	ijtihād	free interpretation (religious term)
ikhwan	ikhwān	brothers
imam	imām	prayer leader; guardian of the mosque (originally leader)
al-jamiyyah al-tashriyyah	al-jam ^C iyah at-tashri ^C iyah	the Legislative Assembly
al-jamiyyah al-umumiyah	al-jam [©] iyah al- [©] umūmiyah	the General Assembly
jihad	jihād	war, struggle, (sometimes: Holy War) (lit: exertion)
jinn	jinn	spirit

Meaning	the black stone at Mecca (lit: cube)	Caliph (lit: successor)	hot wind from the south	whip	village religious school	general (or banner)	school	the holy carpet	council, meeting	Advisory Council	the Legislative Council
Arabic Transliteration	ka ^C bah	khalifah	khamsin	kurbāj	kuttāb	liwā,	madrasah	maḥmal	majlis	majlis al-mashwarah	majlis shūrá al-aawānin
Form Used	Kaba (Kaaba)	khalifa	khamsin	kurbash (Turkish)	kuttab	liwa	madrasa	mahmal	majlis	majlis al-mashwarah	majlis shura al-qawanin

Meaning	official; (Egypt: district officer)	rhymed prose	district; center; (Egypt: provincial center)	rhythm pattern	barber-surgeon	first month of the Moslem year	birth	birthday of the Prophet	<pre>director; (Egypt: provincial governor)</pre>	province (in Egypt)
Arabic Transliteration	ma 'mūr	maqāmah	markaz	masmūdi	muzayyin	muharram	mawlid	mawlid an -nabiy	mudīr	mudīrīyah
Form Used	mamur	maqama	markaz	masmoudi	mizayen (Egyptian)	Moharrem	mouled	Mouled al-Nabi	mudir	mudiria

Meaning	caller to prayer	religious leader: inter- preter of the Koran	chief official in a gov- ernorate	taxes	autumn season	2 piasters	judge	1 piaster	part (sector) (sometimes: police precinct)	one-string violin	ninth month of the Moslem year
Arabic Transliteration	mu'adhdhin	mufti	muhāfiz	muqabalah	nfliy	nisffrank	qādī	qirsh şagh	qism	rabāb	ramadān
Form Used	muezzin	mufti	muhafiz	muqabala	nili	nussfrank	qadi	qirsh sagh	qism	rabab	Ramadan

Arabic Transliteration Meaning	free-will offering	tr the Charity of Breaking the F	the republican salute	banner; flag	water wheel	lord or master	summer season	cranelike device for lifting w	testimony	law (sometimes Islamic Law)	winter season	Oranary
Form Used	sadaqat	Sadaqat al-Fitt sadaqat al-fitt	al-salam al-jumhuri al-jumhūrīy	sanjaq (Turkish) sanjaq	saquia	al-Sayyid as-sayyid	seifi	shadoof	shahada	sharia	shitwi	shoona

Fast

Meaning	leader, teacher	body of Islamic tradition (as distinct from Koran)	liberation	student	dollar	fez (headgear)	one-half piaster	learned men	mayor of a village (Egypt only)	the people (of the	water course
Arabic Transliteration	shaykh	sunnah	tahrir	tālib	tallarī	tarbūsh	ta ^C rífah	Culamā'	Cumdah	ummah	wadi
Form Used	sheikh	Sunna	tahrir	ta1ib	tallari	tarboosh	tarifa	ulama (ulema)	umdah (omdah)	ummah	wadi

Meaning	delegation (political party)	holy man	foundation	nation	alms and almsgiving
Arabic Transliteration	wafd	walīy	waqf	watan	zakāt
Form Used	wafd	wali	waqf	watan	zakat

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THE HUMAN RELATIONS AREA FILES

The Human Relations Area Files contain carefully selected source materials, analyzed and categorized according to An Outline of Cultural Materials. Their use is explained in A Guide to the Use of the Files, to be found at each File. The Files are located at:

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State University of Iowa University of Washington

University of Michigan Yale University

AN OUTLINE OF CULTURAL MATERIALS (OCM)

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The following table of contents serves an an index to the sequence of categories, about seven hundred in number, by which the data on man, his behavior, and his environment are systematically filed.

There are separate files for each distinctive culture or subculture and likewise for each major historical period in the case of societies with records extending over periods of substantial cultural change. The files of each participating institution are housed in filing cabinets accommodating paper slips of the dimensions 5" x 8".

Sources selected for processing are annotated according to the numbered categories of the OCM. Annotation divides the material into logical blocks averaging perhaps a paragraph in length. Such blocks normally contain information pertinent to several categories of the OCM.

Each page of a source is reproduced for filing as many times as there are different categories for which it has been annotated. Thus the files contain, not abstracts, but the literal content of each source processed. In addition, for each file, one copy of every page is placed in Category 116 (Texts). This brings together, in regular page order, the complete text of all sources analyzed. Foreign-language sources are reproduced both in the original and in translation.

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
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